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ABSTRACT
The following study investigates how Catholics in the southwestern German state 
of Baden reacted to German unification in 1871. Although Baden had a Catholic 
majority, during the Second Empire the state was governed by Protestant liberals, who 
often discriminated against the state’s Catholics. To understand how Badenese Catholics 
participated in the nation-building project from 1871 to 1914, this work analyzes Catholic 
reactions to the commemorative discourse that surrounded unification. This discourse 
was often tinged with anti-Catholic sentiments that alleged that Catholics had been 
opposed to the unification and that they harbored stronger loyalties to the Pope in Rome 
than they did to the German Emperor in Berlin. Despite being politically and 
economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics successfully contested this ideological 
message and instead created an alternative discourse that better represented their own 
version of Germanness. My analysis illustrates that these Catholics subscribed to a multi­
faceted version o f German identity. Instead o f being subsumed into a Protestant- 
dominated national identity, they were able to maintain certain pre-1871 elements o f their 
identity, which included loyalties to the Pope, Baden, their fellow Germans in Catholic 
Austria, as w ell as Em peror W ilhelm  I.
This study also displays how central confessional elements were to the 
construction of German national identity during the Second Empire. Religious affiliation
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to a large extent determined how Germans lived their lives, and confessional loyalties 
became one of the key components in the new German national identity. Moreover, this 
work also demonstrates that Catholic and Protestant integration into the new German 
nation-state should be viewed as an ongoing debate about what constituted German. 
Although during the last two decades before the First World War, Catholics and 
Protestants did not clash as frequently over the definition o f Germanness as they had 
during the first two decades of the Kaiserreich, they never completely agreed on the 
exact nature of their national identity. Thus, despite facing numerous political, 
economic, and social obstacles, Badenese Catholics were able to manifest successfully 
their own version of German identity throughout the Second German Empire.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: SOUTH GERMAN CATHOLICS AND THE 
FORMATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, 1871-1914
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
BY
PONTUS ANDERS HIORT 
© 2007 Pontus Anders Hiort
D EK A LB, ILLINOIS 
MAY 2007
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3272153
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
®
UMI
UMI Microform 3272153 
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Certification: In accordance with departmental and Graduate 
School policies, this dissertation is accepted in 
partial fulfillment of degree requirements.
"Y iocprtatinn TYirpr'tnr f
Date
^OSSSsssar
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first and foremost like to thank Prof. Nancy Wingfield-Dosanjh for her 
endless patience, guidance, and assistance during the preparation and completion of this 
project. Without her unwavering support o f my academic career, this dissertation would 
never have been completed. I am also grateful to Professors Elaine Spencer and Heide 
Fehrenbach for the many hours that they spent analyzing and critiquing my work. Prof. 
Rebecca Houze also served as a member o f my dissertation committee and added 
valuable insights to this dissertation.
The staff at various archives in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg provided 
much guidance and useful information during my stays in Germany. Ingeborg, Joachim, 
Christian, and Sissy Bachle have become my extended family, and without their 
hospitality and friendliness, this study could never have been finished. Frank Dun- 
introduced me to the state o f Baden, and for that and his friendship I will always be 
grateful. Peter Oroszpataki and Steven Rodecap have both assisted me in this study more 
than they will ever realize. My wife Gretchen has provided my life with new and 
additional meaning, and her unconditional support and ability to show me what is truly 
im portant in life constitutes a debt that I can never properly  repay. Last, I w ill forever be 
indebted to my parents for teaching me the value o f hard work, to believe in myself, and 
for always supporting what I do. This work is dedicated to them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIG U RES............................................................................................................  v
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................  1
2. SETTING THE STAGE: THE CREATION OF A “LIBERALES
MUSTERLAND” ...................................................................................................  28
3. CELEBRATING UNIFICATION ON THE FRINGES OF THE EMPIRE:
KONSTANZER CATHOLICS AND THE COMMEMORATION OF 
UNIFICATION.....................................................................................................  69
4. NATIONALIZING THE ARCHDIOCESE? FREIBURGER
CATHOLICS IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTUNIFICATION
PER IO D .................................................................................................................. 144
5. A DIFFERENT CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE? HEIDELBERGER
CATHOLICS COMMEMORATE UNIFICATION.....................................  218
6. CREATING ANOTHER KIND OF GERMAN: CATHOLIC
OPPOSITION TO SEDAN D A Y .....................................................................  253
7. REACHING AN UNEASY CONSENSUS: CATHOLIC VIEWS
OF THE UNIFICATION DURING THE LAST TWO
DECADES PRIOR TO THE GREAT W A R ...................................................  331
8. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 411
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................  427
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. The Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg................................................................................. 192
2. Emperor Wilhelm I Monument in Heidelberg........................................................ 405
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Although many German Catholics and Protestants went to war in both 1870 
and 1914 filled with nationalist sentiments, they did not concur on the nature o f the 
German nation at either time. Indeed, though they lived side by side in the Second 
German Empire, they were never able to come to a consensus on what it meant to be 
German. Analysis o f their differing perceptions o f national identity highlights the 
multifaceted nature o f the German nation in which Catholic and Protestant versions of 
Germanness coexisted, sometimes very uneasily. By the 1890s, Catholics and 
Protestants had reached a contentious agreement on what German could constitute, but 
this did not mean that either group had been able to convince the other o f the exact 
nature of national identity. Rather, what emerges here is a complex construction of 
national identity in which Protestants and Catholics interacted with each other to 
determine the nature/s of Germanness.
In this work, I analyze how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorations of 
the wars o f unification to provide insights into how Catholics shaped national identity 
during the Second Em pire. A lthough confessional sentim ents played an im portant 
role in determining the personal experience of Germans during the Kaiserreich, 
historians long neglected to consider religion one o f the important societal forces in 
the nineteenth century. Until the mid-1980s, most scholars viewed the history of
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2nineteenth-century Germany as one o f linear secularization, in which religion played 
an increasingly minor role in society.1 During the early and middle parts o f that 
decade, the publications of Jonathan Sperber, David Blackboum, Thomas Nipperdey 
and others signaled a shift in how scholars viewed religious life in Germany. Their 
research confirmed that while secularization o f society occurred, religion and 
confessional sentiments constituted a major part o f everyday life for Germans during 
the nineteenth century.2 As they revised the standard interpretation of the “long” 
nineteenth century as one of slow decline in religious influence, historians recognized 
how important confessional sentiments were to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews as 
they negotiated their existence in an increasingly modernizing and urbanizing nation­
1 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1973) best represents this view. Exceptions include Christel Kohle-Hezinger, Evangelisch-katholisch: 
Untersuchungen zu konfessionellem Vorurteil und Konflikt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert vornehmlich 
am Beispiel Wilrttembergs (Tubingen: Guide, 1976); Rudolf Lill, “Kirche und Revolution: Zu den 
Anfangen der katholischen Bewegung im Jahrzehnt vor 1848,” Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 18 (1978): 
565-575; and Wolfgang Schieder, “Kirche und Revolution: Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Trier 
Wallfahrt von 1844,” Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 14 (1974): 419-454.
2 Work highlighting the Catholic experience includes: Margaret Lavinia Anderson: Windthorst: A 
Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); idem, Practicing Democracy: Elections 
and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David 
Blackboum, Class, Religion, and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in 
Wurttemberg before 1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); idem, Marpingen: Apparitions 
o f  the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany (New York: Knopf, 1994); Olaf Blaschke and 
Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, eds., Religion im Kaiserreich: Milieus—Mentalitaten—Krisen (Giitersloh: 
Kaiser, 1996); Wemer K. Blessing, Staat und Kirche in der Gesellschaft: Instutionelle Autoritat und 
mentaler Wandel in Bayern wdhrend des 19. Jahrhunderts (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1982); Wilfried Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich: Der Politische Katholizismus in der Krise des 
Wilhelminischen Deutschlands (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1984); Thomas Nipperdey, Religion im 
Umbruch:Deutschland 1870-1918 (Miinchen: Beck, 1988); Anton Rauscher, ed., Katholizismus, 
Bildung und Wissenschaft in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1987); 
Ronald J. Ross, The Failure o f  Bismarck’s Kulturkampf: Catholicism and State Power in Imperial 
Germany, 1871-1887 (Washington: Catholic University o f America Press, 1998); Wolfgang Schieder, 
ed., Volksreligiositat in der modernen Sozialgeschichte (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); 
Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870- 
1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Jonathan Sperber, Popular Catholicism in 
Nineteenth Century Germany {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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3state. Despite ongoing secularization, confessional identities still played a large role 
in determining how citizens lived their lives. Religious affiliation affected where 
Germans lived, shopped, attended school, what they read, whom they married, and 
whom they considered their friends.
Scholars like Helmut Walser Smith, Margaret Anderson, and Wolfgang 
Altgeld now agree that religion was not a by-product o f other forces in society, but 
rather a force that shaped cultural, political, and social actions. The study of German 
nationalism has been no exception to this trend, though the central role o f confessional 
elements in national identity is still underappreciated. With the exception of Smith’s 
path-breaking study, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, and recent studies 
by Kevin Cramer, Michael Gross and Roisin Healy, there has been little research on
• 3how confessional sentiments affected the construction o f German national identity. 
Historians traditionally asserted that Prussian and Protestant values strongly 
influenced this identity. The Prussian (Protestant) victories over Catholic Austria and 
France in 1866 and 1870-1871 confirmed for many Germans that Protestantism should 
play the dominant role in the new nation-state. Consequently, earlier scholars often 
assumed that German national identity was largely Protestant, and thus relatively little 
research was conducted into the confessional nature of national identity or how 
Catholic sentiments affected the construction o f this identity. To be sure, Altgeld,
3 Kevin Cramer, “The Cult of Gustavus Adolphus: Protestant Identity and German Nationalism,” in 
Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany 1800-1914, eds. Chris Clark and Helmut Walser Smith 
(New York: Berg, 2001), 97-121; Michael Gross, The War Against Catholicism: Liberal Identity and 
the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth Century Germany (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan 
Press, 2004); Roisin Healy, The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany (Boston: Brill, 2003); and Smith, 
German Nationalism and Religious Conflict.
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4Horst Griinder, Rudolf Lill, George Winded and others have addressed various aspects 
o f Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state.4 However, none o f them analyzed in 
detail how Catholics shaped and influenced the construction of their own national 
identity. Instead, these scholars have focused on how Catholics sought to fit into the 
unified Empire, without really investigating how or to what extent Catholics helped 
form a new national identity. My work attempts to fill this scholarly void.
My analysis o f how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorative discourse 
surrounding the wars o f unification illuminates how these Catholics helped shape the 
construction of a German national identity. Building on Smith’s research, my work 
reinforces the assertion that confessional sentiments constituted an important element 
of national identity. When Badenese Catholics and Protestants debated the nature of 
their identity, they often employed confessional terms. Confessional sentiments are a 
key component of understanding the multifaceted nature of German nationalism. My 
research demonstrates that Catholics exercised a greater influence on the construction 
o f national identity than previously thought. I contend that these Catholics 
successfully challenged the Prussian-Protestant hegemony on the construction of 
identity, suggesting the need for reevaluating Catholic effectiveness at infusing 
national identity with their own version of Germanness.
4 Wolfgang Altgeld, Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum: Ober religids begrundete Gegensatze 
und nationalreligiose Ideen in der Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus (Mainz: Mathias- 
Griinewald Verlag, 1992); Horst Griinder, “Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich,” in 
Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800 ed. Albrechet Langer (Paderbom: Ferdinand 
Schoningh, 1985), 65-88; Rudolf Lill, “Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgrundung,” in 
Reichsgrundung 1870/71: Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen, eds. Ernst Duerlein and 
Theodor Schieder (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), 345-366; and George Windell, The Catholics and 
German Unity, 1866-1871 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954).
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Although scholars have long assumed that Germany was an incomplete nation­
state in 1871, it is only during the last decade that historians have begun to understand 
exactly how Germans negotiated local, regional, confessional, and social identities in 
the postunification period.5 Alon Confmo and Celia Applegate have demonstrated the 
importance of Heimat as a vehicle for understanding how Germans cemented a 
national identity, showing how veneration of Heimat enabled Germans to interpret and 
understand the “National.” Today, most historians subscribe to the notion that 
Germans in the Second Empire did not abandon their local and regional identities as 
Wurttembergers, Bavarians, or Badeners, but that they instead used these identities as 
means o f becoming German. Simply put, one was a German because one was a 
Badener. These sentiments were not exclusive but rather constituted central 
components o f German identity. Although Prussia certainly played a dominant role 
first in the unification process and subsequently in the Second Empire, this research 
rejects the notion that an overarching Prussian identity subsumed other Germans of the 
Empire. Instead, while they were indeed loyal to the new nation-state and its
5 See for example: Celia Applegate, A Nation o f  Provincials: The German Idea o f Heimat (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1990); John Breuilly, ed., The State o f  Germany. The Nationallidea in 
the Making, Unmaking, and Remaking o f  a Modern Nation state (London: Longman, 1992); Alon 
Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wiirttemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 
1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Abigail Green, Fatherlands: 
State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); James Retallack, ed., Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830- 
1933 (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000); and James J. Sheehan, “What is German 
History? Reflections on the Role o f the Nation in German History and Historiography,” Journal o f  
Modern History 53 (1981): 1-23.
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6Emperor, Germans maintained elements o f their local and regional identities as vital 
ingredients o f their new national identity.
Research on Heimat and other forms of local and regional identity permits a 
better understanding o f how Germans constructed their new national identity. What 
has largely been missing from this picture is analysis o f how confessional sentiments 
affected this process. Although Smith and others have enhanced our understanding of 
how important religion was to the construction o f national identity, much work 
remains to be done, especially concerning the Catholic experience o f the Second 
Empire. To be sure, there is a voluminous literature on different aspects o f Catholic 
life during the period. The works o f Blackboum, Sperber, Ronald Ross, and 
Wolfgang Schieder have ensured that Catholics are no longer perceived simply as 
passive and marginalized victims in the Empire.6 Despite these advances, however, 
we still do not fully understand how Catholics located their identities within the newly 
constructed Germany. Although Altgeld, Windell, Lill, and Griinder have enhanced 
our understanding of Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state, their work fails to 
take into account some o f the newer approaches, especially how central confessional 
aspects were to the creation o f national identity. While Griinder and Altgeld have 
hinted that Catholics maintained a different type o f identity than Protestants, they have 
not analyzed in detail exactly how Catholics constructed German identity nor how
6 See for example: Anderson, Windthorst: A Political Biography, Blackboum, Marpingen: 
Apparitions o f  the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany, and Ross, The Failure o f  Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf.
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7successful Catholics were at maintaining their own identities in the postunification 
period.
My analysis of public commemorations of German unification as a vehicle for 
understanding identity formation adds to a large body of existing research. Over the 
past two decades, scholars have addressed the importance of public commemorations 
to the construction o f identity, establishing that public ceremonies and
n
commemorative monuments were an important means o f helping construct identity. 
Because Protestants in Baden had most o f the provincial economic and political 
power, they controlled most of the construction of these monuments and the 
ceremonies connected with them. Prominent local Protestants who often rejected the 
Catholic interpretation o f their shared history comprised the majority o f members of 
committees that organized and planned these events and monuments. Especially 
during the first few years of the Empire, and particularly during the Kulturkampf most 
o f these ceremonies and monuments contained a strong anti-Catholic message.
7 On this process in Germany, see for instance: Reinhard Alings, Monument und Nation. Das Bild vom 
Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal-zum Verhaltnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996); Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, Dieter Diiding, Peter 
Friedemann, and Paul Munch, eds., Offentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der 
Aufklarung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Rheinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1988); Wolfgang Hardtwig, 
“Der bezweifelte Patriotismus-nationale BewuBtsein und Denkmal 1786 bis 1933,” Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht 44, (1993): 47-75; Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., Der 
Politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmaler in der Moderne (Munich: FinkVerlag, 1994); Rudy Koshar, 
From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts o f  German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000); Wilfrid Lipp, Natur, Geschichte, Denkmal: Zur Entstehung des 
Denkmalbewufitsein der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Campus, 1987); Ute Schneider, 
Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert: die Rheinprovinz von der franzosischen Zeit bis zum Ende 
des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806-1918) (Essen: Klartext, 1995); and Charlotte Tacke, Denkmal im sozialen 
Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995).
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8Reflecting their interpretation o f recent history, Badenese Protestants employed a 
commemorative discourse that labeled Catholics antinational and highlighted their 
alleged opposition to unification. However, rather than accepting the Protestant 
version o f national identity, Badenese Catholics challenged the ideological message 
inherent in this discourse. They created an alternative commemorative discourse that 
manifested their own version of national identity by boycotting commemorative 
events, by keeping their children home from school on days when events such as the 
Battle o f Sedan were commemorated, by employing the press to debate the merits of 
these celebrations, and by using Catholic religious holidays and symbolism to 
manifest their own view of the German nation.
Baden constitutes a useful case study because it was the only state in Imperial 
Germany with a Catholic majority governed by liberals and Protestants. I employ the 
term “liberal” in this work to signify citizens who voted for liberal political parties. In 
Baden, the National Liberal Party was the most dominant political force during the 
Second Empire. Although the Fresinnige Party came into existence in 1881, it failed 
to attract much support. Thus, the overwhelming majority o f liberals in Baden voted 
for the National Liberal Party. These Germans generally supported policies 
advocating economic development such as free trade and commerce, a decrease in the 
power o f the Catholic Church, an emphasis on interconfessional education, and an 
electoral franchise that privileged property owners at the expense of the working class. 
Although a minority in Baden, liberals controlled most of the political and economic 
power. The overwhelming majority o f them were Protestants, which meant that they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9were more often inclined to support a modernization o f society, particularly if  it meant 
a decrease in the power o f the Catholic Church. In the post-1871 period, most 
Badenese Protestants also subscribed to the notion that Protestantism had been a 
driving force in the process of unification, which placed them in direct conflict with 
the state’s Catholics. Moreover, the fact that the Protestant church was organized at 
state levels meant that they regularly criticized Catholic loyalties to Rome, which they 
considered anti-German. The less hierarchical formation of the Protestant church also 
meant that Badenese Protestants considered themselves more independent and 
“modem” citizens. They alleged that the centralized structure o f the Catholic Church 
mired the development o f a modem German society and prevented Catholics from 
realizing their cultural, economic, and political potential. The Protestant milieu in 
Baden was relatively homogeneous. The vast majority o f Protestants voted for the 
national-liberals and generally supported liberal attacks on the Catholic Church. 
Although Protestants in many other areas o f Germany sometimes divided over the 
extent and severity o f the Kulturkampf and other instances of anti-Catholic actions, in 
Baden, the Protestant camp remained quite unified in their anti-Catholic attitudes. To 
be sure, there were differences within the Protestant community, but they were minor
o t
compared to most other areas in Germany. In Baden, Protestants overwhelmingly 
supported the national-liberals, while only a small number voted conservative. The 
Protestant loyalty to the National Liberal Party constitutes one o f the main reasons
8 Frank Michael Kuhlmann, “Protestantisches Milieu in Baden: Konfessionelle Vergesellschaftung und 
Mentalitat im Umbmch zur Modeme,” in Religion im Kaiserreich, eds. Blaschke and Kuhlemann, 317- 
349.
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why the party controlled most of the political and economic power for the duration of 
the Second Empire, which frequently caused conflicts with the more conservative 
Catholic part o f the population.
Baden’s often fiercely anti-Catholic state government frequently issued 
discriminatory legislation aimed at excluding Catholics from the national community. 
My investigation into how Catholics negotiated these obstacles as they became 
German helps illuminate how Catholics throughout the Second Empire were able to 
maintain their traditional identities as part of the new national consciousness. I argue 
that Catholic integration into the Empire should not be viewed as a gradual 
acquiescence to a dominant Protestant and Prussian identity, but rather that Catholics 
instead were successful in maintaining large parts o f their pre-1871 identities. In the 
same way that historians have illustrated how Germans were able to maintain many 
different local and regional loyalties within their national identity, I contend that 
Badenese Catholics preserved numerous layered identities as they became members of 
the new nation-state. Rather than being subsumed into a new official national identity 
that was based solely on Protestant and Prussian values, these Badeners preserved 
class, local, regional, and religious loyalties while at the same time being devoted 
German subjects.
Baden constitutes an ideal study of how Catholics negotiated their national 
identity not only because it had a Catholic majority and was governed by a liberal and 
Protestant minority, but also because its location on the fringes o f the Empire enabled 
Badeners to maintain a large part o f their regional identities in unified Germany.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Badeners were keen to stress the important roles the state and its Grand Duke had 
played in the unification process. They used this commemorative discourse to help 
preserve their traditional identities while negotiating their new national identity. In 
addition, the provincial conflict between church and state during the 1860s provided a 
model for the national Kulturkampf and its attempt to create a national identity along 
confessional lines. The relationship between Catholics and Protestants was tense 
throughout much of the period of this study, which provides insights into how the 
confessional conflict affected the creation of national identity.
The Badenese confessional camps were not, however, monolithic. The 
Catholic community was not entirely cohesive, as evidenced during controversy 
surrounding the declaration o f papal infallibility in 1870. Although I devote some 
attention to the divisions within the Catholic Church, my investigation centers on the 
Catholic community composed of those who supported the doctrine o f infallibility in 
1870, which the Protestants generally labeled ultramontane. These Catholics 
identified closely with the Pope and the international structure o f the Catholic Church. 
They were often conservative, staunch supporters of the Center Party; especially 
during the first few decades o f the Kaiserreich, they were predominantly farmers, 
small artisans, and factory workers. They frequently attended church and were often 
quite influenced by local clergy and Catholic intellectuals in their economic, cultural, 
social, and political opinions. While the majority o f Baden was ultramontane, a 
sizeable number o f so-called liberal Catholics lived there as well. They were 
generally more successful politically and economically than the conservative Catholics
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and sometimes voted for the national-liberals. Although liberal Catholics exercised 
some local political influence, particularly during the first two decades o f the Second 
Empire, I focus on conservative Catholics, who constituted the majority o f the state’s 
citizens. It should also be noted that most o f my subjects were part o f the educated 
middle and upper classes. These Catholics, often local clergy and lay leaders, also 
exercised a degree o f influence on the opinions of lower class Catholics. Although I do 
not subscribe to the frequent Protestant accusations that Catholic clergy controlled the 
lives o f the members o f their congregations, it is clear that there was a certain degree 
o f homogeneity to the conservative Catholic milieu. However, the Catholic voices that 
emerge in this study belonged primarily to the educated upper and middle classes.
I have chosen Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg as case studies because they 
represent a cross section of Badenese society that enables an analysis o f different 
aspects o f Catholic life during the Second Empire. Both Konstanz and Freiburg are 
located in the southern part o f the state, a stronghold o f pro-Austrian sentiments in the 
period leading up to unification. Since the eleventh century, Konstanz had been one 
of the most powerful sites of the Catholic Church in Central Europe. Although Rome 
transferred much of this power to Freiburg, which became the site o f the new 
archdiocese in 1821, in the wake of the territorial reorganizations at the Congress of 
Vienna, the Catholic Church remained powerful in Konstanz. The creation o f the 
Freiburg Archdiocese transformed that city into a Catholic clerical stronghold. The 
church’s position in these two cities meant that the local, largely Protestant, urban 
elites struggled to wrestle power from the church as they strove to modernize the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cities. Hence, the relationship between Catholics and Protestants was often very tense, 
which affected the construction o f national identity. Konstanz and Freiburg shared 
characteristics that distinguished them from Heidelberg in northern Baden, which had 
a majority o f Protestants and had never been a Catholic stronghold. The relationship 
between Catholics and Protestants there tended to be more amicable, which provides a 
useful counterpoint to the conditions in the southern part of the state. Furthermore, 
there were more kleindeutsch supporters in Heidelberg than in the heavily 
grossdeutsch southern part o f the state. Although they were among the largest cities in 
the state, and therefore at the forefront o f political, cultural, and economic 
developments, their histories were different enough to provide for useful comparisons.
During the late nineteenth century, there was much interaction among the 
three cities. City councils in these three cities often discussed among themselves how 
to commemorate unification. Although the cities did not celebrate every occasion 
similarly, their communications still illustrate their cooperation in producing a 
Badenese commemorative discourse. Moreover, Catholics in these cities often 
conferred as they decided how to approach certain commemorations. Particularly with 
the development o f a Catholic press, the level of interaction between Catholics around 
the state increased and aided them in their attempts to create a stronger statewide 
Catholic community.
Although scholars have analyzed some aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century Badenese society, there still are gaps in the provincial historiography. In the 
late 1970s, Gert Zang’s edited volume addressed the Catholic-Protestant relationship,
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the actions and attitudes of liberal Catholics, and some of the roots o f anticlerical 
sentiments in Baden.9 Despite the fact that his and others’ work enhances our 
understanding o f the relationship between conservative and liberal Catholics as well as 
between Catholics and Protestants, none o f them have applied their theories to the 
study o f confessional interaction during the process o f national identity formation. 
Although Lothar Gall, Josef Becker, and Manfred Stadelhofer have published 
valuable, if  dated, studies on the Badenese Kulturkampf and the National Liberal Party 
in Baden, there is a need to apply new research tools to these topics.10 Oded 
Heilbronner’s work on liberalism and the Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden and Ulrich 
Baumann’s stimulating research on the relations between Christians and Jews during 
the late nineteenth and the first part o f the twentieth century represent such attempts.11 
Two other relatively recent works that incorporate newer methods o f analysis are 
Irmtraud Gotz von Olenhusen’s study of the deviant behavior o f Catholic priests in the
9 Gert Zang, ed., Provinzialisierung einer Region: regionale Unterentwicklung und liberale Politik in 
der Stadt und im Kreis Konstanz im 19. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1978).
10 Josef Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche in der Ara von Reichsgrundung und Kulturkampf (Mainz: 
Matthias-Griinewald Verlag, 1973); Lothar Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei. Das 
Grofiherzogtum Baden zwischen Restauration und Reichsgrundung (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
1968); idem, “Die Partei und Sozialgeschichtliche Problematik des badischen Kulturkampfes,” 
Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte Oberrheins 113 (1965): 151-196; and Manfred Stadelhofer, Der Abbau 
der Kulturkampfgesetzgebung im Grossherzogtum Baden 1878-1918 (Mainz: Matthias Griinewald 
Verlag, 1969). Becker’s view o f the Kulturkampf as a political tool that national liberals used to curtail 
the Catholic Church is a good example o f this slightly outdated treatment of this period.
11 Ulrich Baumann, “The Development and Destruction of a Social Institution: Flow Jews, Catholics 
and Protestants Lived Together in Rural Baden, 1862-1940,” in Clark and Smith, Protestants, Catholics 
and Jews, 297-315; Oded Heilbronner, “In Search of the Catholic (Rural) Bourgeoisie: The 
Peculiarities of the South German Burgertum,” Central European History 29 (1996): 175-201. 
Heilbronner., Catholicism, Political Culture, and the Countryside: A Social History o f  the Nazi Party 
in South Germany (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998) constitutes another useful 
study, but it is outside the immediate scope of my work.
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Freiburg Archdiocese and Winfried Haider’s work on Catholic associations in Baden 
and Wiirttemberg.12 Haider’s study o f Catholic associational life provides useful 
insights into the Catholic embrace of modernity as well as how associations helped 
create a stronger, more cohesive Catholic community. Olenhusen’s study challenges 
us to reevaluate our view o f the Catholic clergy, but it has relatively little relevance to 
the national identity of Catholics. Last, Dagmar Herzog’s fascinating study on the 
nature o f Badenese religious politics during the 1840s, despite its insights into the
relationship between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews and the split between liberal and
1 ^conservative Catholics, is outside the scope o f my work. None of these scholars has, 
however, looked specifically at the experiences o f Badenese Catholics as they 
negotiated a complex web of loyalties during the Second Empire. Much o f the 
historiography o f Baden during the Kaiserreich still needs revision. My work 
attempts to fill this lacuna.
I employ the concept of collective memory as an analytical tool to understand 
better the construction o f Catholic and Protestant identities during the Second 
Empire.14 Assessing how Catholics and Protestants formed different collective
12 Irmtraud Gotz von Olenhusen, Klerus und abweichendes Verhalten (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1994); Winfried Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wiirttemberg 1848-1914. Ein 
Beitrag zur Organisationsgeschichte des sudwestdeutschen Katholizismus im Rahmen der Entstehung 
der modernen Industriegesellschaft (Paderbom: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995).
13 Dagmar Herzog, Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996).
14 The literature on collective memory is vast. See for example: Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, 
eds., Work o f  Memory: New Directions in the Study o f  German Society and Culture (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); John Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics o f  National Identity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New
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memories o f the unification and how these memories interacted with and influenced 
each other will allow a deeper understanding o f the creation o f national identity. 
Because collective memory enables individuals to remember events in which they 
themselves did not take part, it aids them when constructing an identity. However, 
what emerges in the analysis o f Catholic attitudes towards the commemorations o f the 
unification is that Protestants and Catholics created different collective memories of 
these events. Moreover, collective memory can also be applied to understand how 
Badenese Catholics adapted to the new national identity. When they constructed an 
alternative commemorative discourse to the wars o f unification, they were also 
creating a collective memory that reflected their own identities. This collective 
memory, which differed from the Protestant one, enabled these Catholics to infuse the 
new national identity with many familiar elements, which made it easier to accept.
This discussion also suggests that Catholics were quite successful at creating 
and maintaining a collective memory of the unification that differed from the 
Protestant one. Pierre Nora was the first scholar to point out that collective memories 
function in different ways; place a memory in a different context, and it will assume a 
different shape.15 Because different groups create memories of events that reflect their 
social, cultural, political, and economic status, it is vital to consider the contexts in 
which these memories were constructed. Catholic memories were created in a
York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention o f  
Tradition (Cambridge: Verso, 1983); and Pierre Nora, ed., Realms o f Memory: The Construction o f  
the French Past, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, 3 volumes (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995-1997).
15 Nora, Realms o f  Memory, 28.
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different milieu than the Protestant ones, and therefore the two often contained 
different components. Consequently, for the most part o f the Second Empire, these 
collective memories and identities reflected different notions about what it meant to be 
German. This suggests that the German nation should be viewed as a contested 
discourse where these memories interacted with and influenced each other.
One of the key reasons why the Protestant and Catholic versions o f national 
identity were so different is their contrasting memories o f events o f the nineteenth 
century. Especially in Baden, which had for many years witnessed a fierce struggle 
between church and state, Protestants and Catholics nourished different memories of 
the last few decades prior to unification. Protestants based much of their new national 
identity on the notion that their faith was one o f the main reasons why Germany had 
been able to unify and was now ready to assume one of the most powerful positions in 
Europe. Thus, Protestant historical memories and identities enabled a positive outlook 
on both the past and the future. O f course, a large part of this identity was invented. It 
is now well accepted that “invention” plays a large part in the creation o f collective 
memories and identities.16 Until 1866, Badenese Protestants had opposed Prussian 
Minister Otto von Bismarck and Prussia’s policies almost as strongly as their Catholic 
counterparts. In the Austro-Prussian war o f 1866, Badenese Protestants sided with 
Austria, which they conveniently forgot in the postunification representations o f the 
past. On the other hand, Catholics nourished different memories. In part due to the 
fierce struggle between the church and state in Baden during the 1860s, Catholics had
16 The seminal work on this topic is Hobsbawn and Ranger, eds., The Invention o f Tradition.
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a very different and much more negative set of memories of the years leading up to the 
unification. The vast majority o f Catholics had long been strongly pro-Austrian, 
which complicated their acceptance of the new nation-state. Finally, the fact that 
Catholics now were in a minority increased their fears about the unified Empire.
Thus, it was difficult for Catholics and Protestants to use these experiences and 
memories o f the recent past to construct a cohesive national identity. Instead, the 
differing memories o f the decades leading up to unification ensured that the two 
confessions used the wars o f unification to construct and strengthen their own views of 
German national identity.
Throughout the Second Empire, these memories and identities coexisted and 
clashed with each other, sometimes resulting in their renegotiation. Hence, it is 
crucial to consider Catholic and Protestant identities in conjunction with each other. 
They did not exist in a vacuum but rather interacted with each other, which created a 
different set o f circumstances at different points throughout the Empire. Major events 
such as the Kulturkampf shifts in political power, the turn to colonialism, and an 
aggressive foreign policy all triggered a reevaluation o f collective memories and 
identities, reflecting the fluidity and instability o f their construction. Although 
towards the end o f the nineteenth century there were fewer public Catholic-Protestant 
disagreements about what constituted Germanness, this did not mean that they had 
reached a consensus on their national identity. Neither Protestants nor Catholics were 
able to convince the other of the correct view of the nation. Because o f this fact, it is 
to some extent misleading to speak about integration into the Empire. The term
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“integration” suggests that the different versions o f Germanness, whether Catholic or 
Protestant, somehow melted with the other one, which is to misunderstand this 
process. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had negotiated an agreement 
that, though they shared certain elements of their identity that made them all German, 
revealed there were still many differences between how a Protestant and a Catholic 
defined Germanness.
These sentiments also serve to reinforce some o f the latest research that has 
been conducted on the German life in the Second Empire. Following the lead of 
Smith, scholars have begun to view the interaction among different confessional 
groups as central to a clearer understanding o f how Germans shaped their identity. 
They have moved away from the traditional model o f analyzing confessional groups 
separately, with rewarding results as they have shown that the interaction between the 
different confessions significantly shaped the experience of the other.
My work builds on theirs, though I do not look specifically at the Protestant 
experience in Baden during the Kaiserreich. However, analysis o f how Catholics 
reacted to the Protestant-dominated official discourse that surrounded unification 
provides insight into how Catholics used the Protestant Other to shape their own 
identities. Indeed, one of the most important means for Catholics to manifest their 
own identities was the use o f a Protestant Other. After analyzing the Protestant 
version o f Germanness, Badenese Catholics most often presented themselves as the 
opposite o f everything Protestant. By labeling Protestants materialistic and accusing 
them of using nationalism to gain political and economic power, Catholics asserted
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their own better understanding o f patriotism. Commemorations frequently constituted 
opportunities for Catholics to employ the Protestant version o f nationalism to create 
their own. Naturally, these Catholics were not always fair in what they attributed to 
the Protestant version o f Germanness, but the content o f this interaction is not as 
important as the interaction itself. After all, Protestants employed similar tactics with 
their accusations o f how Catholics were ready to abandon Emperor Wilhelm for the 
Pope or how Jesuits were poisoning the German national character. The point here is 
not so much what was attributed to each confession but rather the interaction between 
the two.
Catholic distrust of the Second Empire was not solely due to conflicting 
memories o f unification. Catholics were less convinced about the absolute value of 
the nation-state than their Protestant counterparts. Large parts o f their identities were 
tied into concepts such as kinship, region, religion, and religious community, all of 
which predated the nation-state.17 Catholic loyalty to the Pope exemplifies these 
sentiments. Catholics insisted on maintaining strong loyalties to the Pope in the new 
nation-state, showing great concern for his well-being, especially in the tumultuous 
few years following his ousting from Rome in 1870. Although Protestants often used 
Catholic allegiances to the Pope as “p roof’ o f the Catholic anti-German feelings, they 
misinterpreted these sentiments. Protestants rejected the notion that Catholic loyalty 
to the Pope and loyalty to their nation-state were not exclusive emotions but rather 
complementary. Catholics believed it was indeed possible for them to be fiercely
17 Smith, Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 61.
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loyal to the Pope while at the same time having the same sentiments for Emperor 
Wilhelm. Although Protestants were intent on removing these loyalties from the 
national identity, my research demonstrates that they were unable to do so. Instead, 
Catholics maintained these loyalties as part o f their new national identity. This 
example o f the different composition of Catholic and Protestant identities helps 
explain why it was difficult for the two to agree on what constituted Germanness.
I view the German nation as a cultural construct. Although a national 
community is based on material-historical realities, the bonds among its members are
' 1 o
largely imagined, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out. Thus, to quote Smith, “a 
nation is primarily a matter of culture.”19 To be sure, culture does not exist in a 
vacuum, and political developments certainly affect cultural identities. However, 
cultural features o f a nation are in many instances more important for identity 
formation than political ones, which has important implications for how Germans 
created their identities. Although access to power is crucial in ensuring the 
construction o f a particular type o f national identity, the success o f politically 
disadvantaged groups such as Catholics to manifest their own sense o f identity should 
not be underestimated. Many scholars have assumed that because Protestants 
possessed most of the political and economic power in the Kaiserreich, they were able 
to impose their view of national identity on the Catholics. Closer examination of the 
process o f constructing identities, however, makes it evident that Badenese Catholics
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
19 Smith, Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 7.
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were successful in preserving and manifesting their identities despite political and 
economical disadvantages during the first two decades o f the Second Empire. They 
used various means, among them the press and associational organizations, to combat 
the Protestant version of recent history that was so important to the construction of 
identity. That so many o f these activities occurred in the cultural realm suggests that 
cultural activities were instrumental in the Catholic construction o f national identity.
Scholars have traditionally viewed nationalism primarily as a political force, 
which proclaimed that groups that share certain common bonds such as culture, 
language, history, and territory should have a right to govern themselves. Emphasis 
on cultural elements o f nationalism illustrates that it could at times be a divisive force 
rather than a unifying one. To be sure, most Catholics and Protestants in Baden 
accepted the creation of the new nation-state and were unfailingly loyal to Emperor 
Wilhelm I. Thus, in a purely political sense, they shared a limited kind o f German 
nationalism. Analysis on the cultural effects of German nationalism, however, 
produces a more variegated picture o f its effect on Germans. Because Catholics and 
Protestants viewed the composition o f their German nation differently, they employed 
nationalism differently. Especially during the first couple o f decades o f the 
Kaiserreich, Protestants and Catholics used nationalism to propagate their own view 
o f the nation, which often differed from their confessional counterpart. Their actions 
reflect the use o f nationalism by different societal groups to serve their own ends, 
which sometimes conflicted with others. What emerges from such an analysis is a 
multifaceted picture o f nationalism that helps explain how it sometimes unified while
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at other times divided the nation. Too often, German nationalism has been interpreted 
as a homogenizing force that made society more cohesive.20 In fact, it makes more 
sense to consider German nationalism a space o f conflict where Protestant and 
Catholic versions o f Germanness clashed and interacted with each other. The creation 
o f a German national identity was not smooth; instead, it was filled with different 
components where Catholics and Protestants tried to find space for their respective 
versions o f Germanness.
This insight also calls for a reevaluation of how nationalism worked at the 
local level. To be sure, nationalism in the Second Empire served as a unifying force, 
but perhaps not to the degree previously assumed. My research in Baden indicates 
that in many instances, nationalism preserved and sometimes even intensified already- 
existing conflicts. Because Baden experienced a very fierce Kulturkampf during the 
1860s, it strained the relationship between Catholics and Protestants. The first few 
years o f the Empire witnessed an intense focus on strengthening national identity 
through various commemorative efforts, and it was against this backdrop of a fixation 
on national sentiments that Catholics and Protestants negotiated their place in the 
Second Empire. Hence, the nationalist vocabulary that had been popularized during 
the Franco-Prussian War and the first few months o f the Empire served as new tools 
that both Catholics and Protestants in Baden used to conduct their struggles.
20 The classic statement here is Wolfgang Sauer, “Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates,” in 
Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans Ulrich Wehler (Koln: Kipenhauer & Witsch, 1966), 
407-436. Although he notes that different societal groups could employ nationalism for different ends, 
Anderson’s work assumes that nationalism served to make societies more cohesive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
Not until the late 1890s did nationalism and national sentiments in Baden 
begin to serve as more of a unifying force for all residents. During the 1890s, the 
political and cultural climate in the Kaiserreich and Baden began to change, causing a 
transformation in how Catholics and Protestants used nationalism. As local and 
national Catholics grew more politically, culturally, and economically powerful, they 
began to support German colonialism and a military build-up, thus establishing 
Catholics as more “trustworthy” in Protestant eyes. The growing power o f Catholic 
associations and the slow but steady inroads that Catholics made into the cultural and 
economic arenas forced Protestants to broaden their notions of the nature of 
Germanness. In addition, the ever more hostile European diplomatic climate after the 
turn o f the century resulted in a gradual shift where nationalism became ever more 
exclusive. Because o f these facts, Catholics and Protestants were more in agreement 
on how to use nationalism—to strengthen Germany in the face o f some of the 
challenges they faced on the European diplomatic and military scene. O f course, this 
did not mean that the two confessions were in complete agreement on what constituted 
the German nation. However, it did mean that they had reached an uneasy agreement 
that although they constituted different kinds of Germans, nationalist sentiments were 
used to battle external enemies rather than internal ones. To be sure, there still existed 
many instances of religious conflict, but these instances were not as frequent as they 
had been during the first two decades o f the Kaiserreich.
Because German nationalism was often a divisive rather than a unifying force, 
my work illustrates the need to examine further the effects of the Kulturkampf on the
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creation of German national identity. While most scholars now agree that the 
Kulturkampf ultimately failed, and indeed actually strengthened the Catholic 
community, a better understanding o f how the Kulturkampf affected the creation of 
German national identity is still needed.21 Although the Kulturkampf was in part an 
attempt to create a more homogeneous national culture, it actually divided the German 
nation rather than unifying it.
My analysis o f Sedan Day, which in Baden served as a vehicle to promote the 
Kulturkampf illustrates how Badenese Catholics used opposition to this holiday to 
fight anti-Catholic legislation as well as to construct their own version of national 
identity. The initiating o f Sedan Day coincided with some o f the fiercest aspects of 
the Kulturkampf and both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed it as a means of 
anti-Catholic agitation. Confmo and others have documented how national-liberals 
and Protestants failed in their attempt to use Sedan Day as a unifying vehicle, but 
scholars have neglected to consider fully how important confessional attitudes were to 
the demise o f this holiday.22 During the debates over the meaning o f this celebration, 
especially during the first few years of the Empire, Catholics argued that the 
ideological message o f Sedan Day celebrations was intended to exclude Catholics 
from the national community. Catholics often cited Kulturkampf \eg\s\at\on, which 
they argued aimed at eliminating Catholic influence in the new nation-state. By using
21 See Ross, The Failure o f  Bismarck’s Kulturkampf.
22 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 27-51. An important exception is Claudia Lepp, 
“Protestanten feiem ihre Nation-Die kulturprotestantsichen Urspiinge des Sedantages,” Historische 
Jahrbuch 118 (1998): 201-222.
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the nationalist rhetoric popularized during the Franco-Prussian War and its various 
commemorations, Catholics were able to oppose not only the commemorative 
discourse but also the injustices o f the Kulturkampf laws. Furthermore, the failure of 
the Kulturkampf and the fact that the Sedan Day celebrations did not resonate well 
with the population both strengthened Catholics in their attempts to infuse German 
national identity with their own sentiments. As a result, the Kulturkampf and more 
specifically the nationalist rhetoric used in the conflict, served as a divisive force 
rather than a unifying one. Although scholars have analyzed many aspects o f the 
Kulturkampf the divisive effect that it had on German national identity still remains 
relatively unexplored, and my work attempts to fill part of this void.
My analysis also encourages closer examination of how Catholics embraced 
various aspects o f modernity. Although work has been done to revise the traditional 
view o f Catholics as backward and anti modem, many historians still consider them to 
have lagged behind other Germans in their acceptance o f modernity.23 My research 
highlights Catholic employment o f many features associated with a modem society 
such as associations and the press, thus casting doubt on their “backwardness.” 
Badenese Catholics became adept at using the press to strengthen their community, 
both before and after unification. They long utilized newspapers not only to report on 
political developments, commemorations, and other important events, but they also 
used them to ensure that Catholics throughout Germany were aware o f any injustice to
23 For a good discussion of this literature, see Oded Heilbronner, “From Ghetto to Ghetto: The Place of 
German Catholic Society in Recent Flistoriography,” Journal o f  Modern History 72 (2000): 453-495. 
Haider’s work on Catholic associations in Baden and Wurttemberg illustrates some of the modern ways 
that Catholics used these associations.
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Catholics in Baden. This was especially important during the Kulturkampf, where 
Catholics in one location could read about the poor treatment o f Catholics elsewhere, 
and it served to strengthen their sense o f community.
Catholic awareness o f the importance o f the public sphere also casts doubts on 
their allegedly anti modem attitudes. In anticipation of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Pope Pius IX’s election as Pope in June 1871, Catholic papers around the state were 
keen to inform their readership that they needed to take control of the streets on June 
16. This very powerful political manifestation also served as an exercise in nation 
building, and it provides further illustration that Catholics were not only reactionary. 
Moreover, Catholic embrace of selected elements o f modernity also corroborates their 
ability to manifest their collective identities publicly. Their determination to control 
the public sphere, their use of the press, and the growing influence o f their various 
associations all served as important means to influence the construction of national 
identity.
Over the course of the late nineteenth century, Catholics straggled with 
Protestants in Baden over what constituted their shared German national identity. 
Despite political and economical disadvantages, including an often fiercely anti- 
Catholic public sphere, Badenese Catholics influenced the construction of their 
national identity through the application o f familiar loyalties to region and religion to 
the Protestant version o f Germanness. The following chapters analyze exactly how 
Catholics constructed an alternative commemorative discourse of unification and how 
this discourse enabled them to manifest their version of German national identity.
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE STAGE: THE CREATION OF A “LIBERALES MUSTERLAND”
With unification in 1871, Badenese Catholics, the majority o f whom had 
supported the grossdeutsch solution to the German question, confronted the difficult 
prospect o f integration into a nation-state largely constructed on Protestant and 
Prussian values. Rather than being subsumed by the official national identity, 
Catholics developed their own interpretation o f Germanness based upon a past that 
differed considerably from the Protestant-Prussian teleological view o f the process of 
unification. Most Catholics imagined a different Germany than that offered by the 
official nationalist discourse, one more rooted in past traditions and memories than in 
promises o f future glory. They criticized official commemorations, pointing out that 
such ceremonies did not properly acknowledge “their own past.” By offering their 
own interpretation o f history, they indicated that their identities were rooted in 
different traditions, customs, memories, and histories. In so doing, they questioned 
and criticized the official picture of the new German nation-state.1
In the ongoing debates over the value and meaning of monuments and public 
cerem onies, B adenese Catholics repeatedly  referred  to their ancient religious heritage 
and culture, which had long served as the basis of their identity. By stressing
1 See, for instance, Freie Stimme, March 15 and June 6, 1872.
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the old cultural and religious components of their identities, they tried to reinforce the 
compatible nature o f Catholicism and Germanness, and they proudly embraced a 
German identity that emphasized the value o f their confession. These ideas bolstered 
the political and cultural legitimacy of other forms o f identity that had been prevalent 
prior to the nation-state, such as region and religious community, which Catholics 
considered timeless and much too valuable to forsake.
Baden constituted something o f an anomaly among the states comprising the 
Second Empire. Although Catholics made up two-thirds of the state’s population, 
liberals, whose political program to a large extent focused on reducing the power of 
the Catholic Church, governed Baden. Intense church-state conflict characterized the 
decade following the unification of Germany in 1871. Baden constituted a state that 
conducted one o f the fiercest Kulturkdmpfe in Central Europe. Although relations 
between them improved slightly towards the end o f the nineteenth century, the 
struggle between the liberal state and the Church dominated much o f Badenese society 
during the Second Empire. When Baden entered the Kaiserreich, it did so with a 
powerful National Liberal Party, but also with a Catholic population growing 
increasingly determined to maintain its identity despite a fervent Kulturkampf that was 
partly aimed at consolidating the German national identity along confessional lines.
Because o f the particular status o f Baden in the Second Empire and the
2 Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 61. A substantial literature offers a general 
treatment of Catholic attitudes towards the German national state. See Altgeld, Katholizismus, 
Protestantismus, Judentum; Lill, “Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgriindung”; Griinder, 
“Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich”; Rudolf Morsey, Die deutschen Katholiken und der 
Nationalstaat zwischen Kulturkampf und Ersten Weltkrieg,” Historisches Jahrbuch 90 (1970): 31-64; 
and Windell, The Catholics and German Unity.
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importance o f its history to the Catholic population, it is necessary to identify the 
major historical developments o f the Grand Duchy during the nineteenth century.
This overview will facilitate a better understanding o f the choices that Badenese 
Catholics made when faced with a complex web of old and new identities in the post- 
1871 period.
The Creation and Consolidation of the Grand Duchy, 1806-1848
The consolidation o f the future Grand Duchy o f Baden began in 1771 when 
Margrave Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden incorporated the Duchy o f Baden-Durlach 
into his own territories. Before the French Revolution, Karl Friedrich, inspired by 
enlightened absolutist rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Austria, initiated reform. 
Labeling himself an “enlightened despot,” he attempted to modernize agriculture, 
improve education, and create religious toleration.3 Because o f the scope of these 
reforms, the political and social changes that accompanied the French Revolution 
served more as an intensification of innovations already underway in the Duchy than a 
sudden break with the past. Even before the dismantling of ancien regimes elsewhere, 
the southwestern comer o f Germany had established the foundations o f a strong liberal 
tradition.
The Grand Duchy came into existence largely due to Karl Friedrich’s 
opportunistic alliance with Napoleon. The Margrave was fortunate to have as his
3 Willy Andreas, “Badische Politik unter Karl Friedrich,” Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 
26(1911): 415-445.
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main advisor Sigismund von Reitzenstein, an ambitious and well-respected diplomat 
whose policies were based on the understanding that Karl Friedrich could not afford to 
challenge the French. Because Reitzenstein conducted all negotiations with France, 
occasionally agreeing to conditions without prior approval o f the Margrave, historians 
have labeled him the founder of Baden.4
Karl Friedrich profited mightily from the secularization that followed the 
Reichdeputationshauptschluss o f 1803. To compensate for territories lost to France 
after the peace at Luneville in 1801, Napoleon secularized various church lands, 
abolished monasteries, and transferred religious property from the Catholic Church to 
the Margrave, who was subsequently elevated to Elector in 1803.5 These events were 
difficult to accept for the Church, which had already been under attack for the 
previous few decades, beginning with the religious reforms o f Joseph II.6 The 
Reichdeputationshauptschluss constituted a dramatic dismantling o f a long-existing 
societal order. Before 1803, most bishops, as well as other members o f the high
4 Franz Schnabel, Sigismund von Reitzenstein. Der Begrunder des Badischen Staates (Heidelberg: 
Homing, 1927).
5 Lothar Gall, “Griindung und politische Entwicklung des GroBherzogtums bis 1848,” in Badische 
Geschichte. Vom Grofiherzogtum bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildung Baden- 
Wiirttemberg (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1979), 14-20; Wolfgang Hug, Geschichte Badens (Stuttgart: Theiss, 
1992), 194-199; Hansmartin Schwarzmeier, ed., Handbuch der Baden-Wurttembergischen Geschichte. 
Dritter Band. Vom Ende des alten Reiches bis zum Ende der Monarchien (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 
27-29; Karl Stiefel, Baden 1648-1952, Volume I (Karlsruhe: Badische Neueste Nachrichen 
Badendruck, 1978), 50-56.
6 Peter Hersche, “Der osterreichische Spatjansenismus,” in Katholische Aufklarung und Josefmismus, 
ed. Elisabeth Kovacs (Munchen: Oldenbourg, 1979), 180-193; Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg 
Monarchy 1618-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eduard Winter, Der 
Josephinismus. Die Geschichte des osterreichischen Reformkatholizismus 1740-1848 (Berlin: Riitten 
und Loening, 1962).
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clergy, had not only been religious leaders but sovereigns as well. In addition, one of 
the most vital functions o f the Church and its agents had been to serve as the backbone 
o f the educational system, and their dismissal triggered angry responses from both 
clergy and laity. Thus, many communities were deprived of the financial and social 
stability that monasteries had provided.7 To complete the process o f secularization, in 
1807, the newly formed Badenese government issued an edict that regulated the 
relationship between state and church. It reflected the new circumstances as the state 
established firm control over most o f the activities of the Catholic Church. Among 
other provisions, it determined that clergy were considered employees o f the state,
o
which always gave precedence to civil over canonical law.
The final territorial consolidation of the Badenese lands took place after the 
Treaty o f Pressburg in 1805, when Napoleon transferred ownership of the Breisgau 
region from the Habsburgs to Karl Friedrich to reward his loyalty during recent wars. 
In 1806, the electorate was transformed into a Grand Duchy and incorporated in the 
Rhineland Confederation, where it served as a buffer between France and the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Napoleon elevated the Margrave to Grand Duke. A major 
beneficiary o f the Napoleonic reorganization o f Europe, Karl Friedrich extended his 
territory from 3,900 to 14,000 square kilometers and increased its population from
7 Two very detailed accounts of this process are Hermann Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im 
Grofiherzogtum Baden. Von der Grundung des Grofiherzogtums bis zur Gegenwart (Freiburg: Herder, 
1927), 12-38; Heinrich Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden. Mit 
besonderer Beruucksichitigung der Regierungszeit Hermann von Vicari (Freiburg: Herder, 1891), 1-7.
8 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 78-81.
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some 165,000 to 900,000 people between 1796 and 1806.9
Comprising different types of territories such as feudal fiefs, small states, 
independent cities, and religious domains, most o f which had no or few previous ties 
to each other, the Grand Duchy was initially plagued by grave internal tensions. To 
many, the recent drastic political, religious, and social changes constituted an 
unpopular and traumatic break with the past. This aversion stemmed both from the 
fact that they suddenly had a new ruler and from the taxes that Karl Friedrich collected 
and passed on to Paris. More importantly, the new Grand Duke had agreed to supply 
Napoleon with troops if needed. Consequently, in 1812, about 7,000 Badenese 
soldiers participated in the attack on Russia, o f whom only some 100 returned.10
The fact that many of the new subjects were hostile towards the new state was 
o f immense importance for Baden’s future development. Because the Grand Duchy 
contained a variety o f people with different traditions, histories, and pasts, there was a 
need for some means o f integration. Both Karl Friedrich and his son Karl, who 
succeeded him in 1811, were ahead o f their time in recognizing the need for state- 
sponsored nondynastic means o f integration. A new generation o f liberal public 
officials who had been educated in the spirit o f the Enlightenment spearheaded these 
ideas. Many were convinced that a reorganization o f the state administration would 
dissolve old loyalties and cement a new common identity. Although they launched
9 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 199; Marion Wierichs, Napoleon und das “dritte Deutschland. ” Die 
Entstehung der Grofiherzogtiimer Baden, Berg und Hessen (Frankfurt: Lang, 1978), 175-177.
10 Martin Glaser, “Die Badische Politik und die deutsche Frage zur Zeit der Befreiungskriege und des 
Wiener Kongress,” Zeitschriftfur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 43 (1928): 268-317.
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two separate attempts, in 1803 and 1809, they were unable to increase people’s sense 
of identification with the new Grand Duchy.11
Thanks to a secret treaty with the Habsburgs in 1813, Karl received a 
guarantee that if  he deserted his French ally, his territories would remain intact. 
However, after a timely switching o f sides immediately after the battle of Leipzig in 
1813, Baden still faced heavy pressure from Austria and Bavaria, both of which 
wanted the return of lost territories. Even after the post-Napoleonic Congress of 
Vienna had confirmed Baden’s borders in 1815, the Badenese state remained in flux. 
Grand Duke Karl had no male heir, and both the Habsburgs and Bavarians watched
1 9closely to see how the question o f legitimacy would unfold. Still facing the threat of 
disloyal subjects, especially in the Breisgau, the Grand Duke began considering the 
demands for constitutional reform in a more favorable light.
Signed by Grand Duke Karl on August 22, 1818, the Badenese constitution 
was celebrated by contemporaries as the most liberal one in Central Europe, though it 
still provided for a political system closer to enlightened absolutism than to a modem 
democracy. Many Germans had already begun to refer to the Grand Duchy as 
“liberales Musterland,” and for most o f the nineteenth century, Baden remained at the
• ITforefront o f the German liberal movement. The constitution granted citizens certain
11 W illy Andreas, “Friedrich Brauer und die Entstehung des ersten badischen Organisationsediktes vom  
4. Febraar 1803,” Zeitschriftfur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 24 (1909): 628-672; idem, “Zur 
Beurteilung der badischen Verwaltungsorganisation vom 26. November 1809 und ihre Weiterbildung,” 
Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 25 (1910): 308-332.
12 Glaser, “Die Badische Politik,” 306-312.
13 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, xi-xii.
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inalienable rights, including equality before the law, freedom of press, religion, and 
profession. Restrictions applied to many o f these freedoms, however, which 
significantly reduced their value. The constitution confirmed Baden as a monarchy, 
with all powers invested in the Grand Duke, who would use them according to the 
constitution. An upper and lower house (or first and second chamber) constituted the 
representative part o f government. A limited franchise allowed for representatives to 
be elected to the second chamber. Voting citizens had to be over twenty-five years of 
age and possess either a public office or Biirgerrecht. Consequently, in 1819, only 
about seventeen percent o f the population passed the franchise restrictions. The first 
chamber primarily consisted of members o f the nobility and clergy who had been 
given seats by the Grand Duke. This system ensured that the ruling strata could 
employ the first chamber as a check on the power o f the “popularly” elected second 
chamber.14
The constitution proved to be a success in consolidating a common Badenese 
identity. Many historians have labeled the 1820s as the decade when Badeners 
discovered something resembling national consciousness. The liberal Karl von 
Rotteck spoke for many when he stated that the constitution was Baden’s birth 
certificate.15 Consequently, already at an early stage in the nineteenth century, many 
Badeners constructed their identities around notions o f liberalism and progress that
14 For detailed descriptions of the Badenese constitution, see Hans Fenske, Der liberate Sudwesten 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981), 40-42; Stiefel, Baden 1648-1952, Volume I, 237-264.
15 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 212
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were reinforced both by themselves as well as other Germans.
Taking advantage of increased opportunities to influence the political process, 
a new generation of liberals led by Theodor Welcker, Karl von Rotteck, and Johann 
Adam von Itzenstein emerged in the early 1830s. Many of them were tied closely to 
the rising fortunes o f the bourgeoisie and placed most o f their efforts on providing 
more ample conditions for industrialization. Simultaneously, more radical liberal 
leaders such as Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve appeared on the political scene, 
demanding a quicker, more radical approach to the modernizing project, complete 
with demands for social and economic reform.16 During much o f the 1840s, the 
liberal camp was engulfed in conflicts between moderates and radicals, and after 1845, 
they were informally split into two separate factions. The latter argued for a more 
confrontational approach towards the Grand Duke and his ministers, whereas the 
former advocated limited cooperation as the best way o f achieving reform. Hecker 
and Struve led the radical faction while Friedrich Bassermann and Karl Mathy 
spearheaded the constitutional, or moderate, liberals.17
While political life stabilized rather quickly during the pre-March period, it
16 Fenske, “Baden 1830 bis 1860,” in Handbuch der Baden-Wiirttembergischen Geschichte, ed. 
Schwarzmeier, 83-88. For biographical information on some o f Baden’s leading politicians in the pre- 
March period, see Franz Dor, Freiherr Hinrich Bernhard von Andlaw, ein badischer Politiker und 
Vorkampfer des Katholizismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1910); idem., Franz Joseph Ritter von Bufi, in 
seinem Leben und Wirken geschildert (Freiburg: Herder, 1911); Julius Domeich, Franz Joseph Bufi 
und die katholische Bewegung in Baden (Freiburg: Herder, 1979); Gustav Freytag, Karl Mathy. 
Geschichte seines Lebens (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1888); Hermann Kopf, Karl von Rotteck. Zwischen 
Revolution und Restauration (Freiburg: Rommel, 1980); Heinz Miiller-Dietz, Das Leben des 
Rechtlehrers und Politiker Karl Theodor Welcker (Freiburg: Albert, 1968); and Franz Stegmann, ed., 
Franz Joseph von Bufi (Paderbom: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1994).
17 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 45-48.
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took some time for the Roman Catholic Church to adjust to the new order. Internal 
divisions in the Church complicated the situation. Following the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, the existing dioceses had been dissolved, and the 
question o f how to reorganize Church administration became a hotly contested issue. 
After years o f discussion, in 1821 Pope Pius VII published the Bull “Provida 
sollersque,” in which he proclaimed the foundation of the Oberrheinischer 
Kirchenprovinz with five bishop seats: Rottenburg, Mainz, Limburg, Fulda, and 
Freiburg. The Badenese diocese coincided with the borders o f the state, with the 
addition o f two small Prussian territories, Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen and
1 o
Hohenzollem-Hechingen.
Having resolved this problem, the Catholic Church and the Badenese 
government now had to elect a new archbishop for Freiburg. The ensuing conflict 
over this issue involved fundamental questions regarding the degree of state 
involvement in religious affairs. Before proceeding to the question of a potential 
candidate, the two sides had to establish how to conduct the election process. After 
drawn-out negotiations, they agreed that the Catholic Minster Chapter should choose a 
candidate, who then had to be endorsed by the government before the Pope confirmed 
him as Archbishop. This arrangement was to cause many conflicts and an occasional 
deadlock in the future, as both state and church politicized the election process. 
Between 1821 and 1827, for example, neither side could settle on a suitable
18 Erzbischoflichen Ordinariat, ed., Das Erzbistum Freiburg, 1827-1977 (Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 75- 
77; Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 113-124.
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candidate.19
The failure to appoint an archbishop not only reflected the hostile relationship 
between state and church, but also indicated a split within the Church itself. The 
southwestern comer o f the German lands constituted a liberal enclave within the 
Catholic Church. Led by one of the best-known clergy members o f the early 
nineteenth century, Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, this faction advocated 
liberalization o f the Church and closer cooperation with the state, ideas that were 
unacceptable to many Catholics.20 Wessenberg, the vicar-general o f Konstanz from 
1802 to 1827, whose religious outlook had been shaped by Joseph II’s religious 
reforms, worked diligently to modernize the Catholic Church. He sought to translate 
the liturgy into German, establish synods to democratize the Church, increase 
cooperation with Protestants, and reduce the formal stmctures o f the Church to enable 
a more immediate religious experience. Wessenberg also argued for a closer 
cooperation with the state, since the Church would not survive a confrontation. 
Although these theories alienated conservative Catholics, Wessenberg had many 
supporters, and his activities in the seminary in Meersburg influenced an entire 
generation of Catholic clergy. Wessenberg’s ideas and the relatively strong tradition
of liberal Catholicism would be very important for the future development of the
0 1 •state. As the Badenese bourgeoisie developed, most o f its Catholic members
19 Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 23-30.
20 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 51-71, 88-94, 125-131.
21 For a good introduction to Wessenberg’s ideas, see Karl-Heinz Braun, ed., Kirche und Aufklarung
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adopted Wessenberg’s ideas wholeheartedly, which provided for a more confidently 
Catholic bourgeoisie than elsewhere in Germany. Moreover, by establishing a 
relationship, albeit an uneasy one, between liberalism and Roman Catholicism,
Wessenberg’s philosophies were instrumental in preparing for the later success o f the
22Badenese national-liberals during the Kaiserreich.
The position o f Archbishop in Freiburg remained vacant until 1827, when state 
and Church agreed on Bernhard Boll as their choice. Both Boll and his successor, 
Ignaz Anton Demeter, were feeble religious leaders who commanded little respect 
from the clergy and lacked the courage to oppose the state’s attempts to undermine the 
position o f the Church further. On numerous occasions, Pope Pius VIII reprimanded 
the two for failing to defend the interest o f the Church. Archbishop Boll’s weak 
character enabled the Badenese state to make many inroads into the Church’s power. 
Most importantly, the Department o f Religious Affairs possessed rights of supervision
23over the Church’s finances as well as over how they educated new priests.
Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg (Mtinchen: Schnell und Steiner, 1989); for a more complete treatment 
of his character and ideas, see Konstantin Grober, “Heinrich Ignaz Freiherr von Wessenberg,” 
Freiburger Didzesen Archiv 55 (1927): 362-609 and 56 (1928): 294-435.
22 The relationship between liberalism and Catholicism has been discussed by, among others, Thomas 
Mergel, Zwischen Klasse und Konfession (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994). His study 
centers on the Catholic part of the bourgeoisie in the Rhineland, which according to Mergel became less 
Catholic as they became more immersed in the bourgeois culture. The Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden 
differed from their confessional brethren in the Rhineland, however, in that they were better able to 
combine a strong Catholic faith with a bourgeois lifestyle. Mergel has noted this in “Fur eine 
biirgerliche Kirche: Antiultramontanismus, Liberalismus und Biirgertum 1820-1850. Rheinland und 
Siidwestdeutschland im Vergleich,” Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte Oberrheins 144 (1996): 1-31; Oded 
Heilbronner has made similar observations. See Heilbronner, “In Search o f the (Rural) Catholic 
Bourgeoisie.”
23 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 151-152.
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Throughout the 1830s, the Church did not challenge the state’s activities, in part 
because o f the listless leadership of the two archbishops, but also because 
Wessenberg’s ideas attracted much support.
Conditions began to change for the Badenese Catholics only in 1837 as they 
were swept up in the popular religious revival that surfaced throughout the German 
lands following the Cologne events. Also in 1837, Franz Josef BuB and Freiherr 
Fleinrich von Andlaw were elected as the first two Catholic representatives to the 
provincial parliament. Both BuB and Andlaw were conservative Catholics, skilled 
politicians, and accomplished agitators, which brought them to the forefront o f the 
Catholic revival. Largely as a result o f these developments, the Siiddeutsche 
Katholisches Kirchenblatt was founded in Freiburg in 1840. It provided Catholics 
with a small, but effective public forum for their views. BuB often contributed to this 
paper, which helped further boost his popularity.24 Well aware o f his talents as a 
speaker, he traveled throughout Baden and Germany during the 1840s, organizing 
large mass meetings, where he encouraged Catholics to remain strong and defiant in 
defense o f their faith. When the revolution o f 1848-1849 erupted, BuB was the most
25well-known and popular Catholic in Germany.
Another important event that carried major implications for the revival of the 
Catholic Church in Baden was the appointment o f Hermann von Vicari as Archbishop
24 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, p. 20; Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg 
1848-1914,21.
25 Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg 1848-1914, 35.
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in 1842. In contrast to his two predecessors, Vicari was a staunch opponent o f state 
involvement in religious affairs. Already from the outset of his tenure, he proved that 
he was not afraid to contest the government, and he immediately replaced many liberal 
members o f the high clergy with more conservative ones, such as Adolf Strehle and 
Heinrich Maas. Vicari also limited and strictly regulated the political activities o f the 
clergy, which made it difficult for the latter to support the state. The new Archbishop, 
BuB, and Andlaw led the ultramontanization of Badenese Catholics.26
After the relative peace and stability that characterized the political life during 
the 1830s and early 1840s, relations between the Grand Duke and the liberals 
deteriorated quickly in the middle of the 1840s, culminating in the revolution o f 1848- 
1849. Many historians focus on the poor economic conditions during the middle of 
the 1840s as the primary cause o f the revolution. Although both urban and rural areas 
suffered the consequences from meager harvests, the latter were especially vulnerable 
to economic depressions. From 1815 to 1848, the Badenese population, the majority 
o f which still lived in rural areas, had increased by thirty-six percent. Peasants often 
complained that there was not enough land for everybody. Because Baden did not 
employ primogeniture, fertile land had become increasingly divided, causing a 
significant drop in productivity. The failed harvests o f 1845 and 1846 had devastating
27consequences for many peasants, who were forced to rely on inadequate poor relief.
26Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 176-178; Maas, Geschichte der 
katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 133-140.
27 Hugo Ott, “Die Wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum 
Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Badische Geschichte, ed. Landeszentrale fur politische Bildung
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Although the majority o f the population still farmed at mid-century, Baden was 
undergoing a slow transformation from an overwhelmingly agricultural state to a more 
mixed economy. The first surge o f industrialization occurred after the Grand Duchy 
joined the Customs Union in 1835. Textile industries were the first to take advantage 
o f improved infrastructure and a deregulation o f trade and commerce. During the 
1830s and 1840s, increasing numbers o f people found their employment within the 
industrial sector. In 1847, however, industrial development came to a sudden halt 
when the largest banking house in Baden, Haber, went bankrupt. As a consequence, 
Baden’s three largest industries went under, leaving almost 6,000 people unemployed 
and desperate for economic and social reform.28 Consequently, though the economic 
crisis o f the 1840s was primarily agricultural, the failure of some of the recently 
founded industries also contributed to the worsening economic and social conditions.
The Revolutions of 1848-1449 in Baden
As news of the February days in Paris spread across the Rhine in 1848, both 
moderate and radical liberals were quick to take action. At several mass meetings, 
most notably in Mannheim on February 27 and Offenburg on March 19, they 
demanded the abolition of feudal privileges, unrestricted freedom of the press, the 
right to bear arms, and the formation of a German national parliament. On March 2, 
the Badenese parliament granted many o f the liberals’ demands. Most importantly,
Baden-Wiirttemberg, 104-106.
28 Ibid., 106-107.
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feudal privileges were lifted, which had been the major concern o f the large agrarian 
population.29
After the passage of the March 2 decrees, which stilled most o f the 
revolutionary fervor among the peasantry, radical leaders Friedrich Hecker and Gustav 
Struve were forced on the defensive, and neither was elected to the pre-parliament in 
Frankfurt. Both men realized that if  their revolution was to succeed, they had to take 
it to the streets. On April 13, Hecker gathered radicals in Konstanz and boldly 
declared the republic.30 He intended to march on Karlsruhe, rallying support along the 
way. He attracted a number o f sympathizers, although fewer than he had anticipated. 
Eventually, about 4,000 joined the so-called Hecker-march. However, he soon 
realized that after the removal of feudal privileges, most peasants had no immediate 
interests in continuing the revolution. After a few skirmishes, state troops finally 
defeated Hecker and his men at Kandem on April 24, 1848.31
Hecker and Struve’s defeat did not weaken the revolutionary cause. After 
Hecker fled the country, Struve continued the struggle. Following the generally 
unpopular Treaty o f Malmo in September 1848, he attempted another unsuccessful 
armed uprising. Both Hecker and Struve clearly miscalculated the degree o f popular
29 Excellent accounts o f the events in Baden in 1848-1849 include Wolfgang Dreflen, ed., 1848-1849: 
Biirgerkrieg in Baden (Berlin: Dragenbach, 1975); Willy Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983); Franz Vollmer, Offenburg 1848/49. Ereignisse und Lebensbilder aus 
einem Zentrum der badischen Revolution (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1997).
30 Alfred Diesbach, “Konstanz im Re volutions jahr 1848,” Konstanzer Blatter fur Hochschulfragen 40 
(1973): 97-99.
31 Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49, 56-59.
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support for the radical liberals. Although aware o f the split among the liberals, they 
believed that once subsumed in the revolutionary atmosphere, the moderates would 
join their cause. Contrary to their hopes, however, socialist slogans that accompanied 
much o f the radicals’ rhetoric alienated most moderates.
Despite the departure o f the two most important leaders o f the radical liberals, 
the movement did not fade.32 When Frederick Wilhelm IV refused to accept the 
imperial crown in March 1849, the radicals struck anew. Since it was now evident 
that the tactics o f the constitutional liberals had failed, revolutionaries rallied support 
by tapping into the dissatisfaction that many people voiced at the failure o f the 
Frankfurt Parliament. Large numbers o f people gathered in Offenburg and Rastatt on 
May 12 and 13, and many government soldiers joined the revolutionaries. The 
situation became so threatening that Grand Duke Leopold fled to France, calling for 
Prussian troops to assist him in defeating the rebels. Led by Lorenzo Brentano, 
revolutionaries on May 14 replaced the old government with civil commissionaires, all 
o f whom were radical liberals. They abolished the first chamber and called elections 
to a new parliament, which Brentano opened on June 10. Despite this apparent 
success, the revolutionaries were in a precarious position with little prospect of 
ultimate victory. Prussian troops were threatening the state, and though the rebels 
attracted much popular support, they stood little chance against the superior Prussian 
forces. On July 23, the revolutionaries capitulated at Rastatt, signaling the quelling of
32 Hardtwig Gebhardt, Revolution und liberate Bewegung. Die nationale Organisation der 
konstitutionellen Partei in Deutschland 1848/49 (Bremen: Scheunemann, 1974), 68-70.
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the last revolutionary movement in Germany. On August 18, Leopold returned, 
accompanied by Prussian soldiers, who subsequently occupied Baden for the next two
33years.
Creation of a New Liberal Order and the Catholic Response 1850-1871
The revolutions o f 1848 temporarily improved the relationship between the 
Badenese state and church. Faced with sometimes very radical rhetoric, both 
remained on the side o f tradition and shared a desire to avoid drastic changes.34 
Although the Catholic Church played only a minor role in the revolution, it proved to 
be of great importance for Catholics in several respects. Most importantly, the eased 
restrictions on freedom of association enabled Catholics to found organizations that 
contributed to their mobilization. In July 1848, BuB and Andlaw formed the 
Katholische Verein Badens with the explicit intent o f protecting Catholic interests 
around the state. Utilizing his personal popularity, BuB traveled throughout the state, 
calling upon good Catholics to found local chapters of the Verein. Despite limited 
support from the clergy, BuB’ rhetorical skill ensured mass mobilization o f Catholics 
and rapid development o f the Verein. During the summer of 1848, the Parliament in 
Frankfurt received 1142 petitions demanding a guarantee of the Church’s rights in
case o f a new constitution; 434 of these petitions came from Baden—the highest
33 Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49, 136-144.
34 For two general accounts of the role of the chinch during the upheavals, see Wolfgang Hug, 
“Katholiken und ihre Kirche in der Badischen Revolution von 1848/49,” Freiburger Didzesan-Archiv 
118 (1998): 283-311; and Clemens Rehm, Die katholische Kirche in der Erzdiozese Freiburg wahrend 
der Revolution 1848/49 (Freiburg-. Alber, 1987).
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number (in proportion to population) o f any German state. At the first general 
assembly o f the Katholischer Verein in Mainz in October 1848, BuB was the logical 
choice as president.35
Amidst the talks o f restructuring the German Bund, the leaders o f the Catholic 
Church met in Wurzburg in the fall o f 1848 to coordinate their policies. The decisions 
made at this meeting served as guidelines for Badenese Catholics in their struggle 
against the state during the last half of the nineteenth century. Catholics wanted to 
restore much o f their lost independence vis-a-vis the state. Church and state were to 
be separated and permitted to conduct their respective affairs without interference 
from the other. At the conclusion of the conference, participants presented a list of 
demands: to regain control over much of the educational system, to be able to appoint 
priests without state supervision, the removal o f the placet (formal state approval of 
certain church actions), complete control over their finances; and the right to found 
monasteries. Although none o f these demands was fully met, these declarations had 
symbolic value. The Wurzburg conference represented the first occasion in the 
nineteenth century that the most prominent members o f the Catholic high clergy took a 
collective stand against the secularizing policies that had been prevalent in many parts 
o f Germany.36
The failed revolutions o f 1848-1849 caused a temporary halt to most o f the
35 Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg, 27-38. For a general account o f the activities 
and importance of Catholic organizations during the revolution, see Heinz Hiirten, Kurze Geschichte 
des deutschen Katholizismus 1800-1960 (Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald Verlag, 1986), 79-109.
36 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 24-25.
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activities o f the Badenese liberals, and conservatives dominated politics throughout 
the 1850s. Although the time o f reaction did not last as long, nor was it as harsh as 
elsewhere in Germany, it was almost a decade before the liberals fully re-emerged on 
the political stage. One of the primary reasons for the relatively mild reaction in 
Baden was Friedrich I ’s accession to the throne in 1852. Although he was not 
officially crowned until 1856, because his brother Leopold II was mentally ill, 
Friedrich I effectively ruled Baden since the death o f Leopold I in 1852.
The importance o f Friedrich I to the politics o f Baden during the second half of 
the nineteenth century can hardly be exaggerated.37 Married since 1856 to Luise, the 
daughter o f the future Wilhelm I, the liberal Grand Duke was immensely popular with 
his subjects. Friedrich had received a very broad education, in which liberal historians 
Ludwig Hausser and Friedrich Dahlmann played important roles. Both Dahlmann and 
Hausser were admirers o f Prussia’s history, and as they lectured the young prince on 
the achievements o f Frederick the Great and other famous Prussians, they quickly 
made him aware how important Prussia was to the future of German politics. During 
the 1840s, Friedrich attended the universities in Heidelberg and Bonn together with 
the future generation o f leading liberal politicians such as Franz von Roggenbach, 
Julius Jolly, and August Lamey. They became part o f a tightly knit circle, many of
37 For a biographical account of the Grand Duke’s life, see Alfred Dove, Grofiherzog Friedrich von 
Baden als Landesherr und deutscher Ftirst (Heidelberg: Winter, 1902). Excellent insights into the 
character of the Grand Duke can be drawn from Hermann von Oncken, ed., Grofiherzog Friedrich I. 
von Baden und die deutsche Politik von 1854-1871. Briefwechsel, Denkschriften, Tagebucher 2 Vols. 
(Osnabriick: Biblio, 1966).




Roggenbach and Lamey emerged as leaders when the liberal movement began 
to regroup during the 1850s. Their political program stressed the need to clarify the 
relationship between church and state, to decentralize administration, and further 
deregulate trade and commerce. Most importantly, they emphasized finding a solution
• 39to the German question.
The liberals rallied public support by exploiting the growing tension between 
the Catholic Church and the conservative government. After the revolution, political 
life had come largely to a standstill, and it was not until 1853, when Archbishop 
Herman von Vicari demanded that the Catholic Church be allowed to conduct its 
affairs without state involvement, that political activity truly resumed. This first major 
conflict o f the 1850s was triggered by the death o f Grand Duke Leopold I in 1852.
The Senior Consistory in Karlsruhe demanded that the Catholic clergy hold Seelenamt 
for the Protestant Grand Duke. Vicari, abiding by canonical law, refused and ordered 
local clergy to hold a simple funeral service with a funeral speech. This constituted a 
true test of Vicari’s power as he asked his clergy to defy the state. In the end, only 60 
priests, out o f about 1,100, followed the state’s directives. Even more importantly, 
after the event, Vicari punished the ones who had not heeded his orders, while the 
state did nothing to protect them. The state’s inactivity signaled the fact that it was 
unable to support liberal Catholic priests who faced retribution from the ultramontanes
38 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 66.
39 Ibid., 63-80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
in Freiburg and only served to increase the ultramontanization o f Badenese 
Catholics.40
Emboldened by his success, in 1853, Vicari declared that the state did not 
possess the right to interfere in religious affairs, and he began to disregard the 
stipulations that the state had placed on the church. The Archbishop now appointed 
priests without state approval, opened a new seminary without prior agreement with 
the government, and completely ignored the placet. When the department o f religious 
affairs reprimanded him, he excommunicated all o f its members. The state then 
placed Vicari under house arrest, which caused an uproar among Catholics, not only in 
Baden but throughout Germany. In many towns, the situation grew so tense that the 
government had to dispatch troops to maintain order. The reactions to the 
Archbishop’s imprisonment signaled the revival o f political life in Baden. August 
Lamey, who later became one o f the leaders o f the liberal struggle against the Church, 
defended Vicari at his trial in 1854 41 The trial was a much publicized event and 
helped re-establish the liberals as a legitimate political force after the failures o f 1848- 
1849. By defending the Archbishop, Lamey rallied popular support as he and the 
liberals appeared as defenders o f individual rights. During the 1850s, liberals 
maintained an uneasy alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, which contributed 
greatly to their return to the political mainstream.
This controversy also had serious foreign policy implications for Baden. In
40 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden, 206-210.
41 Ibid., 211-217.
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1855, Austria, seeking to strengthen its ties to the south German states, offered to 
negotiate in this conflict. The Prussians did not appreciate this proposal and sent a 
young man by the name of Otto von Bismarck to visit Grand Duke Friedrich I. 
Bismarck, who was very impressed by the pro-Prussian views of the Grand Duke, told 
the latter that he was going to have to be at the forefront of the battle that Protestants 
were about to launch against the Catholic Church.42 Despite Bismarck’s efforts, 
however, Vicari achieved his goal as he forced the conservative government to initiate 
negotiations with the Vatican to regulate the relationship between state and church in 
Baden.
The negotiations concerning the Concordat constituted an important turning 
point in Badenese politics. Had it come into effect, the Concordat would have 
significantly altered the relationship between state and church, since it was based upon 
the premise that canonical law provided the Church with the right to negotiate any 
proposed secular legislation on religious matters. The Concordat furthermore lifted 
the placet and enabled clergy to communicate freely with Rome; it removed state 
supervision from the education o f the clergy and abolished state control over much of 
the Church’s finances.43 This represented the fulfillment of many o f the demands of 
the Wurzburger conference, most of which were unacceptable to liberals.
These much-debated propositions provided an excellent opportunity for the 
liberals to seize political power. Encouraged by the recent Italian success against the
42 Gall, Bismarck. Der weisse Revolutionar (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), 212-213.
43 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 35-56.
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Austrians in 1859, they initiated a public and political campaign against the 
Concordat. Liberals argued that not only did this agreement provide the Catholic 
Church with too much freedom vis-a-vis the state, but because the Concordat would 
regulate domestic policies, it had to be ratified by the Second Chamber. Since the 
conservative government had originally not intended to have the Concordat debated, 
liberals argued that the agreement was unconstitutional.44 As debates intensified in 
late 1859 and early 1860, Franz von Roggenbach utilized his personal ties to the 
Grand Duke, as well as the latter’s resistance to a document that many interpreted as 
too conservative and pro-Austrian, to convince him to dispose of the conservative 
government.45 Meanwhile, in the weeks leading up to the vote in the Second 
Chamber, Archbishop Vicari collected signatures in favor o f the Concordat that was 
presented to the Grand Duke immediately prior to the last debates in the Parliament. 
More than 80,000 people signed the petition—illustrating the growing mass 
mobilization o f Catholics.46 Despite this effort, the Second Chamber rejected the 
Concordat in February 1860, which led to the dismissal of the conservative 
government. To take its place, a new liberal government under August Lamey came 
into power, signaling the beginning of a new era in Baden.
The new government constituted the most liberal regime in any German state 
to that date. With majority support in the Parliament, liberals dominated political life
44 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 94-108.
45 Ibid., especially 98-100.
46 Ibid., 40.
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during the next five years and passed a number o f laws that significantly altered the 
fabric o f Badenese society. Intent on modernizing, they simplified state 
administration and bureaucracy, reformed the judicial system, created a Department of 
Commerce, emancipated the Jews, removed the remains of the guild system and 
created provisions for free trade.47 Perhaps most importantly, after the installation of 
the new liberal government, Friedrich I and his ministers spent several months 
discussing how to regulate the relationship between state and church. On October 9, 
the Grand Duke presented a set o f laws, which remained largely intact until 1918. 
These provisions established that though the Church would receive a certain amount 
o f freedom, it would not be able to conduct its affairs without state interference. The 
freedoms o f the Church were always regulated to various degrees. For instance, the 
Church had the right to try its members under canonical law, but only if  the defendant 
agreed to it and if the case did not pertain to the defendant’s wealth or personal 
freedom. Officially the Church had the right to manage its own affairs, though the 
state had a say in important areas such as education, social policies, and marriages.
The main difference compared to the suggested Concordat was that secular law always 
held precedence over religious.48
The first two years o f the “New Era” in Baden were relatively peaceful. 
Negotiations over how to manage the Church’s finances jointly were concluded 
without much disagreement. In a report to the Pope in late 1861, Vicari stated that
47 For a very thorough description o f these reforms, see ibid., 171-207.
48Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden, 230-237.
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though the Concordat had not been passed, he was still hopeful regarding the current 
situation.49 Despite Vicari’s cautious optimism in 1861, however, the liberals’ 
determination to reform society meant that the prospect of conflict was never far 
removed. Already from the outset o f their rule, liberals declared their intention to 
reduce the Church’s influence over the educational system. Anticipating 
modernization, liberals argued that schools needed to prepare children better for 
society, rather than focus so much on preparing them for heaven. Catholics, on the 
other hand, considered the state’s interference in the educational system as just one 
more step towards a degenerate and immoral society.50
In 1863, Lamey appointed the liberal Protestant Karl Knies director o f the 
newly founded Oberschulrat. In July of the same year, he published his forty-four 
Kniesischen Thesen, which outlined the future organization of the schools. Among the 
most controversial suggestions were a reduction o f religious education from four to 
two hours per week, the current confessional schools should be turned into inter­
confessional ones (there would still be separate religious education), and the geistliche 
Ortschulinspektion was to be replaced by a local Ortschulrat. These proposed 
changes outraged Vicari and the Catholic clergy.51 To add fuel to the fire, the 
government did not include the Church in any type o f discussions, which left the 
Catholics with an even stronger resolve to fight these proposed reforms.
49 Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 480.
50 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 127.
51 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 120-127.
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The debates in the parliament over Knies’s propositions grew increasingly 
hostile during 1863-1864, and it became evident that the two sides were heading for 
open conflict. As the Parliament passed the Schulaufsichtsgesetz in 1864, the lines of 
battles had been clearly drawn. This set of laws removed the Ortschulinspektion, 
which had consisted only of clergy, and replaced it with a local Oberschulrat, where 
clergy, teachers, the mayor, and a few elected members would supervise the schools.52 
Roman Catholics interpreted this measure as the first step towards a complete removal 
o f the Church in schools. Vicari published a pastoral brief in which he used extremely 
sharp language to criticize the latest liberal initiative. In October 1864, Vicari forbade 
Catholics to partake in these new Oberschulrate, even if elected. He furthermore 
ordered Catholics not to participate in the upcoming elections to the Oberschulrate. 
This passive resistance proved successful: in over 400 of 1,800 election districts, no 
votes were cast. The state responded by calling a second round of elections, with the 
added stipulations that there would be a significant fine for people who refused to take 
an elected position and that only three votes were needed for an election to be 
considered valid. Although many o f these elections still were not conducted according 
to proper procedure, 1,679 Oberschulrate were eventually formed.53
Despite its failure to prevent the initiation o f the Oberschulrate, Catholic 
resistance increased. The publication o f the Papal Encyclia “Syllabus Eronum” in 
December 1864 bolstered Catholic confidence. In it, Pope Pius IX condemned most
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 132-133.
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every phenomenon of the new liberal era.54 Ridiculed by liberals as reactionary and 
backward, this papal stance against modernity strengthened most Catholics in their 
resolve to fight the onslaught o f secularization. Also, in 1865, in conjunction with the 
disputes regarding the elections to the local Ortschulrat, the Heidelberg Catholic 
Jakob Lindau founded the Casino Movement, which mobilized and politicized large 
parts of the Catholic masses. Originally, Lindau had no other intention than to provide 
Catholics with a safe haven where they could meet and discuss how to approach the 
injustices that the state levied upon them. He soon proved to be both a skilled orator 
and organizer who could rally great numbers o f Catholics. A salesman by profession, 
one o f the reasons Lindau attracted so much support was that people considered him a 
popular leader o f the Catholic opposition.55
After witnessing the local success o f the Casino, Lindau decided to transform it 
into a “traveling association.” During the spring and summer of 1865, he organized 
Casinos in many cities around the state, assembling hundreds and sometimes 
thousands o f Catholics.56 The importance of the Casino Movement for the 
politicization o f the Catholic masses cannot be overstated. Especially in smaller towns 
and rural areas, Lindau’s agitation concerning the evils of the liberal government met 
with almost unanimous support. Most Catholics welcomed the opportunity to display
54 Hilrten, Kurze Geschichte des deutschen Katholizismus, 127.
55 Franz Dor, Jakob Lindau. Ein badischer Politiker und Volksmann in seinem Leben und Wirken 
geschildert(Freiburg: Herder, 1909), 31-35.
56 A good discussion o f this phenomenon can be found in Dorneich, “Die Entstehung der badischen 
‘Katholischen Volkspartei’ zwischen 1865 und 1869 im Tagebuch von Baurat Dr. Karl Bader,” 
Freiburger Diozesan Archiv 84 (1964): 315-317; see also Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 142-143.
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their aversion to the state’s policies. Despite periods o f temporary religious revival, 
Roman Catholics had been on the defensive for most o f the century. They were 
keenly aware that their majority status was decreasing (in 1828, the state contained 
sixty-seven percent Catholics; in 1900, they were down to sixty-one percent), and the 
fact that they were underrepresented among the emerging bourgeoisie placed a heavy 
burden on them.57 The growing presence o f Catholic organizations in the public 
sphere strengthened the Catholic case as well as escalated the hostility between 
Catholics and liberals. Communities became increasingly divided as confessional 
issues dominated local politics.
In addition to the unpopularity of the liberals’ confessional policies, their 
economic reforms met with resistance as well. To be sure, the new decrees spurred an 
intense period o f industrialization. However, it often took place at the expense of the 
lower middle and lower classes. As an increasing number o f people suffered in the 
transition to a more industrialized society, contemporaries frequently accused liberals 
o f only being interested in aggrandizing their own profits. One o f the more important 
consequences o f the hostility towards this economic policy was that it alienated many 
from other aspects of the liberal movement, which carried grave implications for 
Roggenbach’s foreign policies.
Closely associated with the kleindeutsche solution to the German problem, the 
liberals were well aware of the pro-Austrian sentiments of most Badeners. The state
57 The classic statement on the relationship between Badenese Catholics and the development o f the 
modern industry is Martin Offenbacher, Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie tiber die 
wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden (Tubingen: Mohr, 1908).
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was divided into three uneven camps on the German question. The kleindeutsche 
group centered on Heidelberg and Karlsruhe and, though relatively small in size, 
included many significant politicians and business men. The middle areas o f the state 
contained many people who were initially undecided on this issue. After Otto von 
Bismarck’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the Prussian Parliament and in the 
Schleswig-Holstein affair, however, most adopted a grofideutsch position. Finally, the 
overwhelmingly Catholic southern part o f the state contained a very strong pro- 
Austrian contingent. Because of this complex situation, the liberal government could 
not afford much discontent on domestic issues since it would eliminate any possibility 
o f reaching consensus on the German question. This is an excellent illustration of the 
main political problem that the Badenese liberals faced: the intricate ties between 
domestic and foreign politics. None understood this dilemma better than Roggenbach, 
who centered his political program on this premise. When he became foreign minister
• 58in 1861, his main concern was to unify the German states under Prussian leadership. 
Because o f the prussophile sentiments o f the Grand Duke, Roggenbach had 
Friedrich’s unequivocal support.
Although the liberals initially enjoyed popular support, many of their reforms 
eventually alienated large segments o f the population. There were primarily two 
reasons why Roggenbach and his associates failed to implement their political 
program. First of all, they underestimated the political power o f the Catholic Church. 
When they began reforming the educational system to reduce the influence o f the
58 This is discussed in painstaking detail by Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 208-279.
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Church, an immediate mass mobilization and politicization o f Catholics followed. 
Second, the refusal o f both the Grand Duke and many o f the liberals to accept the 
proposed changes that Austria presented at the meeting of princes and electors in 
Frankfurt in 1863 on how to reform the German Confederation isolated Baden from 
the other middle states.59 Not only did this decision place the state in a vulnerable 
position in case of war, but it also alienated the regime from large parts o f its Catholic 
constituency. Although some liberals supported Friedrich’s actions in Frankfurt, his 
and Roggenbach’s rejection of the Austrian proposals constituted a turning point for 
the liberal government. For his remaining two years as foreign minister, Roggenbach 
had almost no popular support.
In 1865, the hostility towards the liberal government’s economic, educational, 
and foreign policies had grown so strong that the Grand Duke was forced to remove 
Roggenbach. His successor, Ludwig Freiherr von Edelsheim, focused on revising 
Baden’s foreign policy. Edelsheim wanted to end Baden’s self-imposed isolation by 
allying more closely with the middle states, which in effect meant a more pro-Austrian 
policy.60 As Prusso-Austrian relations turned increasingly hostile, it became apparent 
that despite the growing number o f liberals who advocated neutrality in an armed 
conflict and the Grand Duke’s efforts to mediate a peaceful solution to the dispute, 
Baden would have to fight on the Austrian side. Facing pressure from every German
59 Ibid., especially 239-241.
60 Friedrich Koeppel, “Baden und die deutsche Entscheidung des Jahres 1866,” Zeitschrift fur die 
Geschichte Oberrheins 88 (1936): 451-453.
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state on its borders, Baden joined Austria as the Austro-Prassian War erupted in July 
1866. The government’s agony in choosing sides had no equivalent among the 
majority o f the population. The Catholics, comprising two-thirds o f the population, 
almost unanimously supported Austria, and after Bismarck’s belligerent behavior over 
the previous years, many Protestant liberals identified with Habsburg Emperor Francis 
Joseph as well. When the war began, people o f all classes and confessions called for a 
defense o f their German brethren in Austria, who now faced Bismarck’s imperialist 
ambitions. Among large segments o f the population, the outbreak o f war triggered a 
dramatic increase in anti-Prussian sentiments, which did not easily fade with time.61
Baden played a minor role in the Austro-Prussian War.62 Its army was only 
involved in a few minor skirmishes, all o f them following the battle of 
Koniggratz/Sadowa. The soldiers were in a peculiar situation because though they 
identified strongly with the Austrian cause, many o f their high-ranking officers had 
been openly pro-Prussian up to the onset o f war, which certainly affected the army’s 
performance. One indication of how uninterested many officers were in fighting was 
Bavaria’s frequent accusations that the Badenese troops were deserting “the noble 
cause o f the Austrians.”63 After the Prussian victory at Koniggratz, the Badenese
61 Newspapers of all political ideologies and religious confessions were filled with tirades against 
Bismarck’s behavior. See for instance Freie Stimme, July, 24, 1866.
62 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 364-368; Koeppel, “Baden und die deutsche 
Entscheidung des Jahres 1866,” 218-259.
63 See for instance Karl du Jarry de la Roche, Aktenmafiige interessante Enthullungen iiber den 
badischen Verrat an den deutschen Bundestruppen in dem soeben beendigten preufiisch-deutschen 
Kriege (Miinchen, 1866). The Badenese government composed an answer, authored by Robert von 
Mohl, DerAnteil der badischen Felddivision an dem Kriege des Jahres 1866 in Deutschland (Lahr:
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government’s attitude towards the war changed quickly. Realizing that Austria was 
now excluded from the German question, it took appropriate measures. On July 21, 
the government approached King Wilhelm I o f Prussia, asking for a peace treaty, in 
which Baden agreed to pay a large indemnity. The Prussian General Armin von Beyer 
was appointed head o f the Badenese war ministry and quickly reformed the Badenese 
military according to Prussian standards. The two states also signed a secret alliance, 
in which both were guaranteed assistance from the other in case o f attack.
The signing o f this treaty represented the end o f the liberal era in Baden. As 
the government resigned, the liberals remained the dominant party in the Parliament. 
However, from now until the unification o f the Reich, Friedrich I essentially ruled 
above the party system. The Grand Duke enlisted his trusted associate, the 
philoprussian Karl Mathy, to form a new government. Mathy, who died in office in 
1868, and his successor Julius Jolly, sought to minimize the influence of the 
Parliament.64 The Grand Duke, Mathy, and Jolly were all intent on making Baden a 
member of the North German Confederation. Bismarck, however, fearing the 
reactions o f the other southern states, would not comply with their wish. Although 
Friedrich I and other leading politicians were convinced that it was only a matter of 
time before Baden joined the North German Confederation, large segments of the 
population remained strongly opposed. Many voiced their displeasure with the 
“Prussianization” o f Badenese society that took place after the signing o f the peace
Geiser, 1867).
64 Hermann Baumgarten, Staatsminister Jolly. Ein Lebensbild (Tubingen: Laupp, 1897), 21-22.
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and alliance treaties o f 1866. The government was apparently aware of these 
sentiments, as it often stressed the need to watch for “internal enemies” who were 
attempting to undermine the interests of the fatherland.
The elections to the new Customs Union in 1868 provided an indication o f the 
resistance that the Prussian-oriented policies encountered. Led by Jakob Lindau, 
Catholics organized a successful election campaign, which provided stunning results. 
Although the liberals won the popular vote with 89,000, the Catholics with 78,000 
were close behind.65 Because people interpreted this election as a referendum on the 
national-liberal policies, the results were disheartening to the government. Not until 
the escalation o f the conflict between France and Germany in 1870 did much o f the 
population, albeit only temporarily, adopt a more friendly attitude towards Prussia and 
Bismarck.
In the midst o f their popular mobilization in 1865-1866, Badenese Catholics 
had been somewhat taken aback by the Austrian defeat in the war o f 1866. To many, 
the swift (Protestant) Prussian victory and the realization that Austria was now 
essentially excluded from the German question was difficult to accept.66 Immediately 
prior to the war, Catholic opposition to the government had steadily grown stronger, 
and as the liberals sensed the growing discontent with their domestic and foreign 
policies, they had begun to test the waters for a possible compromise with the Church.
65 Excellent accounts o f these elections include: Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 208-214; 
Domeich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 349-370.
66 Many examples of these sentiments can be found in Catholic newspapers. See for instance Freie 
Stimme, December 28, 1866; January 17, 1867.
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The outcome of the war, however, removed any such possibility. Although not all 
Catholics were disillusioned by recent events, the Grand Duke’s selection o f Jolly as 
the successor to the deceased Premier Karl Mathy in 1868 signified the beginning of 
their most difficult time. Jolly, who according to contemporaries was the most 
dedicated o f all German “Kulturkampf ministers,” made the relationship between state 
and church his primary concern. Considered the personification o f all negative traits 
o f liberalism, Jolly became utterly despised among Catholics.
One of the first Catholic experiences with the fierce stubbornness o f the new 
premier was in conjunction with the election o f a new archbishop to succeed Vicari, 
who died in 1868 at the ripe age of ninety-five. In light of the steadily deteriorating 
relations between Karlsruhe and Freiburg, the inability to unite behind a new 
candidate should have come as no great surprise. Considering the many reforms that 
the liberal government was trying to implement, they could not accept an ultramontane 
archbishop, who would offer resistance to their ideas. Likewise, Catholics would 
never tolerate anyone whom they suspected o f being too government friendly. After a 
few unsuccessful attempts at nominating a suitable candidate, both sides realized that 
under present circumstances, no successor to Vicari would be found. This led to a 
peculiar situation, where the current Dean Lothar von Ktibel, from 1868 to his death in 
1882, remained auxiliary Archbishop. Although never appointed to the position, 
Ktibel possessed the same powers that he would if  elected Archbishop. Kiibel, who
67 For a detailed, though slightly biased, account o f Kubel’s life, see Joseph Schofer, Bischof Lothar von 
Kiibel. Sein Leben und Leiden dargestellt (Freiburg: Herder, 1911).
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for a long time had belonged to the most well-respected and influential members of 
the ultramontane clergy, successfully led Badenese Catholics through the 
Kulturkampf
Between 1866 and 1871, the liberal government made several key decisions 
that indicated that a Badenese Kulturkampf was well underway. In 1867, the 
Parliament issued a law requiring all newly examined priests to pass a state-supervised 
exam—the Kulturexamen—before they were appointed to a parish. The exam covered 
the fields o f philosophy, world history, German literature since Klopstock, and
zro
perhaps most importantly, German history since the Reformation. The liberals 
argued that the knowledge required to pass this test was necessary for a priest in his 
role as educator on the local level. Vicari and Kiibel both refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of this examination and forbade Catholics to take it. That only two priests 
took this test is testimony to the power of Kiibel. In response, the liberal government 
did not recognize and later arrested newly appointed priests who were working in their 
parishes without having passed the exam. Similar to the strong reaction to Vicari’s 
house arrest in 1854, Catholic communities rallied around their threatened clergy.
They hid priests, and if  the Badenese state arrested one, mass demonstrations often 
erupted. A clergy member released from prison was met with a hero’s welcome when 
he returned to his parish.69
68 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 239-243.
69 For a good discussion o f these events, see Schofer, Sperregesetz und Sperrlingslos. Ein Auschnitt aus 
dem badischen Kulturkampf fiir das Volk (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1930).
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In the next step towards reducing religious influence in the schools, the 
government in 1868 ordered the establishment of interconfessional schools. This 
decree stated among other things that in communities where both confessions were 
somewhat evenly represented, the community had to abolish confessional schools and 
educate Catholics and Protestants under one roof. This was another instance where 
the government had overestimated its power. Few communities abided by these 
provisions, and when they did, it was accompanied by confrontations between 
Catholics and Protestants.70
In 1869, Jolly introduced civil marriage, which forced couples to conduct a 
marriage ceremony at city hall. Catholic clergy especially resented this decree since 
the institution o f marriage had always been closely related with religion and the
71church. Immediately before the outbreak o f war in 1870, Jolly passed another law 
that stripped the Church of all financial resources that could not be directly linked to 
religious purposes. This law, which was one of the most significant ones during the 
Kulturkampf, prevented the Church from conducting any type o f social activities and 
drastically reduced its capacity for benevolent work. Scholars have estimated that this 
decree cost the Catholic Church over twenty million Goldmark.72 To add further to 
the now extremely hostile relationship between church and state came the conflicts
70 Baumgarten, Staatsminister Jolly, 104-108; Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 243-251; Hans 
Farber, Der Liberalismus und die kulturpolitischen Fragen in Baden 1850-1870 (Freiburg: Herder, 
1959), 286-301.
71 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 251-255; Dor, Jakob Lindau, 59; Schofer, Bischof Lothar von 
Ktibel, 106-118.
72 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 265.
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« . . . .  7Tregarding the 1870 Vatican council and the declaration o f papal infallibility.
In May 1869, as a logical outgrowth of the increased mobilization and 
politicization o f the Catholic masses, Lindau and three other leading Catholic 
personalities—Ferdinand Bissing, Reinhold Baumstark, and Albert Lender—founded 
the Katholische Volkspartei (Catholic People’s Party), which represented a completely 
different view o f the current domestic and foreign policy situation than the liberals.
The People’s Party advocated the formation of a South German Bund, which would 
strive to unify all German states, including Austria, in a loose federation. It also 
demanded that the Church be given complete freedom to conduct its affairs. The party 
scored an immediate success, securing four seats in the parliament elections in 1869. 
Although the liberal government did not consider the four Catholic representatives a 
threat, the presence o f these high-profile Catholics served to further consolidate and 
unify the Catholic opposition.74
Despite the fact that Catholics were able to increase their political 
representation, the three-class voting system ensured that liberals would maintain most 
of the political power. In Baden, until the electoral reforms o f 1905, the franchise was 
divided into three classes based on paid income tax. The first class usually contained 
about one twelfth of the enfranchised population; the second class contained the next
73 For a good discussion of German responses to the declaration of papal infallibility, see Karl Josef 
Rivinius, Bischof Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler und die Infallibilitdt des Papstes (Frankfurt: Lang, 
1976).
74Domeich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 373-375.
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two twelfths. Thus, the third class contained anywhere from eighty to ninety percent 
o f the electorate. All three classes carried equal weight in the election process, which 
meant that a vote in the first class usually carried about fifteen to twenty times as 
much weight as a vote in the third class. The fact that many people in the third class 
often failed to exercise their voting rights on election days only helped to underline 
further the unequal nature o f this election system. City council elections were carried 
out in the same fashion, which ensured that Protestant liberals, who vastly 
outnumbered everybody else in the first two voting categories, were able to maintain
75most of the municipal and state political power throughout the Second Empire. 
Protestant liberals benefited greatly from possessing most o f the municipal political 
power. Although the state maintained a certain control on municipal politics, cities 
could and did exercise a great deal o f influence over their own jurisdictions. Thus, for 
the most part o f the Kaiserreich, these liberals enjoyed a great deal o f local political 
power. Although the Catholic political party gained a significant amount o f political 
power during the last two decades prior to the First World War, they never were as 
politically powerful as the liberals, which played an important role in determining the 
nature o f their relationship.
Although suffering persecution throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Badenese Catholics displayed signs of increasing strength, particularly since 
the 1850s. The ultramontanization and politicization that had taken place especially
75 Dieter Hein, “Badisches Burgertum. Soziale Struktur und Kommunalpolitische Ziele im 19. 
Jahrhundert,” in Stack und Burgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Lothar Gall (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1990), 85-86.
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during the past decade strengthened Catholic resolve to resist the pressure to accept 
Protestant-Prussian-based national identity after 1871. To be sure, conservative 
Badenese Catholics were about to face a new challenge from liberal Catholics, who 
used the controversy surrounding the Vatican Council o f 1870 and the declaration of 
papal infallibility to secede and form their own church, the so-called Old Catholic 
Church. Although life in certain communities was marked by harsh conflicts between 
Old Catholics and Catholics, this only bolstered the latter’s determination to remain 
true to their understanding o f Germanness, largely based on Roman Catholic values.
At the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Baden constituted a state with a 
population o f one and a half million, of which about sixty-four percent were Catholic 
and thirty-five percent were Protestants. As the relationship between France and 
Prussia deteriorated, the political and religious situation in Baden was reaching 
unprecedented levels o f tension. Attempting to reap the benefits from a long tradition 
o f liberalism, Jolly and his ministers were intent on maintaining a fast pace of 
modernization, which caused frequent clashes with the state’s Catholic majority. 
Although the seeds o f this conflict had been sown during the past half-century, not 
until the 1860s and 1870s did the two sides engage in open conflict. Although the 
liberals had a firm grip on political power, the increasing mobilization, 
ultramontanization, and politicization o f Baden’s Catholics had transformed them into 
worthy opponents. When Germany finally solved its national question based on a 
kleindeutsch alternative, many Catholics hesitated to accept the new nation-state. 
Drawing upon the increasing strength that they had displayed during the two previous
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
decades, Baden’s Catholics were not simply subsumed by the new Protestant- 
Prussian-based national identity, but offered their own interpretation of German 
national identity, which was largely derived from their earlier experiences.
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CHAPTER 3
CELEBRATING UNIFICATION ON THE FRINGES OF THE EMPIRE: 
KONSTANZER CATHOLICS AND THE COMMEMORATION OF UNIFICATION
When the citizens of Konstanz celebrated the foundation o f the Second 
German Empire in January o f 1871, many expressed hope that the new nation-state 
would bring peace and harmony to a society that had been characterized by intense 
conflicts for the past few years. Especially since Max von Stromeyer had been 
elected mayor in 1866, the atmosphere in Konstanz had been marked by confessional 
and political tensions. Stromeyer, one o f Baden’s leading liberals, had been 
determined to end Konstanz’s economic woes by rapidly modernizing most aspects of 
local society. More importantly, his modernizing efforts centered on stripping the 
Catholic Church of many of its economic and cultural resources. Although many of 
Konstanz’s leading businessmen (most of whom were Protestants) supported these 
endeavors, the majority o f Catholics were opposed to the attempts to limit 
significantly the role o f the Church. These reforms had also highlighted the difficult 
position that Konstanzer Catholics faced during the 1860s and early 1870s. Caught 
between old regional and religious loyalties and the growing presence o f Protestant 
liberals who stressed the need to integrate the city into Baden, the North German 
Confederation, and the Kaiserreich, these Catholics were forced to reevaluate and 
renegotiate their identities in a most public manner. Consequently, despite
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constituting the overwhelming majority in the city, in 1871, Konstanzer Catholics 
expressed doubts about entering a nation-state dominated by Prussian national- 
liberals. Having experienced firsthand the effects o f nation-liberal rule, both liberal 
and ultramontane Catholics were hesitant about the prospect o f becoming the kind o f 
Germans envisioned by the Prussian Protestant elites.
This chapter will trace the initial reactions o f Konstanzer Catholics to the 
foundation of the Second Empire. Around the time o f unification, Konstanz was a city 
caught in the midst between Protestant liberals and Catholics as well as between two 
religious traditions. On the one hand, the city had for several centuries been the site of 
one o f the most important Archbishoprics in Central Europe, which had left a strong 
legacy of ultramontanism. On the other, during the last decade o f the eighteenth 
century, Konstanz had been greatly affected by Josephine religious reforms and the 
efforts of Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, one of the most important German Catholic 
reformers o f the nineteenth century. Half a century later, the effects o f Wessenberg’s 
reforms were still evident as Konstanz housed a sizeable contingent o f liberal 
Catholics. Because o f these often conflicting traditions, it is necessary to trace briefly 
the recent history o f the city in order to better understand some o f the responses o f the 
Catholics to the unification of the Empire.
Turning Konstanzers into Badeners 1806-1871
Following the treaty of Pressburg in 1805, Konstanz was transferred to what 
was soon to become the Grand Duchy o f Baden. Having previously enjoyed the
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autonomous status o f a provincial city in the Habsburg Empire, Konstanzers were now 
forced to adjust to life under new Grand Duke Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden.
Initially, most locals, especially the older generation, still identified with Austria while 
many younger inhabitants wanted Konstanz to be incorporated into Switzerland. 
Because o f the city’s location on the Swiss border, many were attracted by the relative 
economic success o f their neighbors. Although citizens were not openly hostile to 
their new ruler, it was still evident that there existed no widespread support for the 
Badenese state. When the city was officially handed over to Baden on March 27,
1806, most Konstanzers treated the grand ceremony with indifference.1
In 1806, Konstanz had 4,419 inhabitants, most o f whom made their living from 
a combination o f farming and some form of trade or craft.2 Even by contemporary 
standards, the local economy was underdeveloped, and since the Badenese state did 
not employ primogeniture, fertile land was becoming increasingly scarce. Konstanz 
was heavily Catholic (almost ninety percent), and similarly to most south German 
cities, the Church played a dominant role in society. For several centuries, the city 
had been the seat of one of the most powerful Archbishops in Central Europe, and 
though their powers had diminished over the last hundred years, the Konstanzer high
■5
clergy still enjoyed substantial prestige at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
1 Gert Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1. Restauration, Revolution, Liberate Ara 
1806 bis 1870 (Konstanz: Stadler, 1994), 9. See also Ludwig Mathy, Wie Konstanz badisch wurde: 
Szenische Bilder aus dem Jahr 1806 zu Erinnerung an der Vereinigung Konstanz mit dem 
Kurfurstentum Baden (Konstanz: Presseverein, 1906).
2Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.7,10.
3 For an in-depth treatment o f the conditions o f the Catholic Church in Konstanz during these turbulent
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For most of the Napoleonic wars, Konstanz remained outside the immediate 
war scene. Only once, in 1809, did Austrian soldiers enter the city, but after tearing 
down the Badenese coat of arms displayed on city hall, they quickly left. Although 
not directly affected by the wars, locals still suffered from having to lodge both French 
and Badenese soldiers at various times. In a city with an already strained economy, 
the task o f supplying food and ammunition to soldiers was difficult to bear. 
Consequently, inhabitants accused the new government in Karlsruhe o f imposing too 
many demands on them. These sentiments constituted a recurring theme throughout 
the nineteenth century, as locals often complained that government officials neglected 
Konstanz because o f its status as a city on the margins o f the state.4
While other parts o f Baden slowly embarked on the industrialization process 
during the first decade of the pre-March period, little headway was made in Konstanz. 
Instead of gradually increasing the percentage o f people employed within trade and 
industry, Konstanz witnessed the opposite development during the 1820s and early 
1830s. One o f the most important reasons for the poor economic growth was the 
reorganization o f the Catholic Church in Baden. Prior to the 1821 transfer o f the 
Erzbischoflichen Ordinat (EO) to Freiburg, Konstanz received about 10,000 Gulden in 
annual religious fees. In addition, the loss o f a number o f well-paid positions 
negatively affected the economy. Many members o f the high Catholic clergy had
times, see Franz Xaver Bischof, Das Ende des Bistums Konstanz. Hochstift und Bistum Konstanz im 
Spannungsfeld von Sdkularisation und Suppression (1802/03-1821/27) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1989). 
See also Helmut Maurer, Das Bistum Konstanz: Das Stift Sankt Stephan in Konstanz (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1981).
4 These sentiments dominate much o f the discussion in Zang, ed., Provianzialisierung einer Region.
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earned salaries that were among the highest in Konstanz, and their absence slowed the 
local economy.
During the discussions concerning the reorganization of the Catholic Church, it 
soon became evident that Konstanz would not be the seat of the new Archbishop, 
despite the city’s strong Catholic tradition. Following the death o f Archbishop 
Dalberg in 1817, the Badenese government endorsed Wessenberg, who lived and 
worked in Konstanz, as their candidate. Attempting to convince the curia that he was 
the most appropriate choice, Wessenberg spent five months in Rome in 1817, 
answering to various accusations of unchristian behavior. The Pope and his advisors 
were primarily concerned about Wessenberg’s attempts to translate the liturgy into 
German and his attempts to democratize the Church. The controversy surrounding 
Wessenberg affected all aspects of society as the Pope was determined to strip the city 
o f all religious power and importance, including moving the EO to Freiburg, which 
had dire financial consequences.5
Konstanz’s slow industrialization impaired the development o f a local 
bourgeoisie, and entrepreneurs only began to play a very modest role in city life in the 
1830s. Because o f the city’s location on the Lake o f Constance and the Rhine, 
members o f the bourgeoisie focused their initial efforts on the steamboat industry, 
founding several steamboat companies and shipyards. Locals also began exploring
5 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 49-70. For a more general 
treatment o f Wessenberg’s life and ideas, see Braun, Kirche und Aufklarung and Carl Radlspeck, Die 
Nationalkirchliche Idee Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenbergs im Urteil der Flugschriftenliteratur 1803- 
1821 (Koln: Hansel-Hohenhausen, 1992).
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tourism as a means o f stimulating the economy. Throughout the first part o f the 
century, the efforts to make Konstanz attractive to outsiders increased incentives to 
develop infrastructure and public services.
When Baden joined the Customs Union in 1835, citizens were confident that it 
would be the turning point for the economy, especially considering Konstanz’s status 
as a border city. In addition, people were convinced that the emerging railroad 
network would serve to further integrate Konstanz into the Badenese economy. 
However, despite attempts o f local elites to persuade the state government to extend 
the railroad to the shores o f the Lake o f Constance, it would be another twenty-five 
years before the railroad was completed. During this period, few other topics attracted 
more public attention. Proponents of the railroad argued that there were two main 
reasons why construction was never started: the Badenese government consciously 
slighted Konstanz, and more importantly, city elites did not do enough to convince the 
Grand Duke and his ministers o f the importance of this issue.6 This reflected a 
growing split among elites in the city as liberals became increasingly frustrated with 
what they considered the reactionary and antimodem views o f most o f the ruling 
strata. To complicate matters further, most of the former were liberal Catholics and 
Protestants, whereas the majority o f the latter belonged to the ultramontane faction, 
which brought confessional politics into the realm of city development.
Although the period between 1835 and 1848 witnessed modest economic
6 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 97, 113, 148-149, 197- 
198,256-257.
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growth, primarily within the textile industry, the improvements did not match the 
expectations o f locals, who began to voice publicly their dissatisfaction. To add 
further to the tense atmosphere in the city, several religious conflicts took place in the 
1840s, all of which were increasingly tied to political issues. In the pre-March period, 
most conservative Catholics supported the reactionary views of Count Mettemich 
while the majority o f liberal Catholics advocated a democratization of society more in 
line with the ideas o f Badenese liberals such as Karl von Rotteck and Adam von 
Itzenstein. Although Konstanz, primarily due to the presence o f Wessenberg, housed 
a relatively large contingent o f liberal Catholics, the proximity to Austria helped 
strengthen the conservative camp. Combined with the increasing dissatisfaction with 
the lack o f economic development, the religious revival that originated in the late 
1830s created an explosive atmosphere.
The first major religious controversy emerged as several high-profile liberal 
Catholics, utilizing their increased popularity after the revival, became more 
aggressive in their attempts to reform and democratize the Church. When faced with 
this development, in addition to the growing importance o f the city’s bourgeoisie, the 
vast majority o f whom were liberal Catholics, ultramontane Catholics realized the 
need to engage in public polemic with their liberal foes. The beginning of the 1840s 
witnessed the increasing consolidation o f liberal and ultramontane camps, which 
remained for several decades. In 1845, a controversial visit by Archbishop Hermann 
von Vicari triggered a full-blown conflict between liberals and ultramontanes. While 
in Konstanz, Vicari refused to meet with any liberal clergy members, though some of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
them headed parishes o f considerable size. The Archbishop’s action caused an uproar 
among liberal Catholics and several hundreds took to the streets, where they clashed 
with ultramontanes. This event further reinforced the liberal Catholics’ conviction 
that drastic measures were necessary to ensure their religious freedom, and in October 
1845, they subsequently founded a chapter o f the deutsch-katholische church, which 
opposed the perceived dogmatism within both the Catholic and Protestant churches. 
Although the deutsch-katholische church attracted both Protestants and Catholics, in 
Konstanz, the vast majority o f its members were Catholic. In response, ultramontanes 
collected names for a petition demanding that all members o f the new church be 
barred from public office, effectively illustrating how closely religious conflicts were 
tied to local politics. The conflict surrounding the founding of the deutsch-katholische 
church demonstrates the importance of confessional issues to the development o f a 
public sphere.7
During the revolutions o f 1848-1849, Konstanz played a significant role. 
Housing a large number o f radicals, the city served as the stage where Friedrich 
Hecker allegedly proclaimed the republic and began his march on Karlsruhe. The 
widespread revolutionary sentiments can mainly be attributed to the poor economic 
situation and the inhabitants’ growing political awareness. Notwithstanding that some 
progress had been made since 1835, the city’s economy was still underdeveloped, and 
locals were keenly aware that they were not matching the progress o f other areas of
7 Alfred Diesbach, Die deutsch-katholische Gemeinde Konstanz, 1845-1849 (Mannheim: Freireligiose 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971).
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the state. Although an increasing number o f people derived their main income from 
business or industry, most still had to resort to farming to make ends meet. The mood 
in the city grew tense after 1845, especially since failed harvests marked the last two 
years preceding the revolutions. In 1847, over 1/3 of the local population depended on 
charity to survive, and the city remained in a very agitated state in the months leading 
up to the revolution.8
When the news about the Paris days arrived in Konstanz in March 1848, 
citizens were convinced that drastic change was imminent. On March 4, the city 
council published a long list o f demands, including complete freedom of press and 
religion, the right to bear arms, abolition of all feudal dues, and the election o f a 
national parliament. In addition, they formed a large representative body—the 
permanent committee—which was to hold a weekly meeting until all o f its demands 
had been met. Comprising the majority o f this committee, Konstanzer republicans 
were able to determine the political agenda in the initial stages of the revolution. One 
of their first actions was to nominate a delegation for the Offenburg meeting.
However, the Konstanzers’ initial revolutionary fervor was temporarily taken aback as 
they discovered that representatives from the rest of the state were not nearly as 
radical. Following intense deliberations in Offenburg, they refrained from declaring 
the republic, something that leading revolutionary Joseph Fickler had promised his 
fellow Konstanzers before leaving.9
8 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 151-153.
9 For general accounts of the revolution(s) in the southern part of Germany, please see Franz Vollmer,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
In late March, fivehundred Konstanzers armed themselves in response to 
(false) rumors that the French were about to attack the city. When the French threat 
did not materialize, these armed citizens remained on the streets to “uphold law and 
order.” Although this represented a significant intensification o f the revolution, it was 
not until the arrest o f Fickler on April 8 that sentiments for an armed uprising began to 
spread. When Hecker arrived in Konstanz a few days later, he found the city in an 
uproar. However, despite their brash rhetoric, most Konstanzers were in the end 
unwilling to join Hecker’s march on Karlsruhe. On April 12, when Hecker called on 
the crowds to form an army, several people openly opposed him, arguing that a 
military revolt would not solve their problems. Even the most radical leaders such as 
Nepomuk Katzenmayer and Eduard Vanotti refrained from officially supporting 
Hecker. As Hecker surveyed his troops in the pouring rain on April 13, only about 
thirty people followed him out o f the city. To be sure, in the following days, a few 
hundred more joined his army, but he never attracted the number o f supporters he had 
envisioned. Locals were discouraged by the Prussian troops that were waiting outside 
the state’s border, providing a limited prospect for success. In addition, most o f the 
revolutionary sentiment in and around Konstanz stemmed from the countryside, and 
once the Badenese government abolished feudal dues, a major reason for revolting
Der Traum von der Freiheit. Vormarz und 48er Revolution in Suddeutschland in zeitgendssischen 
Bildern (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1983); idem, Offenburg 1848/49 For discussion of the events in Konstanz, 
see Diesbach, “Friedrich Hecker verktindete am 12. April 1848 vom Balkon des Stadthauses Konstanz 
aus die deutsche Republick-Wahrhiet oder Legende?” Konstanzer Almanack, 1974, 39-46, and Elmar 
Fetscher, Der Konstanzer Bilrgermeister Karl Hiletlein und seine Zeit (Konstanz: Verlag der Siidkurier, 
1987), 152-156.
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was removed.10
Although Bavarian troops occupied Konstanz after Hecker’s defeat, 
revolutionary sentiment did not disappear. Arrests, persecutions, and trials o f 
supposed revolutionaries were constant features and served to maintain the tense 
atmosphere. Konstanz’s location on the Swiss border also contributed to keeping the 
revolution alive as many radicals escaped across the border, where they continued 
their activities.11 During the winter o f 1848-1849, in a similar fashion to many other 
German states, revolutionaries improved their organization at the grass-root level. 
Numerous local associations were founded, of which the Vaterlandischen Verein 
became the most important one. Members were especially successful in awakening 
the small but vocal local proletariat, which came to play an important role in the 
uprising in 1849.
On May 15,1849, members o f the Vaterlandischen Verein met to discuss the 
desertion o f government soldiers at Rastatt and Grand Duke Leopold’s flight to 
France. They initiated a barrage o f criticism of Mayor Karl Hiietlein, accusing him of 
having been too conservative in 1848, causing the first revolution to fail. Many 
argued that if  he was allowed to remain in office, this second uprising would fizzle as 
well. For the next three weeks, Konstanz was a flurry o f political activity as citizens 
prepared for mayoral elections. Despite the criticism, Hiietlein survived the most 
democratic election in the history of the city. The result indicated that the radical
10 Diesbach, “Friedrich Flecker,” 41-43.
n Fetscher, Der Konstanzer Biirgermeister, 156-158.
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faction, though still very vocal, was quickly losing support. Voters were likely 
influenced by the fact that at the time of the election, it was becoming increasingly 
evident that the Badenese revolution would not be able to withstand the force of 
Prussian and Hessian troops. When Prussians invaded the state, Brentano and his 
democratic government fled to Konstanz in a last attempt to delay the inevitable.
After only sporadic fighting, Prussian soldiers entered the city on July 11 and a few 
days later placed the entire region under military occupation.12
Following the defeat o f the revolution, the Grand Duke and his ministers 
appointed a new local government and restricted political activity to a minimum. 
Hessian and Prussian troops occupied the city, placing a considerable burden on the 
local community. In addition to the financial strain, soldiers imposed heavy 
restrictions on everyday life. The often abusive treatment locals received at the hands 
o f Prussian soldiers created much animosity, which remained long after the troops had 
departed.13 In light o f the recent spread o f radicalism, in 1852, the Badenese 
government awarded Konstanz a garrison. Locals expressed delight at this decision, 
which helped stimulate the economy. However, a repressive political climate and an 
economic recession characterized most o f the 1850s. Largely as a result of 
widespread emigration to America, the population decreased between 1852 and 1858. 
The 1850s ended on a positive note as the Badenese government finally decided to
12 Gustav Konig, ed., Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848. Bearbeitet nach den personlichen 
Schilderungen des Giirtelmeisters Josef Wirth in Konstanz anlafilich seines 80. Geburtstages 
(Konstanz: Konig, 1911), 17-21.
13 See for instance, Konstanzer Zeitung, 14, 16, 30 July, 1,4,5 October 1849.
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extend the railroad to Konstanz in 1858. This news caused an eruption o f joy in the 
city, as citizens were convinced that their economy would finally improve. To a 
certain extent, they were correct. Although the abolishing of the guilds in 1862 also 
helped considerably to stimulate the economy, the most important incentive for 
growth in the 1860s stemmed from the railroad, which was finally completed in 1863.
During the 1860s, Konstanz underwent a slow but steady economic growth. 
Highly important to the city’s development was the foundation of the Gewerbeverein 
in I860.14 Comprised o f the most prominent members of the city’s bourgeoisie, this 
organization proclaimed as their specific goal to alter the attitudes o f locals towards 
work and leisure. Members spread leaflets and organized meetings where they 
stressed that Konstanzers could no longer blame outside circumstances for their 
problems. Inherent in this discourse was a heavy criticism of the Catholic Church and 
its allegedly negative views of industrialization and modernization, which placed 
almost insurmountable obstacles on Konstanz’s road to a modem society. Members of 
the Gewerbeverein also tied this discussion to the controversy surrounding the 
Badenese Concordat. Immediately prior to the debates in the Second Chamber, 
Konstanz was heavily polarized as locals presented petitions for and against the 
Concordat to the Grand Duke. It is noteworthy that in their criticisms of the proposed 
agreement, liberals argued that the Concordat would place an insurmountable obstacle 
on the road to German unification. Sensing the growing force o f German nationalism, 
they argued that if  the Grand Duke signed this agreement, it would alienate the
14 Zang, Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1,231.
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northern states to such an extent as to make unification impossible.15 Once again, 
these conflicts effectively illustrate how intricately tied confessional issues were to all 
aspects o f Konstanzer society, including major issues such as modernization and the 
German question. Confessional attitudes largely determined attitudes in political, 
economic, and cultural questions.
The death of Wessenberg in 1860 provided Konstanz’s liberals an opportunity 
to display publicly their increasing strength. Immensely popular with the local 
population, Wessenberg’s funeral was an event of great magnitude. Controversy 
ensued when the EO refused to send a representative to the ceremony, which, 
considering that the current Archbishop Hermann von Vicari had worked together 
with Wessenberg for over half a century, was regarded a tremendous insult. Indicating 
the importance of the deceased reformer, though the Grand Duke did not personally 
attend the funeral, he placed an elaborate wreath on Wessenberg’s grave a few days 
later. Liberals took full advantage o f all these ceremonies, portraying Wessenberg as 
an ideal citizen who had always attempted to modernize the Church as well as the 
city.16 This discourse illustrates how the discussions on modernization encompassed 
all aspects o f society, from the German question to the future character o f the city. 
Taking place just a few months after the liberals had replaced the conservative 
government in Karlsruhe, this increasingly aggressive criticism of ultramontanes
15 Konstanzer Zeitung, 29 February, 16 March, 6, 11 April 1860. For a more general treatment of this 
conflict, see Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 35-55.
16 Konstanzer Zeitung, 10, 16, 22, 23, 25 August 1860.
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indicated that the city was entering a new era.
As was evident in conjunction with the death o f Wessenberg, German 
nationalism had started to take root in Konstanz in the beginning of the 1860s. In 
1861, the local singing society participated in the first all-German singing festival in 
Nuremberg. Upon their return, members reported excitedly about the fellow Germans 
they had met and the growing sense of unity that was spreading around the German 
states.17 In 1862, a local chapter of the Nationalverein was founded, though it initially 
did not attract too much attention. Also in 1862, newspapers encouraged locals with 
“the right amount o f patriotism” to participate in the first commemoration of the battle 
o f Leipzig.18 This popular ceremony serves as an illustrative example of an invented 
tradition as contemporaries failed to note that Baden had actually fought on the French 
side in the battle. This celebration sparked more intense debates regarding the 
German question. In 1863, members o f the grossdeutsche camp founded the 
Bodensee Zeitung, arguing that the increasingly liberal Konstanzer Zeitung 
misrepresented facts in this and other discussions. Not surprisingly, the founding of 
the former caused the latter to become even more openly liberal as the two papers 
engaged in intense polemics in the years leading up to the war o f 1866.
The intricate ties between local and national politics was demonstrated as it 
became increasingly evident that the two factions in the German question represented 
two different attitudes towards the future character of the city. Most of the supporters
17 Zang, Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 270.
18 Ibid.
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of the kleindeutsche solution viewed Prussia as their ideal. Just as Prussians had over 
the years transformed their state into one o f the most powerful entities in Europe, 
locals envisioned that hard work and the right amount o f sacrifices would turn 
Konstanz into an important city. Adopting the term Groflhungern as their method of 
changing the nature of the city, they argued that no sacrifice was too severe on the 
road to success. However, until 1866, Konstanzer liberals were in a difficult position. 
Often criticized for being too “Prussian,” many of their ideas alienated the local 
population. The majority of Konstanzers still remembered vividly the events o f 1848- 
1849 and the subsequent Prussian occupation, and hostile sentiments were still 
widespread. The supporters of the grossdeutsche solution also advocated 
modernization, but at a more reasonable pace. Despite the changing political climate 
in the state, the grossdeutsche camp dominated city politics until the war o f 1866. The 
majority o f Konstanzers championed the plans for unification, but only a relatively 
small number could envision a German state without Austria.19
Following the Austrian defeat in the war of 1866, liberals essentially forced the 
grossdeutsche Mayor Joseph Stadler into resignation. Stromeyer, who had been one 
o f the city’s leading and most vocal liberals for the past decade, succeeded him. 
Determined to modernize the city at all costs, his policies became a source o f great 
conflicts for the next decade. He first centered his attention on removing Church 
control of the Spitalstiftung. The long-time presence o f archbishops and other 
members o f the high clergy had enabled the Church to generate a considerable wealth,
19 See for instance, Konstanzer Zeitung, 28 December 1863, 23 February, 23, 27 March 1864.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
much of which was located in the Spitalstiftung. The Spital constituted a powerful 
institution as it provided citizens with several different welfare services. Ever since 
1865, liberals had frequently brought the issue of the Spital to the forefront o f public 
discussion, attempting to sway public opinion in their favor. After an intense 
campaign where he made repeated overtures to the Grand Duke and his government, 
Stromeyer achieved his goal in 1867 as the Badenese government awarded the city 
complete control over the Spital. This decision caused an outrage from the
ultramontane Catholics, who claimed that the poor would suffer tremendously from
0(\this change.
Emboldened by this success, in 1868, Stromeyer abolished confessional
schools, which made Konstanz the first Badenese city to initiate interconfessional
21schools. Since 1864, liberals had occupied the majority of important posts in the 
newly founded Oberschulraten, and they placed much emphasis on altering the 
educational system. Following the controversial manner in which Stromeyer had 
acquired the Spital from the Church, this decision made the mayor one of the most 
despised men in the area. Many conservative Catholics argued, not without right, that 
a small minority was making decisions that significantly altered the lives o f all 
Konstanzers. To make matters worse, this small minority initiated policies that were 
completely contrary to the desires o f the population. This time, the Church was
20Zang, “Die Bedeutung der Auseinandersetzung um die Stiftungsverwaltung in Konstanz (1830-1870) 
fflr die okonomische und gesellschaftlihce Entwicklung der lokalen Gesellschaft,” in Provizialisierung 
einer Region, ed. Zang, 307-373.
21 Werner Trapp, “Volksschulreform und liberales Burgertum in Konstanz,” in Provizialisierung einer 
Region, ed. Zang, 375-434.
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determined to offer some resistance. After several weeks of intense debates, the EO 
excommunicated Stromeyer in 1868, an event that echoed throughout the German 
lands.22
The last two years before the outbreak o f the Franco-Prussian War witnessed 
an increased hostility between liberals and Catholics in the city. At this time, Konstanz 
contained about 12,000 inhabitants, with Catholics numbering almost 10,000. The 
polarization o f local society became clearly evident in the mayoral elections in June 
1870. Known as the dirtiest in city history, the elections served as a referendum on 
the future character o f the city. Few citizens on either side o f the political spectrum 
would have denied that they were facing a choice as to how Konstanz should 
modernize. The liberals argued that the changes that they had implemented since 
1866 had already brought some significant economic progress, while Catholics 
claimed that liberal reforms had been too drastic and that though modernization was 
necessary, it had to be conducted in a more gradual manner. On June 23, 1870, 
Stromeyer won the election by a small margin, largely because the opposition had not 
been able to coordinate their forces. Catholics and Democrats were only united in
23their opposition to Stromeyer and had failed to form a coherent political program.
22 Ibid
23 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2: Aufschwung im 
Kaiserreich (Konstanz: Stadler, 1993), 15-19.
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The Franco-Prussian War and the Development of a Commemorative
Discourse
Consequently, as relations between Prussia and France grew increasingly 
hostile in the summer of 1870, the majority o f Konstanzers were preoccupied with 
local politics. Throughout the spring and early summer, newspapers almost 
exclusively focused on the election and many citizens seemed almost surprised when 
relations between the two states rapidly deteriorated in mid-July. However, when the 
city’s regiment left on July 17, papers centered their attention on the impending 
conflict, and the atmosphere in the city changed drastically.24
For Konstanz’s ultramontanes, the outbreak o f war signaled a temporary 
respite from the misfortunes o f local politics and provided them with an opportunity to 
reestablish themselves as an important societal force. Already on July 19, the Catholic 
Freie Stimme assured its readers that the unjustified belligerence of Napoleon III had 
caused the war and that the south German states were determined to support Prussia.25 
Reflecting the current political conditions, the papers also stressed that they hoped that 
the war would bring some unity to Konstanz and the rest of Germany. Citizens 
quickly became absorbed by the events in the west. Catholics and Protestants alike 
expressed fears that a French victory would mean disaster for the city, and politicians 
called upon all men and women, regardless o f confession and political opinion, to 
serve the fatherland, w hich now  incorporated not only the local and regional bu t the
24 See for instance Freie Stimme, July 19, 1870.
25 Ibid.
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national as well.26
Despite these official sentiments o f unity, events of recent years had created 
deep-seated resentments that would not easily disappear. Even when expressing 
support for the war, Catholics remarked that at least this time, all Germans would be 
fighting on the same side, which constituted an improvement compared to 1866. Still 
smarting from that defeat, local Catholics predicted that all German soldiers would 
battle in an “honest and determined” manner, which apparently had not been the case 
in 1866. They even offered some renewed criticism of the Bavarian effort in the last 
war, assuring that the German troops would have no difficulties locating the battle 
fields in France, unlike the Bavarians in 1866, who had claimed that they “could not 
find the enemy.”27
Notwithstanding these tendencies, Catholics and Protestants alike celebrated 
the first few victories. Both camps interpreted these triumphs as signs o f better things 
to come, and though initially not too aggressive in their nationalist rhetoric, they soon 
began calling for annexation o f Elsass and Lothringen.28 The victory at Sedan caused 
the most public excitement as people gathered in the streets to celebrate the capture o f 
Napoleon III. Although both Catholics and Protestants greeted the news of early 
victories with great relief and excitement, it soon became evident that the two groups 
viewed this conflict in different ways. Already after a few days o f war, Konstanzer
26 Freie Stimme, July 21, 1870; Konstanzer Zeitung, July 21, 1870.
21 Freie Stimme, July 21, 1870.
28 Konstanzer Zeitung, October 2, 1870.
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Zeitung claimed that though internal peace should be protected, locals must not turn a 
“blind eye” to the activities of the Catholic clergy. Several liberals had been quoted as 
stating that this war had little to do with the Prussians and the French; instead the 
Jesuits and their actions at the Vatican Council were to blame for the current 
hardships. Liberals also claimed that the Catholic hatred of all things Prussian had 
convinced Napoleon III that he could provoke war without having to face a united
9QGerman army. These accusations reflected the hostile local political climate prior to 
war, though it is doubtful how much attention Napoleon paid to Catholic demands to 
“throw the Prussian [Stromeyer] out o f City Hall.”
As it became increasingly evident that Germany would win the war, most 
Konstanzers turned to the issue of the future character o f the nation-state. Liberals 
were especially active in this debate, pointing out that they had finally been proven 
correct about the inherently flawed character o f a South German Federation. They 
ridiculed Catholics for having supported this idea, and some claimed that this proved 
how ignorant Catholics were about foreign policy matters, which in the end would 
justify banning them from local politics.
One o f the most severe conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in 
Konstanz during the war emerged in mid-November. At a banquet celebrating the 
conquering o f Metz, the Protestant city council member Ernst Zogelmann proclaimed 
what he labeled a new version of “The Lord’s Prayer.” Modeled on the famous prayer,
29 Konstanzer Zeitung, July 24, 26, 28; Freie Stimme, July 26, August 2, 1870.
30 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 5, 20, 1870.
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Zogelmann’s version, entitled “A Pious German’s Wish,” was not directed to God, but 
to the King of Prussia. Zogelmann pleaded with the King to grant Germans what they 
had so long been striving for: a unified nation-state. This request in itself would not 
have offended Catholics, but Zogelmann continued by asking Wilhelm to destroy the 
power of the “blacks,” who were attempting to divide and weaken the German
T 1nation. During the following days, Zogelmann’s blasphemous speech became the 
topic o f conversation among locals, and Catholics expressed their outrage in a variety 
o f ways. They claimed that to ask Wilhelm to destroy Catholic power was not only 
futile but also constituted a grave insult of the King’s character. Although not a 
Catholic, Wilhelm had often proven himself to be a man of proper religious 
convictions. Judging from his frequent praise o f God after German military victories, 
it was evident that he was a pious man who would never deliberately hurt his Catholic 
subjects. By suggesting otherwise, Zogelmann had insulted the King and should be
'K ')punished accordingly. As we shall see later, Catholics, though critical o f the official 
commemorative discourse, strove to stress their respect for and loyalty to the future 
German Emperor, providing additional evidence that Wilhelm on many occasions was 
located outside the official canon of nationalism. In a similar fashion, the Emperor 
was also never truly associated with the Kulturkampf though “his” politicians were 
the ones instigating the legislation.
31 The poem was published in its entirety in Freie Stimme, November 9, 1870. The banquet took place 
on October 29, 1870.
32 Freie Stimme, November 9, 1870.
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Catholics also argued that Zogelmann’s demands for complete dis- 
empowerment o f the Catholics proved that he and his fellow Protestants were creating 
divisions among Germans. In addition, his blasphemous speech made clear that he 
had little or no respect for religion, which was so important to all Germans, whether 
Catholic or Protestant. Catholics stressed that their clergy members displayed a better 
sense o f patriotism when refusing to support the demands for execution o f Napoleon
33III. Only a German without a deeper understanding o f nationalism would call for 
further punishment o f Napoleon III, a man who had already lost everything. This was 
one o f the earliest instances where Catholics displayed a different perception o f their 
national identity. Contrary to most official canons o f nationalism, Catholics often 
stressed the humane aspects o f their patriotism. As nationalism grew increasingly 
populist, they often complained that it appealed to the worst aspects o f people, 
encouraging greed, intolerance, and ignorance. Catholics argued that their ability to 
display compassion for the fallen enemy made them better Germans.
All Konstanzers greeted the news that Wilhelm had been crowned German 
Emperor with enthusiasm, and locals again united briefly around success.34 Towards 
the end of February, district council (Gemeinderat) members began contemplating 
which types o f festivities would be appropriate to celebrate the recent events.
Members were acutely aware o f the divided nature o f the city, as they naively stressed 
that if  celebrated in the appropriate manner, the peace celebration on March 3-4
33 Freie Stimme, November 12, 1870.
34 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1871; Freie Stimme, January 21, 1871.
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should be a major step towards unifying the community. Consequently, they decided 
to be quite strict in their guidelines for this festival, emphasizing the need to display 
Konstanzers as unified and much supportive of the new Reich. Alongside school 
children o f all ages, they invited a wide variety o f associations and organizations to 
participate.35 They hoped to present a representative cross section o f Konstanzer 
society, in which people from different political and confessional groups would 
partake in the festivities. In a rather unusual move, they specifically stressed that 
women were invited to attend the banquet at night, though the latter were informed 
that they would have to dress properly, otherwise they might be refused entry.36 In 
their invitation, which was published in all major newspapers, members o f the district 
council also declared that at the banquet everyone who wished to propose a toast 
would be able to do so. It was not clear whether this offer extended to the women as 
well. These initiatives suggest that liberal elites attempted to present these 
celebrations as emerging from below. By encouraging extensive personal 
participation, they wanted to display how excited Konstanzers were at the prospect of 
becoming Germans. In addition, by allowing regular citizens to partake actively in the 
festivities, they hoped to strengthen their grip on the commemorative discourse and to 
increase personal identification with the ideological message that they hoped to instill 
in locals. By establishing the framework for these commemorations, liberals
35 Stadtarchiv Konstanz (St. AK hereafter), S II 5375. Militar und Kriegssachen: Den deutsch- 
franzosischen Krieg 1870-1871. Friedensfeiem und Erinnerungsfeiern. Protocol from district council 
meeting, February 24, 1871.
36 The invitation can be found in St. AK, S II 5375.
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attempted to solidify their hegemony on this public discourse. If they were able to 
control the context in which patriotism and nationalism were expressed, they would be 
in a better position to control the construction of the new German identity.
As for the religious aspect o f the ceremony, organizers wanted to eliminate any 
potential conflicts. On February 24, they approached the Catholic and Protestant 
parishes with the request that they would ring the church bells in the manner 
prescribed by the council. They furthermore outlined the contents o f the religious 
celebrations, determining which prayers should be said as well as how long the service 
would last. Aware o f how unusual these demands were, they repeatedly stated how 
important it was that this celebration presented the city and its inhabitants as 
supportive citizens o f the new Reich.37 All parishes replied that they would conduct 
their services according to the wishes of the district council.38 Organizers were keenly 
aware of the confessional tensions in the city, and by streamlining the services, they 
hoped to avoid any possible controversies. They had most likely observed some o f the 
conflicts that had occurred around Baden in the wake of similar celebrations. Often, 
both Protestant and Catholic clergy members used these occasions to further their own 
agenda rather than commemorating the sacrifices made by their soldiers. There were 
frequent reports of especially Protestant clergy who delivered sermons more aimed at
37 See note no. 47.
38 St. AK, S II 5375, replies from the three Catholic and one evangelical parishes that they would oblige 
by these directions.
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re-launching the Kulturkampf than promoting unity. Aware o f the already 
fragmented nature o f their city, organizers wanted to avert a similar scenario. Catholic 
clergy members appealed to members of the district council to visit their service, but 
this request was refused on the basis that people could choose to attend whichever 
service they wanted.40
As is often the case around the Lake of Constance in the wintertime, March 3 
was very foggy with poor visibility. Initially upset at the fact that the weather did not 
cooperate, locals soon discovered that the fog actually enhanced the almost 
transcendental atmosphere in the city. Public buildings were lit up during the day, and 
many commented that it seemed as if the celebration took place in magical 
surroundings. Some locals displayed banners that stressed the unity and future success 
o f the German Reich. The train station was decorated with a painting of Germania 
with accompanying text: “On the ground lays the poisonous dragon/Which Germania 
defeated with a strong hand/This was the victory for the just cause/God bless our 
German Fatherland.” The two-day celebration ended with a banquet in Konzilsaal, in 
which one of the walls was decorated in a suitable manner: Germania offering 
protection to two figures, representing Rhein and Konstanz 41 This symbolism made it 
evident that leading Konstanzers were keen to emphasize the city’s place within the 
newly founded Reich. Liberals viewed these sentiments as a logical continuation of
39 See the discussion pertaining to the celebrations in Freiburg.
40 St. AK, SII 5375, correspondence between the district council and the parish o f St. Stephan.
41 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 6, 1871, contained extensive coverage of the festivities.
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their own efforts to economically and culturally integrate the city into Baden. They 
believed that their efforts to rid Konstanz of its marginal status had finally been 
rewarded. Stromeyer’s “Prussian” behavior was no longer something to criticize, but 
instead was deemed necessary for the future success o f the city. However, not all 
inhabitants agreed with the messages displayed on the banners. Many Catholics were 
especially offended by the one that hung on one o f the major schools in the city: 
“Looking ahead/building on the school/what we cannot see/we trust to the future.”42 
By referring to the initiation of the interconfessional school as one o f the reasons why 
the war effort had been so successful, liberals attempted to legitimize their reforms in 
the best possible way: by linking these reforms to the strength and success of the 
German Reich. This issue was especially sensitive to Catholics since they considered 
the liberal views on education to be particularly harmful to German society. Many 
sermons contained references to the important role that Catholics and the Church had 
to play in the educational realm. Catholics also tied this issue to the new nationalist 
discourse as they often argued that young men and women could only learn the true 
notions o f patriotism within the confines o f the Church since the Bible constituted the 
best source on how to love one’s fatherland.
Although many people participated in the celebration, and liberals deemed it a 
great success, the peace celebration had not created the much-hoped-for unity. One 
reason for the failure was the local national parliamentary elections that had been held 
in late February, which had hardened divisions in the city. Although this election at
42 Ibid.
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first glance might not seem to be relevant to our discussion, a closer examination of 
the rhetoric employed during the campaign reveals that it served as one of the first 
instances in which Catholics and Protestants began to construct the memory of the 
recent war. Taking advantage of the current political climate, liberals in Baden and 
around Germany conducted a very aggressive election campaign in which they used 
the military victory and the unification as proof o f the superiority o f their policies-all 
expressed through vocabulary and discourse adapted from the war.43 The Protestant- 
liberal campaign focused to a great extent on portraying their opposition from the 
Catholic People’s Party as traitors who had not contributed to the war effort and in 
some instances even prayed for French victory. The traitorous clergy member became 
a prominent theme in the election campaign as liberals used the nationalist discourse 
to promote their political agenda. Most o f the topics discussed pertained to the war, 
and liberals often pointed out that prior to 1870, the Catholic candidate, Franz von 
Bodman, had advocated a decrease in military spending, which had it been passed, 
certainly would have led to the demise of the Badenese fatherland.44 In his campaign, 
von Bodman was frank about his past policies, admitting that though he was ecstatic 
that Germany had been unified, he would have preferred the unification process to 
involve Austria as well. However, he was keen to stress that these sentiments did not 
prevent him from being a true German and that if  elected he would ensure that the
43 Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2, 24.
44 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 14, 21, 1871.
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unified fatherland would become strong, just, and powerful.45 This was an important 
statement since it clearly displayed that Catholics subscribed to different notions of 
Germanness. When von Bodman admitted that he was still very much tied to the 
Austrian cause, he expressed publicly what many Catholics thought privately. 
Unfortunately for von Bodman and his fellow Catholics, their assertions that these 
sentiments did not mean that they were any less German than their liberal and 
Protestant opponents fell on deaf ears. In a postwar period characterized by 
heightened nationalist sentiments, any allusions to loyalty to the recently defeated 
Austrians were sure to provoke accusations o f treason and anti-Germanness.
As the election drew nearer, local Protestants intensified their efforts of 
portraying Catholics as poor Germans who had contributed little, if  anything to the 
war effort. A few days before the election, auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Kiibel 
published a pastoral letter in which he only briefly discussed the recent military and 
political events, instead focusing on the debate over papal infallibility.46 Liberals 
claimed that the pastoral letter proved that Rome was the true Heimat o f the Catholics. 
They accused Kiibel of being wholly unaware o f what the majority o f Germans 
wanted: to continue to celebrate unification. Liberals repeatedly returned to this 
pastoral letter, emphasizing how it displayed just how alienated Catholics were from 
the German nation and how important it was that voters take note o f Catholic attitudes 
toward the recent historical events. Political opponents stressed the notion that
45 Freie Stimme, February 23, 1871.
46 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 21, 1871.
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Catholics could not be trusted with political power, since they obviously did not have 
sufficient knowledge o f what Germans considered to be the most important issues of 
contemporary society. Consequently, not only were Catholics accused of being 
traitors, but they were also declared unfit to hold political power.
The outcome o f the election proved disastrous for the Catholics. Despite the 
heavily Catholic nature o f Konstanz, the liberal candidate received more than twice 
the votes of his Catholic opponent. This was not an abnormal result, as liberals 
received twelve out of the fourteen Badenese mandates to the national parliament.47 
Local politicians were quick to utilize this election result as yet another piece of 
evidence that Konstanzers were tired o f the poor Catholic leadership and that the 
people had faith in the national-liberals to integrate properly the city into the new 
Reich. Most o f their election analyses were framed in nationalist terms, and the fact 
that the results were celebrated in conjunction with the peace celebration indicates 
how keen liberals were to tie their political victory to the emerging nationalist 
discourse. They consistently stressed that people had cast their votes based on 
patriotic and nationalist sentiments and that voters had recognized their efforts during 
the past decade to integrate Konstanz into Germany.48
The arrival o f the troops in the city on March 29, 1871, constituted the last 
major celebration in the immediate aftermath o f the war. Similarly to the previous
47 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, March 6, 1871. For a complete treatment o f election results in 
Baden during the Kaiserreich, see Fred Sepaintner, Die Reichtagswahlen im Groflherzogtum Baden.
Ein Beitragzur Wahlgeschichte im Kaiserreich (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983).
48 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 11, 1871.
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commemorations, Konstanzers displayed different attitudes towards this ceremony. A 
committee comprising the leading men o f the city met the soldiers just outside the city 
and accompanied them to the Marktstatte, where a gigantic triumphal arch complete 
with flower decorations had been built. On the arch, a poem heralded the great 
sacrifices made by the soldiers. The poem, in a similar fashion to the one on the 
school, hinted at national-liberal policies as the reason for this great success. The first 
few lines read: “A people skilled with weapons/skilled in science/can create 
wonders....”49 Although not addressing any specific liberal policies, it was clear that 
the reference to science indicated that the national-liberal program had paved the way 
for the military victories. Several houses were decorated, and many people appeared 
in the streets to greet their local heroes. The rhetoric employed at the celebration was 
heavily laden with nationalist symbols, and speakers lauded the troops as saviors of 
the fatherland. Still suffering from the dreadful election result, conservative Catholics 
maintained a low profile both prior to and after the celebration.
While Konstanzer Zeitung covered the event in detail, often quoting speeches 
verbatim, Freie Stimme was more reserved in its treatment o f this celebration.50 
Although they agreed that this was a memorable day, they were not as excited as their 
liberal colleagues. Instead, they used this occasion to offer a subtle challenge to the 
liberal control of the commemorative discourse as they criticized the liberal use o f the 
term “fatherland.” They reminded their readers that in 1866, liberals had been quite
49 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 30, 1871.
50 Freie Stimme, March 30, 1871.
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confused about the nature o f their fatherland, and it was inconsistent to claim now that 
they all along had advocated this specific solution to the German question. Catholics 
were becoming increasingly concerned about how liberals construed the previous war 
to fit the official commemorative discourse that suggested a teleological approach to 
the wars o f unification. Local liberals often praised the previous war as the first 
necessary step towards unity. They admitted that at the time, many had viewed it as a 
case of Prussian expansionism, but history has proven that it constituted a required 
clarification o f the relationship between the two great German powers. In their 
attempts to rewrite the history o f the previous war, they always stressed how anti- 
Prussian the Catholics had been, failing to mention that they had been highly critical 
o f Bismarck and Prussia as well. Freie Stimme often focused on outlining and 
explaining some of the events (in which Bismarck’s role was becoming increasingly 
suspect) that caused the war o f 1866.51 Throughout the next few years, they spent 
considerable efforts trying to uncover the true reasons for the war, and many of these 
arguments were subsequently used to attack Bismarck and the liberals’ official version 
of nationalism. As scholars have noted, responses to war are formed both through 
personal experience and through pre-existing narratives.52 The act o f remembering a 
war is done through a pre-existing cultural narrative, which aids people to understand 
the present conflict. One of the problems that Catholics encountered when attempting
51 These efforts intensified with time. See for instance, Freie Stimme, August 12, 1871.
52 For a very useful addition to the vast literature on this topic, see T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and 
Michael Roper, eds., The Politics o f  War: Memory and Commemoration (London: Routledge, 2000); 
see also Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in Memory, History, Culture and the Mind, ed. T. 
Butler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97-113.
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to express their memories o f the last war was that the official state-sponsored 
discourse did not provide any frameworks through which Catholics could express their 
sense o f Germanness as well as their view of unification. While liberals, aided by 
their control o f political power, sought to rework the meaning o f earlier historical 
episodes such as the war o f 1866 to fit the official narrative, Catholics struggled to 
preserve an alternative discourse that was threatened to be subsumed by the 
hegemonic Protestant-liberal discourse.
Constructing a Kriegerdenkmal in Konstanz
While busy planning the peace celebration, members o f the city council also
53discussed the need for a monument to celebrate recent events. Swept up in the 
commemorative craze that characterized most o f Germany at this time, it seemed 
obvious that the city o f Konstanz would construct a statue as well. As will become 
evident in later chapters, cities around Baden all embarked on similar projects during 
the first few years o f the Second Empire. The city council first addressed this matter 
on February 23, 1871. At this meeting, members initially considered placing a plaque 
with the names of all participating soldiers on city hall. All agreed that in light of the 
sacrifices that these soldiers had made, the city would pay for the plaque. After 
expressing concerns that two commemorative projects (a plaque and a monument) 
would be too costly, members decided to explore the option o f constructing a
53 St. AK, S II 3045. Militar und Kriegssachen. Errichtung eines Kriegerdenkmals. Protocol from city 
council meeting, Febmary 23, 1871.
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monument and placing a plaque on the base o f the statue. At the same meeting, they 
also discussed the matter of the proposed Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, which was an 
issue that caused them many problems during the next few months. Although they 
were aware that it was supposed to represent the gratefulness o f the entire Badenese 
state, they hesitated to contribute any funds. In their response to Freiburg, they stated 
that they were considering constructing a monument in Konstanz, which would make 
it very difficult for Konstanzers to donate any money to the statue in Freiburg.54
The city council’s attitude to the Siegesdenkmal is noteworthy. There is no 
evidence that at the time of their reply to Freiburg, they had finalized their plans to 
build their own monument. Furthermore, during the next few weeks, as they refused 
to answer letters from Freiburg and failed to organize any collection drives, it became 
increasingly evident that members realized that they should have acted differently. On 
May 28, the Konstanzers finally replied, reiterating that they would not be able to 
participate in this project, since the construction of their own monument would empty 
the funds designated for commemorative activities. They also claimed that since they 
had made their decision to construct a monument prior to the decision in Freiburg, 
there was not anything that could be done about the situation. According to the 
minutes of the city council meetings, this was a blatant lie since no official decision 
had yet been made concerning the monument in Konstanz.55 The organizing 
committee in Freiburg authored a very stem reply to this letter, pointing out that many
54 Ibid.
55 St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the organizing committee in Freiburg, May 26, 1871.
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other Badenese communities were constructing monuments while simultaneously 
contributing donations to the Siegesdenkmal,56 Faced with the possibility of being 
singled out as the only major Badenese city that refused to participate in this 
undertaking, city council members reluctantly agreed to start a collection among 
locals.57
There were several different reasons for this reluctance to participate in a 
project that most other cities willingly supported. First o f all, it had suddenly become 
evident to the city council that the commemorative events during the last few months 
had cost a great deal o f money. All together, they had spent almost 8,000 Gulden,
58which considering the city’s struggling economy was a substantial amount. Eager in 
their attempts to present the city as a bastion of Germanness, city council members 
had overextended their budget. The frivolous spending would greatly affect the 
construction o f their own monument, as the council decided that they could not spend 
as much as initially planned.
On June 1, the Gemeindeversammlung met to consider the prospects for the 
construction o f a monument.59 The well-known local artist Hans Bauer had produced 
a model o f a Victoria statue, which would cost 4,000-6,000 Gulden to build,
56 St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the city council in Konstanz from organizing committee in Freiburg, May 
30, 1871.
57 St. AK, S II 3045.
58 St. AK, S II 3045. Noted in a protocol from the Gemeindeversammlung on June 1, 1871. The 
Gemeindeversammlung was a formal gathering in which voting citizens could attend, though they 
seldom did, the deliberations o f city politicians in regards to municipal administrative issues.
59 Ibid.
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depending on material. Bauer’s model held a laurel wreath (Lorbeerkranz) in one 
hand and a palm branch (Palmzweig des Friedens) in the other, celebrating both the 
victory as well as the peace that would now dawn on Germany. Interestingly, city 
politicians stressed that this would not be presented as a Victoria statue. Instead, this 
was supposed to be a statue modeled upon Nike, the Greek goddess, who according to 
them was more akin to a “Germanic Virgin.”60 However, these plans failed 
completely as inhabitants, as well as most politicians, always referred to the statue as 
Victoria. This should not have been particularly surprising, since Victoria had long 
since replaced Nike as the goddess of victory. In their attempts to dislodge completely 
the commemorative discourse from Rome and anything Catholic, politicians did not 
take into account how deeply ingrained the figure o f Victoria was among the 
population. At this meeting, they also discussed the high costs o f the past months’ 
celebrations, and they concluded that though the city could not afford to pay for the 
entire monument, it would contribute 2,000 Gulden towards the total cost. On June 
10, they decided to use marble as the material, which put the final cost to 
approximately 6,000 Gulden.61
Despite this decision, city council members did not seem fully committed to 
the monument. They waited until November 1871 to start collecting donations, which
60 In his report to the Konigliche Preussische Staatsanzeiger on February 25, 1875 regarding the 
construction process of the monument, Ludwig Leiner was keen to stress that Nike had been the 
original model, not Victoria. According to Leiner, the former was modeled on the “...mild-mannered 
and arts loving Hellas... not the more animalistic and baneful ‘Victoria’ that stems from the blood 
thirsty and aggressive Romans. Nike is not only victorious, but because o f the victories, she has 
morphed into a mild, human representation o f a German virgin.. St. AK, S II 3045.
61 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from meeting of the Bezirksamt, June 10, 1871.
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greatly increased the difficulties of raising money.62 Most cities attempted to take 
advantage of the heightened nationalist pride that accompanied unification, which 
made citizens more inclined to donate money to commemorative projects. However, 
almost a year later most o f the initial euphoria had disappeared and been replaced with 
old and often increased hostilities among the population. If not adequately tended to, 
immediate memories of the fears and joys that accompany wars can evaporate rather 
quickly, and this was one o f the reasons Konstanzers displayed minimal enthusiasm 
about the monument. In the close aftermath of a war, both soldiers and civilians often 
experience a need to express and manifest their memories, but often as time passes, 
that need decreases. While in other cities, newspapers would report how much money 
had been collected to date and who had provided an especially large donation, the 
local press in Konstanz almost completely ignored this project, which was quite 
detrimental to the fund raising. Another important factor why the project never 
created much enthusiasm was that as confessional hostilities resumed and 
subsequently increased during the first few years o f the Kaiserreich, the local Catholic 
population became quite unwilling to partake in any o f the projects that seemingly 
promoted the official commemorative discourse. The fact that this monument did not 
aid the Catholic part o f the population to express their memories o f the conflict, and 
faced with what they considered a hegemonic commemorative discourse that did not 
include their own experiences, they were hesitant to support these types o f endeavors.
Clearly displeased with the fund raising, members of the city council soon
62 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, November 2, 1871.
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realized that they would have to modify their original plans. They had initially 
envisioned a six-meter-high statue, but as it became evident that they would not be 
able to raise the required funds, they decided to settle for an approximately two meter 
tall Victoria figure.63 In late January 1872, Bauer reported that he would soon present 
a plaster version of the statue to council members.64 Although it took until June 
before the model was ready for inspection, members expressed their satisfaction with 
the work o f the renowned artist. During the next eighteen months, the production 
process proceeded without major problems. The only question that caused some 
debate was the location o f the monument. Initially, most members had advocated the 
harbor as the most suitable place, primarily because the many visitors who arrived in 
the city via the lake would be greatly impressed with this patriotic display. However, 
after downscaling the monument, many voiced concerns that such a diminutive statue 
in this prominent place would reflect poorly on the national character o f the 
Konstanzers. Ludwig Leiner was the most outspoken representative o f this view and 
led the attempts to find a more suitable location. After considering almost every 
square in the city, they finally decided on the Marktstatte, agreeing that though the 
square was prominent enough, it was not so large that the monument would 
disappear.65
Freie Stimme used these debates to voice their displeasure at the importance
63 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, January 7, 1872.
64 St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to city council, January 24, 1872.
65 See for instance the discussion in Konstanzer Zeitung, June 2, 15, 1872.
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attributed to this project. They mockingly noted that it was fortunate that few tourists 
were present in the city to witness the spectacle o f the Konstanzer elite carrying 
around a plaster model to different places in the city. They were especially critical of 
Mayor Stromeyer, pointing out that it was rather symbolic to watch the mayor 
following Victoria wherever she went.66 These sentiments served as an indirect 
condemnation of the national-liberal version of patriotism. Catholics were often 
critical o f their opponents for seemingly changing their definition of nationalism to fit 
a variety o f different political, cultural, and economic causes. Catholics argued that 
the attempted rewriting o f the war o f 1866 served as an illustrative example of how 
liberals and Protestants reconstructed history to fit official notions o f Germanness. 
Furthermore, the fact that they were so willing to reconstruct their notions o f German 
national identity indicated that they had a limited understanding of what it meant to be 
a German. Their definition of the concept was obviously highly superficial and did 
not contain any profound and deeper understandings o f their own identity.67 
Konstanzer Zeitung promptly used this criticism as proof that ultramontanes did not 
understand what was important to a German. There was nothing shameful about the 
way in which the mayor and the rest o f the city elite participated in this debate. On the 
contrary, the importance attached to this matter clearly indicates how dedicated 
Stromeyer and the liberals were to honor the great events of the recent past.68
66 Freie Stimme, June 20, 1872.
67 Ibid. An additional example of these sentiments can be found in Freie Stimme, December 9, 1871.
68 Konstanzer Zeitung, June 24, 1872.
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After having received fifteen centner of French canons from Wilhelm I, the 
construction process began in early 1873.69 City council members urged Bauer and 
the foundry Lenz to make sure that the statue was in place by May 10, which was the 
two-year anniversary o f the signing o f the peace treaty. Contrary to the majority of
70these ceremonies, this one was carried out “without great fanfare.” To be sure, the 
dignitaries o f the city were present and speeches were held, but compared to 
unveilings in other cities, Konstanz’s was very subdued. Liberals blamed the poor 
weather, which forced the city council to cancel the participation o f school children, 
but that did not fully explain the lack of enthusiasm. Unveiling ceremonies were 
always considered an integral part o f the monument and the message(s) that it was 
supposed to convey. Contemporaries were well aware o f the importance o f making 
the unveiling as impressive as possible, which would instill respect, admiration, and 
support for the monument. Most often, speakers heavily stressed the ideological 
message that accompanied the monument, leaving little or no room for 
misinterpretation. These types of events also constituted opportunities to unite the 
population as people gathered in the streets to display their support for a particular 
cause. The unveiling o f the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg constitutes an excellent 
example o f a successful ceremony where local and national officials interacted with
69 The production process was actually delayed due to the fact that Konstanzers only received the 
promised fifteen centner from the Emperor after asking him for it. During his visit to the city in late 
1871, Wilhelm had promised to donate the material. However, he had to be reminded in the beginning 
of 1873 before the metal was sent to foundry Lenz in Niimberg. See letter from the city council to the 
Emperor, January 15, 1873. They received a positive response on February 20, 1873. St. AK, S II 
3045.
70 Konstanzer Zeitung, May 11, 1873.
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the city’s inhabitants to produce a festive and educational event.
The absence o f a grand ceremony at the unveiling of the monument illustrates 
several important points. Locals’ lukewarm attitude toward the monument was a 
reflection o f the problems and divisions that Konstanzers had faced during the past 
few years. As had become evident in the press and in the local community, the little 
unity that the war produced was long gone. The relaunching and intensifying of the 
Kulturkampf heightened tensions between Catholics and Protestants, and the former 
had become increasingly determined to display their own version of the nation and the 
events that had led to the unification of the Reich. Although Bauer’s statue did not 
contain any extravagant symbolism, it was still perceived to be located within the 
official discourse o f unification that emanated from Berlin. Most ultramontanes 
rejected the view o f the unification that the monument presented, and it was therefore 
not surprising that many refrained from participating in the unveiling ceremony. In 
addition, as we shall see later, the first few months o f 1873 were filled with 
confessional conflicts, which further alienated the conservative Catholics from the 
official commemorative discourse. The lack o f support for the monument also 
illustrates the disparity between the liberal leadership and the Catholic majority o f the 
population. This disparity was something that Catholics often criticized, claiming that 
a few men were reforming the city in ways that few people really wanted.
Lack of Catholic support for the statue comes as no surprise, but the absence of 
enthusiasm for the monument extended to parts o f the community that had initially 
been supportive o f the project. The brief report in Konstanzer Zeitung regarding the
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unveiling provides some clues as to why people had become disillusioned with the
71undertaking. The paper pointed out that though the monument was quite acceptable, 
no blame should be placed on the artist for the average result. Although they did not 
state it explicitly, journalists were very critical o f how the city and its inhabitants had 
approached this project. By failing to raise enough money, the city had forced Bauer 
to significantly reduce the size o f his statue, which had yielded a mediocre outcome. 
The report, as well as letters to newspapers and the city council, indicate that many 
citizens were simply ashamed o f their small and insignificant statue.72 In times where 
national pride was often measured by the size and beauty of a monument and/or the 
enthusiasm displayed at public ceremonies, Konstanz’s failure in both areas did not 
present the city in a favorable light. Instead of producing a magnificent statue that 
would prove to the Emperor and the rest o f Germany the loyalty and dedication of his 
new subjects in the southwest, this half-hearted measure reinforced the insecurity and 
apprehension that many experienced at the prospect of becoming Germans. By 
comparison, monuments in cities such as Freiburg served as a source o f pride for the 
city’s inhabitants and provided them with opportunities to use the ideological message 
o f the monument for local, regional, or national integration. In Konstanz, the fact that 
Konstanzer Zeitung, whose editor, Otto Amman, was one of the staunchest liberals 
and anti-Catholics in the area, offered this indirect criticism of the liberal elite is
71 Ibid.
72 A few letters can be found in St. AK, S II 3045. This file also contains a long report from city 
council member Ludwig Leiner, dated May 25, 1873, on the completed project, in which the criticism 
from the community is discussed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
highly significant, as the paper usually could find no fault with liberal policies. Of 
course, Amman’s criticism did not only pertain to the liberal elites but also to the 
majority o f Konstanzers who had not contributed enough to the monument. In this 
case, Amman attributed their lack o f commitment to the influence o f the antinational 
Catholic Church.
Konstanzers’ reception o f the monument had damaged the pride o f Hans Bauer 
as well. In a letter to the city council on May 30, 1873, he voiced his displeasure at 
the reception his statue had received. He claimed that he had been subjected to much 
criticism from locals, who had informed him that the general consensus in the city was 
that the monument was simply “insufficient.” He emphasized that when he planned 
the statue, he had constructed a model whose proportions were ideally suited to a 
monument much larger than the one he finally built. The diminutive size o f the 
statue was not the only criticism that the city council faced in the following weeks. To 
meet this barrage o f negative sentiments, they appointed a special committee under 
Ludwig Leiner. In a lengthy report on May 25, he discussed the perceived 
shortcomings o f the monument. Apparently, many locals had approached him and the 
city council with complaints that the list o f soldiers on the monument contained 
numerous errors. People who did not participate in the war were included, some who 
did were not, and only one soldier was identified as “Officer,” though there were at 
least three others who deserved similar recognition. In his discussion of these 
complaints, Leiner addressed several o f the key issues accompanying
73 St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to the city council, May 30, 1873.
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74commemorations.
He stated that he had from the beginning been critical o f the suggestion to 
place the names of participating soldiers on the monument. His opposition to this idea 
did not only stem from the difficulties involved in confirming that all the correct 
names were included but also had a more profound reason. He argued that the 
presence o f soldiers’ names provided them with too strong of an association to the 
statue, which should not only honor their deeds but the entire unification process.
After all, he stated, who was to say that the efforts on the home front were not as 
valuable as the ones on the battlefield? Should not all the sacrifices made by civilian 
men and women be recognized as well? Leiner claimed that despite his protests, the
75  •rest o f the members were determined to place the names on the monument. It is 
interesting to note that Leiner, a staunch national-liberal who had been the leading 
force in this project, now suddenly maintained that the ideological message o f the 
monument was too narrow. Most likely, especially considering that the minutes from 
the meetings show no trace o f his objections, he presented these claims in an attempt 
to avoid the harsh criticism. However, irrespective o f his intentions, his remarks 
highlight one o f the key problems when designing a commemorative effort, especially 
in a society in which different groups struggle over the control o f the memory o f the 
war. This discussion became even more intense because this monument was placed in 
such a significant public space. In a time period when old elites and the emerging
74 St. AK, S II 3045, report from Ludwig Leiner to the city council, May 25, 1873.
75 Ibid.
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bourgeoisie fought to control the public space of German cities, the monument (and its 
message) became a highly important part of this struggle. Leiner recounted all the 
steps that had been taken to ensure that all o f the names were correctly spelled and that 
none was forgotten. The final list had been compared to the military’s records and 
approved by General Strauss. Furthermore, he noted that the city council had placed 
several notices about this process in Konstanzer Zeitung, so if  someone had a 
complaint, there had been sufficient time to correct a mistake prior to the unveiling.76 
It is noteworthy that they did not place any ads in Freie Stimme, thereby excluding 
ultramontanes from this discourse. This fact casts some additional doubts on the 
sincerity o f Leiner’s complaints that the commemorative discourse was not inclusive 
enough.
In his report, Leiner recommended that nothing be done about the plaque, 
pointing out that though at least one name was misspelled, that did not justify the cost 
of replacing the whole plaque. He reiterated that people did not realize how expensive 
these types o f projects were, and if  they could only fully grasp the difficulties involved 
in the production process, they would not be so critical. He sarcastically suggested 
that perhaps new plaques should be placed on city hall, where all people who were 
remotely connected to the monument could be listed: the ones who fought, the ones 
who went to church on Sunday praying for victory, the people who organized the 
construction o f the monument, etc. He ended his long report by stating that the 
original idea of this monument was to express gratitude toward the sacrifices made
76 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
and to celebrate the victorious war. Both of these tasks had been accomplished in an 
appropriate manner.77
The criticism of the monument and Leiner’s response provides insights to 
contemporary attitudes toward these commemorations. Although most often people 
supported these initiatives to honor important events and/or people, if  they were 
conducted in an unsatisfactory manner, even people who would be expected to 
champion these endeavors remained aloof. In his report, Leiner frequently stated that 
the people offering criticism only did so because they had their own agenda to pursue. 
What Leiner did not realize (or acknowledge) was that it was precisely this personal 
agenda that commemorations were supposed to address. Because the commemoration 
failed to celebrate properly the war and the unification, even veterans were alienated 
from the discourse that the city council and Hans Bauer constructed. An important 
reason why this monument was built was to strengthen the “new” national identity and 
prove that Konstanzers were loyal subjects, but the poor execution o f the project 
meant that none o f these objectives were fully achieved. Of course, commemorations 
often failed to popularize an ideological message among all parts o f the population. 
However, the fact that so many people who under normal circumstances would have 
been expected to be enthusiastic about this project did not support it suggests that the 
execution of these commemorative activities played a large role in its potential 
success. Although the monument occupied a reasonably important position in society
77 Ibid. Despite the long and detailed report, the members o f the city council decided on May 29 to at 
least look into what it would cost to alter the plaque. St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council 
meeting, May 29, 1873.
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during the following decades, citizens never quite seemed to embrace it 
wholeheartedly. To be sure, on national holidays, veterans’ organizations would 
gather at the statue, and sometimes official ceremonies would be conducted, but 
overall, the monument played a comparatively minor role in local society.
Additional Commemorative Activities in the Postwar Period
Although the construction o f monuments played one o f the most important 
roles in the commemorations o f the unification, the immediate post-1871 period 
witnessed other events as well, which we will now analyze. Turning back to late 1871, 
Konstanzers received an opportunity to exhibit their newfound patriotism as Emperor 
Wilhelm made an official visit in October. Despite the fact that the relationship 
between Catholics and Protestants had grown increasingly sour during the summer, 
most citizens were excited at the prospect of entertaining the Emperor as their guest. 
The fact that Grand Duke Friedrich was so closely connected to the city made locals 
even more receptive for imperial pomp and circumstance. Although many cities 
throughout Baden and Germany claimed that they enjoyed a special relationship with 
their local rulers and the Emperor, Konstanz, even more so than either Freiburg or 
Heidelberg, did have a special relationship with especially the Grand Duke, but the 
Emperor as well. The good-hearted and jovial nature o f the Grand Duke, who could 
often be seen chatting casually with citizens during his Sunday strolls through 
Konstanz, contributed greatly to the popularity o f imperial and royal symbols in the 
city and its immediate surroundings. Even ultramontane Catholics, who elsewhere in
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Germany sometimes hesitated to participate in the most extreme examples of
• ■ 78veneration for the Emperor, joined in the celebrations, albeit on their own conditions. 
Scholars have stressed that the Emperor served as an integrative symbol closely
70associated with the official version o f German nationalism. Although that was often 
the case, the sentiments in Konstanz indicate that despite his obvious ties to the new 
Reich, the persona o f Wilhelm was still located outside the official canon of 
nationalism, which many Germans opposed.
Despite Wilhelm’s popularity, there were still some differences in how 
Catholics and Protestants approached the festivities. Konstanzer Zeitung went out of 
its way to proclaim its loyalty to the prominent guest. The paper’s coverage o f the 
event dominated the news for several days with long and detailed articles analyzing 
the nature o f the celebration.80 Freie Stimme, on the other hand, was much more 
subdued in its reporting. Although it dutifully described the visit and the reaction of 
locals, it did so in a more sober manner, omitting most o f the references to the 
greatness of the Emperor that dominated the articles published in Konstanzer 
Zeitung.81 The difference in press coverage serves as a reminder o f how easily the 
rhetoric and language o f the Catholic papers could be interpreted as antinational.
78For analysis o f Catholic attitudes towards Wilhelm I, see Blessing, S t a a t  u n d  K i r c h e ,  esp. 179-181.
79 See for instance Koshar, F r o m  M o n u m e n t s  t o  T r a c e s .
80 See for instance K o n s t a n z e r  Z e i t u n g ,  September 9, 12,14, 1871.
81 F r e i e  S t i m m e  did not reprint any o f the speeches held at the festivities, and their reporting was in 
general quite subdued and devoid o f declarations of the supposed greatness o f the Emperor. See for 
instance F r e i e  S t i m m e ,  September 14, 1871.
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Indeed, the comparison is even more illuminating if  one analyzes Catholic coverage of 
the many anniversaries and celebrations o f Pope Pius IX ’s reign. In describing these 
occasions, the Catholic press used similar adjectives that the liberal Protestant papers 
used when characterizing the Emperor. Both were portrayed as heroic, courageous, 
and honorable men who served as great examples and leaders for their subjects. In a 
society caught up in nationalist frenzy for large parts o f the immediate post unification 
period, the ultramontanes’ celebratory discourse surrounding the Pope and the Vatican 
was certain to offend many opponents.
In the coverage o f the Emperor’s visit, Konstanzer Zeitung repeatedly stated 
that it was evident that citizens were keen to display their love and devotion to 
Emperor and fatherland. Locals also stressed that because o f the presence o f Grand 
Duke Friedrich, the crowds viewed Wilhelm in a new light.82 People witnessed the 
affection between him, his daughter, and son-in-law, and instead of royalty, they 
became just another set o f family members. The good relationship that Konstanzers 
enjoyed with the Grand Duke now enabled them to get closer to their Emperor.
Arriving by boat from the Mainau, Wilhelm was greeted by Mayor Stromeyer 
in the harbor, whose welcoming speech contained an abundance o f nationalist cliches 
while also managing to offend ultramontanes. Stromeyer greeted Wilhelm by 
remarking that the city had finally escaped the dark period that had lasted for so many 
centuries. No doubt referring to the long period o f Habsburg rule, he tied Wilhelm’s 
visit to similar ones by German Emperors during the First Empire. The mayor also
82 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 14, 1871.
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stressed how much the city appreciated the Prussian leadership in the German 
question, noting that “the more the sun shines on Prussia, the better Konstanz will 
fare.”83 Keeping in mind the calls for “removal o f the Prussian from city hall” that 
accompanied Stromeyer’s election, these sentiments were clearly not representative of 
the city’s population. This speech served as another attempt to rewrite the history of 
German unification. Stromeyer’s references to the dark period from which Prussia 
and Wilhelm had saved the inhabitants naturally disregarded that only five years ago 
Konstanzers had gone to war against Prussia. Ultramontanes complained bitterly 
about these attempts to legitimize the teleological and Prusso-centeric version of the 
unification. This official version o f local history clearly did not represent the 
experience of local Catholics, who were forced to create their own memory to be able 
to ground their identities as Germans in a historical narrative. As we shall see, much 
o f this narrative was created within the confines o f the Church and voluntary 
associations, and Catholics made sure to utilize other types o f public ceremonies to 
manifest publicly their responses to the foundation of the nation-state.
Catholic Responses to the Official Commemorative Discourse
Considering the dominant role that liberals played in the immediate postwar 
period, how did Catholics experience these first few months as Germans? As indicated 
above, soon after the unification, liberals and Protestants launched an onslaught on 
ultramontanes, which forced the latter to define and defend their positions as Germans.
83 Ibid.
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In a similar fashion to their brethren in Freiburg, one o f the earliest incidents to assert 
themselves publicly in the community was the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pius IX’s 
reign as Pope in June 1871. The celebrations in Freiburg were the most elaborate ones 
in the state, so we will leave a more extensive analysis o f this important event to the 
next chapter. However, it should be noted that much o f the rhetoric in Konstanz was 
similar to that in Freiburg, but given the increasingly precarious situation of the 
conservative Catholics in the former, they placed even more emphasis on the need to 
use this commemoration as an opportunity to display their aversion to what they
84labeled the moral demise o f German society.
Local Catholics staged a variety of attempts to defend themselves against the 
accusations o f unpatriotic behavior. On the first anniversary o f the war, Freie Stimme
o r
published a lead article concerning the events of the past year. The paper pointed 
out that July 18, 1870, had witnessed two historical milestones. First o f all, the French 
launched their attack on Germany, which after courageous fighting led to peace and 
unification. However, ever since the conclusion of the war, many Germans had 
engaged in internal warfare, using the pretext o f the other historical event o f July 18: 
the declaration of papal infallibility as justification for their actions. During the past 
few months, these so-called Germans had subjected one-third o f the population to 
various allegations o f unpatriotic behavior. To refute these accusations, Freie Stimme 
discussed the heroics o f local Catholic clergy members during the war, including
84 Freie Stimme, May 25, June 15, 1871.
85 Freie Stimme, July 22, 1871.
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volunteering at the local hospital.86
The Catholics remained steadfast in their convictions, drawing support by 
portraying themselves as martyrs, falsely criticized of a variety o f un-German 
behavior. Catholics often used these accusations as a means of integration. By 
highlighting the negative qualities o f the Protestant national-liberal version of 
patriotism, they were able to accent their own sense o f Germanness simply by being 
the things that Protestants and liberals were not. Their use o f the Protestant-liberal 
Other enabled them to further consolidate and strengthen their own identity. A lead 
article in Freie Stimme in November 1871 constitutes a perfect example of this type of 
integration.87 The article claimed that national-liberals considered it patriotic to aid 
your government in the hunt for Catholics, to label falsely Catholics as enemies of the 
fatherland, and to persecute local Catholic priests, while preventing them from 
carrying out their divine duties. Most importantly, liberal patriotism seemed to be 
based on the notion that German Catholics were vaterlandslose, who did not deserve 
to have a nation to call their own. Without explicitly stating so, the article inferred 
that simply by not possessing any of these qualities, Catholics were better Germans 
than their opponents. They often emphasized this last aspect o f official nationalism as 
they pointed out that they never called for the exclusion of anybody from the German 
nation, which made them better Germans. O f course, this was a slightly idealized 
picture, as Catholics often engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric and were sometimes
86 Ibid. See also August 15, 1871.
87 Freie Stimme, November 11, 1871.
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outright hostile to including Jews in the German nation.88 Although as Smith has 
observed, the Catholics did not participate in the anti-Semitic tirades to the same 
extent as the Protestants, the Catholic community was quite clear that the Jews did not 
have a place in the German nation. Especially in Konstanz, there were quite a few 
instances of Catholic anti-Semitism, which Catholics used as means o f integrating into 
the new nation-state. In conjunction with this discussion, Catholics also criticized 
liberals and Protestants for claiming that Rome was the true Heimat for German 
Catholics. They claimed that their opponents had never understood that though their 
spiritual home was in Rome, that did not make them Italians. These sentiments tied 
into their notions that liberals and Protestants only used the concept o f national 
identity as a means to other ends. The latter’s preoccupation with materialism and 
their tendency to use the nationalist discourse to gain material, financial, and 
economic advantages proved that their Germanness was not as well-founded in the 
German historical and philosophical tradition.
The Development of the Old Catholic Church
During the first few years o f the Empire, ultramontane Catholics in Konstanz 
did not only face opposition from liberal Protestants but from fellow Catholics as well.
88 It is noteworthy that the small Jewish community in Konstanz often faced discrimination. See for 
instance the discussions regarding the establishment o f a synagogue. Zang, Konstanz in der 
Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2, 97-98. See also Smith, “Religion and Conflict: Protestants,
Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State o f Baden in the Era o f Wilhelm II,” Central European 
History 27 (1994): 283-315. For a somewhat conflicting view o f relations between different 
confessions in Baden, please see Ulrich Baumann’s excellent essay, “The Development and Destruction 
of a Social Institution.”
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Mainly due to its long tradition o f liberal Catholicism, Konstanz was one of the areas 
in Germany where Old Catholics were able to establish themselves as a societal force,
O Q  t t
albeit only for a brief period o f time. At first glance, it might appear as if  the
conflict surrounding the Old Catholics had little to do with issues of national 
integration, but upon further analysis, it soon becomes evident that national identity 
and national integration were among the key issues fueling this conflict. Other 
scholars, most notably Thomas Mergel, have argued that Old Catholics were 
reluctantly pushed into a close relationship with the state and that nationalist issues 
were o f only minor importance to them.90 However, a close reading of the conflict in 
Konstanz reveals that Old Catholics were more than willing to use questions of 
national identity as one of the means of acquiring support. They placed much 
emphasis on portraying themselves as better Germans than other Catholics and 
attempted to use this line o f argument to better their relationship with the Badenese 
state.
Throughout the summer and fall o f 1871, city liberals became increasingly 
aggressive in their confessional rhetoric as they praised Joseph Ignatz von Dollinger as 
one o f the few Catholics who properly combined patriotism and religion. Eager to
89 For general accounts on the Old Catholic Movement(s) in Baden and elsewhere, please see Becker, 
L i b e r a l e r  S t a a t  u n d  K i r c h e  i n  d e r  A r a  v o n  R e i c h s g r i i n d u n g  u n d  K u l t u r k a m p f  especially 137-141, 306- 
3 0 9 , 3 3 1 -3 4 2 ;  Grober, “Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz,” 1 9 0 -2 4 8 ; Maas, G e s c h i c h t e  d e r  
K a t h o l i s c h e n  K i r c h e  i m  G r o f i h e r z o g t u m  B a d e n ,  282-291; Mergel, Z w i s c h e n  K l a s s e  u n d  K o n f e s s i o n ,  
282-307; and Johannes Rieks, D e r  A l t k a t h o l i z i s m u s  i n  B a d e n .  E i n e  F e s t s c h r i f t  z u r  z e h n j a h r i g e n  
B e s t e h u n g s f e i e r  d e r  b a d i s c h e n  G e m e i n d e n ,  i n s b e s .  d e r  i n  H e i d e l b e r g ,  L a d e n b u r g  u n d  S c w e t z i n g e n ,  
s a m t  e i n e m  M i t g l i e d e r - V e r z e i c h n i s  d i e s e r  (Heidelberg, 1883).
90 Mergel, Z w i s c h e n  K l a s s e  u n d  K o n f e s s i o n ,  283.
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portray the ultramontanes as unpatriotic, they argued that a Catholic who accepted the 
declaration o f papal infallibility could not be a good German.91 Faced with these 
accusations, ultramontanes connected Dollinger’s decision to leave the Church to the 
recent political and military events. They argued that had not the Catholic powers of 
Austria and France been defeated in 1866 and 1871 and had not Pius IX been removed 
from Rome, Dollinger would never have had the courage to oppose him.
Consequently, his actions should be interpreted as an opportunistic ploy, which had 
little to do with the Catholic faith.92 In their criticism o f the Old Catholic Movement, 
this was a recurring theme. Ultramontanes often stressed that Old Catholics, the vast 
majority o f whom were liberals, were using the conflict over papal infallibility to strip 
the Church o f resources. Although this constituted a grave simplification o f the 
matter, these allegations were not unfounded as Old Catholics spent much energy 
focusing on how to acquire as much of the Church’s capital as possible. This 
controversy clearly illustrates how confessional issues transcended many other 
important issues in Konstanz and that confessional conflicts became the arenas for 
many other types o f conflicts.
The growth of the Old Catholic Movement meant that ultramontanes in 
Konstanz faced additional challenges in their attempts to integrate into the Second 
Empire. On April 12, 1872, a number o f Old Catholics met in a local inn to discuss 
the future o f the movement. Most of the meeting focused on what was wrong with the
91 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, April 25, 1871.
92 See for instance Freie Stimme, May 6, 9, August 15, 1871.
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Catholic Church.93 Dr. Alfred Marquier claimed that the main problem with the 
Catholic faith was that it actively opposed progress. To prove his point, he cited the 
debates concerning the educational system, which indicated how closely tied the Old 
Catholic Movement was to local liberal politics. Marquier furthermore argued that 
Catholics, and then especially the Jesuits, were trying to dismantle the new Empire. 
The Catholic faith was “completely anti-national, which has as its final goal the 
destruction of the German Reich.”94 Although the disagreements had little to do with 
national issues, the Old Catholics consistently accused their opponents of being anti­
national. In the midst o f the most intense period of the Kulturkampf these 
accusations were timely as they were bound to attract more supporters to the Old 
Catholic cause. Some Catholics who were concerned about being labeled un-German 
in these times of nationalist frenzy were receptive to the Old Catholic assurances that 
their faith enabled Konstanzers to be both good Catholics and good Germans.
In his speech, Marquier furthermore focused on Konstanz’s historic role in 
promoting religious progress, which should serve as an inspiration to the Old 
Catholics. Citing the important role played by Wessenberg in the history o f German 
Catholicism, he claimed that all supporters of progress needed to “...get together and 
just as the brave heroes from Belfort built an iron wall to stave off the foreign enemy,
93 Joseph Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde zu Konstanz von 1873-1898 (Konstanz: Buch 
und Steindruckerei von J. Kuttruff, 1898), 11-12. The meeting is also described in great detail in 
Konstanzer Zeitung, April 14, 1872.
94 Konstanzer Zeitung, April 14, 1872.
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so we should also stand together until the inner enemies are all defeated.”95 His 
speech left no doubts about the role that the liberal Catholics and Protestants had 
played in the war, and the role that they needed to play in the Second Empire. The 
nationalist rhetoric and the invoking of images from the last war, and then especially 
the battle o f Belfort, where the Badenese troops played a major role, proved to be a 
great success with the audience. Immediately after Marquier finished his speech, the 
crowd demanded that they should form an Old Catholic community in Konstanz. 
Although Marquier and Leiner decided that the time was not yet ripe for this drastic 
step, they elected a delegation that would attend the upcoming Old Catholic meeting 
in Offenburg.96
In January 1873, the anniversary o f the foundation of the Reich triggered 
several months o f intense confessional conflicts. At the banquet held to commemorate 
the events in Versailles, Protestant General Alfred Strober proclaimed that Germans 
had displayed great courage on the battlefield, which was now needed again to defeat 
the domestic enemies.97 He finished his speech by noting that “just like our Army 
stood, man by man, chest by chest, against the ones who were threatening our borders, 
so must we also stand there against the ones who wants to tie our minds to a foreign 
power...and every one should participate, who has the knowledge: I am a German.”98
95 Ibid.
96 Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde, 15.
97 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1873.
98 Ibid.
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The last few words are especially noteworthy as they implied that Catholics were not 
Germans. Outraged at this speech, ultramontane priests used the following Sunday’s 
sermon to answer the accusations against them and their fellow Catholics." Clergy 
members focused on illustrating the link between the Old Catholic faith and the 
economic situation in the city, stressing that this was not a religious conflict, but an 
economic one. The elites o f the city were using the infallibility issue to further 
increase the economic differences between citizens. The Old Catholic Movement was 
nothing but a cover to access more of the city’s wealth.
Following this argument, Freie Stimme and Konstanzer Zeitung engaged in a 
fierce discussion of what constituted a true Catholic. The latter proclaimed itself the 
official organ o f the Old Catholics while arguing that the only real Catholics were the 
ones who rejected the doctrine o f papal infallibility. Journalists claimed that 
ultramontane Catholics comprised a sect that did not deserve to be called Catholic 
anymore. In the ensuing months, Old Catholics and Protestants often invoked the 
image o f Protestant martyr Jan Hus, who had been executed in the city in the fifteenth 
century, and they stressed the strong heritage that Hus and Wessenberg had left in the 
city. Konstanzer Zeitung often stressed that locals were fortunate to witness a historic 
period in the city, in which “the flames which murdered Jan Hus, will serve as a 
guiding light for the future.”100 The fact that the Old Catholics appropriated Hus’s
99 Reports o f this can be found in Freie Stimme, as well as appeals to the Catholics in the city, outlining 
the dangers of the Old Catholic Movement. See Freie Stimme, January 19, 23, 1873.
100 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 4, 1873.
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memory is illustrative o f the conflation o f Protestant and Old Catholic identities. To 
ultramontanes, the fact that the Old Catholics celebrated Hus only further reinforced 
their notion that the former had no real knowledge of the Catholic faith. By 
appropriating the memory o f the Bohemian reformer, they were not only able to tie 
their cause to a well-known historical figure, but they were also able to create a 
continuous historical narrative from the times of Hus’s struggles against Church until 
the last war against the French Catholics.
In response, Freie Stimme published a separate one page appeal addressed to 
the Catholics of the city. In this proclamation, they outlined the differences between 
Old and “normal” Catholics in great detail, taking pains to discredit the former as 
much as possible. Judging from the type of people who supported the Old Catholic 
movement, it was clear how much they knew about religion and the Church. 
Ultramontanes pointed out that prior to the Vatican Council, none o f these people had 
been active in the Catholic Church, and many had even been Protestants.
Consequently, they were not qualified to interpret the true meaning of Catholicism.
The appeal also outlined some o f the features that characterized a true Catholic. It 
reinforced the notion of papal infallibility while strongly refuting the claims that Old 
Catholics had a right to any of the Church’s property.101
Early February 1873 witnessed an intensification of the hostilities. Led by 
Leiner and Joseph Laible, the Old Catholics organized a referendum in which 
Catholics were encouraged to come and vote yes or no to the declaration o f papal
101 Freie Stimme, January 19, 23, 1873.
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infallibility. The date was set for February 10, and in the days preceding the 
referendum, Old Catholics reiterated that this constituted a sign that Konstanz was 
prepared to initiate another religious reform movement. They also compared the 
excitement in the city to the one that had existed on the day that the news o f the 
outbreak o f war in 1870 spread. The day was marked by chaos. People from both 
camps were out in the streets trying to stake claim to the public space o f the city. A 
few skirmishes took place, and one of the leading ultramontanes, Joseph Wirth, was 
attacked as a mob threw stones through his windows.102
Although they claimed otherwise, the results o f the referendum must have been 
a disappointment to the Old Catholics. Despite their propaganda, only 657 people cast 
their votes against infallibility, and since they claimed that over 3,000 people had 
attended the preparatory meetings, the low turnout must have been a setback.103 The 
result most likely reflected the fact that though many people might have been 
dissatisfied with certain aspects of their faith, most were not prepared to make an 
official stance against the Church. Despite the relatively poor showing, Leiner and 
Laible still hailed the result as a great victory and proceeded to form an official 
community in Konstanz. On February 22, they presented a petition to the Grand Duke 
and his government, claiming that a religious congregation o f this considerable size 
possessed a right to use the local churches. Konstanzer Zeitung triumphantly printed 
the reply from Julius Jolly, in which he stated that though they rejected the notion of
102 Konig, ed., Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848, 80-85.
103 Results were reported in Konstanzer Zeitung, February 13, 1873.
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papal infallibility, these Konstanzers were still considered Catholics and consequently 
had a right to use the churches in their city. They were granted a right to share one of 
the three Catholic churches, but since ultramontanes would never remain in a church 
that Old Catholics used, the latter possessed complete control of it.104 This was a 
significant victory with broad ramifications. Not only had the Old Catholics been able 
to acquire control o f a significant public space in the city; this decision presented the 
ultramontanes with a number of different problems. The uprooting o f an entire parish 
was quite disruptive to religious life in the city, and conservative Catholics faced a 
number o f logistical difficulties during the next few years trying to accommodate 
these unfortunate members o f their congregation.
The reaction o f local ultramontanes was swift and decisive. Anybody who had 
voted against the dogma of infallibility was excluded from the Church, which meant 
that the Catholic Church in Konstanz had officially split. In a city where religion 
constituted a significant part o f everyday life, this division further disrupted the fabric 
o f local society. The conflict in Konstanz attracted nationwide attention. Liberals and 
Protestants celebrated the efforts of the Old Catholics, invoking the legacies o f Hus 
and Wessenberg while praising the city for always being at the forefront of religious 
reform. Faced with these challenges, ultramontanes began to more actively contest the 
official version o f the war and the unification process. It was certainly no coincidence 
that as the oppression o f Catholics increased, the more determined they became to 
display and manifest their own version of Germanness.
104 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 22, 1873.
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In the midst of these debates, the third annual Old Catholic Congress convened 
in Konstanz on September 10-15, which added fuel to the ongoing debates.105 The 
attitude o f local authorities was something that caused controversy and further 
confirmed ultramontane suspicions that they suffered heavy discrimination. In 1869, 
Mayor Stromeyer had refused to make any public buildings available for the proposed 
general assembly o f German Catholics (Generalversammlung der Katholiken 
Deutschlands). In addition, he proclaimed that a Catholic meeting o f this kind would 
never take place in Konstanz as long as he was mayor, which forced organizers to 
move it to another city.106 Conservative Catholics had not forgotten this injustice and 
were therefore all the more incensed as the city council granted every Old Catholic 
request. The theater, Konzilium building, and city hall were all made available to the 
delegates. Konstanzer Zeitung played a major role in these events, promoting it as the 
most important meeting since the fourteenth-century Konzil. The paper encouraged 
locals to support the congress and use this opportunity to further distance themselves 
from the “Jesuit pack” that was spoiling Germany’s national character. They told their 
readers that “your suffering under the heavy-handedness of Rome’s often half-crazed
• 107followers and incendiaries would soon end.” During the congress, 356 delegates 
from several European states participated in a variety o f meetings and events. A few 
common themes dominated the speeches. Maintaining that ultramontanes were
105 The congress is described in detail in Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde, 55-72.
106 Grober, “Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz. Die Geschichte seiner Entwicklung und Bekampfung,” 
230.
107 As quoted in ibid.
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completely under the control o f the Jesuits and the Pope, Old Catholics viewed 
themselves as saviors o f religious virtue and freedom. They consistently compared 
themselves to Luther and claimed that German history was about to enter a similarly 
dramatic phase as during the Reformation.108
During the Old Catholic Congress, many conservative Catholics labored to 
rewrite the history o f the wars of unification. Drawing upon new evidence from 
Italian diplomats, ultramontanes questioned Bismarck’s role in orchestrating these 
wars, attempting to prove that he and his fellow Prussians had been the aggressors in 
these conflicts. They accused the Chancellor o f having negotiated behind the back of 
his King and quoted him as having stated repeatedly that he was “much more Prussian 
than German.” According to the ultramontanes, in 1866, Bismarck had been prepared 
to cede (non-Prussian) German territories to France to avoid a conflict. This was cited 
as evidence o f how Bismarck and his liberal supporters defined patriotism. 
Furthermore, by tracing and presenting Bismarck’s plotting in 1866 and 1870, 
conservative Catholics claimed to have debunked the myth of the unification wars.
On both occasions, but especially in 1870, Germans had been told that the fatherland 
was being attacked and that great sacrifices were needed to save the nation. However, 
as ultramontanes strove to clarify Bismarck’s role in these wars, they criticized the 
national-liberal notion that there had been something almost holy about the unification 
process.109 Instead, they noted that the German lives lost in these wars had primarily
108 Freie Stimme, September 20, 1873.
109 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
served to satisfy Bismarck’s appetite for territorial gains. The liberals responded 
angrily to these Catholic aspirations to correct the history behind the wars, which only 
proved that the Catholics were really allied with the French. Invoking the great efforts 
during the war, the paper called upon all true Germans to rally around Emperor and 
the Grand Duke to make sure that Catholics would not be able to further spread their 
message of deceit and treason.
In the beginning o f 1874, Konstanzer Zeitung and Freie Stimme engaged in a 
fierce polemic regarding the development of the German Reich. Ultramontanes 
argued that it had become evident during the last few years that the inner unity that 
had existed during the war had all but vanished and that Germans were becoming 
increasingly divided. This development was blamed on Bismarck and the national- 
liberals, who had deliberately chosen to ostracize more than one-third o f the 
population. Freie Stimme claimed that it was unprecedented in history to have a group 
o f people who “fought for the fatherland with courage and blood, be labeled deviant 
sons o f the fatherland, traitors, and disturbers of the peace.”110
In the same year, Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics used the centenary 
anniversary o f the birth o f Wessenberg as a forum to debate national identity. Because 
of the symbolic importance that Wessenberg enjoyed, his memory became heavily 
contested. In a similar fashion to how ultramontanes utilized various anniversaries 
connected to the Pope as opportunities to display their strengths, Old Catholics sought 
to use Wessenberg’s birthday to manifest their position in the city. This was a
110 Freie Stimme, January 3, 1874.
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celebration that attracted attention throughout the German lands, and national 
newspapers debated Wessenberg’s merits and flaws. Many arguments were framed in 
nationalist terms; whether Wessenberg had placed Rome ahead o f the German nation 
constituted one of the most frequently discussed questions. Local Old Catholics 
attempted to claim Wessenberg as their own, arguing that he had always been mostly 
concerned about the fate o f his fellow Germans and never succumbed to the pressure 
from Rome. They often stressed that by standing up against Rome, he had served to 
strengthen the German nation. The discussion about Wessenberg’s relationship with 
the German nation and his supposedly conscious efforts to strengthen it is a perfect 
example of inventing traditions. At the time o f Wessenberg’s action, Ernst Moritz 
Arndt was trying to sort out what constituted the German fatherland and nothing 
indicated that Wessenberg’s actions were motivated by patriotic sentiments. Most of 
the Old Catholic celebrations turned into tirades against the Catholic Church, as 
speakers focused on the detrimental role that the papacy had played throughout history 
while stressing that Wessenberg’s most admirable trait had been his determined 
resistance to Rome. Several speakers drew parallels to the events o f 1870 and agreed 
that had Wessenberg been alive, he would never have accepted papal infallibility.111 
Freie Stimme was quick to answer this challenge and with the assistance of
Badischer Beobachter stressed that the Old Catholics must stop tarnishing
112Wessenberg’s memory. By extensively citing Wessenberg’s letters, ultramontanes
111 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 5, 15, 1874.
112 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 12, 21, 1874.
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tried to prove that though Wessenberg had been a liberal Catholic, there existed no 
evidence that he would have supported the Old Catholics. No doubt aware of the 
tremendous symbolic impact that Wessenberg had on locals, ultramontanes went to 
great lengths to disassociate Wessenberg’s memory from the Old Catholics by 
pointing out that though Wessenberg had been liberal, he had always been determined 
to avoid a split in the church. The ultramontanes furthermore cited several passages 
from his writing in which he specifically stated that one of the most important tasks of 
the Church was to foster a national consciousness.113 This was a negative form of 
integration as ultramontanes, who normally were quite critical o f Wessenberg’s ideas, 
appropriated his memory only to prevent Old Catholics to reap benefits from 
associating with the famous religious reformer.
Local Catholic Responses to National Events
Although most Konstanzers were focused on local matters, occasionally 
national issues came to play an important role on the local level. Most often, these 
events were interpreted in ways that exacerbated local conflicts. In 1875, the 
unveiling of the Hermannsdenkmal polarized Konstanzers. During these days of 
supposed national unity and joy, a conflict that emerged over the attitudes towards this 
monument shook the city. Already a few days after the unveiling, Freie Stimme noted 
that Old Catholics and Protestants had attempted to use the unveiling ceremony and 
the discourse surrounding it as means o f further attacking the Church. This
113 Ibid.
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constituted another example where Catholics were not just excluded from the 
commemorative discourse and reduced to the role o f spectator, but where they were 
attacked by the interpretations of the ideological message that accompanied the statue. 
They were especially critical o f the fact that these people were so harsh in their 
judgment o f the Church, though the Catholic Church had been the main reason for the 
greatness o f German culture o f past centuries. Unwilling or unable to base their 
identities in the recent military and political victories, Catholics elected to stress a 
different form of Germanness that emphasized cultural accomplishments. In the same 
article, they reported extensively on the unveiling o f a local monument in Meersburg. 
They highlighted this monument, which honored the sacrifices made by men and 
women during the Franco-Prussian War, by stating that it was so nice and refreshing 
to witness a ceremony devoid o f Kulturkampf rhetoric.114 Consequently, Catholics 
were more than willing to celebrate the recent war as long as the commemoration was 
conducted in a manner which allowed Catholic experiences to be manifested as well.
The annual end o f the school year celebration triggered the controversy. As 
part o f the festivities at the Gymnasium, Headmaster Schiller read a poem written by 
one of the students. The poem, entitled “Hermann the Cherusker’s Protest Against the 
Hermannsdenkmal,” described what Hermann’s reactions to the monument might 
have been had he been alive in 1875.115 Contrary to expectations, Hermann was not at 
all pleased, but outraged and wished that he “still had his old strength so that he with
114Freie Stimme, August 19, 1875.
115 Freie Stimme published the poem in its entirety on August 26, 1875.
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one blow could destroy the statue.”116 The reason for his wrath was that he could not 
understand how the builders, who dared to call themselves patriotic Germans, had the 
audacity to construct a monument to his honor when they were still completely 
dominated by the Romans. The main reason for his fury stemmed from the fact that 
by the look of contemporary society, Germans had not properly protected his great 
victory over the Romans. According to the poem, Hermann did not want to have a 
monument built until the German nation was unified again, which would not happen 
as long as Jesuits and other servants o f Rome roamed freely throughout the German 
lands. Hermann was ashamed to witness these developments, especially since they 
took place in a country where proud men such as Luther had carried out many great 
deeds. The tone o f the poem was very inflammatory and sure to insult Catholics. 
Among other things, Hermann stated, “We, who beat the Romans/who are now with a 
bloody hand/chaining you Germans/ and ruining your mind/I do not want to have 
anything to do with a monument.”117
Even from an objective standpoint, the student writing the poem was guilty of 
some questionable interpretations o f German history. Freie Stimme immediately
pointed out that until Luther initiated centuries o f internal division, Germans had been
118unified and quite powerful. The Catholic Church had been completely innocent in 
this conflict, which was to be blamed on the Protestants who had plunged Germany
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Freie Stimme, August 31, 1875.
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into centuries o f despair. The paper also took issue with the glorification of Ulrich 
von Hutten, who had been nothing but a revolutionary troublemaker. Was the author 
o f this poem aware o f the fact that von Hutten had led the French farmers in an 
uprising that eventually threatened the Germans as well?119 Freie Stimme was highly 
critical o f the author’s reference to the abundance o f Jesuits in Germany. Had the 
author not noticed that the German government had passed several ruthless laws 
which banned all Jesuit activity and forced them into exile? Furthermore, had he not 
witnessed how the Jesuits had come to the rescue o f the fatherland in the last war and 
how many o f them had served so valiantly that they received the Iron Cross?120 The 
recital o f the poem sparked several different debates which covered topics from the 
effectiveness o f the Oberschulrat to the interpretation of German history. 
Ultramontanes pointed out that most o f the draconian measures that the Oberschulrat 
had initiated, including firing Catholic teachers, had been justified with the need to 
“preserve the confessional peace.” They also focused much o f their criticism on the 
fact that it was unacceptable to expose young children to such harsh Kulturkampf 
propaganda.
The nine hundredth anniversary o f the death o f the Holy Konrad, after whom 
the city was named, provided Konstanz’s conservative Catholics with an excellent
119 Ulrich von Hutten was one o f  the most prominent German literary figures during the Reformation.
In addition to authoring songs and poems, many o f which stressed the need for the German nobility to 
unite and free themselves o f the yoke of Rome, he strongly supported and published Luther’s works.
For additional information on Hutten’s life and ideas, please see Hajo Holbom, Ulrich von Hutten and 
the German Reformation (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
120Freie Stimme, August 31, 1875.
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opportunity to reclaim control o f the city’s public space.121 A well-publicized event 
that attracted famous guests from all over Germany, this celebration constituted a 
major occurrence for the city’s Catholics. Local Catholics were well aware of the 
importance of the festivities as they repeatedly stated that it was a blessing that this 
celebration occurred, considering all of the difficulties that local Catholics had faced 
during the past couple o f decades. An estimated 10-12,000 people visited the city and 
sermons by Kiibel and Ketteler attracted over 5,000 people.122 Freie Stimme and other 
Badenese papers described the festivities in painstaking detail, attempting to instill 
new faith and strength in the Catholic subjects. Most o f the sermons held were quoted 
at length in the Catholic papers; most of them stressed the need for the faithful to 
remain strong in the face o f all the persecution and injustices that the Church had 
faced lately.123 The planning for the meeting was extensive and members o f the 
organizing committee attempted to ensure that all o f the high-ranking guests received 
at least one opportunity to hold a sermon. It is also noteworthy that organizers 
claimed that they would not engage in any form of polemic with other confessional 
groups during the celebration. They explicitly stated that despite all o f the injustices 
that had been done unto them, they would not seek out the opportunity for revenge.
By stressing the fact that they would focus on being good Catholics and good
121A detailed account o f the planning and execution o f these events can be found in Gustav Brugier,
Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, gefeiert zu Konstanz vom 25. November bis 3.
Dezember 1876. (Freiburg: Herder, 1877).
122Freie Stimme, December 5, 1876.
123 See for instance Freie Stimme, December 2, 1876.
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Germans, locals were able to present themselves as superior to the polemics and 
accusations that their enemies constantly initiated.
Bishop Ketteler held an impressive opening sermon, which centered on how 
religion had become increasingly lost in society. He especially stressed the many 
difficulties that Catholics have had to face during the past few years and how now 
more than ever, people needed to turn to the Bible as a source of unity and strength.124 
During the three days, sermons covered a wide variety o f topics, many of which 
discussed various types o f affection for the fatherland. Kiibel among others claimed 
that St. Konrad was a great patriot, who at all times followed the commands and 
desires o f his Emperor. He also made a point o f stating that because o f the love for the 
fatherland and the need to defend it, God also blessed the kind o f wars that are needed 
to secure these things. He also spent much time outlining what one should do to 
manifest and strengthen one’s love for the fatherland. With a clear message to the 
Protestant national-liberals, the Bishop claimed that it was not enough to be a member 
o f certain associations or to participate in festivities laced with great speeches. No, the 
love and devotion to the fatherland must be expressed in proper behavior, hard work,
1 J  c
and religious dedication-all o f which would help strengthen the fatherland.
The military priest Finneisen delivered a whole sermon on the topic of love for 
the fatherland. From the outset, he noted that nowhere in the Bible does it say that one
124 Brugier, Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, xxviii.
125 This sermon is reprinted in its entirety in Bmgier, Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, 1- 
8 .
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should love one’s fatherland. However, this was o f little importance as this kind of 
love is o f the kind that is inscribed in every person’s heart, just as the love for ones 
mother. He also made a connection to the geographic location o f the city, stating that 
in few other areas does the love o f the fatherland become so important as in a place 
like Konstanz, where just a few steps would be required to enter another country. 
Following some initial comments regarding the soldier’s love for his fatherland as he 
fights to defend it against the enemy, he proceeded to discuss the religious foundations 
o f this specific kind o f love and devotion. He briefly discussed the amount o f love for 
the fatherland that the old prophets so wisely displayed.126
As the celebrations drew to a close, controversy emerged. The local Old 
Catholic priest, Hoffmann, wrote a letter to Konstanzer Zeitung essentially challenging 
Ketteler to a rhetorical duel, but as Freie Stimme noted with great satisfaction, Ketteler 
would not lower himself to this level.127 The Catholic paper also argued that though 
the Old Catholics claimed that their movement was still growing, the numbers in the 
respective churches on Sunday effectively demonstrated who was winning the battle 
within the Church. The Old Catholic service was visited by sixty-five people while 
the regular service had 500-600 visitors. Freie Stimme also noted that Konstanzer 
Zeitung had attempted to offer all sorts o f different explanations why this celebration 
took place: to rally the forces before the upcoming Reichtags elections or to defeat the 
Old Catholics. Freie Stimme countered by stating that they were offended by the fact
126 Ibid., 152-167.
127 Freie Stimme, December 7, 1876.
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that their opponents thought that such worldly motives constituted the reason for this 
celebration. Instead, this was a celebration to express gratitude for all o f the great 
things that the Holy Konrad had done during his life and to ensure that his legacy 
remained intact. Furthermore, this type o f celebration offered local Catholics an 
opportunity to strengthen their spirit and resolve in a most public manner, which 
considering the events o f the last few years had become increasingly important. In a 
similar fashion, at the concluding banquet, von Bodmann specifically stressed that 
irrespective o f the treatment that the national and state government had imposed on 
Catholics, the latter were utterly dedicated and loyal subjects of Wilhelm I, once again 
reinforcing that the Emperor was excluded from most o f the criticism that Catholics 
offered o f the government.
After the conclusion of the festivities, local Catholics expressed delight at the 
success o f the celebration. They stressed that the last few days had provided a good 
opportunity for not only the city’s but Germany’s Catholics to display publicly their 
strength and resolve to persist in the face of the persecution they had faced since the 
inception of the Kaiserreich. They furthermore praised locals for attending the 
services and ceremonies in great numbers, which had enabled the city to present itself 
as a bastion o f Catholic Germanness. Consequently, it is evident that contemporaries 
viewed this celebration as an opportunity to brandish their interpretation of what it 
meant to be a German. Finneisen’s sermon on the Bible as the final authority on the 
characteristics o f love for the fatherland demonstrates that these Catholics were 
actively participating in the construction of a German national identity.
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In the immediate postunification period, because of their dissatisfaction with 
the ideological message accompanying the official commemorative and celebratory 
discourse emanating from Berlin, local Catholics used opportunities and means such 
as the ones discussed in this chapter to popularize and legitimize their own version of 
the German nation. This version, though in many instances not drastically different 
from the Protestant-liberal one, still contained enough differences to merit frequent 
public display. Between 1871 and 1876, the Catholics in Konstanz utilized 
commemorative activities to both express their opposition to parts of the ideological 
messages accompanying the official discourse as well as to offer their own 
interpretation of the unification process and the Second Empire, which enabled them 
to integrate into the new nation-state on their own terms. Because the city had 
experienced fierce struggles between Protestants and Catholics throughout the 
nineteenth century, tensions between the two confessions and between liberal and 
conservative Catholics were high at the time of unification. Rather than eliminating 
these tensions, however, the popularized nationalist discourse enabled Protestants and 
Catholics new means to preserve old conflicts in a new setting. As will also become 
evident in the next chapter’s analysis of the Catholic experience in Freiburg, in cities 
such as Konstanz and Freiburg where confessional conflict had long been a staple o f 
local society, Badenese Catholics and Protestants frequently used each other’s version 
o f Germanness as an Other when negotiating their own identities. Because both cities 
were strongholds o f clerical power, which often triggered a hostile relationship with 
local Protestant urban elites, Catholics in both locations were forced to interact with
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Protestants when negotiating their identities. However, as was evidenced in Konstanz, 
this interaction did not mean that Catholics were subsumed into a Protestant version of 
Germanness, but instead that the two confessions negotiated their own spaces within 
the new national identity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
NATIONALIZING THE ARCHDIOCESE? FREIBURGER CATHOLICS IN THE 
IMMEDIATE POSTUNIFICATION PERIOD
When the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was unveiled on October 3, 1876, citizens 
o f the city assembled in the lavishly decorated streets, taking the opportunity to 
display publicly their affection, love, and devotion to Emperor and fatherland.1 After 
more than five years o f planning and construction, the time for the unveiling o f the 
monument had arrived. The monument, which Freiburger Zeitung labeled one o f the 
most magnificent in Germany, was to commemorate both the heroic efforts of the 
German military in the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification. The 
presence o f both the Grand Duke of Baden, Friedrich I, and Emperor Wilhelm I at the 
unveiling would underscore the significance of the statue.
The unveiling o f the Siegesdenkmal appears at first instance to vindicate the 
claims of the national-liberal press that the German nation was finally completely 
unified. A close examination of these events, however, reveals that the seemingly 
homogeneous commemorative context surrounding the monument was in fact 
contested and infused with different meanings that could be interpreted in various 
ways. Caught in a complex web o f old and new loyalties, the Catholics of Freiburg
1 Freiburger Zeitung, October 10, 1876.
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opposed much o f the official commemorative discourse that emerged from Berlin, 
much in a similar fashion to their brethren in Konstanz. The discourse surrounding the 
construction and reception o f the Siegesdenkmal indicates that though residents were 
inclined to embrace certain aspects of their new national identity, they were reluctant 
to accept portrayal o f Prussia, the Hohenzollem dynasty, and Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck as the driving forces in the unification process. Despite brief, obligatory 
references to the glory of Wilhelm I, the commemorative discourse around the 
Siegesdenkmal focused almost solely on the role o f Baden’s soldiers in the Franco- 
Prussian War. The planning and construction o f the Siegesdenkmal illustrates how 
Freiburgers, irrespective o f confession, made their integration into the Second Empire 
dependent upon the maintenance o f local and regional identities. As was evident in 
the last chapter, this type of integration had taken place in Konstanz as well, but it was 
even more evident in Freiburg. For many o f Freiburg’s ultramontane Catholics, 
however, the ideological message of the monument, though it challenged many 
notions inherent in the official nationalist discourse, still did not represent their own 
sense of Germanness. Most of the bourgeois city fathers who spearheaded this project 
were either Protestants or Old Catholics, while ultramontanes remained largely 
excluded from this exercise in region and nation building.
To be sure, since the monument served as a means of constructing an 
alternative memory o f the Franco-Prussian War and the unification o f the Reich, 
conservative Catholics could identify with parts o f its ideological message. This 
alternative memory o f unification enabled Freiburgers to maintain their local-regional
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loyalties while developing national-dynastic loyalties and integrating into the new 
nation-state. The monument’s references to nation and Emperor were sentiments 
mediated through the regional perspective, which permitted residents o f the state to 
express devotion to their Emperor while also allowing them to legitimize their own 
past as well as their special regional status in the new Reich. Although Catholics 
rejected much o f the symbolism of the Siegesdenkmal as well, the fact that the statue 
represented the construction of a national identity through a south German perspective 
increased their acceptance o f its ideological message. The fact that the monument 
offered them an opportunity to manifest part o f their regional identities as a vital 
ingredient of the national identity made it easier for these Catholics to accept the 
official symbolism of the monument. Thus, the Siegesdenkmal illustrates how both 
regional and religious loyalties constituted important aspects o f the Catholic national 
identity.
This chapter analyzes how Catholics in Freiburg attempted to construct and 
assert their own sense o f Germanness in light o f their reactions to the Franco-Prussian 
War and the commemorative discourse that emerged in the post-1871 period.
Although much of the commemorative effort in Freiburg centered on the planning and 
construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, Freiburg’s Catholics also employed other means to 
affirm their own identities. As in other cities around the state, even during the war, it 
became evident that local Catholics and Protestants would disagree on how to 
construct a memory of the war. Faced with liberal and Protestant accusations of 
harboring anti-German sentiments, and having only a very limited influence on the
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construction of the Siegesdenkmal, Freiburg’s conservative Catholics resorted to other 
means o f publicly displaying their identities. Since many of the Catholic responses to 
the official nationalist discourse were influenced by Freiburg’s location as a city on 
the margins o f not only the Second Empire but Baden as well, a brief survey of the 
history of the city since the inception o f the Grand Duchy is necessary to better 
understand the Catholic responses to war and unification.
Turning Freiburgers into Badeners, 1806-1871
Freiburg was one o f the south German cities most affected by the territorial 
changes that accompanied the Napoleonic wars. Until 1803, it was the capital o f the 
Austrian Vorlande, thus occupying an important position as the westernmost city of 
the Habsburg Monarchy.2 After the Treaty o f Pressburg in 1805, the city was 
transferred to Elector and soon-to-be Grand Duke Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden. 
Having belonged to the Habsburgs since 1368, citizens of Freiburg were now forced to 
shift their allegiances. Because o f its relatively large size (in 1809, the city had 9,573 
inhabitants), Freiburg immediately became the third most important city in Baden 
after Mannheim and Karlsruhe, the capital.3
Faced with a new ruler and state administration, residents o f Freiburg 
expressed many concerns about their future. In addition to fears that they would be 
forced to give up their university and military garrison, they were apprehensive about
2 Heiko Haumann and Hans Schdek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau. Band 3. Von der 
badischen Herrschaft bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1992), 19.
3 Ibid., 20.
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the integration o f their almost exclusively Catholic city into a Grand Duchy governed 
by a Protestant Grand Duke.4 These worries were soon overshadowed by more 
immediate problems, as Breisgauers struggled to make it through the Wars of 
Liberation. These wars were taxing for the population, which complicated further 
their acceptance o f the Badenese state, and triggered many complaints about their new 
rulers. They not only resented that Badeners had to participate in the French attack on 
Russia but also that their city was forced to quarter thousands of Prussian and other 
German soldiers after Baden deserted its French ally in 1813. Before the Congress of 
Vienna, neither Karl Friedrich nor his successor Karl was a popular figure in the city, 
and citizens were still loyal to the Habsburgs. These sentiments were expressed when 
the Habsburg Emperor Francis I arrived in Freiburg on December 15, 1813. People 
lined the streets to greet “their” Emperor, and it was obvious that Freiburgers still 
considered themselves a part o f the Habsburg Monarchy.5 After the battle o f Leipzig 
in 1813, though the city had belonged to Baden for several years, people started 
dreaming o f a return to the Habsburg Monarchy. This became all too evident in May 
1814, when a pro-Habsburg mass demonstration turned into a riot, in which people 
attacked city hall, tore down the Badenese coat o f arms, and replaced it with a double­
headed eagle.6
4 See for instance Alfred von Kageneck, Das Ende der vorderosterreichischen Herrschaft im Breisgau 
(Freiburg: Rombach, 2000), 288-290.
5 Anonymous pamphlet, Lebhafte Schilderung der Freuden- und Ehren-Bezeugungen, welcher Seiner 
Majestdt dem Kaiser von Oesterreich als Sieger bey Seiner Ankunft in Freyburg den 15then Dezember 
1813 (Freiburg: no publisher, 1815).
6 Ursmar Engmann, ed. Das Tagebuch von Ignaz Speckle, Abt von St. Peter im Schwarzwald (Stuttgart:
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Although citizens slowly began to come to terms with the new state after 1815, 
the process o f integration was uneven. The nobility and the Catholic Church were 
least inclined to forsake their old Habsburg identities. Besides the confessional issue, 
these groups were unwilling to accept the abolition o f the privilege state that 
accompanied the foundation o f the Grand Duchy. Contemporaries noted that the 1828 
statewide commemoration of the centenary o f Karl Friedrich’s birth constituted one of 
the first occasions when Freiburgers enthusiastically demonstrated loyalty to Baden 
and its ruling family.7
During the nineteenth century, Freiburg underwent many changes. From the 
founding o f Baden until the unification of the Second Empire, the city’s population 
more than doubled. The increase was not so much the result o f changes in birth and 
death rates, but rather from the increased immigration to the city that accompanied the 
developing industry.8 Although Freiburg’s early entrepreneurs began the process of 
industrialization in the pre-March period, the local bourgeoisie soon became 
concerned with that city’s geographic location on the fringes o f the state. After Baden 
joined the Customs Union in 1835, most o f the trade was directed away from France 
towards other German states, and Freiburg’s southern location hampered industrial 
development. Baden’s infrastructure was still evolving and the city became removed 
from the major trade routes, which shifted most of the industrial development to
Thiess, 1966), 467.
7 Freiburger Zeitung, November 26, 27, 1828.
8 Theodor Zwolfer, Die EinwohnerzahI der Stadt Freiburg in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1936), 3-4.
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Karlsruhe and Mannheim in the northern part o f the state. Not until 1845, when the 
railroad between Offenburg and Basel was completed, was Freiburg reintegrated into 
the economic life o f the state.9
During the nineteenth century Freiburg became one of the main arenas for the 
conflicts within the Catholic Church. Having been made the site o f the Archbishop of 
the Badenese diocese in 1821, the city became closely identified with the Catholic 
Church and confessional politics for much of the nineteenth century. Although 
containing a strong ultramontane element, Freiburg was also home to a number of 
liberal Catholics. The latter, who subscribed to the ideas of Vicar-General Ignaz 
Heinrich von Wessenberg in Konstanz, were strongly represented in the city during 
the 1820s and 30s, which provided for frequent clashes with more conservative 
Catholics. However, after the Cologne events in 1837, and the subsequent Catholic 
revival, few liberal Catholics remained in the city.10
Parallel to developments on the state and national levels, the political climate 
grew increasingly hostile in Freiburg during the 1840s. Friedrich Hecker and Gustav 
Struve’s radical liberal movement enjoyed a large following in Freiburg, and the two 
often visited the city to rally further support. The election to city government in 1847 
had witnessed a public split in the liberal camp as radicals and moderates argued about
9 Albert Kunzenmiiller, “Wie Freiburg zu seiner ersten Eisenbahn kam,” Freiburg Almanach 5 (1954): 
121-136.
10 August Franzen, “Die Zolibatsfrage im 19. Jahrhundert. Der badische ‘Zolibatssturm’ und das 
Problem der Priesterehe im Urteil Johann Adam Mohlers und Johann Baptist von Hirschers,” 
Historisches Jahrbuch, 91 (1971): 345-383, here especially 366-367.
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to what extent society should be reformed.11 Following the news of the revolution in 
Paris in February 1848, the city’s leading liberals gathered in the tavern Harmonie and 
selected a deputation dominated by radical liberals. This delegation included the 
city’s most prominent men, who traveled to Karlsruhe to demand that the government 
comply with Hecker and Struve’s demands. On March 26, 25,000 people gathered on 
the Miinsterplatz, where the black-red-gold flag hung from the famous Catholic dome, 
to hear Mayor Karl von Rotteck (the nephew of the famous liberal) and Struve speak. 
Both called for the creation o f a republic with a new constitution.12 Even before 
Hecker declared the republic in Konstanz on April 12, radicals in the city had called 
upon Badeners to rise up against the Grand Duke and the government.
When the Hecker-march began, though Rotteck had previously stated that an 
armed uprising was premature and unjustified, he now declared that the city would 
remain neutral. Many people interpreted this change of tone as an affirmation of the
1 Tcity’s support for Hecker. During April, the rifts in the liberal movement became so 
serious that street clashes became an everyday occurrence. At the end o f April, radical 
liberals occupied city hall. However, they were quickly besieged by Badenese and 
Hessian government troops. After a few skirmishes on Easter Monday, the 
revolutionaries surrendered. Thirty-three people lost their lives in the struggles on
11 Bernhard Zilling, Helfen kann nur die grofle That...Die Radikalisierung in Baden 1848 (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1984), 20-26.
12 Heinrich Schreiber, “Die biirgerlichen Bewegungen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849,” Schau-ins-Land. 
Zeitschrift des Breisgaugeschichtsverein 41 (1967): 145-155.
13 Ibid., 156.
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April 23-24.14
Even after this defeat, a strong radical element remained in Freiburg, especially 
among workers and students. The presence of courts in which accused revolutionaries 
were tried helped maintain the radical fervor. These trials were well-publicized 
events, which often unveiled the brutality employed by state troops. Large audiences 
attended the trials, and they often publicly celebrated the acquittal o f an accused.15
When Lorenzo Brentano led the third Badenese military uprising, many 
Freiburger radicals once again took up arms. However, fear and skepticism were the 
prevailing sentiments in the city. As the fortunes o f Brentano’s followers started to 
turn, Freiburg was flooded with fleeing revolutionaries. At one point, the city housed 
over 10,000 radicals, an overwhelming number for a city with 15,000 inhabitants. 
Despite complying with Badenese and Prussian troops, Freiburg was occupied on July 
7, 1849. The arrival of these soldiers initiated a trying time for the city as the state 
demanded that inhabitants denounce the hiding revolutionaries. Many radicals were 
caught, tried, and given harsh sentences. To add to the already difficult circumstances, 
the city had to quarter the occupying Prussian soldiers for the next two years, which 
created much aversion against the powerful state in the north.16
Because of the important roles that many members o f city government had
14 Konrad Fisch, Hans Rittner, and Julian Wiirtenberger, Die Revolution 1848/49 in Freiburg (Freiburg: 
Unpublished manuscript, 1974), 41-44.
15 Ibid., 74-75.
16 Rudolf Muhs, “Aus den letzten Tagen einer deutschen Revolution. Was in Freiburg vor 135 Jahren 
geschah,” Badische Zeitung, July 7, 8, 1984.
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played in inciting revolutions in previous years, the state suspended their activities 
until 1850. New elections were held that year, albeit without political debate and with 
the understanding that anyone who had been active in the revolutionary cause would 
not be allowed to stand for election. Political activity was further stifled due to the 
fear o f the masses that members of the upper classes had developed after witnessing 
the events o f 1848-1849. Instead o f addressing how to improve the conditions for the 
underprivileged, the nobility and local Honoratioren sought to further exclude them 
from the political process, primarily by imposing stricter limitations on the 
Biirgerrecht. These measures proved to be quite successful as the number of 
enfranchised citizens decreased from about 11 % in 1840 to 6,7 % in 1871. The new 
three-class voting system also helped limit the local political influence o f the middle 
and lower classes.17
Although the first few years after the revolution were characterized by a 
struggling economy, the middle o f the 1850s and the 1860s witnessed a significant 
economic boom. In 1859, the entrepreneur Eduard Fauler was elected mayor. 
Although not popular with all Freiburgers, he possessed a keen sense for how to utilize 
the innovations that accompanied the new liberal era to improve the city. The 
presence o f liberals in city government brought improvements to infrastructure and 
generally enhanced the conditions for industrialization. Especially the textile and 
clothing industry developed rapidly during this time, and in 1870, almost seventy 
percent o f the factory workers were employed within this sector. From 1847 to 1865,
17 Dieter Hein, “Badisches Biirgertum,” 78-79.
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the number of people working in companies with more than twenty employees 
increased by 536 % .18 One of the consequences o f the rapid industrialization and the 
sudden rise in population was that it fostered tremendous social problems. In some 
areas o f the city, poverty was rampant, the housing situation grossly inadequate, and 
hygiene and sanitary conditions were often dismal. Some improvements were made in 
the late 1860s, when a number o f factory owners followed the example o f Fauler and 
Karl Mez and started constructing separate housing for their workers. The need for 
adequate poor relief helped strengthen the position o f the Catholic Church, which 
increasingly focused its attention on the social question. When Freiburg entered the 
Kaiserreich, it was as a city that had to face both the negative and positive effects o f 
the rapid industrialization during the preceding decade.
Because o f the presence of the Archbishop and the Erzbischofliche Ordinariat 
(EO), the tensions within the Catholic Church, and between church and state, 
constituted a defining characteristic o f Freiburg. With the advent o f modernization, 
confessional tensions often ran high. During the 1860s and 1870s, the religious 
situation in Freiburg represented a microcosm of the one on the state level. The city’s 
Catholics were divided into two camps: ultramontane and liberals. As was the case in 
many other areas o f Baden, the former constituted the vast majority while the latter 
occupied many of the most important positions in the city and were therefore able to 
exercise a disproportionate influence on especially secular policies. Freiburg’s 
strongly emerging bourgeoisie contained almost exclusively Protestants and liberal
18 Haumann and Schdek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau, 151 -153.
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Catholics, who in their attempts to modernize society often clashed with the 
ultramontane faction led by the Archbishop. In 1870, about ninety percent o f the city 
was Catholic. However, because o f the economic and political rise o f the bourgeoisie, 
Freiburg’s Protestants had a very disproportionate level of influence.
The reforms that Franz von Roggenbach and his liberal government initiated 
during the 1860s had immediate consequences on the local level. When the 
parliament instituted Oberschulrate in 1864, ultramontane Catholics in Freiburg 
greeted the news with dismay. Archbishop Vicari immediately published a pastoral 
letter in which he called upon all Catholics to oppose these new provisions.19 To 
nullify the effects o f this action, Mayor Fauler, himself a liberal Catholic, published an 
announcement to declare his support of the reforms. In 1864-1865, there were many
well-publicized cases in which teachers were either criticized or applauded for
20refusing to follow the directions of the state.
From the early 1850s, Vicari, BuB, and Andlaw had worked to strengthen the 
position of the ultramontane Catholics. Until the mid-1860s, however, they were 
largely a nonpresence in the public sphere. In the beginning o f 1865, Jakob Lindau’s 
traveling Casino arrived in Freiburg. On February 14, Lindau, Andlaw, and the well- 
known retired city councilor Karl Bader addressed a mass meeting o f Catholics and 
encouraged them to resist the latest state-sponsored educational reforms. The 
gathering was preceded by a public argument between Fauler, who had refused to let
19 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, March 23, 25, 1864.
20 For a good discussion of some o f these cases, see Domeich, Franz Josef Bufi, 375-376.
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the meeting take place in the Festhalle, and the organizers of the Casino. Participants 
ended the Casino by publishing demands for increased freedom for the Catholic 
Church.21 Ten days later, Fauler convened a meeting o f liberal Catholics, where they 
distanced themselves from these demands while claiming to represent the true nature 
o f Roman Catholicism. These two meetings were representative o f many similar 
conflicts during the 1860s. When the ultramontanes founded Freiburger Katholisches 
Kirchenblatt in 1864 and Freiburger Bote in 1867, they started engaging in an often 
very hostile polemic with the liberal Freiburger Zeitung over political and religious 
issues. Although the city’s Catholics briefly united during the war o f 1866, the 
aftermath of the war witnessed a renewal and intensification o f the conflicts.
The new liberal government that came into power after the war o f 1866 
specifically targeted Freiburg with some of their reforms. A decree dated November 
14, 1867, stripped the city’s Dominican monastery o f control over its finances, and the 
right to supervise the Adelhauser public school as well as its own educational institute.
Although this issue triggered indignant protests from both the EO and the local
22population, the liberal government would not retract the decision. As a consequence 
o f the increased Catholic mobilization and the sharp tone of their protests, the liberal 
government grew less tolerant o f Catholic opposition. The state’s refusal to accept 
Kiibel as the new Archbishop did not do much to damage the Catholic cause; on the 
contrary, Catholics only grew more determined to resist the state’s persecutions. The
21 Domreich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 315-316.
22 See for instance Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, November 16, 23, December 7, 12, 1867.
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last few years leading up to unification were typified by an increasingly tense situation 
in the city. The relationships between state and the EO and between ultramontane and 
liberal Catholics were deteriorating rapidly, and Freiburg became a central arena for 
confessional conflict. The pro-Prussian policies o f the Mathy/Jolly government were 
very unpopular in the city, and inhabitants were quite apprehensive o f the prospect of 
joining the North German Confederation. A growing hostility between the 
government and the city’s Catholics characterized the time immediately before 
unification.
The Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the Construction of an 
Immediate Postwar Commemorative Discourse
When the conflict between Prussia and France escalated in the summer of 
1870, Freiburgers became swept up in the nationalist frenzy that characterized the 
German public response to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July.23 In 
contrast to other areas in Germany, however, people in Baden did not become 
completely engulfed in the aggressive nationalist rhetoric prevalent elsewhere.24 The 
first few weeks of the war witnessed a common unity that superseded all previous 
divisions. For a brief period, inhabitants o f the city, which at the time numbered 
almost 31,000, o f which 23,000 were Catholics, were no longer Badeners, Protestants,
23 Freiburger Zeitung, July 21, 1870.
24 It is noteworthy that it took until the end of September before the newspapers in Freiburg began to 
call for annexation o f French territories. In other areas o f Germany, these demands were made at a 
considerably earlier stage.
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Catholics, or Jews, but Germans. Following the initial euphoria and heightened 
nationalist pride, tension in the city grew quickly. Because o f their proximity to 
France, citizens were aware o f their precarious geographical position. To add further 
to the sense o f uncertainty, soldiers normally stationed in the city were incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Army Corps and left for France. During the first few weeks o f the 
war, Freiburgers could hear the fighting, which increased their apprehensions o f a 
French invasion.25 This fear soon passed, however, as the German Army strung 
together a series o f impressive victories, crowned by the stunning defeat o f the French
' J f iforces at Sedan on September 2. As the sense o f security increased, many 
Freiburgers became more aggressively nationalist; in the middle o f September, the 
first demands for annexation o f Alsace-Lorraine surfaced in local newspapers.
Because o f its location, Freiburg was assigned a military hospital during the 
war, and in late July, newspapers began calling for civilian volunteers.27 Throughout 
the war, wounded soldiers were treated in the Festhalle or in private homes. Judging 
by the number o f people who opened their homes to soldiers and/or refugees,
• • • • • 98Freiburgers were willing to make the sacrifices necessary for victory. Although by 
volunteering local men and women proved their support for the war, many still
25 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, August 30, 1870.
26 For a general description of the battle o f Sedan, see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War 
(New York: Macmillan, 1962), 203-223.
21 Freiburger Zeitung, July 23, 1870.
28 Walter Vetter, “Anno 1870/71. Die Freiburger und der deutsch-ffanzosische Krieg,” Einwhoner- 
Adrefibuch der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 64-65.
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expressed ambivalent feelings about fighting the French. In the past, they had enjoyed 
a close and friendly relationship with their Alsatian neighbors, and especially during 
the last months o f the war, despite the official nationalist rhetoric, it became evident 
that many Freiburgers had mixed feelings about this conflict.29
The Catholic makeup o f the city played an important role in the emerging 
hesitancy towards the war. Much o f the German nationalist rhetoric, especially after 
the victory at Sedan, explained the collapse o f the French forces by claiming that
• • 30Roman Catholicism had obstructed France’s transition to a modem nation-state. The 
majority o f Freiburgers strongly disagreed with this idea and pointed out that 
Protestants and liberals had misinterpreted the religious aspect o f the war. Noting that 
the declaration o f papal infallibility at the Vatican Council in July 1870 had gone 
almost unnoticed because of the outbreak o f war, Catholics maintained that the 
conflict represented God’s way of showing both French and Germans how alienated 
they had become from the Christian spirit. The suffering brought by the war, not only 
to Germans and French but to the Pope as well, should remind Christians of all 
nationalities o f how important religion was. This war did not posit one confession 
against another; instead, it served as a confirmation that in their quest for
* * 31modernization, Germans must not denigrate the importance o f religion. These 
sentiments illustrated the Catholic resistance towards the modernization reforms that
29 Ibid., 60-61. See also Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, November 16, 1870.
30 See for example Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 5, 1870.
31 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, July 20, 1870.
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Badenese liberals had initiated during the past decade. Catholics argued that these 
reforms were signs that the German national character was increasingly corrupted by 
the uninhibited striving for modernity.
In their responses to Protestant-liberal claims that Roman Catholicism cost the 
French the victory, Freiburg Catholics stressed that the French failure did not stem 
from their Catholic faith, but from their inability to remain good Catholics. They were 
especially critical o f Napoleon Ill’s un-Catholic behavior, citing his decision to assist 
the Italians against Austria in 1859 as a strong indication of how far he had strayed 
from his convictions. Local papers stressed that though French Catholics were 
suffering greatly, this ordeal would assist them in reconnecting with their Catholic 
faith, which they had gradually abandoned during the past decades.32
When Bismarck initiated negotiations with the south German states in 
November 1870, making it evident that Germans were heading towards unification, 
Freiburg’s Catholics, though delighted at the prospect o f a unified Empire, remained 
hesitant about their immediate future. Gravely concerned about the situation in Rome, 
they realized that in the aftermath o f a German victory the fate o f the Pope would 
become even more uncertain. After French troops left Rome in August 1870, Italian 
forces chased the Pontiff out o f the capital on September 20. Relegated to the small 
territorial enclave that constituted the Vatican, surrounded by liberal Italian 
nationalists, the future o f Pius IX seemed very unsure. This matter was of great 
concern to German Catholics, and it occupied their attention for decades to come.
32 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 10, 1870.
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Inhabitants o f Freiburg repeatedly stressed the need to protect the Pope, arguing that if 
the French were unable to do it, the Prussian government should assume this task. In 
times o f war, statements o f the nature, “The interests o f Catholicism and Bonapartism 
are no less than identical,” attracted criticism from other Germans who accused 
Catholics o f enmity towards the fatherland.33 By repeatedly including the struggles of 
the Pope in their analyses o f the Franco-Prussian war, Catholics employed a non­
nationalist discourse, which triggered charges of treason from Protestants and liberals. 
Catholics refuted these denunciations, claiming that their concern for the Pope did not 
lessen their loyalty to the German cause. Indeed, these sentiments reflected a Catholic 
sense o f Germanness that differed considerably from the national identity that 
emerged from Berlin. German Catholics especially, with their strong ties to Rome, 
had for centuries constructed their identities around the persona o f the Pope. When 
entering the age o f the nation-state, with its exclusive focus on national groups, these 
sentiments further complicated Catholic integration into the Second Empire.
After the initial unity that accompanied the outbreak o f war, relations between 
Catholics and Protestants in Freiburg deteriorated during the last months of 1870, just 
as they had in Konstanz. Emboldened by the success o f the German Army, liberals 
and Protestants started voicing complaints o f Catholic behavior during the war. In this 
campaign, Catholic priests were especially targeted, and there were several well- 
publicized cases in which local clergy were accused of praying for French victory.
The behavior o f Catholic priests during times of war was not a new topic o f conflict.
33 Ibid.; Freiburger Zeitung, August 19, 1870.
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After the war against Prussia in 1866, liberals and Protestants denounced Catholic 
priests for boasting that in case of Austrian victory, all German Protestants would be 
forced to convert to Catholicism.34 In 1870-1871, one o f the cases that attracted most 
attention was that o f Catholic priest Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf, a rural 
community on the eastern shore of Lake Constance. During the fall o f 1870, 
Burgweiler reportedly led his congregation in prayer for French victory on several 
occasions, claiming that a Prussian triumph would greatly endanger German 
Catholicism.35 These accusations not only reflected Protestant-liberal concerns about 
the loyalties o f Catholic clergy but also fears about the increased influence o f Catholic 
priests, especially in rural areas. Since the election o f Herman von Vicari as 
Archbishop in 1842, a gradual ultramontanization of the Catholic clergy had occurred. 
Coupled with the popular religious revival that took place throughout the German 
lands during the 1840s and ‘50s, it brought an increasingly powerful local clergy. The 
influence that local priests enjoyed in their communities intimidated non-Catholics. 
During the war, many allegations surfaced o f Catholic priests convincing entire 
villages to support the French, which enhanced tensions between the two 
confessions.36 The power o f local clergy remained a contentions issue throughout the 
nineteenth century. On several occasions, Catholic priests were arrested in 
conjunction with elections, accused o f persuading their parishes to vote for a particular
34 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, February 10, 12, 1867.
35 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 31, September 7, 1870. See also Erzbischofliche 
Archiv Freiburg (EAF hereafter), B2-29, Staat und Kirche.
36 Freiburger Zeitung, October 7, 13, 1870.
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candidate.
The Catholic press around Baden used these allegations of anti-German 
sentiments to illustrate how the prospect o f victory was corrupting many Germans. 
Catholics in Freiburg referred to the initial Protestant-liberal reaction to the outbreak 
o f war, which had stressed that this was a time when Germans would put aside their 
political and confessional differences. Catholics claimed that liberals and Protestants 
only heeded their own advice while the outcome o f the war was still uncertain. 
However, as soon as victory was imminent, the apparent unity disappeared. Freiburg 
Catholics cited several liberal newspapers that after the battle o f Sedan claimed that 
the primary task in this war was to defeat Catholicism and found an Empire based 
upon the only true religion—Protestantism.37 Liberals referred to the imminent defeat 
o f the French and the removal o f the Pope from Rome as two major victories for 
civilization. To accentuate these arguments, many liberal papers cited a letter from the 
Prussian General Friedrich von Holstein to the French General Gorardin, in which he 
explained the German victory with the following words: “The future belongs to the 
Nordic or Protestant race...Catholicism stupidities...God will remain with the ones
T O
who seek progress, which is why he is abandoning the Roman people....” 
Consequently, during the war, local Protestants began constructing a memory o f the 
war that stressed the confessional aspect. As the conflict drew to a close, the hostility
37 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, October 5, 1870. For an excellent discussion of the 
relationship between Protestantism and the unification, see Ernst Bammel, Die Reichsgrundung und der 
deutsche Protestantismus (Erlangen: Universitatsbund, 1973).
38 Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 1870.
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towards Catholics only increased. When liberals outlined Germany’s promising 
future, which was sure to follow this military victory, many openly questioned 
whether there was any room for Catholics in the new Empire: “Should Germany 
really contain a large part whose Heimat is not in Germany, but on the other side of 
the Alps? After a struggle in which the best blood of the fatherland was spent, that
39would constitute treason and must under no circumstances be allowed by the nation.” 
Although Catholics had contributed greatly to the war effort, the constructed memory 
o f the war implied that not only had they been useless during these trying times but 
also that their Catholic faith excluded them from the German nation. Even before any 
peace treaties were signed, the official nationalist discourse interpreted the impending 
victory as a signal for Germany to assume its rightful place as the most powerful state 
in Europe. Freiburger Catholics, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on the 
“positive” aspects of the war and instead expressed concern about their own future 
status in the Empire, and the increasing secularization o f society and lamented the fate 
of the Pope. Even in the midst o f battle, German nationalist rhetoric tended to divide 
more than it unified.
Faced with Protestant accusations o f anti-German sentiments and assertions 
that they had no place in the German nation, Catholics in Freiburg recognized the need 
to refute publicly the ideological messages that accompanied the official nationalist 
rhetoric. During the fall o f 1870, locals held several mass meetings where they 
discussed these denunciations and the appropriate reply. On October 23, Freiherr von
39 Ibid; see also Heidelberger Tagblatt, September 24, 1870.
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Andlaw addressed a large number o f Catholics and encouraged them to stand up for 
the Pope, regardless o f the criticisms that their actions triggered. Claiming that it was 
the duty of a Catholic to remain always loyal to the Pontiff, Andlaw stressed that these 
sentiments did not prevent Catholics from being good Germans.40 To accentuate the 
importance o f this cause, FKK published an announcement on November 16 calling 
upon Catholics of all nationalities to donate money to a fund that would aid the 
struggling Pope. Also at the October 23 meeting, Catholics expressed outrage at 
suggestions from a few o f the city’s Protestants that one of the premier Catholic 
symbols in southern Germany—the Freiburg Cathedral—be handed over to the 
Protestants after the war. The Protestants’ argument was rather unsubstantial. They 
noted that the cathedral had at one point been Protestant and, in light of the recent 
Catholic defeats, should be returned to them. This claim was not taken very seriously 
by the leaders o f the city and only served to alienate Catholics further from the 
nationalist discourse and increase tensions between the two confessions.
Although Catholics in Freiburg participated in the celebration o f the 
proclamation o f the Reich on January 18, 1871, as in other areas of the state, doubts 
about their future soon replaced the feelings of elation. To be sure, they were 
enthused about the new Empire, but the recent successes of liberalism and 
Protestantism were causes for concern. Even as they celebrated unification, Catholics 
often stressed that they would not rest peacefully until the Pope had returned to Rome. 
Catholics entered the new nation-state not only with different expectations about the
40 This meeting is discussed in great detail in Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, October 26, 1870.
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future but also with a different memory of the Franco-Prussian War. While most 
Germans constructed their memory around notions of military victories, success, 
prosperity, and unity, for most Catholics this conflict had additional connotations. 
Although they were proud o f the achievements of the German troops and excited 
about unification, the accusations of anti-Germanness and the aggressive Protestant 
nationalist rhetoric, in addition to the situation in Rome, caused Catholics to construct 
a different memory o f the war.
In a similar fashion to other cities around the state, Freiburg celebrated the 
return of the troops. However, this festive occasion caused some conflict between 
local Protestants and Catholics. In February 1871, Mayor Carl Schuster and city 
councilor Karl Mez approached the EO and requested that a local Protestant minister 
be allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, even though the main religious ceremonies 
would take place in the Catholic cathedral. Citing canonical law, Capitular Otto 
Marmon refused this petition, which triggered an argument about the rights of 
ownership to the cathedral.41 Although a Catholic church and used by Catholics only, 
the city o f Freiburg owned the building, which meant that depending on the 
composition o f the city council, conflicts were bound to happen. Because of the 
prominence o f the cathedral, both Catholics and Protestants realized the importance of 
controlling it on days of public commemorations. On several occasions throughout 
the century, members o f the city council decided to flag the cathedral on non-Catholic
41 Letter from Schuster and Mez to the EO, March 28, 1871. The answer is dated March 20, 1871. This 
correspondence can be found in Stadtarchiv Freiburg (St. AF hereafter), K 1/28, Nachlass Schuster.
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holidays, which offended Catholics. Although in this case the Protestant minister was 
not allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, this well-publicized conflict made the 
city’s Protestants aware that they possessed at least theoretical rights to use the church, 
an insight that caused major conflicts in the 1890s.42
During the war, Freiburgers had been almost exclusively interested in the 
activities o f the Fourteenth Army Corps, in which a majority o f Badenese soldiers 
fought under General August von Werder.43 These first gained prominence in the 
battle that led to the capture o f Strasbourg on September 28, but their most memorable 
moments came as they besieged Belfort between November 1870 and January 1871.44 
Following an approximately two-month stand-off between the Badenese and French 
troops, a fierce and bloody battle erupted on January 14. It lasted for three days, until 
on January 18 the Badenese troops took Belfort. This victory coincided with the 
proclamation o f the Second German Empire in Versailles. After occupying the French 
city for two months, the soldiers returned home. On March 23, the city organized a 
large parade, decorated official buildings, and encouraged residents to decorate their 
own homes festively. Most houses were adorned with yellow and red, the traditional 
colors o f Baden. Few homes sported the Prussian black and white, fewer still elected
42 These conflicts are described in great detail in Heinrich Muller, Oberbiirgermeister Otto Winterer.
Ein Vierteljahrhundert Entwicklungsgeschichte der Stadt Freiburg (Freiburg: Herder, 1916), 140-171.
43 A quick glance at the newspaper coverage of the war makes this evident. See for instance 
Oberrheinischer Courier, August 5, August 16, 1870.
44 The activities o f the Fourteenth Army Corps are described in Vetter, “Anno 1870/71,” 60-66. For a 
thorough description of the war, see Theodor Fontane, Der Krieg gegen Frankreich, 1870-1871 (2 
Vols.) (Berlin: Verlag der koniglichen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1873); Howard, The 
Franco-Prussian War.
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to use the grossdeutsch black, red, and gold.45
Although Freiburgers celebrated the return o f local soldiers in a cheerful 
manner, local newspapers reported about hostilities between Protestants and Catholics 
in surrounding areas. In Zweibriicken, just outside Freiburg, local Protestant priest 
Heinz Roth used the peace celebration to proclaim that now when the external enemy 
had been defeated, it was time to root out the internal ones. Attacking social 
democrats and Catholics, he claimed that their behavior during the recent war proved 
that there were many Vaterlandslose among the true (Protestant) Germans. If 
Germany was to acquire its place in the sun, these elements had to be removed from 
the German nation.46 Roth’s sermon represented an early example o f the liberal- 
Protestant attempts to control the commemorative discourse. Many of the 
commemorative efforts in the first months after the war stressed the religious aspect of 
the recent war, as Protestants accentuated that Germans should be grateful towards 
(the Protestant) God for the victory over France. Catholics, on the other hand, argued 
that it was not altogether clear what their country had achieved in the last war. To be 
sure, Germany was now unified, which was worth celebrating. They repeatedly 
warned, however, against the overconfident attitude o f their fellow countrymen that 
accompanied the military victory. The commemorative discourse surrounding 
unification was littered with references to Germany’s greatness and how the rest of 
Europe now faced the reality o f a dominant German nation-state. Although they took
45 Freiburger Zeitung, March 24, 1871.
46 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, March 29, 1871.
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care to emphasize the value o f sound national pride, Catholics claimed that other 
Germans were not behaving in a manner befitting to their supposedly religious 
character. They never failed to point out that these attitudes were becoming part of 
what it meant to be German and that these sentiments were signs o f how the 
Protestant-liberal stress on individuality and egocentrism had poisoned the German 
national character.
May 1871 witnessed the emergence of several conflicts in Freiburg concerning 
both the commemorations o f recent events and over strictly religious matters.
Although at first glance it might appear as if  confrontations over issues not directly 
related to the construction o f national identity were irrelevant to that process, many of 
these apparently non related issues had a great impact on the project o f nation 
building. Catholics often employed nationalist vocabulary when engaged in conflicts 
over seemingly non national issues. Especially with regards to the increasing 
competition to control public space in Freiburg, Catholics frequently used these 
opportunities to assert their own sense o f Germanness. In the aftermath of the war, the 
relative peace that had characterized the relationship between the Catholic Church and 
the state during the war ended, and the hostilities from the prewar period resumed.
The recommencing of the Kulturkampf which served in part as an attempt to construct 
a national identity along confessional lines, immediately repolarized Catholics and 
Protestants and greatly complicated their efforts to consolidate a new national 
identity.47
47 For the interpretation of the Kulturkampf as an attempt to construct a national identity along
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In late May, certain members o f the theology faculty at the university caused a 
great controversy when they publicly supported Ignaz von Dollinger’s opposition to 
papal infallibility.48 Although the influence o f liberal Catholics had steadily decreased 
at the university during the past decades, there were still a few among the faculty.
Their actions caused an outrage among most Catholics in Freiburg. Not only were 
they disappointed that some members o f the faculty supported Dollinger, but the fact 
that the university made such negative headlines was a source o f embarrassment to the 
Catholic city. Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt noted how strange it was that 
these “so called Catholics” suddenly had become experts on religious matters. 
Previously, none o f them had been among the well-known Catholic personalities of 
the city; they seldom attended church and never participated in any of the numerous 
Catholic organizations 49 Attempting to highlight the ignorance o f these liberal 
Catholics, Freiburg’s ultramontanes tried to downplay the significance of the event. 
One of the main things they stressed in their detailed criticism of the theology faculty 
was that no Catholic possessed the right to question the decisions o f the Pope. This 
reference to the hierarchical nature o f the Catholic Church opened Freiburg’s 
ultramontanes to criticism, as liberal Catholics and Protestants argued that it was 
inconceivable that decisions made in Rome could carry such importance on German 
soil. Critics reasoned that since conservative Catholics obeyed these decisions, it
confessional lines, see Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 19-20.
48 On Dollinger, see Franz Xaver Bischof, Ignaz von Dollinger (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997).
49 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, May 24, 1871.
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located the base of their identities and loyalties in Rome instead o f Berlin.50
Faced with a commemorative discourse that largely celebrated a different 
national identity, Catholics attempted to create an alternative discourse that expressed 
their own sense of Germanness. To succeed in this venture, they recognized the need 
for an expanded Catholic presence in the public sphere, which would counteract the 
Protestant-dominated official commemorative discourse. To control public space 
became one o f the keys to Catholic construction and assertion o f national identity. 
Various kinds of papal anniversaries constituted one o f the most important means that 
Catholics employed to gain control over the public sphere. More so than Protestants, 
Catholics placed heavy emphasis on celebrating various religious anniversaries. Most 
were small local festivities. However, the celebration o f several major papal 
anniversaries constituted important occasions that demanded the attention of the entire 
city and its immediate surroundings. Taking into consideration the context in which 
these celebrations were staged, it becomes evident that Catholics employed them, at 
least in part, to display and manifest their own sense o f identity.
June 16, 1871, was the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pius IX’s election as Pope, 
which provided Freiburg’s Catholics with an early opportunity to display publicly 
their presence in the city and to offset some o f the hostile rhetoric that they had 
endured during the last six months. Although these celebrations took place throughout 
the state, since Freiburg was the site o f the Archdiocese, the city staged the largest and 
most important celebration. On June 14, Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt (FKK)
50 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, June 16, 1871.
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published a long article outlining the importance o f this commemoration. After 
surveying some of the festivities that were planned throughout Germany, the paper 
turned to the upcoming events in Freiburg and the importance o f publicly celebrating 
this occasion. The article claimed that though it was self-explanatory that every pious 
Catholic would honor Pius IX on this day, people should be aware that at the present 
time, Catholics needed to display their affections for the Church and Pope in a 
distinctly public manner. Not only had the Pope experienced hardships during the last 
year, but he had also been distraught at news from Freiburg about the behavior of 
Protestants and liberal Catholics. To assure him that the city still remained strongly 
Catholic, Freiburgers needed to display their loyalty in the streets as well as inside the 
churches.51
Catholics deemed the three-day observance a great success. Thousands 
participated in various celebrations, and their public presence made it evident that 
though the German government refused to correct the injustices done to the Pope, 
south German Catholics were unwavering in their support. By partaking in religious 
services, various types o f processions, concerts, and theatrical performances, Catholics 
in Freiburg displayed that their definition o f German national identity had room for 
loyalty to the Pope. Not surprisingly, Protestants and liberals heavily criticized this 
celebration, claiming that it only served as further proof what all good Germans 
already knew-that there is no such thing as a loyal German Catholic.52
51 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, June 14, 1871.
52 Freiburger Zeitung, June 21, 23, 1871.
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During summer 1871, new debates emerged in Freiburg concerning the role of 
the Catholics in the Franco-Prussian War. The more distant the conflict, the more 
Protestants and liberals tended to “forget” Catholic efforts in the war and instead 
focused on their allegedly traitorous behavior. Part o f their attempts to control the 
memory o f the war, Protestants and liberals ignored the official recognition that 
various Catholic institutions received for their efforts. In August 1871, Luise, the wife 
of Grand Duke Friedrich I, traveled to Freiburg to honor the volunteer work o f the 
Sisters o f Mercy. In a well-publicized ceremony, she placed a cross on their building 
and spoke with respect o f the important contributions o f the nuns.53 A few days later, 
the liberal newspaper Karlsruhe Zeitung published a lead article arguing that, during 
the last few years, Baden’s Catholics had proven useless in the defense o f the 
fatherland. Disloyal to their Emperor and without true love for the German Heimat, 
Badenese Catholics had been more o f a burden than an asset in the recent war.54 
Catholic newspapers were outraged at these accusations, and Stephan Braun, one of 
Freiburg’s leading Catholics, published an article in which he encouraged Protestants 
and liberals to question Luise concerning this matter—she would set the record 
straight. In addition, he recounted the activities o f the Maltheser order in painstaking 
detail. Braun listed every conceivable statistic regarding the monks’ activities during 
the war, from how many volunteered as doctors and nurses to the number of bandages
53 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August, 2, 1871.
54 Karlsruhe Zeitung, August 5, 1871.
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they applied.55 Determined not to let Protestants and liberals exclude them from the 
memory o f the war, Catholics took care to refute the false claims that the former used 
in their attempts to control the commemorative discourse.
The Construction of the Siegesdenkmal
Although Protestants and Catholics clashed over several different issues in 
conjunction with the commemoration o f unification, the construction o f monuments 
constituted perhaps the most important means of publicly negotiating their identities. 
Indeed, with the possible exception of the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, the 
planning and construction of the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was the most important 
commemorative effort in Freiburg. Although it is evident that though the planning and 
construction o f this monument first and foremost reflect how residents o f Freiburg, 
irrespective o f  confession, used this monument to combat the Prusso-centered national 
identity emerging from Berlin, the discourse surrounding the statue also provides 
indications o f how the city’s Catholics manifested their identities. Indeed, that the 
monument allowed Freiburgers to integrate into the Second Empire by maintaining 
their local and regional identities indicates how resistant the majority o f Badeners 
were to accept the means of nation building emanating from Berlin. In the end, this 
resistance made it easier for Catholics to accept at least parts o f this particular 
commemorative discourse.
55 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 28, 1871.
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After the proclamation of the Reich, the citizens of Freiburg began to address 
the issue o f commemorating the recent historic events.56 It became evident in early 
discussions that the memory o f the Franco-Prussian War would be commemorated to 
help maintain local-regional loyalties as the southwest Germans were integrated into 
the new Reich. On January 23, members o f the BiXrgerausschuss met to consider 
whether to honor General Werder by making him an honorary citizen of the city.57 
These discussions were similar to others throughout the German lands, where 
committees took analogous initiatives in the wake of the nationalist exhilaration that 
accompanied the military victory and unification. Following initial deliberations, 
however, the members o f the Biirgerausschuss agreed that rather than limit 
celebrations to Freiburg, it would be more appropriate to include all the major cities in 
southern Baden in the commemorative effort. Their logic was simple: since the brave 
actions o f Werder and his men had saved the Badenese state from invasion and 
subsequent destruction by the French, the entire region needed to display gratefulness 
towards the troops.58 The more people who participated, the greater the significance 
o f the project.59
The Biirgerausschuss sent a memorandum to several cities in south Baden, 
asking for donations to provide Werder with a ceremonial sword and a small gratuity
56 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, protocol from Biirgerausschuss meeting, January 23, 1871.
57 Ibid.
58 The term “Badische Oberland” refers to the southwestern part o f the state.
59 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, protocol fro m Burger a ussch uss meeting, January 23, 1871.
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for each participating soldier. Most communities responded positively; some even 
included a donation with their answer.60 Many offered suggestions about what might 
be another appropriate form o f honoring Werder and his troops. From the outset o f 
this initiative, however, it was evident that not everyone agreed on the meaning and 
value o f the commemorative effort. For instance, the town council o f St. Blasien, 
whose members were all conservative Catholics, immediately condemned the 
proposed monument as a waste o f money. Council members declared themselves 
willing to donate only if  the local soldiers were to receive some compensation from 
the new German nation-state, for which they had so valiantly risked their lives. The 
ultramontane Catholic city councils in Triberg and Breisach also opposed spending 
money on anything other than aiding the veterans. Instead of constructing a 
monument, they argued that funds should provide assistance to wounded war veterans 
to help them cope with life after the war. In their replies, all three cities made 
references to the recent Austro-Prussian War. The St. Blasien council expressed 
dissatisfaction that the veterans o f 1866 had not been honored in the same manner as 
those of the more recent war, although they also had risked their lives to protect their 
fatherland. Triberg echoed these sentiments, pointing out that many veterans o f 1866 
had experienced economic difficulties when they returned to civilian life.61 Not only 
did the differing opinions demonstrate that even the seemingly most homogeneous
60 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. See for instance the answer from Kandem, February 7, 1871.
61 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letters to the Biirgerausschuss from Breisach, February 9; Lorrach,
February 11; and Triberg, February 16, 1871.
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local-regional commemorative discourse could be contested but also how differently 
many Catholics viewed the process o f unification compared to the official nationalist 
discourse.
In the popular Protestant-Prussian memory of unification, the three wars 
against Denmark, Austria, and France constituted an almost ideal way to achieve 
unity. According to the official discourse, Germans had been divided for centuries, 
until the threat o f external enemies brought them together in joint defense o f their 
common fatherland. Baden’s Catholics found this ideological message impossible to 
accept for several reasons. First and foremost, they had fought with the Austrians in 
1866. Although the liberal government and Grand Duke Friedrich I had hoped to join 
a Prussian-led unification up until the outbreak of war, the overwhelming majority o f 
the Badenese population supported Austria. It should be pointed out that not until the 
outbreak o f the Franco-Prussian War did most Badeners abandon their hopes for an 
inclusion of Austria in a unified Germany. Consequently, Badenese Catholics were 
unable to accept the notion that the war o f 1866 constituted a logical step on the road 
to unification. Their criticisms o f the failure o f the official commemorative discourse 
to recognize the efforts o f courageous Badeners who had supported their fellow 
Austro-German Catholics illustrated the different collective memory that they had of 
unification. Badenese Protestants, on the other hand, most of whom had supported the 
philo-prussian policies of the Grand Duke, Roggenbach, and Lamey, simply 
suppressed the Austro-Prussian War in their construction o f the memory of 
unification. Baden’s Catholics were also critical o f the fact that the official
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commemorative discourse declared that Germans, in a similar fashion to 1870, had 
defended their fatherland in 1866. The term “fatherland” meant something entirely 
different to the Catholics in Freiburg and the Breisgau, which had belonged to the 
Habsburg Monarchy for several centuries before 1806, than it did to other Germans.
As part o f their opposition to the construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, some Freiburg 
Catholics reminded members of the Biirgerausschuss that if  the veterans o f 1870-1871 
were commemorated with a monument, attempts should be made to include the 
veterans of 1866 in this discourse as well.62
The members o f the Bonndorf town council first voiced the idea of 
constructing a monument in one of the larger cities in the area to commemorate recent
ATevents. Freiburg, a city that had housed a garrison, would be the logical choice. On 
February 19, representatives from the major Badenese cities met in Freiburg and 
decided to go ahead with the construction.64 The Freiburg city council formed a 
committee with the task o f overseeing the planning and construction of the monument. 
Most of the members of this body came from the city council itself. However, other 
important local personalities, such as Mayor Carl Schuster, council members Carl Mez 
and Adolph Wagner, retired Lieutenant von Boeck, and privy councilor Alexander
62 St. AF, Denkmaler/3. This was discussed in a meeting on March 10, 1871.
63 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letter to the Biirgerausschuss from Bonndorf, February 7, 1871.
64 This decision was made after a request from several communities in the northern part of the state. The 
latter thought that if  they were to donate money to the project, they should be allowed to participate in 
the organizational work. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
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Ecker were also included.65 The composition of the committee ensured that almost all 
important sectors o f bourgeois society were represented, including industrialists, 
politicians, and military officials. Members o f the city council made a conscious 
effort to form a committee that would command respect from the population of both 
city and state. There was no dearth of potential candidates; many members of the 
rising bourgeoisie were eager to perform their civic duty publicly, thus establishing 
themselves as important actors in the local community during the last half o f the 
nineteenth century. Voluntary associations such as this committee became tools of 
bourgeois emancipation and self-affirmation.66 Since the majority o f the city’s 
bourgeoisie was either Protestant, liberal Catholic, or about to become Old Catholic, 
the committee did not truly represent the population o f the city, the vast majority of 
which consisted o f conservative Catholics.
From the outset o f this project, it was evident that the Siegesdenkmal would be 
employed to facilitate integration into the nation-state by maintaining the strength of 
local loyalties, which enabled Catholic acceptance o f parts o f its ideological message. 
In March, the organizing committee sent a Dankadress to General Werder, signed by 
the mayors o f the largest cities in Baden. The text of this document indicates how the 
construction o f the memory o f this still recent war was adopted to fit the local context. 
It recounted the major victories o f the German Army while stressing the grave danger
65 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. The selection o f the committee was finalized on March 6, 1871.
66 See for instance Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the 
Nineteenth Century,” in Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, eds. 
Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
302-304.
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that Baden had faced during the conflict. “In the days between January 15 and 17, our 
people waited anxiously as the enemy, three times as strong and hungry for revenge, 
attacked our army. It was our brothers and sons who formed the last line of 
defense.. ..”67 The text conveyed the notion that had it not been for the heroic efforts 
of Werder and his men, the French would have invaded the state. The national 
perspective was virtually excluded from the address, and the only time that it was 
mentioned was to illustrate how grateful the rest o f Germany was towards the 
Badenese troops for winning the war. “Admiringly, the grateful eyes o f all of 
Germany...went to General Werder, the re-conqueror o f our Strassbourg, the savior of 
south Germany....”68
The campaign to collect donations from throughout the state began on June 22, 
1871, when the committee published an official announcement. Like the Dankadress, 
this document stressed the important role played by the local troops, which under 
Werder’s heroic leadership had not only prevented the French from occupying Baden 
but had also delivered the final blow that caused the French to surrender.69 Freiburg 
itself had already set the pace for the campaign by donating 5,000 Gulden.70 The 
initial response to the announcement proved extraordinarily positive as donations 
came from every comer of the state. While many o f the donations came from the
67 A copy o f the letter can be found in St. AF, K l/28, Nachlass Schuster.
68 Ibid.
69 The Aufruf can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
70 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, protocol from Biirgerausschuss, February 28, 1871.
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upper classes, the response from the middle classes was quite positive. Like their 
willingness to serve on organizing committees, the well-publicized generosity o f the 
local bourgeoisie indicates their eagerness to use this project to establish themselves as 
important personalities in the community. Since Honoratioren still largely dominated 
politics, the Badenese bourgeoisie used various organizations, associations, and public 
projects to gain control o f the public sphere in the Empire. The construction of 
monuments offered the bourgeoisie a context in which they could express their 
aspirations to social, cultural, political, and economic leadership in the Empire. In 
Freiburg, representatives o f both Bildungs- and Wirtschaftsbiirgertum dominated the
71process of planning and constructing the Siegesdenkmal.
The presence o f local members of the bourgeoisie in these projects was not 
uncommon throughout Germany, and certainly not in Baden either. As scholars have 
pointed out, Baden possessed an active bourgeoisie that participated to a great extent 
in the development and administration o f their cities. Indeed, even in smaller towns, 
both Catholic and Protestant bourgeoisie used city and commune administration as one 
o f the most important means to heighten their importance in their communities. It is 
worth nothing that though most o f the members o f the bourgeoisie were Protestant, 
Baden had a sizeable contingent of Catholics in this class as well. Because of many
71 For a discussion o f the Burgertum and its relation to the Denkmalskultur, see Wolfgang Hardtwig, 
Nationalismus und Burgerkultur (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1994); idem, Geschichtskultur 
und Wissenschaft (Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1990). For a more general discussion on 
the Burgertum and its role in Imperial Germany, see David Blackboum and Geoff Eley, The 
Peculiarities o f  German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Lothar Gall, Burgertum in Deutschland (Berlin: Siedler, 
1990); Jurgen Kocka, Burger und Burgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1987).
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reasons, one o f the most important ones being that Baden did not employ 
primogeniture, the state had a relatively large pool o f citizens who aspired to become 
part o f the Burgertum. Despite the sometimes harsh conflicts with the Catholic 
Church, certain Catholics were part o f this group. To be sure, many o f them left the 
Church; however, many still remained active Catholics.72
One o f the favored means o f collecting donations was to organize events such 
as concerts and plays whose proceeds would be donated to the monument fund.73 The 
committee also publicized the names o f the people who had contributed, often 
including the exact amount o f the donation.74 Members of the Freiburg city council 
devised a particularly ingenious way to collect money for the Siegesdenkmal. In 
November 1872, they decided to compensate those who had housed soldiers and/or 
refugees during the war. Those offered this money, however, were encouraged to 
refrain from collecting it, instead having it directly transferred to the monument’s
n  e
fund. The publicity associated with a large donation could of course turn negative if 
an individual or community did not contribute as much as contemporaries expected of 
them. When members o f the Konstanz city council initially declined to participate in 
the campaign, claiming that they had their hands full trying to collect enough money
72 Heilbronner, “In search o f the (Rural) Catholic Bourgeoisie,” 175-200; Hein, “Badisches Burgertum,” 
65-96.
73 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3.
74 Local newspapers often published detailed lists complete with names and amount donated. See for 
instance Freiburger Zeitung, October 11, 1871.
75 The announcement to encourage people to donate the money that they were about to receive was 
published on November 21, 1871. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3.
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to build their own monument, Freiburg city council members criticized them, pointing 
out that there were other cities in the same situation that had still graciously donated 
large sums of money for the Freiburg monument.76 Although the Konstanzer city 
council certainly could afford to contribute a small amount to the monument in 
Freiburg, the fact that they were unwilling to do so is noteworthy. This dispute points 
to the multifaceted web of loyalties that the citizens o f the Second German Empire had 
to sort through when integrating into the new nation-state and how difficult it 
sometimes could be to forge even regional identities.77
When the committee met again in late September 1871, members drafted the
• 4 75?invitation to the competition to decide who would construct the monument.
Committee members initially disagreed whether they should limit the competition to 
Badenese artists and sculptors only. They eventually decided to allow artists from the 
entire Reich to participate, primarily because a national competition would increase 
the status o f the monument. The competition announcement detailed what the 
monument should illustrate, though artists were left with some room for their own 
interpretation of the recent events: “...a main part containing an allegorical figure or a
76 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3., letter from the city council of Konstanz to the organization committee in 
Freiburg, May 26, 1871. Also, answer from the organization committee to the city council in Konstanz, 
May 29, 1871. Apparently, the city of Konstanz decided that the publicity would be too negative and 
eventually donated 84 Gulden. See also pages 103-104 in Chapter 2.
77 It should also be noted that Konstanz was not the only city to complain about having to donate money 
to this project. The mayors o f Mannheim and Karlsruhe were both initially quite unwilling to organize 
donation drives in their cities. The mayor of Karlsruhe repeatedly stressed that it was going to be 
difficult to contribute money to the monument in Freiburg. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, letter from the 
mayor o f Karlsruhe to the organizing committee, February 10, 1872.
78 This invitation is dated “October of 1871” and can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5.
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group o f figures representing the successful defense o f south Germany and especially 
the Badenese lands... .”79 As in the Dankaddress to Werder, the committee stressed 
the local-regional rather than the national-dynastic perspective o f the war and 
subsequent unification. Since the monument was to be a permanent site o f memory, 
the committee wanted to ensure that the memory constructed would facilitate 
maintenance o f local-regional loyalties while also permitting the integrating of 
Badeners into the Empire on their own terms. The committee set a May 1, 1872, 
deadline for submissions. In order to confirm and stress the notion that this was to be 
a popular monument, the invitation declared that all artists had to submit a model of 
the proposal, which was to be publicly exhibited. The jury would consist o f five well- 
known German artists.
The committee decided to exhibit the twenty best proposals in Freiburg’s art 
museum from May 12 to June 9 , 1872.81 To honor the occasion, the museum was 
richly decorated with flowers, wreaths, paintings, and busts o f Bismarck, Moltke, 
Friedrich I, and Wilhelm I and others.82 Judging by the efforts that the organizers 
made to create an environment filled with patriotic symbols, they were aware o f the 
importance that people attached to these symbols and their roles in the process of 
identity formation.
79 Ibid.
80 According to Ute Scherb, the jury consisted of art professors Semper, Magnus, Hahnel, Liibke and 
Knecht. Ute Scherb, Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal—ein badischer Alleingang? (Freiburg:
Unpublished master’s thesis, University o f Freiburg, 1990), 72.
81 Freiburger Zeitung, May, 25, 1872.
82 Ibid.
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The public took great interest in the exhibit. Over 5,000 people attended, 
which, considering that Freiburg only had 30,000 inhabitants, was a remarkable 
number. The committee made a nice profit, which it applied towards the cost o f the 
monument. Most o f the models were variations on the same theme: a triumphant 
Germania, illustrating the strength and greatness o f the German nation. A few artists 
attempted to portray the complex relationship between Baden and the new nation-state 
by including both Germania and Badenia in their monuments. For the duration of the 
exhibit, the local public opinion was preoccupied with the evaluation o f the merits and 
flaws o f the models, and the citizens of Freiburg enthusiastically offered a variety of 
criticisms. According to newspapers, none o f the models was able to excite the public 
with a proper visual representation o f the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of 
the Reich. The most common complaint was that the models placed too much 
emphasis on the national perspective.83 All o f the monuments that centered on 
Germania, regardless o f their overall artistic quality, were criticized for failing to 
consider the important aspects o f the Badenese history and the major role that Baden
0 4
and its Grand Duke had played in the unification process.
Local citizens and the press accused even those artists who had included 
Badenia in their models o f having misunderstood the real relationship between 
Badenia and Germania.85 In these models, the former was too passive and seemed to
83 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, May 28, 1872.
84 Ibid.
85 Breisgauer Zeitung, June 8, 1872.
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be in a subordinate role to the latter. There was particular criticism of the few models 
where it appeared as if  Germania was offering protection to Badenia. The public 
maintained that due to the prominent role that Baden and its soldiers had played in 
unification, the reverse would better represent the true nature of the relationship 
between the local and national. Any other type of symbolism would constitute a 
distortion o f the facts and provide a false account of both the Franco-Prussian War and 
the unification process.86 This alleged misrepresentation of events proved a sore point 
for liberals, conservatives, Catholics, and Protestants alike, and the discourse 
surrounding these models provided an outlet for some o f the frustrations that people, 
despite their nationalist rhetoric, experienced during the unification process. 
Commentators often pointed out that the people o f the city and the state had no interest 
in commemorating how the mighty Germania saved the weaker and dependent 
Badenia from the grasp o f the French. Not only was this an incorrect account of 
events, but it also implied that the state o f Baden was in a submissive position to the
• 87rest o f Germany in the new Reich.
Such sentiments can be partly traced to the fact that Baden was the only one of 
the three southern states that conceded almost all o f its demands in negotiations with 
Bismarck during the last months of 1870. Both Wiirttemberg and Bavaria proved 
more resistant to the demands of the future Chancellor, which in the end provided
86 Freiburger Zeitung, May 29, 1872.
87 Ibid.
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• 88them a larger degree o f autonomy in the new Empire than Baden received. This 
issue was sensitive to many Badeners, and they often complained that their state was 
neglected in both the economic and political realms compared to other German 
states.89 Therefore, it became even more important for citizens o f the state to make 
sure that they maintained control over their public space. Many argued that an 
unconditional acceptance o f the ideological message o f the official commemorative 
discourse that emerged from the center would be unacceptable. These people on the 
margins o f the Empire were not prepared to concede control of their public space in 
favor o f the Prussian-dominated national symbolism that stressed the importance of 
the Hohenzollem family and Emperor Wilhelm I. Control of their local public space 
became a way o f asserting their own identities and counteracting the political, 
economic, and cultural hegemony that accompanied the official commemorative 
discourse. As John Bodnar has pointed out, the creation of public memory “help[s] a 
public or society understand both its past and its present, and by implication, its 
future.”90 The construction o f a public memory ideally takes place in a public space, 
where it offers insights into structures of power in a society and questions o f loyalty to 
various institutions. By insisting on constructing a monument that offered a regional 
interpretation o f the process of unification, and by placing it in a prominent city such
88 Karl Bosl, “Die Verhandlungen iiber den Eintritt der siiddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen 
Bund und die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung,” in Reichsgrundung 1870/71, eds., Duerlein and 
Schieder, 148-163. See also Gall, Bismarck, 447.
89 Some o f these ideas are discussed, albeit on a more local scale, in Zang, ed., Provizialisierung einer 
Region. See also Haumann and Schadek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau, 199-200.
90 John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City: Commemoration in Cleveland,” in 
Commemorations, ed. Gillis, 72.
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as Freiburg, Badeners wanted to ensure that the importance o f their role in the 
unification process as well as in the new Empire was made evident. Once again, these 
types o f sentiments made it easier for conservative Catholics to partake in this project. 
Although few of Freiburg’s conservative Catholics played an important role in the 
planning and construction o f this monument, the knowledge that the statue’s 
ideological message, though not in confessional terms, opposed the official nationalist 
rhetoric enabled ultramontanes to remain relatively neutral.
In their criticism of these models, most journalists were understanding o f the 
faults o f the artists. They noted that most o f the participating artists lived outside 
Baden and had not experienced the horrors o f the war and the threat o f French 
invasion first-hand. Thus, they should not be judged too harshly for their failure to 
commemorate the war and the unification of the Reich properly.91 Most used this 
argument as a further indication that it was all the more important for the people of 
Baden to describe and commemorate the events that had taken place in this area 
during the war in a proper manner. Otherwise, they ran the risk of being neglected in 
the overall narrative o f the Franco-Prussian War. This fear proved unfounded as 
contemporary histories o f the war included sufficient descriptions and analysis of the 
activities o f Werder and his troops.92 These discussions point to the value people 
placed on maintaining the originality and uniqueness of their region. During the 
planning and construction of the Siegesdenkmal, local citizens often expressed
91 Freiburger Zeitung, May 29, 1872.
92 See for instance Fontane, Der Krieg gegen Frankreich, Vol. II, 714-726, 922-964.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
189
contempt for Prussian descriptions o f the dangers the German fatherland faced during 
the war, arguing that it was only the people of Baden who had the right to discuss the 
dangers o f a potential French invasion.93 This served to strengthen not only their 
regional identities, but also, because their region was the one exposed to the gravest 
danger during the war, which had called for a heroic defense o f the fatherland, it 
enhanced Badeners’ sense o f importance.
Freiburg’s proximity to the French border further complicated the acceptance 
o f the commemorative discourse surrounding unification. This became evident in the 
public’s criticism of these models as too degrading in their representation of the 
French. As previously discussed, the city’s Catholics had already during the war 
opposed the defamation of the Catholic French. Although many Protestants and 
liberals had been quite harsh in their descriptions o f the inabilities o f the French troops 
during the war, they did not want this denigration to be displayed in such a permanent 
medium as a monument. Newspapers from across the political spectrum agreed that 
the city of Freiburg could not identify with an anti-French monument. Journalists 
pointed out that this monument was to be an integral part of the city for centuries to 
come, and though locals wanted to celebrate the victory of the war and the unification 
o f the Reich, they had no desire to completely degrade their neighbors in the process.94 
People kept in mind the many years of fruitful cooperation that they had experienced 
in the past and hoped for in the future. Newspapers cited these opinions as evidence
93 See for instance Breisgauer Zeitung, June 6, 1872.
94 Freiburger Zeitung, May 25, 1872.
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of the cultured and sophisticated nature o f the Badeners. To quote Freiburger 
Zeitung: “Our respect for humanity forbids us to humiliate publicly a neighboring 
state for hundreds o f years to come.”95 These sentiments reinforced Badeners sense of 
identity in a positive manner and set them aside from the “official” national identity 
that made frequent use o f the French Other.96
After intense deliberations, the jury decided to award first prize to the 
relatively unknown artist Friedrich Moest from Karlsruhe.97 The choice of an unsung, 
but local, artist caused much speculation in the newspapers over the fairness of the 
competition. Journalists agreed that there were other models that were far superior to 
Moest’s. And although the jury was supposed to have made its decision without 
knowledge of the identity of the participating artists, people surmised that Moest had
n o
been awarded first price because he was from Karlsruhe. The jury also submitted a 
long list o f details that needed to be altered before the final construction of the 
monument.99 To be sure, it was not uncommon for a jury to offer suggestions for the 
improvement o f a winning model. In this case, however, the list o f recommended 
changes was more extensive than usual. The fact that a Badenese artist won the
95 Ibid.
96 Freiburger Zeitung, May 25, 1872.
97 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872. For a brief sketch on Moest’s 
career, see Brigitte Mayer, “Friedrich Moest,” in Denkmaler, Brunnen und Freiplastiken in Karlsruhe, 
ed. Gerlinde Brandenburger, (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1987), 686.
98 Freiburger Zeitung, June 2, 1872.
99 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872.
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competition indicates that the committee wanted to ensure that the Siegesdenkmal 
would present local-regional loyalties in an appropriate manner. In general, the people 
of Freiburg were not too critical o f the winning entry, but they did not display great 
enthusiasm for it either. Most seemed to have accepted Moest’s model as perhaps not 
the greatest piece o f art, but one which contained no incorrect or offending symbolism.
Moest envisioned a fifteen-meter monument, consisting o f a five-meter bronze 
statue o f Victoria atop a ten-meter pedestal (fifty percent granite and fifty percent iron; 
100 see Figure 1). The selection o f Victoria as the major figure for this monument 
indicates the difficulties that accompanied the symbolic issue. As noted above, many 
artists’ choice of Germania drew criticism for placing too much emphasis on the 
national perspective. Artists also faced the problem that Badenia was relatively 
unknown as a symbol, which meant that many viewers would have difficulties 
understanding the allegorical message of the monument. The relative dearth o f local- 
regional symbols suggests another difficulty that people encountered when trying to 
imagine the region. By choosing Victoria, Moest simply avoided most o f these thorny 
issues while still using a symbol that resonated with the vast majority o f the 
population as representing German might and power.
Moest’s statute focuses on the figure o f Victoria, who, holding a laurel wreath, 
stands atop a globe, symbolizing the rise of the German nation to the top o f the world. 
Victoria’s solemn gaze is directed downward to the soldiers below her, leaving the 
impression that even in this triumphant moment, she is mourning the lives lost. Both
100 For a detailed description o f the monument, see Scherb, Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal, 77-80.
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Figure 1. The Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg. (Reprinted from Otto Funke. Das 
Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau. Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase, 
1877).
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her hair and clothes seem to be flowing in the wind, providing the notion o f her body 
in forward motion. These details leave little doubt that Moest wanted to express the 
forward motion of the Empire as it assumed its place as one o f the dominant powers in 
the newly industrializing world. Below the globe upon which Victoria is standing, 
four soldiers, a gunner, an infantry man, a man with a rifle, and a militia man, are 
positioned. By clothing two o f them (the militia man and the soldier with the rifle) in 
Prussian uniforms and the other two in Badenese uniforms, it might appear as if  Moest 
struck a “proper” balance between the regional and national perspective. However, 
upon closer examination, the picture becomes more complicated. The militia man and 
the solider with the rifle are clearly the more passive and defensive o f the soldiers. 
Despite looking courageous, they both seem to be hesitant and waiting for assistance. 
Both the gunner and the infantry man, however, appear to be active, strong, and 
determined. This symbolism illustrates how the artist wanted the public to view and 
remember the events o f the war. The majority of symbols on the monument illustrate 
an extraordinary role played by Baden in the unification process, reflecting the alleged 
impossibility o f achieving such a glorious victory over the French had it not been for 
the valiant efforts o f the Badenese troops.
Aware that his monument also needed to reflect some form of national- 
dynastic loyalties, Moest also included references to Emperor and Reich. On the 
middle o f the foundation, he placed a plaque containing the text o f the telegram that 
Wilhelm I sent to the Empress after the battle o f Belfort.101 In Baden, because o f its
101 Ibid.
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emphasis on the local soldiers, this telegram was often employed in the 
commemorative discourse that surrounded the Franco-Prussian War and unification. 
On almost any anniversary o f either the battle at Belfort or the proclamation o f the 
Reich, liberal newspapers reprinted it to remind citizens o f the elation that had 
accompanied this event.102 Despite its national-dynastic connotations, however, this 
telegram also reinforced the notion that the victory of the Fourteenth Army Corps had 
been of utmost importance for the overall campaign. Consequently, even when 
addressing the national perspective, the symbolism of the monument enabled locals to 
construct their national identity and express loyalty to Wilhelm I by stressing the 
importance o f their local identities.
Below the telegram was an imperial crown, one of the symbols that drew 
public criticism. Many complained that two symbols of Reich and Emperor were too 
many and that it was a shame that the “great” General Werder was not represented on 
the front of the monument.103 The committee had intense discussions about what to 
place on the sides of the pedestal. A variety o f ideas were examined before the 
committee members finally elected to place the imperial crown on the prestigious 
front side.104 These discussions continued after the statue was unveiled as locals 
voiced their displeasure that Werder did not occupy the most prominent spot on the 
pedestal. Largely as a result of popular pressure, members o f the city council decided
102 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, January 21, 1872.
103 Freiburger Zeitung, June 2, 1872.
104 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, protocol from committee meeting, April 21, 1875.
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to replace the imperial crown with a bust o f the General following Werder’s retirement 
in 1879.105 Residents of the city as well as o f the rest of the state expressed 
satisfaction upon learning o f this change. Once again, this leaves little doubt as to 
what aspects o f the monument the public deemed worthy of emphasizing, and it also 
indicates that even after the Second Empire had been in existence for almost a decade, 
the people of Baden were still not willing to concede completely their regional 
loyalties in favor o f national-dynastic ones.
The fact that the battles around Belfort were the last major ones in the war 
played a role in creating the notion that they had been the decisive ones for the 
outcome of the war. When constructing this memory, locals often ignored basic facts. 
It was certainly true that Werder and his troops had survived a hefty challenge during 
those critical days in January 1871. Considering, however, the overall context of the 
war, the local population exaggerated the importance o f the efforts of the Badenese 
troops. In reality, Werder and his soldiers had experienced serious difficulties towards 
the end of the battle. Had they not received assistance from General Edwin von 
Mantteuffel and his Prussian troops, the Fourteenth Corps would probably not have 
captured Belfort.106 Local contemporary accounts almost completely ignored the role 
o f the Prussians. As the planning of the Siegesdenkmal progressed, locals overlooked
105 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. This decision was made in a city council meeting on April 29, 1879.
106 Howard, Franco-Prussian War, 424-427. He points out that though Mantteuffel did not offer much 
direct assistance to Werder, the fact that the former was approaching the battlefield with thousands of 
Pmssian soldiers broke the spirit and resolve o f the French army.
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Mantteuffel’s involvement to an even greater extent.107 An even more remarkable 
example o f inventing traditions was the attempt to make General Werder, in reality a 
Prussian, into a Badener who had answered the call of his fatherland and valiantly 
fought off the French attacks.108
One o f the persistent voices opposing the view o f the war that the monument 
presented was that o f Freiburg military historian Friedrich von der Wengen.
Beginning in January 1872, he wrote several letters to the organizing committee, 
arguing that the commemorative discourse offered a distorted account of the recent 
events. Citing both French and German sources indicating that the heroics of 
Werder’s troops had been considerably exaggerated, he argued that if  Mantteuffel had 
not arrived with his Prussian troops to support the Fourteenth Army Corps, it would 
have been defeated in the battles around Belfort. Thus, von der Wengen argued that 
Mantteuffel deserved to be honored rather than Werder.
The correspondence grew increasingly hostile after several o f the military 
historian’s letters were published in the Oberrheinischer Courier, providing von der 
Wengen with a public forum for his views. The national-liberal Freiburger Zeitung 
refused to discuss this controversy, realizing how the constructed memory of the war 
could be tarnished if  the public arena for Wengen’s views was expanded. The 
organizing committee continued to dispute his arguments, even though they were
107 The actions of Mantteuffel and his troops were never discussed in any o f the otherwise very detailed 
descriptions o f the battles that the newspapers offered. See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, January,
17, 1872.
108 Oberrheinischer Courier, May 25, 1872.
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never able to refute his claims properly. The committee was unable to make the kinds 
o f changes to the monument that von der Wengen was demanding since they would 
have shifted the focus of the monument from the regional towards the national 
perspective. This conflict continued until October 1872, when the committee simply 
stopped responding to von der Wengen’s letters.109
Other Catholic Manifestations of Their National Identity
While the construction of the monument would take another three years, 
Freiburg’s Catholics were involved in other instances o f intense contestation of their 
national identity. As the Badenese Kulturkampf resumed in 1872 and 1873, this time 
intensified by a full-scale national one as well, the city’s Catholics came under 
increased pressure. In 1873, in a similar fashion to the celebration of Pius IX in 1871, 
Freiburg’s Catholics took advantage o f the centenary celebration o f former 
Archbishop Hermann von Vicari’s birth on May 13 to stake public claim to the city.
As one o f the main leaders o f the Catholic revival after 1850, Vicari was a revered 
symbol o f the strength o f the Catholic Church. Because of his close ties to the city, 
inhabitants of Freiburg and surrounding areas were especially keen to treasure his 
memory and were determined to use this celebration to showcase their appreciation of 
his efforts for the Church. The Catholic press once again reminded people that given
109 The correspondence can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2. See also Oberrheinischer Courier, 
July 16, October 3, 4, 1872.
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the current situation it was crucial that they take these celebrations to the streets.110 
Since this commemoration took place only a few days after the passing of the May 
laws, Catholics were under heavy pressure throughout the Reich. In addition to 
stressing the need for Catholics to display their strength, the Catholic press also 
published excerpts from the Archbishop’s diary describing his house arrest in 1854. It 
was no coincidence that these passages were chosen. Since the initiation of the 
Kulturexamen in 1867, an ever-increasing number o f Catholic priests had been 
arrested. The so called Sperrlinge, who were forced to carry out their activities in 
secrecy and under constant threat o f discovery, needed encouragement to maintain 
their resolve.111 The centenary commemoration o f Vicari’s birth was a success as it 
attracted thousands o f Catholics from the city and surrounding areas. Immediately 
after the passing o f the harshest Kulturkampf laws, the celebration constituted an 
impressive display o f Catholic unity and strength.
In 1875, Catholics in Freiburg and around the state took advantage of two 
opportunities to celebrate publicly their faith and sense of Germanness. On July 25, 
Wilhelm von Ketteler, one o f the best-known German bishops, had his twenty-fifth 
anniversary as Bishop. Once again, the eagerness Catholics displayed as they 
embarked on the planning and celebrating of this commemoration indicates their 
resistance to the Protestant-based national identity. Most of these public celebrations 
were accompanied by harsh polemic in the press, both prior to and after the event. In
110 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, May 14, 1873.
111 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, June 4, 1873.
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the last weeks leading up to Ketteler’s anniversary, the liberal Badische Landeszeitung 
and FKK engaged in a fierce debate regarding the importance o f the Bishop to 
contemporary society.112 The former attempted to downplay the significance of 
Ketteler to the Catholic cause while FKK answered by discussing in great detail all he 
had done for the Church. FKK placed much emphasis on Ketteler’s great qualities as 
a human, which they claimed earned him respect among his enemies as well. This 
was a common trend throughout these debates, as Catholics often stressed the personal 
qualities o f their own, claiming that the Catholic in question constituted a perfect 
example o f a German. Their enemies, on the other hand, were mostly denigrated as 
shallow, egotistical, and unkind persons, representing a poor example o f Germanness. 
Many times, these characterizations were conducted in national terms, indicating that 
the opponents o f the Catholic cause were not really true Germans, wheras Catholics
113constituted the perfect embodiment o f Germanness.
As far as Ketteler’s character was concerned, FKK pointed out that as a true 
man of God, members o f the local and national community respected him. In 
conjunction with this celebration, the ever-present issue of papal infallibility was once 
again brought to the forefront o f the debate. In an attempt to disgrace Ketteler, 
Protestants and Old Catholics claimed that prior to the Vatican Council he had been 
opposed to the notion o f infallibility. Ketteler refuted these allegations by admitting
112 Badische Landeszeitung, June 26, 28, 1875; Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, July 21, 1875.
113 An excellent example o f this can be found in Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 11,
1873, where Vicari is seen as an exemplary German while Bismarck is heavily criticized for embodying 
all the flaws o f the German national character.
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that he had initially expressed some concerns about certain aspects o f the notion of 
infallibility. As soon as the Council made its decision however, he unconditionally 
accepted it. This was the main difference between himself (and in the end, every good 
Catholic) and the Old Catholics and Protestants, who incorrectly believed that they 
could challenge the decisions o f the highest clergy.114
Also in 1875, as the host o f the General Assembly of Germany’s Catholics 
(Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands), Freiburg and the Catholics of 
Baden had another opportunity to manifest their strength. This annual event 
constituted a highlight for Catholics throughout Germany and neighboring countries. 
Almost every Catholic newspaper carried extensive coverage o f the congress, 
commenting on the debates and the decisions made. The local Catholic press covered 
the meetings in great detail, often including complete transcripts o f the discussions. 
The Catholics o f Freiburg were determined to take advantage of this opportunity to 
prove themselves worthy hosts o f this event, just as Catholics in Konstanz had 
embraced the anniversary o f the birth o f the Holy Konrad in 1876 to manifest publicly 
their presence in their city. Prior to the congress, people were encouraged to 
participate in as many proceedings as possible, to ensure that the rest o f Germany 
would witness the strength and vitality of the Catholic community. An event o f this 
magnitude was tremendously important to the Catholics in Freiburg as it provided 
them with an opportunity to control the city’s public space. During the several days 
that the congress lasted, the city was overwhelmed by Catholics who completely
114 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 11, 1875.
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dominated the urban landscape. Indirectly addressing this issue, on September 1,
1875, Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt published a long letter from Pius IX to 
the organizing committee, expressing his delight that Freiburg hosted that year’s 
congress. He encouraged people to gather strength from the presence o f other 
Catholics, which was even more important in these times when liberal regimes in 
Germany and Europe constantly attacked Catholics.115
As opening day drew nearer, masses o f Catholics arrived in the city. 
Contemporaries estimated the number o f participants at over 2,000, most o f them 
Germans, but with a fair number of French, Austrian, and Swiss delegates as well.
The main events took place in the Festhalle, which was the only building large enough 
to hold all the delegates. Auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Ktibel gave the opening 
speech, in which he outlined the importance o f these meetings as means o f increasing 
the strength and unity o f Catholics. Besides stressing the value o f having so many 
Catholics gathered in one place, he focused most o f his speech on the latest 
educational reforms at the hands of the liberal government.116
In the following speech, Bishop Ketteler provided a good example of how 
German Catholics viewed themselves and their role in contemporary Germany. Not 
surprisingly, he was extremely critical o f the liberal regime in power, claiming that 
there was nothing liberal about it—members of the liberal movement were absolutists, 
just as Louis XIV had been an absolutist ruler in France. Ketteler expressed dismay
115 See Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, September 1,9, 1875.
116 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, September 9, 1875.
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that liberals based their idea of the modem state on the notion that they could form 
human beings through application o f secular laws. He attacked the liberal argument 
that schools needed to be reformed to provide for a more nationally integrated and 
better educated population, claiming that the removal o f religious influences in the 
schools would bring disastrous consequences. In his criticisms, Ketteler revealed how 
differently Catholics viewed the construction of a nationally conscious population. 
While most liberals viewed these reforms as prerequisites for a successful transition to 
a modernized nation-state, Catholics were more inclined to embrace an older version 
o f national identity that stressed ties to the past. Furthermore, Ketteler sharply 
criticized the notion that the state could shape its citizens. In Ketteler’s view, this 
constituted blasphemy as it seemed to imply that the modem state was assuming the 
role o f God. This argument was a recurring one in Catholic criticisms of the modem 
state; they often accused liberals of placing entirely too much faith in the powers of 
the modem state and failing to recognize the important role that religion had to play in 
the modem society.
Ketteler also took issue with liberal claims that the deregulation o f trade and 
commerce had increased the freedom of Germans. He maintained that one just had to 
look at the dismal conditions o f the factory workers to realize that this was not tme.
He also addressed the recent economic crash by using a nationalist vocabulary. 
Claiming that Catholics have always been tme to the German fatherland, he argued 
that the liberal entrepreneurs who caused the recent economic downturn were the true 
enemies o f the fatherland. These liberals had no concern for their fellow Germans, but
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instead were only interested in increasing their own fortunes, which in the end caused
117tremendous suffering to the German nation.
The president o f the congress, Freiherr von Bamboldt, gave one of the most 
important speeches o f the event. Briefly outlining some of the major events of the last 
century, he noted that the last few decades had not been kind to the Catholics, or to 
any confession for that matter. There had been more wars, more revolutions, more 
shifts of power than ever before. In his speech, Bamboldt made a comment that was 
immediately seized upon by his enemies as proof that Catholics were not interested in 
bringing Germany to the forefront of European politics. Bamboldt stated that though 
life was simple in the Middle Ages, at least back then people were pious, and they all 
believed in one God, whom they obeyed. The ruling kings and popes maintained a 
good grip on their respective power and rarely fought over who would control which 
aspects of society. During the last century, however, the constant struggles between 
the church and secular leaders had contributed to an increasingly chaotic and 
degenerate society, in which individualism and egocentrism constitute the ruling 
virtues.118 Both local and national Protestant-liberal press attacked these statements, 
which they claimed served as irrefutable proof that the influence o f the Catholic 
Church needed to be even further reduced if Germany were to claim its place in the
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Freiburger Zeitung, September 15, 1875.
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Despite the criticism that some of the speeches attracted in Protestant-liberal 
circles, the Catholics in Freiburg were very pleased with the outcome o f the congress. 
For several days, Catholics, who grew ever more determined to refute the claims that 
they did not constitute true Germans, dominated the city’s public space. To be sure, 
sentiments such as the ones expressed by Bamboldt illustrated that Catholics, aided by 
their own interpretation o f the German past, subscribed to different notions of 
Germanness. That did not, however, make them less national than their Protestant 
countrymen and women.
Completion and Unveiling of the Siegesdenkmal
During all o f these debates, the men responsible for the construction o f the 
Siegesdenkmal continued their work. During late 1875, discussions over the location 
o f the monument delayed the construction for a few months. In spring 1876, the 
committee began to push hard for an unveiling during the late summer or early fall. 
The main reason for their hurry was that Wilhelm I and other members of the 
Hohenzollem family often visited the spa in Baden-Baden during the summer, a stay 
that this year included the celebration of the Empress’s birthday on September 29. 
Keeping in mind that Baden-Baden was only a few hours away, the committee 
members considered their chances of securing the presence o f the Emperor and any 
other family members at the unveiling to be much greater during the early fall, before 
the return to Berlin. Already in a letter to Moest in April 1876, the committee stressed
120 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2. The letter to Moest was sent on April 29, 1876.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
205
the importance o f completing the monument before a proposed date in early October 
since that would greatly enhance the possibility o f an imperial presence at the 
unveiling.121
The organizing committee was well aware that Wilhelm I often attended these 
types of ceremonies, making him the premier consumer of the monument culture that 
emerged in Germany. Wilhelm I was convinced that he needed to undertake many 
trips within his Empire to manifest both his own legitimacy and that of the nation­
state. His role as a consumer of this culture not only lent legitimacy to it, but it also 
helped popularize the persona of the Emperor.122 The committee was elated when he 
accepted their invitation, though he was sorry to inform them that due to poor health,
123his wife would not accompany him to Freiburg.
On August 18, 1876, a committee was formed to plan the unveiling ceremony. 
Invitations were sent out to selected dignitaries, including Wilhelm I, Grand Duke 
Friedrich I, General Werder, Bismarck, Moltke, and Mantteuffel. Werder agreed to 
attend the ceremony on the condition that he would not be its focus, which indicates 
that the location o f the ideological emphasis o f the monument was no secret.124 In 
addition to figures o f national prominence, the committee invited all o f Baden’s
121 On August 1, the committee finalized October 3, 1876, as the date for the unveiling after consulting 
with both Lenz and Moest. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
122 Koshar, From Monuments to Traces, 24-25.
123 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, letter from the Office o f the Emperor to the organization committee, 
August 27, 1876.
124 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/1. Werder’s request was discussed in a meeting of the organizing 
committee on September 11, 1876.
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ministers as well as representatives of hundreds o f different organizations. Among the 
latter, the city offered some rare praise for the women of the city as they invited 
members o f the Freiburger Hiilfsverein to attend the ceremony. Leading women in 
the community had founded this organization immediately after the outbreak of the 
war, and they proved to be o f much value on the home front during the war.125 This 
was the first major public occasion on which the city had recognized the efforts of the 
women. Other than this rather minor note, women were largely excluded from this 
project as well as from most of the commemorative discourse that surrounded the 
unification.
The members o f the organizing committee went to great lengths to include the 
entire city in the planned ceremonies. They planned a parade from the train station to 
the place o f the unveiling that was to include the most prominent guests, and they also 
arranged for several different ceremonies to be held throughout the city. In addition, 
they were careful to include the Catholic Church in these ceremonies. This was 
obviously a thorny issue, especially since the Badenese Kulturkampf had just reached 
new heights during the summer and fall o f 1876 as the provincial parliament had 
passed new legislation that abolished confessional schools, which upset Catholics.126 
In addition to the aforementioned Catholic reservations concerning this monument, 
local Catholics had become increasingly critical o f the fact that while monuments 
were being built all over Germany to celebrate the efforts o f the soldiers, Jesuits were
125 Otto Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau (Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase, 1877), 29.
126 Becker, Liberaler Staat undKirche, 358-364.
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being driven out of the new nation-state. According to most Catholics, the Jesuits had 
played an important role in caring for the wounded, especially in southern Baden, and 
some of them had been awarded the Iron Cross for their services.127 In the first 
decades after the war, Jesuits and their role in the Franco-Prussian War caused 
considerable controversy as liberals accused them of having prayed for French victory. 
Catholics pointed to the courage and love for the fatherland Jesuits had displayed 
when volunteering for the war effort.128 Especially in 1874-1875, when reports about 
mistreatment o f Jesuits reached Freiburg and the EO on an almost daily basis, local 
Catholics were very critical of the actions o f both the national and state government.
Consequently, members o f the EO found themselves in a difficult position. On 
the one hand, they were hesitant to associate with celebrations that commemorated an 
event that in many ways constituted the beginning o f the national Kulturkampf. On 
the other, they regularly faced accusations of being enemies o f the fatherland who 
maintained closer and stronger ties to Rome than Berlin. Therefore, if  they elected not 
to participate, it would be interpreted as yet another confirmation o f their hostile 
attitudes towards the Second Empire. Finally, after some negotiating between the 
organizing committee and Kiibel, the latter agreed to deliver a speech that day, not at 
the monument, but at the Catholic dome. His decision to participate in the ceremony 
was made easier by the fact that the monument did not contain any anti-Catholic
127 These types of debates resurfaced in conjunction with different types o f commemorative activities. 
See for instance Freie Stimme, September 9, 1874.
128 See Michael B. Gross, “Kulturkampf and Unification: German Liberalism and the War Against the 
Jesuits,” Central European History 30 (1997): 545-566.
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symbolism, nor did it resonate with the official national identity emanating from 
Berlin. In addition, Kiibel was able to convince the committee not to let the Old 
Catholics participate in the ceremony, which would enable Freiburg’s conservative
• 129Catholics to stake claim to a small part o f the commemorative discourse.
Most local newspapers participated in heightening the anticipation o f the day 
o f unveiling. In the days before and after to the ceremony, they were filled with 
articles, editorials, poems, and songs. “Zum Dritten Oktober 1876,” an article 
published in the Freiburger Zeitung, hailed the deeds o f Werder and his troops. 
According to this article, although Werder and his men were faced by an enemy that 
vastly outnumbered them (the French were said to have had a ten to one numerical 
advantage), they only had to recall the danger that the women and children at home 
were facing in order to summon courage to do battle. The article repeatedly stressed 
that during these three days o f national danger, it was Werder and his men who held 
“die Wacht am Rhein.”130 This glorified version of events ignored the fact that the 
French, while not yet defeated, did not constitute a significant threat to the Germans 
by January 1871. After the defeat at Sedan, the French army had primarily engaged in 
a defensive war.
Another page in the Freiburger Zeitung contained a song honoring Werder and 
his troops. This song followed a similar pattern to the article, placing particular 
emphasis on the unity, courage, and nobility o f Werder’s troops. It made clear that the
129 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letter from Kiibel to the organizing committee, September 30, 1876.
130 Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 1876.
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unveiling commemorated the role that Werder and his men played in the defense of 
the Badenese (and German) fatherland. There was no mention of unification, though 
it is inferred that by exhausting the last reserves o f the French enemy, the Badenese 
troops were the ones who delivered the decisive blow that made possible the
1 T 1proclamation of the Reich and forced the French to surrender. Furthermore, it 
alluded to the ambivalent meaning of the term “fatherland.” Often, it seems as if the 
newspapers themselves were unsure what exactly constituted their fatherland. There 
are numerous examples defining it in local {Badische Oberland), regional (Baden), 
and national terms. This ambivalence indicates that locals were not prepared to accept 
simply the connotations that the official discourse attached to the term and that they 
used the term to express their own definition of Germanness. Indeed, the various 
meanings o f fatherland indicate the unstable nature of the nationalizing project.
The newspapers furthermore claimed that the time had finally come for 
Freiburg and Baden to display the appreciation o f its citizens for its brave fathers, 
sons, and brothers, who risked their lives in order to protect the German border. When 
the monument was unveiled, it would stand as a symbol to remind this and future 
generations o f the heroic deeds o f these soldiers. The Freiburger Zeitung praised the 
Emperor for accepting the invitation to attend the ceremony, and reminded its readers 
of the last visit that Wilhelm I had made to the city. It took place in September 1870, 
as the King of Prussia arrived to inspect the dutiful work of the people in the middle of 
the war. Who does not remember the great speech that he held on the Karlsplatz that
131 Ibid.
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day, encouraging people to maintain their morale in these difficult times? The paper 
even claimed that already on this chilly September evening, one could tell that the 
people o f the city had long embraced the idea o f the unification o f the Reich and that 
the mere presence o f the future Emperor prompted many spontaneous expressions of 
devotion to the Hohenzollem family.132 This is another example o f an attempt to 
invent traditions. The public did not respond to the future Emperor’s visit in the 
fashion that the newspaper now tried to portray. To be sure, newspaper reports 
portrayed the city as elated by the presence o f the King of Prussia. There was, 
however, little or no traces o f any sentiments expressing a desire to crown him 
German Emperor.133
Newspapers further stressed that although the last few years had been filled 
with hard work, the love for Emperor and fatherland had only increased since 1871. 
This love would be manifested in the grandest o f manners as the Emperor visited the 
city.134 Oberrheinischer Courier went to great lengths to emphasize that after 
witnessing the display of affection and love for the Emperor, no one would doubt that 
the people o f Freiburg and Baden were loyal subjects o f Wilhelm I. The paper 
repeatedly emphasized that the only thing that mattered was for the Emperor to leave 
the city with a good impression of its inhabitants. He reportedly did not care about the 
pomp and glamour that surrounded the monument, or even the monument itself.
132 Freiburger Zeitung, October 2, 1876.
133 Freiburger Zeitung, September 21, 1870.
134 Breisgauer Zeitung, October 2, 1876.
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Instead, all that concerned him was how the people of Freiburg greeted him.135 These 
sentiments indicate that the people of the city were well aware that their monument 
favored local-regional over national-dynastic loyalties, which made it all the more 
important for the people of the city to display their love and devotion to the Emperor.
The citizens o f Freiburg made every effort to beautify their city on October 3. 
According to newspapers, the city had seldom looked so attractive as houses and 
buildings were decorated to mark this event.136 The Grand Duke and prominent 
representatives of the city greeted Wilhelm I and his entourage at the train station; 
cannons were fired and church bells were rung to signal the long-awaited return of the 
Emperor. Along the parade route, cheering people lined the streets, anxious to get a 
glimpse of their Emperor. Judging from the number o f people that turned out, the 
inhabitants o f the city cherished their Emperor. At the ceremony itself, many 
renowned members of the local community delivered speeches, the vast majority of 
which focused most o f their attention on the heroic efforts of the Badenese troops 
during the war.137 Both the unification and the ties to the Hohenzollem dynasty were 
celebrated as well, especially since Wilhelm I had been gracious enough to attend this 
ceremony. Still, most speeches treated the unification of the Reich and the role o f the 
Emperor, Bismarck, and military leaders such as Moltke, as secondary. After the 
event, a few o f the local newspapers even remarked that if  one had not known
135 Oberrheinischer Courier, October 2, 1876.
136 See for instance Oberrheinischer Courier, October 5, 1876.
137 All speeches are reprinted in Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal, 28-51.
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anything about the war, one would have believed that had not Werder and his men
138fought so valiantly, Germany would never have been unified.
Privy councilor Ecker, the chairman o f the organizing committee, gave the 
main speech at the unveiling ceremony. In his address, he asserted that because all of 
Baden had contributed to the construction o f this monument, the Siegesdenkmal 
should be labeled a Badenese monument, which had enjoyed unequivocal support and 
approval in the entire state. He noted that it was a privilege for the city to be able to 
present to the Emperor this ...Siegesdenkmal that has been constructed by the entire 
Badenese people.”139 This was at best a half-truth, for communities such as St. 
Blasien, Triberg, and Breisach had opposed its construction for a variety o f reasons. 
Ecker recounted the process by which the monument came into existence so that all 
present would “correctly” understand the “true” meaning and symbolism of this statue. 
The majority o f his speech centered on the fear that the people in the Badenese 
Oberland had experienced during the course o f the war, how the heroics of the 
Fourteenth Army Corps had saved the fatherland, and how the “ .. .rest of Germany 
admired the Fourteenth Army Corps and its leader.”140 Paralleling the ambiguous 
language that the newspapers employed, Ecker also refrained from offering a more 
precise definition of the term “fatherland.” In addressing the imperial presence, he 
stated that the city o f Freiburg was honored to have the Emperor as its guest. He
138 See for instance Oberrheinischer Courier, October 7, 1876.
139 Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal, 31.
140 Ibid., 33.
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quoted the telegram that Wilhelm sent to his wife after the battle o f Belfort, reporting
that the French had been defeated in the southwest. By reading this telegram, he
ensured that the national perspective was recognized. It should be noted, however,
that the telegram places the Emperor in an inactive role in the unification process. As
its author, he is reduced to the role of medium that reports the military victories that
led to unification. Consequently, though he acknowledged Wilhelm’s importance in
the unification process, as well as his graciousness in attending the ceremony, Ecker
was able to ensure that the state o f Baden and the city o f Freiburg were portrayed as
extremely important agents o f German unification. Finally, Ecker pointed to the two
Badenese and two Prussian soldiers pictured on the monument, which he claimed
provided the entire statue with a greater and deeper meaning:
And just as North and South stand here in united defense, this monument 
should proclaim that the German tribes that fought and bled together 
should also in the future remain inseparable, and it should serve as a 
permanent symbol o f the re-conquered, united German Fatherland, 
which we have hoped and fought for ever since our youth, and which has 
now been given to us by our exalted Emperor and his glorious army.141
In his claim that people had dreamed of the unification since their youth, Ecker
conveniently failed to mention that Baden and Prussia fought on opposite sides in the
war o f 1866. Moreover, Ecker’s reference to this supposed unity o f North and South
came at the end of his speech, after he had already established the symbolic context of
the monument, which pointed to the important role that Baden had played in the
process of unification and its vital role in the new Empire. Hence, the unity o f North
141 Ibid., 35.
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and South was established on the terms o f the southern states (i.e., Baden) and was 
perceived as dependent on an acceptance o f the south’s own sense of Germanness.
Following Ecker’s speech, the Emperor unveiled the statue, whose grandeur 
reportedly stunned those present.142 The ceremony ended with the singing of “Heil 
Dir im Siegerkranz." After the unveiling, the Emperor and his entourage participated 
in another procession through the city that ended at the famous Freiburg Cathedral, 
where Lothar von Kiibel and other members of the high clergy welcomed them. After 
a tour of the church, Kiibel conducted a separate ceremony, providing the Catholic 
Church with the opportunity to participate in this commemorative effort on its own 
terms. Kiibel must have been pleased at this privilege as well as the fact that the Old 
Catholics were denied participation in the official ceremonies. True to their habit of 
portraying themselves as more patriotic than the Catholics, the Old Catholics hung a 
banner outside their church: “When the state, as in this case/unites with the
church/the Empire stands forever/solid on its foundation.”143 Because Old Catholics 
were not allowed to participate in the official ceremonies, however, Kiibel and his 
conservative Catholics held the upper hand on this day.
Most local newspapers agreed that the unveiling and imperial visit had been a 
great success. They praised the city’s residents for providing the Emperor with a 
warm welcome, which surely convinced Wilhelm of the support and popularity that he 
enjoyed even in this liminal area of the Empire. The newspapers’ emphasis that it was
142 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, October 6, 1876.
143 A selective list of some of the banners that were hung around the city can be found in Funke, Das 
Siegesdenkmal, 64-70.
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so important that the Emperor had gained a favorable impression of Freiburg and its 
inhabitants serves as a further reminder that when expressing national-dynastic 
loyalties, people were more concerned about the immediate impression they had made 
on the Emperor.
Although Wilhelm I’s presence at the unveiling of the monument affirmed the 
national-dynastic connotations o f the statue, the memory o f the Emperor’s visit faded 
with the passing of time, while the permanent symbolism of the monument remained, 
which prioritized the local-regional over the national-dynastic. By securing the 
attendance o f the Emperor, people received the opportunity to demonstrate to him and 
the rest of the German nation their devotion to the Emperor. However, the monument, 
as a permanent site o f memory, ensured that after this occasion had passed, people 
were able to continue constructing their national identities through the regional lens. 
For the duration of the Second Empire, the monument occupied an important space in 
the city. On most official holidays associated with the unification, some type of 
ceremony would take place at the monument, which enabled citizens to continue 
constructing their national identities on their own terms. This is not to say that the 
people of the city did not cherish their Emperor. There is no doubt that they had great 
admiration for his persona. Their dedication to Wilhelm I, however, did not mean that 
they were willing to accept a hegemonic status o f Prussia and the Hohenzollem family 
in the newly founded nation-state.
As we have seen throughout these discussions, the fact that the monument’s 
symbolism stressed the local rather than the national perspective made it somewhat
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easier for Freiburg’s Catholics to accept its ideological message. Strengthened by the 
many public manifestations of their own sense of Germanness between 1870-1876, the 
city’s Catholics were able to participate actively in the commemorations o f the wars o f 
unification on their own terms. During these first years of the Kaiserreich, they seized 
every opportunity to contest the official German national identity emanating from 
Berlin and Prussia. As evidenced at instances such as the General Assembly of 
Catholics in 1875, Freiburger Catholics sought the support o f their confessional 
brethren elsewhere in Germany in their joint efforts to withstand the pressure to 
assimilate into the new nation-state on Protestant/Prussian conditions. The city’s 
Catholics demonstrated on several occasions that they accepted the kleindeutsche 
solution to the German question. However, because their version of Germanness 
differed from their Protestant counterparts, they were forced to offer alternatives to the 
official discourse. By creating an alternative discourse, they ensured that the 
Protestant anti-Catholic sentiments did not became part of the new national identity. 
Instead, during the first few years o f the Second Empire, Catholics and Protestants in 
Freiburg used nationalist sentiments to debate what it meant to be German in post­
unification times. In a similar fashion to Catholics in Konstanz, Freiburger Catholics 
employed the nationalist discourse to manifest their own version o f Germanness. The 
analysis o f the relationship between Catholics and Protestants in these two cities and 
how they used nationalist sentiments suggests that Badenese Catholics were active 
participants in the creation o f the new national identity, despite facing economic and 
political disadvantages. The following chapter will trace the lives o f Catholics in
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Heidelberg during the first few years o f the Empire, which will illuminate a slightly 
different Catholic experience. Because Heidelberg was a city that enjoyed more 
amicable relations between Catholics and Protestants, its Catholic citizens faced 
slightly different circumstances as they negotiated their identities in the post- 
unification period.
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CHAPTER 5
A DIFFERENT CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE? HEIDELBERGER CATHOLICS 
COMMEMORATE UNIFICATION
After the analysis of early Catholic responses to war and unification in Konstanz 
and Freiburg, it is now time to investigate the reactions of Heidelberger Catholics to the 
events leading up to and immediately following the unification o f the German Empire.1 
As was seen in the previous discussions, Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg shared 
similar experiences during the years prior to and after the unification. Although 
Catholics in Heidelberg certainly were forced to deal with some o f the similar anti- 
Catholic sentiments, they experienced a slightly smoother transition into the Kaiserreich 
than their brethren in the southern part o f the state. O f course, this did not mean that their 
transformation from Badenese Catholics into Germans was conflict-free, but the 
commemorative discourse was somewhat different in Heidelberg compared to Freiburg 
and Konstanz. Thus, Heidelberg’s Catholics reacted differently to some of the events and 
commemorations that surrounded unification. Because the Catholic experience around
1 Unfortunately, the Third Reich and the Second World War witnessed the destruction o f many valuable 
sources in Heidelberg, especially in regards to the city’s Catholics. From the early 1860s to the late 1880s, 
there are large gaps in newspaper, city council, and associational records, which makes it slightly more 
difficult to analyze reactions o f Heidelberger Catholics to the foundation o f the Empire. In addition, due to 
the scarcity o f sources, scholars have been unable to compose a comprehensive history o f Heidelberg. To 
be sure, there are several sources that provide glimpses into certain aspects of city life, but no general 
history o f  the city. For some examples see Oliver Fink, Kleine Heidelberger Stadtgeschichte (Regensburg: 
Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2005); Elmar Mittler, Heidelberg: Geschichte und Gestalt (Heidelberg: C. 
Winter, 1996); and, Heidelberg—Stadt und Universitat {Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1997). These sources, 
along with many others, do not discuss the political and/or religious history o f the city but instead focus 
most of their attention on cultural and intellectual developments and personalities.
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Baden certainly was not uniform, an analysis o f the reactions of Heidelberger Catholics 
to the unification will provide useful clues to how different groups o f Catholics 
responded to these monumental changes. As will become evident, Catholics in 
Heidelberg enjoyed a more amicable relationship with the city’s Protestants, which 
provided them with a less hostile environment in which to negotiate their changing 
identities. There were several reasons for the different nature o f the relationship between 
Catholics and Protestants. For one, the population of about 22,000 was more evenly 
distributed between Catholics and Protestants, with the latter constituting the majority 
with 13,000. Also, in general, the Catholic population in Heidelberg was less politically 
mobilized. The city lacked a strong class o f Catholic clergy and intellectuals, which 
existed in both Konstanz and Freiburg. While the latter two had long been strongholds of 
Catholic power, manifested in the role o f the Church (and the university in Freiburg), that 
was not the case in Heidelberg. The city did not possess a strong Catholic clergy, and the 
university’s theology faculty was Protestant. Moreover, the economic and to some extent 
the political power was more evenly distributed between Catholics and Protestants in 
Heidelberg compared to the other two cities under investigation, and it will be useful to 
evaluate how this more equal relationship affected the construction o f the new national 
identity.
Because of the scarcity o f sources, this chapter will not include much information 
on this city’s history until 1866 but instead will focus more on the events between 1866 
and 1871. Although this method will provide a slightly different view from the analysis 
o f Catholic reactions in Konstanz and Freiburg, it will still be useful since it will
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illuminate Catholic attitudes to the prospect of Germany unification prior to 1871. In 
addition, despite the paucity o f post-1871 sources, the existing ones still enable us to gain 
brief insights into how Catholics approached the unification o f the Kaiserreich. To be 
sure, the scarcity o f sources will not allow a similar in-depth investigation as in the cases 
o f Konstanz and Freiburg, but the available material will still provide an adequate picture 
o f the different Catholic experience in Heidelberg. In addition, the situation of Catholics 
in Heidelberg during the late 1860s and early 1870s was more akin to the situation in 
Baden and the German Empire during the 1890s, which will provide useful clues into 
how Catholics successfully integrated in the Kaiserreich.
Heidelberger Catholics and the Austro-Prussian War
Similar to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Catholics firmly 
supported Austria as tensions began to escalate between Bismarck and Habsburg 
Emperor Francis Joseph I in 1866. Because Heidelberg is located in the northern part of 
Baden, the city’s inhabitants, both Catholic and Protestant, were not as intimately tied to 
the Austrian sphere o f influence, though they were clearly more loyal to their southern 
neighbor than to Prussia. As an early example o f these sentiments, the Catholic Pfalzer 
Bote noted in April 1866 that though Bismarck had enhanced the status o f Prussia, he had 
done so at the expense o f other German states, and then especially Austria. The paper 
further claimed that Bismarck’s demands on Austria were completely unrealistic and 
proved that Prussia was an uncivilized and barbaric state. The paper also maintained that 
if  Bismarck had attacked any country but Austria, he might have been able to gain the
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support o f the Badenese people; however, his recent actions left true Germans no choice 
but to support the Austrians.2 Thus, already before tensions had escalated into war, 
Catholics in Heidelberg attempted to portray Bismarck and the Prussians as anti-German, 
who were only concerned about improving Prussia’s lot, even at the expense of other 
German states.
When war broke out, both Catholics and Protestants in the city united behind the 
Austrians. The Protestant Heidelberger Zeitung sharply criticized the Badenese 
government for delaying support to the Austrians, which not only hurt them but also 
jeopardized Badenese soldiers.3 Pfalzer Bote reacted to the news o f war by publishing an 
appeal to the city’s inhabitants, in which they claimed that Bismarck was violating 
international and natural law and needed to be stopped immediately. Every true German 
should do his duty and defend Baden and Austria. The call to action was signed by the 
city’s three most influential Catholics: Jakob Lindau, Ferdinand Bissing, and Leopold 
Fischer. They argued that it was evident that Prussians, and specifically Bismarck, had 
no understanding of the true requirements o f patriotism and that his actions proved that 
he only sought to expand Prussia’s role in Europe at the expense o f other German states.4 
The city’s Catholics were fiercely loyal to Baden and Austria in the face o f these attacks 
from the un-German Prussians. Catholics also argued that through their actions Prussia 
and Bismarck had violated natural laws that every German possessed. Alluding to a
2 Pfalzer Bote, April 7, 14, 17, 1866.
3 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 13, 1866.
4 Pfalzer Bote, June 19, 1866.
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sense that all Germans possessed a shared set o f qualities, characteristics, and inviolable 
rights, Catholics claimed that Bismarck’s violation of these rights proved that he was not 
a true German. O f course, to label negative characteristics un-German was a very 
common method that both Protestants and Catholics employed in their struggle for 
control o f the construction o f German national identity.
During the first few days of the war, Heidelberg’s Catholics were hopeful that 
Prussia would be quickly defeated. Pfalzer Bote reprinted Emperor Francis Joseph’s 
appeal for all Germans to stand up to the Prussian offensive, and the paper maintained 
that after Bismarck had been defeated, the relationship between the German states would 
be greatly improved. Badenese Catholics argued that ever since the conclusion o f the 
war against Denmark in 1864, Bismarck’s actions had only been designed to benefit 
Prussia. Indeed, the recent events proved that he was not a German patriot and that he 
was detrimental to the cause o f German unity. Because the Badenese government under 
August Lamey and Foreign Minister Franz von Roggenbach had been relatively friendly 
to Bismarck, Badenese Catholics also criticized government officials in this context. It 
was not uncommon for Catholic newspapers to accuse Bismarck of being anti-German 
while at the same time implicating the Badenese government in this charge as well. 
However, Heidelberg’s proximity to the Badenese government in Karlsruhe placed 
Pfalzer Bote in a more critical position than other Catholic papers throughout the state. 
The criticism of Roggenbach, Ludwig Edelsheim (his successor since 1865), and the 
Badenese government’s perceived inability to defend the Badenese and Austrian honor 
was met with great hostility from the government. While Catholic newspapers in
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Konstanz and Freiburg enjoyed a much greater freedom in their ability to criticize the 
government, the Pfalzer Bote soon found itself under attack. Already on July 3, 1866, the 
paper reported that government officials had seized their issues on five different 
occasions and that they were under constant pressure to cease their criticism o f the 
government’s policies.5 A few days later, the paper discussed these measures in greater 
detail as they claimed that they were only defending the rights o f all Germans and that the 
government had misinterpreted their intentions. They furthermore noted that the 
government’s actions towards the paper did nothing to aid the war effort; instead, it only 
ensured that confessional discord grew across the state and Germany. They maintained 
that not only had Catholic papers been targeted with sanctions but also that the 
government was spreading lies about Catholic intentions in case o f an Austrian victory. 
Here, the usual accusations surfaced against Catholics, most notably the claim that in 
case of an Austrian victory, Catholics would forcibly convert the state’s Protestants. 
Pfalzer Bote also reported that the government was spreading lies about Catholic plans to 
use the war as a pretext to murder Protestants and Jews.6 The paper responded that these 
accusations were completely unfounded and that these actions proved that the 
government was not interested in strengthening and protecting the Badenese fatherland. 
They noted that the government’s intentions to disturb the confessional peace only
n
proved that they were not fully committed to the Austrian and Badenese cause. In
5 Pjalzer Bote, July 3, 1866.
6 Pfalzer Bote, July 5, 1866.
7 Ibid.
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addition to offering support to the Austrians, these arguments also aided Heidelberger 
Catholics in presenting themselves as better Germans. By labeling the ideas and actions 
o f their opponents as un-German, they sought to strengthen their own connections to the 
construction o f national identity. As has been evident throughout this work, this method 
of identity formation was quite common among Catholics in the postunification period.
Construction of a Memory of the Austro-Prussian War
Although Heidelberg’s Catholics and Protestants had been united in their support 
o f Austria during the war, differences began to emerge as soon as the peace treaty was 
signed. Protestant papers noted that though it was unfortunate that the Austrians had lost 
the war, Badeners must now attempt to negotiate a favorable treaty with Bismarck and 
Prussia. Protestants claimed that Badeners faced a difficult choice: to ally themselves 
closer with Bismarck or to remain independent and isolated. Heidelberger Zeitung 
advocated the first option, arguing that an isolationist policy would leave Baden 
vulnerable to the French. To be sure, Protestants in the city were quite unhappy with the 
outcome of the war, and they were still very critical o f Bismarck and his aggressive 
behavior, but they also realized that the current political conditions forced them to make 
some difficult choices.8
This rhetoric did not sway Heidelberg’s Catholics. They were incensed that the 
Austrian and Badenese governments had accepted defeat so quickly and even noted that 
“ .. .are we not men enough to continue this struggle? We have a nation (!) of forty
8 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 22, 23, 1866.
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million people who would support us... .”9 To illustrate further this point, on July 21, 
Pfalzer Bote published a letter from Roggenbach to Bismarck, in which the Badenese 
minister admitted that Prussia needed to play the leading role in German affairs.10 They 
were highly critical o f the former foreign minister and even accused him o f treason. 
Besides being directly critical o f certain specific actions that the government undertook, 
these sentiments also illustrated the fact that Heidelberger Catholics did not feel that their 
own government represented their interests. O f course, the recent Badenese Kulturkampf 
made it difficult for Catholics to trust any government policy.
Considering the Catholic statements in the immediate aftermath of the war, it was 
evident that they were still loyal to Austria. However, Catholics were also aware of the 
political shift that had taken place and the need to perhaps reevaluate some of their 
policies. Towards the end of July, Pfalzer Bote published a series of articles in which the 
paper outlined its responses to the new political developments. Although they were still 
very critical of the Prussian actions, as time passed, they grew more conciliatory. To be 
sure, the paper made a point to note that Badeners were not as friendly towards Bismarck 
as several other German states, but they also admitted that the behavior o f the Prussians 
was improving. Especially after the arrival of Prussian troops in the city, they noted that 
the soldiers were friendly and treated locals with dignity and respect.11 However, these 
sentiments did not mean that Heidelberger Catholics were prepared to accept entry into
9 Pfalzer Bote, July 14, 1866.
10 Pfalzer Bote, July 21, 1866.
11 Pfalzer Bote, July 28, August 14, 1866.
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the North German Confederation, something that local liberals and Protestants were 
strongly considering. Although the latter were mindful o f the harsh fate that awaited 
Austria, they also noted that the war might prove a blessing as Germans would finally be 
able to unify.12 Not surprisingly, Catholics in the city took issue with these sentiments.
In a long article in the August 9 issue, Pfalzer Bote claimed that no matter what had 
happened in the past, they must make sure that “ .. .the south German way of living and 
their [south Germans’] love of freedom must be protected... .The North German Bund 
would perhaps make for a strong entity on the outside, but it would be rotting on the 
inside... .”13 They also noted that proponents o f the North German Confederation 
supported “ .. .German unity, Protestantism, the Customs union, and France.. .”14 Thus, it 
was evident that already in 1866, Badenese Catholics associated a Prussian-led 
unification with Protestantism, which made them even more opposed to the policies of 
Bismarck and his allies. It was also clear that they did not believe that the North German 
Confederation had any long-lasting value. As has been evident throughout our 
discussions, Catholics tried to present themselves as advocates o f a nation-state that was 
based on strong internal values and not corrupted by Prussian and Protestant materialistic 
concerns.
Heidelberger Catholics also maintained that the Austro-Prussian War had 
weakened the German states. They claimed that though Prussia had become stronger, the
12 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 17, 1866
13 Pfalzer Bote, August 9, 1866.
14 Pfalzer Bote August 11, 1866.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
227
war and subsequent territorial changes would make the German states more vulnerable to 
outside threats. Moreover, Catholics disputed the assertion that the recent war had 
clarified the German question. On the contrary, the last war had only further confused 
the relationship between the German states, especially since an increasing number was 
falling under the Prussian spell.15
Although there was some hostility between the Catholic and Protestant camps in 
the city, and it was clear that they subscribed to different notions about what Baden 
should do following the war of 1866, it was also evident that these differences were not 
as pronounced as in Konstanz and Freiburg. While Pfalzer Bote had been, and continued 
to be, critical o f Prussia and Bismarck, the paper was not nearly as virulent in its criticism 
as some of the Catholic papers in Freiburg and Konstanz. This did not mean that 
Catholics were applauding Bismarck’s policies, but it did represent a softer approach to 
Prussia and its chancellor. These sentiments were probably also a result of the fact that 
the area around Heidelberg was a stronghold o f the kleindeutsche view. Most o f the 
Badenese supporters o f the kleindeutsche alternative to German unification were located 
around Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Also, it is noteworthy that during the 
Austro-Prussian War, there was much less hostile rhetoric between the two confessional 
camps in Heidelberg. To be sure, some o f the usual accusations that if  Austria won 
Catholics would forcibly convert all Germans to Catholicism did surface, but overall the 
two confessions enjoyed a better relationship than in Konstanz and Freiburg. This was a 
trend that resurfaced during the Franco-Prussian War, and it continued for most o f the
15 Pfalzer Bote, July 30, 1866.
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Second Empire. An indication o f this friendlier relationship is that the rate o f interfaith 
marriages in Heidelberg was among the highest in the state.16 Here, the lack o f a militant 
Catholic clergy probably played a very important role in allowing for more interfaith 
marriages. Another reason for the seemingly more amicable relationship was that the city 
had a more equal distribution o f Catholics and Protestants, with a slight majority for the 
latter.17 Thus, there was less overt Catholic hostility towards the fact that the city’s 
Protestants occupied most o f the political, economic, and cultural capital in the city. 
Conversely, Heidelberg Protestants also tended to be less aggressive towards the city’s 
Catholics since they were not threatened by their numerical advantage. In cities such as 
Freiburg and Konstanz, Protestants were in a clear minority and thus faced constant 
pressure from the Catholic majority to relinquish some of their political and economic 
power. As has been evident throughout this work, this unequal distribution was one of 
the main reasons why Catholics and Protestants used nationalist rhetoric and the 
construction o f a national identity as means o f gaining political, economic, cultural, or 
social power.
Catholic Reactions to the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War
Turning to the outbreak o f war in 1870 between Prussia and France, Catholics in 
Heidelberg initially viewed the increased tension between the two states almost with 
indifference. They focused most o f their attention on the activities at the Vatican
16 Smith, “Religion and Conflict: Protestants, Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State o f Baden in the Era 
o f Wilhelm II,” 290.
17 Die Katholische Gemeinde Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Libertas Verlag, 1989), 10.
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Council, and the conflict between Prussia and France was almost entirely absent from the 
news. As the conflict escalated in the middle o f July, Pfalzer Bote even deemed it 
necessary to summarize the major events associated with the question o f the Spanish 
succession, since . .many of our readers might not be entirely familiar with all of these 
complex events... .”18 At first, their reporting displayed a certain amount o f neutrality. 
They assigned partial blame to both camps for the increased tensions, though they were 
careful to point out that Bismarck and the Prussians were more in the right than their 
French counterparts.19 However, as the prospect of war loomed larger, their tone became 
increasingly anti-French. They maintained that France was acting in an irresponsible 
manner that threatened to bring chaos to the European continent. Catholics were 
especially critical of the un-Catholic behavior o f Napoleon III and accused him of 
provoking a war only to improve his domestic situation, which had grown increasingly 
dire during the last few years. However, it should be noted that though supportive of 
Bismarck and Wilhelm I, Heidelberger Catholics also claimed that they were somewhat 
hesitant about the prospect of war. They maintained that this seemed to be largely a 
Prussian cause and that it was not entirely clear what the other German states stood to 
gain from a war with France. They also expressed concern for Baden’s exposed 
geographical position. Just a few days before the outbreak of war, they openly 
questioned if  Baden would be able to defend itself and if  other German states would
18 Pfalzer Bote, July 14, 1870.
19 Ibid.
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come to its aid if  needed.20 These types o f sentiments illustrate that Germany was far 
from ready for complete external and internal unification in 1870. Although 
Heidelberger Catholics were slowly warming to the Prussian cause, they were still not 
convinced that this was a war they should fight. O f course, these types of statements 
made Catholics vulnerable to Protestant and liberal accusations of anti-German feelings, 
which helps explain why the construction of the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and 
the subsequent unification became so contested.
However, as soon as war broke out, any Catholic doubts about the military 
conflict disappeared quickly. On July 19, Pfalzer Bote reported that citizens across the 
German lands were ecstatic about the war and that the French enemy had to be defeated 
at all costs. Catholics also noted that though the Catholic People’s Party had not been 
supportive o f the Badenese government in the past, true Germans would now set aside 
their differences and unite in support o f the fatherland. Catholics claimed that their party 
was one of the most patriotic ones and that they would now receive a chance to prove 
their worth to Germany.21 In a similar fashion to Catholics and Protestants around the 
state, Catholics in Heidelberg suddenly did not display any doubts about what constituted 
their fatherland. These sentiments also illustrate how fluid the notions o f national and 
regional identity were at this time. Only a few days prior to the war, Heidelberger 
Catholics had openly wondered whether Prussia’s cause was theirs, but as soon as war 
broke out, these Catholics were united with Prussians, Wiirttembergers, Bavarians, and 
other Germans.
20 Pfalzer Bote, July 16, 1870.
21 Pfalzer Bote, July 19, 1870.
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Similarly to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Protestants and 
Catholics were united in their war efforts for the first few days. However, Pfalzer Bote 
soon noted that there were some Protestant and liberal papers that labeled the Catholics 
lesser Germans. Already on July 30, the paper had to defend the wartime behavior of 
Catholics, who were accused o f being as indifferent to this war as they had been to 
defending German interests in 1866. The paper pointed out that it was wrong to compare 
the two wars. The Austro-Prussian War had been an unfortunate affair between two 
brothers, which explained Catholic ambivalence towards it. Indeed, the paper maintained 
that Catholic reluctance to fight the Prussians could and should serve as an indication of 
their patriotism. O f course, they also pointed out that Protestants had been eager to fight 
the Prussians in 1866, a fact that was now conveniently forgotten. Heidelberger 
Catholics furthermore argued that this war was completely different. This time, an 
outside enemy had attacked the German fatherland, and Catholics were keen to defend 
German territories against the external threat.22
Despite this occurrence o f some hostile rhetoric, it is interesting to note that most 
of the accusations that Catholics faced came from outside the city. Indeed, the Protestant 
Heidelberger Zeitung was much more conciliatory towards the Catholic part of the 
population compared to other Protestant publications around the state. Throughout the 
fall of 1870, the paper was very respectful towards the Catholics, and towards the end of 
the war, they even claimed that it was remarkable to see how loyal the city’s Catholics 
had been during the war effort. They maintained that throughout the war, Catholics and
22 Pfalzer Bote, July 30, 31, 1870.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
Protestants had successfully fought side by side.23 Although there were occasional 
accusations o f Catholic anti-Germanness, these instances were far and few between, and 
when they did occur, they were mild in comparison to similar ones around the state. As 
we saw with cases such as the accusations against Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf, 
liberal and Protestant newspapers often focused on the alleged misdeeds of local 
Catholics to illustrate Catholic anti-German sentiments. For some o f the reasons already 
alluded to, this was not the case in Heidelberg, where Catholics and Protestants, though 
not living in perfect harmony, managed to coexist relatively well, even during such a 
critical time as the Franco-Prussian War.
Although Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg reacted in similar manners to 
the war, there were still slight differences in how they viewed the conflict and what it 
meant for the future of the German states. While the city’s Protestants were consumed 
with thoughts about the glory that the German fatherland would now enjoy, Catholics 
were more careful in their assessment of the current events. Despite growing 
increasingly enthusiastic about the efforts o f the German troops with each military 
victory, there were also some concerns for the future mixed in with these positive 
sentiments, particularly in regards to the minority status of Catholics in the new Empire. 
Although there were differences between Heidelberger Catholics and Protestants in their 
responses to the war, there were also marked differences between how the city’s 
Catholics reacted to the war compared to other Catholics around the state. On August 21, 
even before the victory at Sedan, Pfalzer Bote argued that Germans must already begin to
23 Heidelberger Zeitung, December 29, 1870.
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consider what would happen after the war. They maintained that one o f the big mistakes 
that Germans had made after the victory o f 1813 was that they had not adequately 
planned their move towards unification. Thus, they should now begin a discussion about 
how Germany would unify once the French enemy had been defeated. Quite remarkably, 
the paper argued that after the war, Germany had to unite under Prussian leadership and 
elect Wilhelm I German Emperor. Catholics claimed that though the Catholics in 
Heidelberg and Baden had always been loyal to the Austrians in their struggle with the 
Prussians, it had now become evident that the former were not strong enough and would 
not be able to provide adequate leadership in the German quest for unification. Instead, 
Germans needed to follow the lead o f the Prussian king towards a unified nation-state.24
Although these were o f course very pro-Prussian sentiments, the paper also noted 
that “black-red-gold” should be the theme for the Empire and that this war constituted the 
end of Prussian dominance in German affairs. They claimed that Prussia had enjoyed a 
long history with many glorious moments; however, Germany (though they never defined 
what they meant by “Germany”) possessed an even longer history, and it was now time 
for a German nation-state to assume its rightful position in Europe. Catholics also argued 
that this was the time when Germany would be able to finalize their relationships with 
France and Austria.25 O f course, these attitudes were different compared to the ones in 
both Freiburg and Konstanz, where Catholics had been reluctant to even discuss the 
prospect o f unification until just a few weeks before it was completed. The different
24 Pfalzer Bote, August 21, 1870.
25 Ibid.
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Catholic attitudes in Heidelberg illustrates that not only did they have a better 
relationship with Protestants in the city, but their Catholic identities were composed in a 
slightly different manner. During the latter part of the Kaiserreich, it became evident that 
Catholic attitudes around the state were more uniform; however, at this time that was not 
yet the case. These notions also serve as an illustration hat the state o f Baden was not as 
unified and cohesive as some of its citizens portrayed it to be and that not only did 
Germans disagree on what constituted the German fatherland, they also disagreed on how 
to define Baden. Judging by these accounts, Catholics in Heidelberg were more 
integrated into the North German Confederation than their brethren in the southern part 
o f the state. To be sure, this did not mean that Catholics in Heidelberg would ally 
themselves with Bismarck rather than with the south Badenese Catholics, but it does 
illustrate the fluid nature o f their identities. As will become evident, on most issues 
Heidelberger Catholics agreed with Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg, but there were 
also instances where they differed. These differences illustrate just how difficult it was 
for any group to maintain, preserve, and strengthen a cohesive identity during the middle 
part of the nineteenth century when German society underwent so many drastic changes.
During the fall of 1870, citizens in Heidelberg were relatively unaffected by the 
war. Compared to both Freiburg and Konstanz, Heidelbergers did not complain about the 
threat o f a French invasion. Indeed, based on newspaper accounts, the war passed 
without any major distractions to civic life. On December 22, Pfalzer Bote reported that 
the Catholic People’s Party had voted to support the creation of a unified Empire. The 
paper maintained that though this was not an easy decision, it was the right one,
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especially considering that it was impossible for Baden to remain independent. In 
addition, with the recent Badenese Kulturkampf in mind, they argued, somewhat naively, 
that by supporting the creation of an Empire, the party had ensured that Badenese 
Catholics would be more protected than under the rule o f the Badenese government. 
Hence, to support unification did not represent a capitulation to Prussian interests, but 
rather a careful plan to protect both the interest of the Church and the Badenese 
fatherland. In a similar fashion to other Catholic sentiments around the state, it was clear 
that Catholics in Heidelberg were not completely satisfied with how unification had taken 
place. However, given the current circumstances, the creation of the Kaiserreich 
constituted the most attractive political alternative.26
Although Catholics in Heidelberg displayed slightly different sentiments towards 
German unification than did some o f their brethren in Freiburg and Konstanz, it was still 
evident that they did not consider the Second Empire the ideal solution to the German 
question. As Pfalzer Bote reported in a subdued manner on the celebrations following 
the proclamation of the Empire in Versailles, they claimed that though this was a great 
day for Germany, Catholics would liked to have see an Austrian Emperor at the head o f 
the German Empire. However, they also argued that it really did not matter what they 
wanted; instead, they had to accept that the German fatherland needed Wilhelm to be its 
Emperor, and thus every true German needed to support him. The paper maintained that 
people in Heidelberg, both Catholics and Protestants, had greeted the news o f the 
proclamation o f the Empire in a very positive manner and that citizens had gathered as
26 Pfalzer Bote, December 22, 1870.
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Germans in the streets to celebrate this news. However, in the same article, they also 
noted that Catholics around Baden and Germany needed to be watchful as there were 
already rumors circulating about the recommencement o f a Kulturkampf but this time on 
a national scale. They quoted the Center Party leader Ludwig Windthorst, who warned 
that now when the French had been defeated, liberals and Protestants had turned their 
attention to the Catholics, who could expect many attacks in the coming years.27 Thus, 
already from the very outset of the Second Empire, Catholics were uneasy about their 
existence in the new nation-state.28
In a similar fashion to the inhabitants of Freiburg and Konstanz, Catholics and 
Protestants in Heidelberg approached the Second Empire with different attitudes. While 
the latter viewed January 1871 as the beginning o f a glorious time that would transform 
Germany into one o f the most powerful states in Europe, Catholics were a bit more 
subdued. O f course, Catholics worried about the threat o f a national Kulturkampf, but 
also about issues such as the status o f the Pope in Rome.29 The Catholic ambivalence 
towards this new political arrangement became clear very quickly. Even in the first few 
days after the foundation of the Empire, Catholics in Heidelberg focused on their fears 
rather than their hopes for the future.30 O f course, the fact that Catholics in Heidelberg 
displayed trepidation before these new times, despite the fact that they had enjoyed a 
much greater degree of peace and harmony than other Catholics around the state, clearly
27 Pfalzer Bote, January 21, 1871.
28 For an example of some of these concerns, see for instance Anderson, Windthorst, 146-149.
29 Ibid.
30 For example, Pfalzer Bote, January 23, 26, 1871.
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illustrates the difficult situation Catholics faced in the Empire. Furthermore, it also 
proves that though Germany had just unified, the new nation-state was not cohesive and 
that the new national identity was far from stable.
In the beginning o f February 1871, both Heidelberg Catholics and Protestants 
gathered in the streets o f the city to commemorate the official capitulation o f France. 
People hung flags on their houses, paraded in the streets, and celebrated this piece of 
news in a dignified and worthy manner. However, in the aftermath o f this celebration, 
the city witnessed one o f the few recorded incidents of public manifestations o f anti- 
Catholic sentiments. In the morning hours of February 2, three drunken men tried to set 
fire to a local Catholic’s house, claiming that he belonged to the “blacks.” They failed in 
their attempts to bum down the house and were subsequently arrested by the police. 
Pfalzer Bote noted that it was unfortunate that some did not understand how to celebrate 
patriotic occasions and that they were saddened that an act by a few people would ruin 
the celebration for others.31 However, other than these relatively mild statements, the 
Catholic daily did not spend any more time on this incident, which again illustrates the 
relatively amicable relationship between the two confessions. In other cities, this type of 
event attracted great attention from Catholics and Protestants alike, and the two 
confessions would use the occasion to debate the national character o f the opposing 
confession. Also, it should be noted that this was the only incident of anti-Catholic 
behavior that the local press reported, which is quite different from the frequent attacks 
that Catholics around the state had to endure. Given the anti-Catholic sentiments that
31 Pfalzer Bote, February 4, 1871.
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were evident in both Freiburg and Konstanz, it appears as if  Catholics in Heidelberg were 
in a different situation compared to their brethren in other parts o f the state.
O f course, this did not mean that Heidelberg Catholics were completely immune 
to the abuse that was taking place around Baden and Germany. Following the first 
elections to the German Parliament in February 1871, Pfalzer Bote claimed that it had 
long been clear that the Catholics would lose since the election districts were divided up 
in an unfair manner that benefited the national liberals.32 Protestants and national-liberals 
argued that the decline in Catholic political power since the elections to the Customs 
Union in 1868 proved that Catholics were opposed to the new nation-state and that voters
33had punished the Catholic parties for their anti-German policies. However, according 
to Pfalzer Bote, this decline in political power was not due to voters’ disapproval o f the 
Catholic political message; instead, the decrease in political power could be attributed 
solely to the new election districts.34 The national-liberals and Protestants countered this 
argument by maintaining that it was evident that Catholics were anti-German and that 
they longed for the preunification days.35 These were not uncommon sentiments as 
Protestants and national-liberals used any type o f Catholic criticism of the new political 
conditions as evidence that they were opposed to the foundation o f the Empire. Pfalzer 
Bote also argued that the national-liberals had been very successful in using the
32 See also Hans-Jurgen Kremer, ed., Mitt Gott fur Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht: Quellen zur 
O rgan isa tion  u n d  P o litik  d er  Z en trum sparte i u n d  des p o litisch en  K a tho lizism us in B aden  18 8 8 -1 9 14 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983), 41-42.
33 Pfalzer Bote, March 6, 1871.
34 Pfalzer Bote, March 11, 16, 1871.
35 Heidelberger Zeitung, March 8, 1871.
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unification as a means to achieve success in the first parliamentary election.36 As was the 
case in other areas o f Baden, national-liberals did very well in these first elections, and 
many viewed it as a confirmation that Germans subscribed to their notion o f unification 
as the apex of a teleological view of history. O f course, this view of history as a straight 
line leading up to unification was a complete construct as even the Protestant national- 
liberals had been opposed to Bismarck and his annexationist policies until after the war of 
1866. Still, the tone between Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg was much more 
conciliatory than in Freiburg and Konstanz. To be sure, there were many instances where 
both camps engaged in hostile rhetoric, but the changing o f the political discourse to 
include nationalist rhetoric adopted from the war did not happen as quickly here as it did 
in other parts o f Baden. As will become evident later, these antagonistic notions actually 
become more popular later in the Kaiserreich, though they never reached the same 
heights as they did in other parts of the state.
Additional Catholic Displays of an Alternative National Identity
Catholics in Heidelberg also used the twenty-fifth anniversary in June 1871 of 
Pius IX’s election as Pope as a way o f publicly manifesting their presence in the public 
sphere. However, celebrations were not as extensive as they were in other parts o f the 
state, and they were met with a lot less resistance from Protestants in the city. Although 
it is of course difficult to pinpoint exactly why Protestants were less inclined to oppose
36 Pfalzer Bote, March 11, 1871.
37 It is interesting to note that during the days surrounding the twenty-fifth anniversary, Heidelberger 
Zeitung completely ignored these events. In both Konstanz and Freiburg, the Protestant press used this 
occasion to label Catholics anti-German, whose Heimat was located in Rome and not in Germany.
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these public manifestations of Catholic identity, it should be noted that Protestants in 
Heidelberg seemed to be generally more inclined to accept a Catholic version of 
Germanness. The Protestant approach towards these events was more similar to the ones 
during the last two decades of the Empire when the economic, political, and cultural 
power relationship between the two confessions was more equal. Thus, it would seem as 
if  Protestants were better prepared to accept the Catholic version of national identity 
when the relationship between the two confessions was more equal. O f course, it should 
also be noted that throughout the nineteenth century, Heidelberg had not served as a 
bastion o f Church power, which had been the case in both Freiburg and Konstanz. In 
those cities, Protestants were still determined to strip the Catholic Church o f as much 
power as possible, which reflected earlier events during the nineteenth century. Since 
this was not the case in Heidelberg, Protestants were more inclined to ignore Catholic 
displays o f identity.
In the days leading up to the June 16 anniversary, Pfalzer Bote argued that 
Catholics around Germany and in Heidelberg should use this opportunity to display their 
gratitude towards the Pope for his great leadership during these difficult times. Catholics 
argued that this celebration constituted a good opportunity for them to display how strong 
and united they were, despite some o f the problems that they were encountering on the 
national level.38 Once again, Catholics in Heidelberg were not too critical o f the situation 
in their own city, but they noted that Catholics were quickly labeled second-class citizens 
in the new nation-state.
38 Pfalzer Bote, June 15, 1871.
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On June 16, 1871, local Catholics gathered in the city and organized a march to a 
cross dedicated to Archbishop Hermann von Vicari on the Leitenberg outside the city. 
Pfalzer Bote reported that the city’s local Casino association had organized the 
celebration and that people had followed the lead of the city’s leading Catholic 
dignitaries in displaying their strong support for the embattled Pope. Most of the 
coverage focused on the fact that German Catholics now more than ever needed to 
support the Pope since other European Catholics, most notably the French, were 
abandoning him. Also, though the paper discussed the celebrations in Heidelberg, it 
spilled far more ink describing the celebrations in Freiburg and Rome. As with many 
other events during this time, by publishing detailed accounts of events in other cities, the 
paper helped to create an imagined community of Catholics. Throughout the 
Kaiserreich, the Catholic press made good use o f this new means of creating and 
consolidating identities. By publishing accounts o f different events and trends that 
pertained to the Catholic experience in the Second Empire, Catholic newspapers served 
as extremely valuable tools to create a sense of strength and cohesion among the state’s 
population. This phenomenon was not only evident in conjunction with various 
commemorations but also during the Kulturkampf Newspapers around the state would 
keep a close eye on what was transpiring in other communities, and reports from around 
the state became pivotal in strengthening the Catholic community, particularly in times of 
crisis and turmoil. In addition, considering that the Catholics in Heidelberg did not have 
the same kind o f exuberant celebrations that took place in other areas of the state, it was 
useful for them to be able to partake in these events, even if it was just via a newspaper
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account. In their reporting, Pfdlzer Bote was careful to point out that the Pope had 
reacted very favorably to the Catholic display of support and that this event had 
strengthened the Catholic community.39 As a matter o f fact, the celebrations in 
Heidelberg became almost secondary to the ones in Rome and Freiburg. By focusing 
much o f their attention o f other events around the state, Pfdlzer Bote confirmed that 
though Heidelberg Catholics were in a relatively favorable position compared to many 
other Catholics around the state, they still needed to be aware o f how Catholics in other 
areas were treated.
Another example o f creating and strengthening the imagined community of 
Catholics appeared in Pfdlzer Bote a few days later. In their June 20, 1871, issue, the 
paper discussed the recently published book, Der Staat und die Kirche im 
Grossherzogtum Baden seit dem Jahre 1860, by Prof. Albert Friedberg. This book was 
heavily critical o f the Catholic Church and adopted a very pro-Protestant and national- 
liberal stance. It was not uncommon for Catholic papers to discuss works that were either 
strongly pro- or anti-Catholic, and these discussions served an important function in 
strengthening the Catholic community. In addition to alerting citizens to newly published 
works, these discussions also informed Catholics about what constituted the official 
Catholic view of a certain issue. Also, these types o f discussion also strengthened the 
Catholic imagined community. As noted above, these types of discussions would enable 
leading Catholics to educate their constituents and it ultimately served as an extremely 
important tool to create a more cohesive community.
39 Pfalzer Bote, June 17, 1871.
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For two days, Pfdlzer Bote analyzed Prof. Friedberg’s arguments. He claimed 
that by having to constantly fight the Catholic Church, the Badenese state had been 
hindered in its economic, cultural, and political development. Furthermore, he 
maintained that the Church was too powerful and that if  Baden wanted to modernize, the 
government needed to reduce clerical influence. The paper reported that most of the 
book focused on a comparison o f Prussia and Baden, and given the fact that the author 
was Prussian, it was no surprise that he was very critical o f Baden’s perceived lack of 
development.40
Pfdlzer Bote used Friedberg’s arguments to manifest the ill-treatment of Badenese 
Catholics since 1860. They claimed that though the church laws of 1860 should have 
guaranteed the safety of the church and the freedom of religion for all citizens, the 
government had failed to implement these laws correctly. The paper outlined the various 
abuses that the clergy had been exposed to ever since the national-liberals had come to 
power. They were especially critical of the Staatsexamen, which had done more damage 
to the Catholic cause than any other law. The paper also chronicled some o f the most 
famous cases o f government mistreatment of Catholics. This was another useful way of 
ensuring that Catholics were aware o f the injustices that were being done to them around 
the state and nation. Especially for Catholics in Heidelberg, who were not exposed to the 
same mistreatment as many of their brethren, these accounts were valuable tools to 
strengthen the Catholic community. Last, the paper tied this discussion into the context 
o f the creation of a national identity by criticizing Friedberg’s defense o f the state’s right
40 Pfdlzer Bote, June 20, 1871.
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to ban certain female orders. Pfdlzer Bote maintained that these Catholics represented the 
German spirit better than anybody else and that the state was depriving itself o f some of 
its best assets. This was an argument that constantly resurfaced in these discussions. 
Catholics maintained that they were the best representatives and defenders of the German 
national spirit, and by attacking and banning these orders, Protestants were undermining 
the German national character. Hence, though this issue was not directly related to war 
and unification, it became tied into the newly popularized nationalist discourse.
Construction of a Kriegerdenkmal in Heidelberg
A comprehensive analysis o f the commemorative activities that immediately 
followed the unification of the Second Empire is difficult because o f the limited sources. 
Available sources do, however, provide some insight into how Heidelberg Catholics 
viewed the foundation o f the Kaiserreich and the immediate postunification period. In a 
similar fashion to the other cities analyzed in this work, the city o f Heidelberg also 
decided to construct a monument to honor the efforts of German and local soldiers in the 
Franco-Prussian War. On June 19, 1871, the Heidelberg city council decided to construct 
a plaque to honor the local soldiers who had died in the war against France. On the same 
date, city council officials also decided that they would set aside a special place for these 
soldiers in the city’s most prestigious graveyard.41 However, after additional discussion, 
they revised their plans on July 5. Instead o f just producing a plaque, they would
41 Stadtarchiv Heidelberg (St. AH hereafter), Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 158-3, Die Errichtung eines 
Denkmals fur die Gefallene im Deutsch-Franzosischen Krieg 1870-1871, protocol from city council 
meeting, July 5, 1871.
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construct a monument. Although city council records show no indication of the reason 
for this change, it is pretty safe to assume that since many other Badenese and German 
states were constructing monuments, the Heidelberger city council did not want to appear 
unpatriotic by just donating a plaque. Recognizing the expensive nature o f this project, 
the city council agreed to pay for the entire monument by guaranteeing 3,000 Gulden. 
(This was less than half what Konstanz spent for their monument, and obviously much 
less than the cost for the Siegesdenkmal.) It is also noteworthy that the city did not ask 
the general population for donations. Instead, the city’s elite donated an additional 
several hundred Guldens, which the city used as part o f the payment for the monument.
In a speech to the city council, Mayor Schnetzler remarked that because the victorious 
war had brought national unification, locals must never forget the military and civilian 
sacrifices. He noted that even as he spoke, there were soldiers in the hospital who had 
not yet recovered from wounds suffered in the war and that the city and its inhabitants 
needed to honor these men in an appropriate manner.42
A committee was appointed to spearhead the project, led by city councilors 
Bauemfeind, Desaga, Mays, and Trtibner. During the first few months of 1872, they 
invited artists to produce models of the proposed monument. After much debate, they 
decided that the local artist Hermann Behagel would receive the honor of designing the 
monument. Continuing with the local theme, they entrusted local Bildhauer Franz 
Sommer with the construction o f the monument. 43 Behagel’s winning entry consisted of
42 St. AH, HUA 158-3, protocol from city council meeting meeting, December 12, 1871.
43 Geschichte und Beschreibung des Krieger-Denkmals in Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Georg Mohr, 1873), 9.
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a three-tiered monument composed of red sandstone. On two sides o f the monument, the 
names o f the 157 German soldiers who were buried in Heidelberg were listed. Only four 
of these soldiers hailed from Heidelberg, but by listing all the soldiers who were buried 
on the Heidelberg cemetery, the city council ensured that the monument assumed a 
national as well as regional character. This was important as it served to integrate further 
the city into the national landscape o f monuments. On the other two sides, the monument 
displayed the Reichsadler as well as several wreaths and cannon balls. The top consisted 
o f an obelisk with an elaborate design that contained cannon balls and wreaths. Under 
one of the wreaths, an inscription listed: “In memory of the German soldiers buried here 
who fought for the honor and unity o f the fatherland in the years 1870-1871. Dedicated 
by the city of Heidelberg.” 44
Although Sommer completed the monument in November 1872, the city council 
decided to postpone its unveiling to the spring to ensure better weather for the ceremony. 
Contrary to most other unveiling ceremonies around Baden and Germany, the general 
population was not invited to attend. The ceremony took place on the graveyard where 
the monument was located. Because space was limited on the site o f the monument, only 
a select number o f individuals were invited. Coupled with the fact that there had been no 
donations from the general population, this underscored the fact that the monument was 
not a mass-based one. Compared to most other monuments analyzed in this work, 
common citizens in Heidelberg, whether Catholic or Protestant, had no influence on what 
the monument would look like, where it would be located, or who would pay for it. To
44 ibid., 10.
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be sure, there were representatives from all major groups o f the city, such as the clergy, 
students, politicians, important businessmen, as well as military officials from Bavaria, 
Wurttemberg, and Baden. In addition, about twenty relatives of the fallen soldiers had 
made the trip to Heidelberg and were made honorary guests at the ceremony. However, 
despite the fact that these people marched in a parade from the center o f the city out to 
the cemetery, which was located outside the immediate city center, popular participation 
in this project remained limited. Contemporary sources made no reference to any 
significant popular reception o f the monument, which is important. Usually, in order to 
emphasize that these types o f monuments represented popular sentiments, contemporaries 
were careful to stress that the general population had responded very well to a certain 
monument. On this occasion, however, it seems as if  the monument in Heidelberg was 
comparatively disassociated from the everyday citizen.
Mayor Krausmann held the plenary speech at the unveiling. After a brief recap of 
the war, he recounted how the city council in June 1871 had decided to honor the great 
sacrifice that these Germans had offered the fatherland. He claimed that this monument 
constituted the least that civilians could do, especially since they were now reaping the 
benefits o f the soldiers’ heroics. Furthermore, there were many German soldiers who 
perished in the war and were not able to witness the glorious achievement that they had 
accomplished. He also noted that the monument struck a nice balance between the local 
and national since it honored the efforts o f German soldiers from many different areas o f 
the nation-state. Thus, the monument could be seen as a sign o f the new national spirit 
that was spreading across Germany and that had contributed to the successful foundation
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of the Empire. The mayor also claimed that the monument would always serve as a 
reminder o f how grateful Germans should be for the unified Empire and how the heroics 
o f these soldiers had answered the prayers o f German patriots. The monument should 
also remind people that the city o f Heidelberg was very grateful for what Germans from 
every part o f the country did for their fatherland. Hence, the city should serve as a 
guiding light for some of the other German cities that had not yet honored the German 
soldiers in a fitting way.45 After the mayor had concluded his speech, a Protestant and 
Catholic priest held two separate prayers. The Catholic priest, Wilfried Herbst, remarked 
that city inhabitants must never forget the sacrifices made by these people and that the 
efforts o f these men fulfilled the dreams that Germans had held for several centuries. The 
ceremony ended with the Protestant clergyman Hermann Schellenberg noting that 
although it was unfortunate that these people had perished in the service o f the fatherland, 
people could rest assured that they were in a better place.46
Although this monument was constructed around the same time as some of the 
other ones that have been analyzed in this work, the one in Heidelberg represented a 
different type o f monument. First o f all, because the general population was not invited 
to participate to any great extent in the planning and/or construction process, the 
population struggled to identify with the monument.47 Throughout history, it has always 
been easier for people to identify with monuments that are perceived to be truly popular.
45 Ibid., 12-13.
46 Ibid., 14.
47 Neither archival sources nor newspapers mention any parades out to the monument on national holidays, 
events that were commonplace in both Konstanz and Freiburg.
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In addition, because the monument was placed on the outskirts of the city, it was not 
readily accessible for Heidelbergers. While the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was located in 
the immediate city center, that was not the case in Heidelberg, which made it even more 
difficult to popularize the monument. This monument was also slightly different because 
it was designed to honor both local soldiers as well as soldiers from other parts of 
Germany. To be sure, the people behind the Siegesdenkmal attempted to portray it as a 
national monument as well, but as was evident in the analysis of its symbolism, that was 
not the case. Both the Siegsesdenkmal and the monument in Konstanz were more located 
in the local context. Once again, this serves as an illustration o f the fact that the city of 
Heidelberg, due to its geographic location, was not as provincial as Konstanz and 
Freiburg. One thing that is clear is that the monument did not attract the same kind of 
controversy and/or attention as some of the other ones did. This was something that was 
constructed by the city elite and it does not appear as if  it ever became part o f the popular 
consciousness. Thus, as has been evident throughout these discussions, the memory of 
the Franco-Prussian War and the unification was not as contested in Heidelberg as it was 
in other areas o f the state. While citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg employed the newly 
popularized nationalist discourse to intensify existing conflicts, locals in Heidelberg 
initially remained relatively unaffected of the divisive effects o f the nationalist discourse.
Despite the limited sources that obstruct the view of how Catholics and 
Protestants viewed the unification and initial years of the Second Empire in Heidelberg, it 
is still evident that the relationship between the two confessions was more amicable in the 
1860s and 1870s than it was in both Konstanz and Freiburg. Because the city had a more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
250
even distribution between the two major confessions, they seem to have enjoyed a better 
relationship. Also, as was seen above, the fact that Heidelberg had never been a bastion 
o f Catholic clerical power certainly helped their citizens to a better relationship with their 
Protestant counterparts. While Protestants and liberals in Konstanz and Freiburg were 
intent on stripping away as much power as possible from the once-so-powerful Catholic 
church, no such trends were evident in Heidelberg. Naturally, the Protestant and liberal 
actions in Konstanz and Freiburg ensured that the relationship between state and church, 
as well as between Protestants and Catholics, was quite uneasy. However, the absence of 
these types o f conflicts in Heidelberg meant that the two major confessions were able to 
coexist in a much more peaceful manner. Largely because of these reasons, Catholics in 
Heidelberg enjoyed a smoother and less conflict-ridden integration into the Second 
Empire, though conflicts between Catholics and Protestants certainly existed there as 
well. O f course, this does not mean that Heidelberg Catholics simply changed their 
identities to German in January 1871, but the lack o f strong conflicts between Catholics 
and Protestants meant that the city’s Catholics had one less element to contend with as 
they negotiated their new national identity in the postunification period.
Although Catholics and Protestants in the city enjoyed a more amicable 
relationship, there certainly existed conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, and 
people did try to construct different memories o f the Franco-Prussian War and 
unification, particularly towards the end of the nineteenth century. For instance, the 
controversies surrounding the celebrations of Bismarck’s eightieth birthday in 1895 
caused some Heidelberg Catholics to lament how poorly treated they had been and how
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their brethren had suffered during the war. However, these alternative memories were 
created in retrospect and did not adequately reflect reality. Although some o f these 
sentiments certainly reflected how some Catholics experienced the war and unification, 
contemporary sources really do not support these notions. One o f the reasons why 
Catholics in Heidelberg were more likely in the 1890s to complain about the conditions 
during the 1860s and 1870s was the fact that by the 1890s Catholics had been able to 
form a much stronger consciousness, largely due to the Kulturkampf and the advent o f a 
more developed Catholic press and associational life. Scholars have documented how the 
Kulturkampf served to strengthen Catholic identity rather than weaken it, and the 
Catholic press and associational life also served to create a more homogeneous Catholic 
identity. Hence, during the 1880s and into the 1890s, Catholics all around the state of 
Baden became acutely aware o f how they had been mistreated by local Protestants and/or 
the state. Thus, even if  they lived in a community that enjoyed amicable confessional 
relations, by the 1890s, the stronger Catholic consciousness would enable them to be 
more aligned with some o f the other sentiments in the state. Consequently, when they 
constructed the memory of the unification twenty years later, they tended to emphasize 
the more adverse aspects o f the Franco-Prussian War and the immediate postunification 
period, though this might not reflect adequately the situation in their city. Indeed, one of 
the things that should be taken away from this chapter is the fact that though the Catholic 
experience in Baden had many common elements to it, there were certain differences 
between areas as well, especially in the first few years of the Second Empire. Catholics 
in Freiburg and Konstanz faced different circumstances than the ones in Heidelberg,
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which caused slightly different experiences. After the conclusion o f the Kulturkampf, 
Catholics around the state exhibited a more cohesive identity, but as was seen in this 
chapter, at the time o f the unification, Catholics around Baden displayed slight 
differences in how they approached the commemorative discourse surrounding 
unification. It should also be noted that the fact that Protestants in Heidelberg refrained 
from launching into too many of the customary anti-Catholic tirades also meant that the 
nationalist discourse was more stable and less contested. It was not until later in the 
Kaiserreich, when Catholics in Heidelberg had become fully aware o f the injustices done 
to their brethren around the state, that they engaged fully the Protestant ideological 
message that surrounded much o f the commemorative discourse.
Despite these differences, however, there were certain elements that united 
Catholics around the state. The next chapter will primarily chronicle Catholic resistance 
against the Sedan Day, which was a holiday that Catholics around the Empire vehemently 
opposed. Thus, though Catholics around Baden reacted slightly differently to unification, 
there were still certain Protestant ideological messages that they all opposed and that in 
the end aided them in manifesting their own version o f German national identity.
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CREATING ANOTHER KIND OF GERMAN: CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO
SEDAN DAY
During the 1870s and ‘80s, Badenese Catholics responded in a variety o f ways 
to the official attempts to exclude them from the commemorative discourse 
surrounding war and unification. This chapter will investigate the most contested of 
the commemorations: Sedan Day. This celebration merits a closer analysis for a 
number o f reasons. First of all, it created more controversy than any other public 
ceremony in the immediate postunification period. Second, the debates that ensued in 
the wake o f these conflicts serve as excellent representations o f many o f the issues that 
Protestants and Catholics contested as they embarked on the nation-building project.
In conjunction with these discussions, we will also examine other public celebrations 
such as specific battle commemorations and imperial birthdays, which at first glance 
might not seem to be related to war commemorations. However, closer investigation 
o f these events reveals that city elites utilized a variety o f different public celebrations, 
not all o f them directly related to wars, to construct an official memory o f wars and 
unification. War and unification tended to dominate the discourse at most public 
events, and especially since control o f the public space became increasingly important 
to Catholics and Protestants, they debated these issues in a variety o f settings. For 
instance, the ideological message surrounding imperial birthdays placed
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great emphasis on the rulers’ roles as Germans, and their specific contributions to the 
unification process. Thus, Catholics faced a difficult choice in how to approach these 
celebrations. On the one hand, they wanted to express their devotion to the Emperor, 
but on the other, most o f the rhetoric at these events was tinged with strong anti- 
Catholic sentiments. This discussion will also trace how Catholic attitudes towards 
the official commemorative discourse changed as the nineteenth century drew to a 
close. Some o f these changes stemmed from the changing political conditions as the 
National Liberal Party struggled to retain their grip on political power. As Catholics 
were able to play more important political and economic roles in the Second Empire, 
they were better able to manifest their own sense of Germanness. To be able to 
understand fully some of the changes in Catholic attitudes towards the official 
commemorative discourse, a brief overview o f some of the most important political 
developments is necessary.
Badenese Political and Religious Developments, 1871-1914
During the first few years o f the Second Empire, the national-liberals under 
their controversial leader Julius Jolly dominated Badenese politics. Popular among 
the state’s Protestants and liberals, Jolly’s embrace o f the Kulturkampf alienated 
Catholics throughout the state. Strengthened by the passing o f the May laws in 1873, 
he categorically refused to negotiate with the EO and passed many decrees regulating 
the activity o f the Church. He shut down most seminaries, imprisoned a majority of 
Catholic priests, and granted extensive rights to Old Catholics. All o f these measures
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divided the state and distanced the Catholic majority from the government’s political 
program.1
Despite the political hegemony of the national-liberals, Jolly’s hard-line 
policies eventually alienated many Protestants as well. Although most Protestants 
supported the liberal attacks on the Catholic Church, and though the Protestant 
community in Baden was much more cohesive than in most other areas o f Germany, 
Jolly’s actions finally became too much for some Protestants. As the minister 
president pushed hard for the complete abolishing of confessional schools, Grand 
Duke Friedrich, considerably concerned about the increasingly hostile relationship 
between Catholics and Protestants, only agreed to sign the law into effect if  Jolly 
consented to resign. Understanding that to continue as minister president would be 
impossible without the support o f the Grand Duke, Jolly resigned on September 21,
1876. This event signified a turning point in the relationship between Baden’s 
Catholics and the state.
Friedrich appointed Ludwig Turban to replace Jolly. Contemporaries 
considered Turban a moderate politician who had remained in the background during 
most o f the struggles between the church and state. Turban and Friedrich cooperated 
to staff the new administration with ministers such as Franz Ludwig Stosser, who were 
willing to abolish some of the more draconian measures of the Kulturkampf. To the 
state’s Catholics, these decisions cemented and increased the popularity of the Grand
1 Schwarzmeier, Handbuch derBaden-Wurttembergischen Geschichte, 173-175.
2 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 364-365.
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Duke. People around the state praised him for removing Jolly and recognizing the 
need to normalize relations between Catholics and Protestants.3 This reinforced the 
already popular notion that Friedrich never really had been aware of the poor 
treatment that Catholics suffered at the hands o f Jolly and his accomplices.4
While the dismissal o f Jolly indicated a slight change in religious policies, the 
Badenese Kulturkampf remained in effect, and it was not until 1879 that conditions 
began to change. Once again, it was the Grand Duke’s distress over the religious 
situation that prompted an improvement for the state’s Catholics. At the end o f the 
1870s, due to the effects o f the Examensgesetz, 416 Catholic parishes did not have a 
priest.5 Concerned about the obvious plight o f many of his Catholic subjects,
Friedrich was determined to bring the state and the Catholic Church to the negotiating 
table. Although Lothar von Kiibel was initially reluctant to agree to some o f the 
conditions of the proposed compromise, the improved relationship between Berlin and 
the Vatican following the death o f Pius IX and the succession of Leo XIII enabled 
more fruitful negotiations. In 1880, after lengthy talks, the Examsgesetz was changed 
in a manner acceptable to both parties. This compromise helped normalize relations 
between Catholics and Protestants. Within a relatively short time, the majority of 
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some of the aversion towards the state.6
Kiibel’s unexpected death in August 1881 provided the two sides with an 
opportunity to further improve their relationship. In the light o f the recent successful 
cooperation, both church and state were keen to fill the Archbishop seat in Freiburg, 
which had been vacant since the death of Herman von Vicari in 1868. Further 
facilitating a compromise was the altered political landscape. Although the national- 
liberals were still in control o f the government, their support was steadily decreasing. 
Whereas they had received over fifty percent o f the votes in the elections between 
1871-1877, in the beginning o f the 1880s, their numbers had declined to around forty 
percent. Indeed, in the 1881 elections, they failed for the first time since 1859 to
* 7obtain an absolute majority in the second chamber of the parliament. Contemporaries 
debated the reasons for this loss. Many liberals argued that the easing o f the 
Kulturkampf had produced a number o f new, strongly antiliberal priests who had 
reasserted control over their parish members. Although many subscribed to this 
convenient explanation for the party’s recent struggles, the reasons were more 
complicated. First o f all, the enormous success that the party had enjoyed for the 
better part o f two decades had made its leaders complacent. They no longer 
participated with equal vigor in the election campaigns and often ignored the issues 
voters considered important. Furthermore, the economic depression that hit the state 
and the rest o f Germany after 1873 had caused a general loss o f faith in liberal
6 Ibid., 367-368.
7 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 287.
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economic policies. Both the Catholic Party and the conservatives had focused much 
of their election campaigns on the economic issues, and the former even avoided 
religious questions to concentrate on the poor standard of living.
After drawn-out negotiations, Johann Baptist Orbin was elected new 
Archbishop in 1882. Orbin placed emphasis on improving the relationship with the 
Badenese liberals and Protestants. Especially during his first few years as Archbishop, 
he remained rather passive in religious matters, an approach that significantly 
improved the relationship with the state. He employed a careful approach in his 
negotiations with the state. Instead o f presenting a long list of demands, which had 
been the frequent habit o f his predecessors, he elected to concentrate on one issue at 
the time. The government responded favorably to his overtures and permitted re­
opening o f new seminaries in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Tauerbischofsheim, in addition 
to scaling back the rights o f the Old Catholics.8 Although the increased cooperation 
with the government aided the Catholics in their quest to revoke all o f the Kulturkampf 
legislation, it also presented them with a political dilemma. No longer able to base 
their party ideology solely on resistance to the government’s policies, they needed to 
redefine their political identity. The ensuing debates regarding the character o f the 
party greatly diminished popular support for the party. Thus, though the religious 
situation improved considerably, Catholics were not able to take political advantage of 
these developments
Orbin became Archbishop at age seventy-five, and his death five years later
8 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche, 329-335.
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therefore came as no surprise. He was quickly replaced with the Bishop o f Limburg, 
Johann Christian Roos. The latter enjoyed a reputation as a peaceful man, intent on 
improving the relationship between church and state, much like his predecessor. 
Initially, he lived up to the expectations that the government had placed on him; 
however, after Prussia repealed the vast majority o f its Kulturkampf Jaws in 1887, he 
became much more politically active. Roos used the increasing growth of the social- 
democrats as a powerful argument why it was so important for church and state to 
cooperate as much as possible. The new minister responsible for cultural and religious 
affairs, Wilhelm Nokk, presented a series o f suggestions for a compromise between 
the two sides. Although the government did not reject all the legislation passed during 
the Kulturkampf they eliminated key decrees and debated passing some new 
legislation favorable to Catholics. Among the more important ones was a 
recommendation to permit members o f religious orders, who were still banned in 
Baden, to conduct charity work. While the Parliament rejected this particular law, it 
passed many others, which helped to improve the situation for Catholic clergy and 
laity in the state.9 Although the Church was satisfied with the concessions, the laws 
voted into effect in July 1888 did not mean that the tension between Catholics, 
Protestants, and the state had come to an end. Many Kulturkampf laws were still in 
effect, though they were not enforced with the same rigor.
Similarly to the national Kulturkampf the Badenese version ultimately failed. 
Despite the fact that the state created great problems for the Catholic Church, the
9 Ibid., 337-339.
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resistance offered by both the EO as well as Catholic laity made it impossible for the 
state to complete their agenda. Indeed, most o f these measures strengthened Catholic 
communities as they united to meet the state’s challenge.
Although national-liberals were vulnerable to political attacks during the late 
1870s and the 1880s, struggles within the Catholic Party over how to approach the 
ending of the Kulturkampf prevented the latter from taking full advantage o f the 
situation. In the Catholic Party, Theodor Wacker led the faction advocating a hard­
line approach to the issue, whereas Frans Xaver Lender supported a more conciliatory 
approach to the liberal government.10 The debates grew increasingly hostile until a 
public argument during the 1885 election campaign completely severed the 
relationship between the two sides. After realizing that Lender enjoyed more support 
within the party, Wacker officially resigned his seat while refusing to recognize the 
legitimacy of Lender’s faction. Although the Catholic Party had enjoyed an increasing 
amount o f support, these disputes undermined their credibility among the population. 
Thus, in the 1887 election, they only managed to acquire nine seats. This poor result 
forced Lender to retire from politics and created a power vacuum within the party. In 
1888, Wacker, together with the prominent Freiburger lawyer Ludwig Marbe, staged a 
number o f rallies throughout Baden to try to revive support for their version of 
political Catholicism. Wacker’s speech at the General Assembly o f Catholics in 
Freiburg in 1888 marked his ascendancy to power and the beginning of a 
reorganization of the party. He stressed the need to maintain the strong opposition
10 Kremer, Mitt Gottfur Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 25, 32-33, 116-117.
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towards the National Liberal Party, especially since so many of the Kulturkampf laws 
were still in effect. Seeking to integrate the Badenese party more fully into the 
national party structure, he also managed to supervise a name change to the Badische 
Zentrumspartei (Badenese Center Party). Wacker immediately embarked on a 
reorganization o f the party structure, creating three party centers in Konstanz,
Freiburg, and Heidelberg. Under his leadership, the party transformed itself from a 
Weltanschaungspartei into more o f a Intressenpartei, which was more apt to gain 
political support. Already in 1891, his efforts brought significant results as the party 
improved its share o f seats in the Parliament from nine to twenty-one.11
Consequently, when Nokk replaced Turban as minister president in March 
1893, the national-liberals were on the defensive. In the elections a few months later, 
they lost additional seats to the Catholics, which meant that they no longer possessed a 
majority in the state parliament. Instead, the opposition occupied thirty-three of the 
sixty-three seats. More importantly, the liberals were unable to reverse this negative 
trend. Catholics, social-democrats, and conservatives continued to gain seats, and in 
the mid-1890s, the liberals “only” possessed about forty percent of the seats, a very 
low number by their standards.12
Although religious issues still played a major role in Badenese politics, much 
o f the political life around the turn o f the century focused on the need for electoral 
reform. Catholics and social democrats were the most fervent supporters o f some type
11 Ibid, 35-36.
12 Landeszentrale, ed., Badische Geschichte, 82-83.
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of reform. In a similar fashion to the rest of Germany, the Badenese liberal 
Honoratioren experienced difficulties adapting to the new mass politics that began to 
develop in the 1890s.13 They often complained that if  the election system was to be 
changed according to the wishes o f the Catholics and the social-democrats, the lower 
house would soon be overflowing with members from the lower classes. During the 
last few years o f the century, all major parties offered different suggestions as to how 
the election system should be altered. Eventually, it was the resignation of Nokk in 
1900, who had been one o f the staunchest opponents o f direct elections, which paved 
the way for a compromise. During the next three years, representatives from all 
parties debated the best way to redraw the Badenese constitution. The result was a 
substantial change o f the political system. The introduction of direct, universal (male) 
suffrage once again placed Baden at the forefront of liberal reform. Both the first and 
second chambers were expanded and the election districts were redrawn to better 
represent the new urban society. The special privileges held by nobility and clergy in 
the first chambers were removed. These provisions ensured that the political life 
would take on a new shape after 1905.14
The fact that elections o f representatives to the chambers were to be 
determined in main and run-off elections opened the possibility for new electoral 
alliances. In the past, the common opposition to the national-liberals had preserved 
the harmony among the opposition parties. With the uncertainty about how voters
13 Ibid.; Hug, Geschichte Badens, 287.
14 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 289.
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would behave in this new system, the national-liberals became increasingly interested 
in ensuring support from especially the Freisinnn and the Democratic Party. The 
negotiations between the three parties resulted in a pact in which they all agreed not to 
participate in certain election districts. Both the social-democrats and the Catholic 
Center remained aloof from these negotiations and conducted independent campaigns.
After the first round o f elections, it appeared that the Center Party was headed 
for an absolute majority-they only needed to win nine o f the twenty-three seats that 
had to be determined in run-off elections. Catholics across the state were jubilant, as it 
appeared as if  they had finally placed themselves in a position to enjoy significant 
political power. However, to the great surprise o f political analysts everywhere, the 
national-liberals and social-democrats now entered an alliance that all but doomed the 
Center’s chances o f reaching a majority. As the result o f the run-off elections came in, 
the Center had failed to win a single seat. Although they were still the largest party, 
they were far away from a majority, and given the newfound cooperation among the 
social-democrats and the national-liberals, the prospect for political reform remained 
poor.
The formation of this so-called “GrossblocK’ caused strong reactions, and not 
only among the Catholics, who were incensed at this unholy alliance. Large parts of 
the bourgeoisie, as well as Grand Duke Friedrich, demanded an explanation how the 
national-liberal leadership had allowed such a dramatic increase in revolutionary 
influence to take place. Alexander Freiherr von Dusch, the national-liberal leader, 
tried to assure both the Grand Duke and the voters that this was an entirely pragmatic
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alliance and that the social-democrats would not be able to exercise any major 
influence on the course o f Badenese politics. For the Catholics, this alliance 
constituted a heavy blow. The exhilaration that they had experienced after the first 
round o f elections had been quickly replaced by despair. Despite the remarkable 
growth in strength, the party would not be able to exercise any major influence on the 
course o f state politics. The last decade prior to the outbreak o f World War I was 
characterized by a political stalemate as passing of new decrees often was dependent 
upon the cooperation between social-democrats and national-liberals. Although this 
coalition experienced many problems, it performed better than might have been 
expected. Especially after the 1909 elections, the two parties proved that they were 
able to cooperate rather well, and they made sure to set aside any major conflicts and 
focus instead on issues that they agreed upon. Despite a remarkable amount of 
success, the last elections prior to the war in 1913 displayed an increase in the support 
for the Center, while the other major parties drew less support.15
As noted above, Catholics around the state were outraged at the alliance 
between social-democrats and national-liberals. Because Catholics had been able to 
cultivate their loyalties to the Badenese state in a much different manner since the 
dismantling of the Kulturkampf, this failure was even more hurtful. As will become 
evident in the discussions regarding Catholic attitudes towards various 
commemorations, it became increasingly clear that they felt more integrated into 
Baden and Germany as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The only major issue
15 Ibid.; Kremer, Mitt Gottfur Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 43-44.
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of contention between the government and the Church was the ban on the religious 
orders that was still in effect. The increased political strength o f the Center Party 
enabled the religious leadership to place increasing pressure on both the Grand Duke 
and the national-liberals. Aided by the number of Center representatives in the first 
and second chambers, the Church was able to revoke the ban on the missions in 1894; 
however, the orders were still not allowed to return. Despite presenting a number of 
different suggestions that would facilitate the return o f the orders, the EO was not able 
to convince the government to change its stance.
Because o f the struggles over the religious orders, the appointment o f a new 
archbishop following the death o f Roos in 1896 became hotly contested. After almost 
two years o f negotiations and one failed appointment (Bishop Komp died on his way 
to Freiburg), the two sides agreed on Thomas Norber from Baden-Baden.16 The 
government and the Grand Duke expected him to exercise a calming influence on the 
agitation from the Center, but that proved false. After a few initial confrontations, 
Friedrich informed Norber that he would have to help calm Wacker down before any 
meaningful negotiations could take place. Because Norber’s appointment was 
accompanied by a much milder rhetoric from Wacker, it seems likely that the new 
archbishop was able to convince the political leader to tone down some o f his more 
aggressive argumentation. As a result o f the improved relationships, in 1902, the 
liberal government even declared itself prepared to discuss the reopening o f some of 
the monasteries and even the potential return o f some of the religious orders.
16 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche, 353-354.
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However, though the liberal politicians might have been ready to accommodate the 
Catholics, large parts of society was not. The news that the government and the EO 
were entering negotiations regarding this issue ignited a storm of popular protests 
around the state. Indicating that the relationship between Protestant and Catholics still 
remained tense, the so-called Klostersturm attempted to influence the government. 
Refusing to give in to both popular pressure and the opposition of the Grand Duke, the 
minister president Arthur von Brauer began talks with the EO in 1903. Despite their 
determination to negotiate, it soon became clear that the government was only 
prepared to do it on its own terms. Thus, the EO quickly left the negotiating table, 
citing the inflexible stance of the government as their reason for abandoning the
17attempt to bring the orders back into the state.
The formation of the Grossblock presented Badenese Catholics with an 
interesting situation. To be sure, they did not possess the political power that they 
thought they deserved; however, the fact that the social-democrats and the national- 
liberals differed significantly on the religious issue provided some potential leverage. 
However, they were unable to achieve any major victories, and the relationship 
between state and church was pretty uneventful during the last decade before the war. 
Although the Center Party was unable to facilitate the re-entry o f the religious orders 
into Baden, their political situation had undergone a drastic change since the inception 
o f the Second Empire. Badenese political Catholicism had developed from a 
disorganized and splintered movement into a major political force that exercised
17 Kramer, Mitt Gott filr Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 152-154.
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considerable influence on the political process. As we shall see, this change also 
manifested itself in transformed Catholic attitudes towards the official rhetoric 
surrounding wars and unification. However, this change was a slow and often painful 
process as will become clearly evident in the analysis o f Sedan Day.
Catholic Responses to Sedan Day
The annual commemoration o f the victory at Sedan proved to be one o f the 
most contested celebrations in early Imperial Germany.18 Although social-democrats 
and others abstained from participating, confessional and not class issues were at the 
forefront o f the controversies. Protestants viewed the annual celebration of the 
military victory as an opportunity to shape the nascent nation-state according to the 
tenants o f liberalism and Kulturprotestantismus. Especially during the first two 
decades o f the Kaiserreich, the commemorations became manifestations o f the 
supposedly close connection between nationalism and Protestantism. As part of their 
attempts to control the construction o f Germanness, Protestants used this and other 
commemorations to establish a link between the wars o f unification and their 
confession. This holiday became a vehicle for Protestants to assume the role of sole 
interpreters o f the national history and national identity. They presented these ideas in 
a manner which supposedly made them incontestable; however, Catholics and others 
actively protested this view of German history and identity. Thus, few other
18 Excellent accounts of Sedan Day include: Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 27-51; Lepp, 
“Protestanten feiem ihre Nation”; Schneider, Politische Festkultur.
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commemorations caused more debates regarding the manner in which unification had 
been achieved and how to shape the new nation-state.
In Baden and other confessionally mixed areas, Sedan Day became an annual 
forum for contesting the nature o f the German nation, and Catholics, Old Catholics, 
and Protestants clashed (sometimes violently) over what constituted a good German. 
An analysis o f the debates surrounding this celebration will not only highlight the 
contested nature of Germanness but also reveal some o f the methods that Catholics 
employed to display publicly their own view of the nation. Some scholars have 
argued that since Catholics seldom organized counter-demonstrations on September 2, 
they did not utilize Sedan Day to rally support to the same extent as social-democrats, 
who often staged alternative meetings on the very day o f the celebration.19 However, 
this interpretation fails to take into consideration the important role that the debates 
surrounding this annual celebration played in the Catholic community. By using the 
debates in the media, Catholics and others were able to propagate their own view of 
the German nation. This constitutes a good illustration of the fact that 
commemorations and corresponding debates served as more than a means o f spreading 
an officially approved ideological message. Groups such as Catholics and social- 
democrats used these newly opened avenues o f communication to criticize specific 
features o f contemporary German society. These commemorations often enabled 
various groups to make their voices heard in a more efficient and public way than 
would otherwise have been the case.
19 To a certain extent, this view permeates Schneider’s work.
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Although receiving an increasing amount of scholarly attention during the past 
decade, the historiography of Sedan Day still contains significant gaps. Alon Confino 
and Ute Schneider have attempted to locate this commemoration in the wider context 
o f the creation of a public culture, collective memory, and national narrative.
However, neither has considered in depth the importance of the debates surrounding 
Sedan Day to the Catholic community, though Confino stresses the intimate 
connections between the Protestant-liberal view of the nation and the celebration. The 
history o f Sedan Day represents yet another means that Protestants and liberals used in 
their attempts to shape the German nation-state according to their own values. Thus, 
in many Badenese communities, especially during the 1870s, the festivities became 
instruments in the fierce Kulturkampf that dominated most local societies. It was no 
coincidence that the popularity of Sedan celebrations concurred with the political 
dominance o f the National Liberal Party. Local Protestant liberals employed these 
celebrations to affirm their dominant position in society and to appropriate the role as 
interpreters o f Germany’s national history. Although Confino is correct when arguing 
that liberals “...voiced their own ideas o f Germany and o f German history in a way 
that made these ideas incontestable...,”20 he overstates the hegemony of the 
Protestant-liberal view of the national narrative. To be sure, most o f the people who 
organized Sedan Day were members o f their community elite, which lent a certain 
amount of authority to their message. However, because Confino’s study centers on 
Wurttemberg, which did not experience a strong Kulturkampf, he overlooks the
20 Confino, The Nation as a Local Methapor, 58
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centrality o f confessional conflict to Sedan Day. In Baden, Catholics were quite 
successful in using the debates surrounding the ideological message that liberals and 
Protestants presented to manifest their own view o f Germany’s past and future. Here, 
the fact that Catholics had already experienced a harsh Kulturkampf aided them in 
their struggles with the Protestant-liberal elite. Already accustomed to discrimination 
and unjust treatment, Catholics did not let the political and economic power of their 
opponents prevent them from expressing an alternative sense of Germanness. 
Moreover, Catholics employed these debates to validate and legitimize their 
membership in the German imagined community. Although not actively participating 
in the festivities, Catholics used their opposition to Sedan Day to construct and exhibit 
notions of Germanness.
Almost immediately after the capture o f Napoleon III, a number of Germans 
demanded that the nationalist exhilaration that had accompanied the military victory 
should be manifested in a ceremony. Members o f the Protestant Association in 
Bremen first requested an annual celebration in which Germans could showcase their 
patriotism and love for the fatherland. During the first few months o f 1871, the well- 
known lawyer Franz von Holtzendorff and Johann Caspar Bluntschli, the president of 
the Protestant Association, discussed initiating an “allgemeine Volks und 
Kirchenfest.,,2i During the 1860s, Bluntschli, located in Heidelberg, had become 
known as one of the fiercest advocates o f the Badenese Kulturkampf. Although he 
and Holtzendorff initially claimed that the celebration would have an intra-
21 Quoted in Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 310.
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confessional character, their private correspondence reveals their intentions to use it to 
exclude parts o f the population from the German nation-building project. In a letter to 
Bluntschli in February 1871, Holtzendorff stated: “No law or parliamentary debate 
can damage the radicals, the socialists, the Jesuits, and the ultramontanes, as seriously 
as a Volksfest, in which people are annually reminded just who the founder of the 
Empire were, and who the enemies o f the German Reich in 1870 were.”22
Fully aware o f the importance of public celebrations to the nation-building 
project, Bluntschli suggested turning Sedan Day into a Burgerweihe in which young 
Germans would pass through an acceptance ritual into the national community. 
However, Holtzendorff and others deemed these ideas to be too ambitious. Instead, 
under the auspices o f Holtzendorff, eighty-eight liberal Honoratioren signed a petition 
to the Emperor, asking him to initiate an annual “Volks-und Kirchenfest.” Most o f the 
signers came from Baden and included Grand Duke Friedrich I. In addition, the 
Grand Duke personally handed over petitions from forty-nine Badenese communities 
that supported Holtzendorff and Bluntschli’s initiative. Given the intense nature o f the 
Badenese Kulturkampf during the 1860s and the Protestant domination o f municipal 
politics, this level o f support was not surprising. Despite these efforts, Wilhelm turned 
down their request. Although he had several different motives for his actions (one 
being his dislike of the Protestant Association), his official explanation was that a 
celebration such as this one should not be organized from above, but instead emerge 
spontaneously from the people.
22 Ibid.
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Following this official rebuke, the Protestant minister Friedrich von 
Bodelschwingh took up the matter. During summer 1871, he circulated a similar, only 
more detailed, petition to communities in the Rhineland. His initiative attracted 
national attention, and local communities throughout Germany began planning a 
celebration of Sedan along similar lines of the commemoration of the victory at 
Leipzig in 1813. Only a few cities staged official festivities in 1871, but by 1872, 
most communities organized some form of celebration.
In Baden, Protestants and Catholics already from the outset contested the 
nature of this commemoration. For instance, in Konstanz, though the city council did 
not organize an official celebration in 1871, a number of locals attempted to take 
advantage o f this opportunity to manifest their dissatisfaction with the actions and 
policies of the Catholic Church.23 In a similar fashion, a more official celebration in 
1872 contained harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric. Having witnessed the surge in nationalist 
sentiments during the Franco-Prussian war, these locals had learned to use the 
nationalist rhetoric to criticize certain features o f society, and they realized that it 
could be employed as an effective weapon in the Kulturkampf. Most o f the speeches 
held during the 1871 festivities focused on the need for an intensifying o f the 
Kulturkampf rather than celebrating the victory at Sedan. Speakers placed the 
majority o f their emphasis on the religious aspect of the war and noted that at Sedan 
“ .. .the Roman spirit was defeated by the courageous and dutiful Germanic spirit, 
which was able to deliver a deadly blow to the Jesuits, who had been protected by the
23 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 5, 1871.
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French for so long.”24 Notwithstanding that the celebration did not attract any major 
attention, it was still important as it established the tone for future ones that would 
draw more participants and spectators.
Although substantial anti-Catholic sentiments were present from the outset of 
the commemoration, the intensification of the regional and national Kulturkampf 
significantly increased the hostility towards Catholics during the festivities. The brief 
unity that had existed in the wake o f war and unification had quickly disappeared and 
was replaced with struggles over how to remember these momentous events. Already 
from the outset o f these celebrations, they turned into a forum in which liberals and 
Protestants tried to propagate their view o f German history. They had been 
increasingly successful in connecting the recent war with their faith. In 1873, the 
liberal association (Liberale Verein) in Konstanz organized a celebration complete 
with a banquet in the Konzilsaal. Liberal politician and Old Catholic Hermann 
Schulze-Delitzsch gave the plenary speech, in which he focused on the connection 
between the last war and the Konzilsaal, where the decision to execute the Czech 
religious reformer Jan Hus had been taken in 1415.25 He urged his audience to note 
that the events surrounding the injustices done to Hus marked the pinnacle o f clerical 
power in Konstanz, and though the last war as well as some o f the domestic efforts 
since 1871 had been successful in the battle against the internal enemy, the war was 
not yet won. He reminded people that the clerical spirit was resilient and it would
24 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 3, 1872.
25 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 4, 1873.
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require much determination and dedication on behalf o f “true” Germans if they were 
to break the stronghold which the Church had held on local society for so long. He 
ended his speech by conjuring the spirit o f Hus, stating that it was unfortunate that 
they just could not bum the spirit o f the clericals, just as they had burned the religious 
reformer.26
Throughout the Kaiserreich, especially during the Kulturkampf, Badenese 
liberals and Protestants frequently compared the current situation to the martyrdom of 
Hus. They often constructed monuments and organized other commemorative 
ceremonies to maintain and honor the memory of Hus. For instance, in Konstanz, one 
o f the most controversial topics o f the 1860s had been the construction o f a monument 
to celebrate the city’s intimate connection to the Bohemian reformer.27 Thus, they tied 
their cause to one o f the best-known historical figures in the area, and they were also 
able to create a continuous historical narrative from the times o f Hus’s struggle against 
Rome until the last war against the papal powers. This view of history fit perfectly 
with the kleindeutsche version that culminated in the unification in 1871. In addition, 
it excluded Catholics from the commemorative discourse. Even if  they had wanted to 
celebrate the victory at Sedan, they were unable to do so because o f the heavy anti- 
Catholic sentiments that dominated the official discourse. This proved to be very
26 Ibid.
27 Konstanzer Zeitung, 21 January, 27, 28 March, 10 April 1862. See also Jiri Koralka, “Konstaz als 
Reiseziel tschchischer Husverehrer um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhundrets,” Schrr VG Bodensee (1987): 
93-130; St. AK, S II 15226, Die Errichtung eines Hussenstein, 1834-1939. Another illuminating 
example o f  Konstanz’s ambivalent relationship to the Czech reformer is the controversy regarding a 
1877 decision to change “PaulstraBc” to “HuscnstraBe.” See for instance Freie Stimme, August 4, 1877.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
275
important since Germans placed so much emphasis on using these events as basis for 
their new national identity.
Another typical example o f the controversies that took place was the conflicts 
connected to the school celebrations that had taken place just outside the city. 
Ceremonies involving children were often the source o f some of the most heated 
debates, especially since, as Confino has noted, “celebrants therefore directed their 
efforts to the children and the youth whose identity was still in a sense a tabula rasa.”28 
In the small town o f Tiengen, the local teacher, accompanied by a priest, usually took 
the children for a walk to explain the significance o f the day. Germans attached great 
importance to Sedan Day as a pedagogical holiday. This was supposed to be an 
occasion when children of all ages were educated about the great sacrifices made by 
their fathers and the need to honor those deeds, which was one o f the major reasons 
why this and other holidays became so controversial. Citizens recognized how 
influential these ceremonies could be to a child, which explains why parents went to 
such great lengths to ensure that their offspring would not be taught what they 
considered corrupting ideas. However, this year the city council had assigned the Old 
Catholic priest Hampp to guide the children, which upset many parents, who 
subsequently approached the school and asked them to revert the decision. The 
parents appeared reasonable in their request, suggesting that to make everybody 
happy, it was probably better to eliminate the role o f the priest altogether. Despite 
widespread support for this appeal, the decision stood. As a result, many parents
28 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 46.
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boycotted the celebration and instead organized their own walk from Tiengen to 
nearby Waldshut, in which over 160 children participated. Although the local clergy 
and various Catholic organizations praised the parents for taking this worthy initiative, 
local liberal politicians criticized them heavily. The latter claimed that by separating 
the Catholic children from the Protestant, Jewish, and Old Catholic ones, they were 
only serving to further divide the German Reich. Despite the criticism, Catholics 
stood by their decision, stressing how important it was to provide today’s youth with a
9Qproper understanding o f the recent events. Consequently, they used the national- 
liberals’ own argument as to why some of these commemorations were so important, 
but instead o f exposing their children to the official canon o f nationalism, they elected 
to present their own version of these important events.
This was one o f the most common conflicts during the first few years o f the 
Kaiserreich. In Konstanz and other cities, Catholic parents often kept their children 
home on the days when Sedan was celebrated. Naturally, this caused much 
controversy as liberals and Protestants used this behavior as evidence of how 
backward Catholics were since they were willing to risk their children’s education for 
their own political and religious purposes. Another reoccurring conflict pertained to 
the unwillingness o f local Catholic clergy members to support publicly the ideological 
messages that accompanied the festivities, which they manifested by frequently 
refusing to ring the church bells. This pointed and very public action led to heavy 
criticism and renewed accusations of hostility towards the fatherland. The refusal to
29 Freie Stimme, September 5, 1873.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
277
ring the bells constituted a powerful manifestation of Catholic disapproval o f the 
ideological messages surrounding the celebrations. As Protestant churches around the 
state were ringing on the morning of September 2, the silence of Catholic ones 
constituted a sharp contrast and disrupted the intended effect o f the commemoration. 
By not participating and indeed often going about their lives as if  it was any normal 
day, Catholics and others were able to destroy the supposedly special character o f this 
holiday. The Catholic disruption of this effort to create an imagined community was
TOquite successful.
Catholics often complained that though their brethren were frequently targets 
for both verbal and physical abuse, they were not even allowed to offer light-hearted 
criticism of public figures. Towards the end o f the nineteenth century, the public 
sphere assumed ever greater importance in a modernizing German society. Catholics, 
despite being labeled backward and antimodem by their opponents, were keenly aware 
o f the importance o f controlling, or at least participating in, the public arena. They 
used papal anniversaries and other Catholic holidays to establish their presence in the 
public sphere, and their criticism of the exclusiveness o f Sedan Day reflected similar 
concerns. Catholics around the state criticized how both local and state government 
ignored the verbal and sometimes physical abuse Catholics had to suffer at the hands 
o f Protestants. Physical confrontations were not everyday events, but assumed great 
importance when they happened. Many contemporaries viewed them as a literal 
manifestation o f the struggle for control of the public space that took place between
30 Schneider, Politische Festkultur, 241.
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Catholics and Protestants. Following the 1873 celebrations, Badischer Beobachter 
questioned the Grand Duke and his government: “[Are] we Catholics are without any
31rights?...since the government does nothing to stop these actions.”
In the wake o f unification, liberals and Protestants argued that it was evident 
by how people celebrated Sedan Day that it had become the new national holiday. 
Catholics, however, rejected this claim, maintaining that only the veterans association 
staged celebrations and that people were already growing tired of this 
commemoration.32 They also claimed that an increasing number o f liberals boycotted 
the event, joining the ranks of Catholics and socialists, which rendered Sedan Day an 
increasingly artificial celebration. Indeed, they claimed that the ceremony had 
developed into “a farce arranged by the [liberal] party leadership.. ..”33 This 
interpretation was far removed from the liberal and Protestant attempts o f portraying 
the festivities as something that had emerged from the people. Freie Stimme noted: 
that
It would be more than enough to do it every ten years. The French are 
just happy that Napoleon is gone, and for us Germans, who are more 
divided and hostile towards each other than ever before-all because of
31 Badischer Beaobachter, September 5, 1873.
32 Although Catholics were active in veterans organizations in Baden, Protestants dominated these 
associations. These associations were supposed to be confessionally neutral, but in reality, their 
rhetoric and actions often carried traits of anti-Catholic sentiments. See Thomas Rohkramer, Der 
Militarismus der “kleinen Leute die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1990).
33 Freie Stimme, September 2, 1873.
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the Kulturkampf that began in those September days o f 1870—it would 
be enough to celebrate the great national-liberal St. Sedan every ten
34years.
Such statements illustrate how differently Catholics and Protestants viewed the 
war. It was impossible for Catholics to relate to the commemorative discourse 
surrounding September 2. While Protestants celebrated it as one o f the greatest days 
in German history, Catholics located the origins of the national Kulturkampf in the 
victory over Napoleon III.35 Liberal behavior proved that they, who claimed to be the 
true representatives o f Germanness, tried to use Sedan Day to complete their victory 
over the Catholic Church. In their attempts to prove how limited support for this 
commemoration was, Catholic newspapers offered detailed accounts from any city in 
Germany where celebrations had not met liberal and Protestant expectations. They 
reported extensively on nonexisting decorations, canceled banquets, and poor 
attendance. They argued that one of the main reasons why the commemoration had 
failed to gather popular support was its militaristic and chauvinistic nature, which did 
not fit the pious German national character. This constituted a frequent Catholic 
complaint and serves as a proper illustration o f their attempts to stress the religious 
aspect of their national identity. Furthermore, the constant references to the defeat of 
the Catholic French, which would be followed with an onslaught on German 
Catholics, naturally  alienated the Catholic part o f  the population.
34 Freie Stimme, September 12, 1876.
35 Ibid.
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In their criticism, Badenese Catholics also complained that not only did 
liberals and Protestants condemn them for their alleged disloyalty during the last war, 
but they were also beginning to blame them for the suffering that Germans had to 
endure ever since the Reformation. Especially during the first three decades of the 
Kaiserreich, the debates concerning Luther, the Reformation, and the origins and 
causes of the Thirty Years War intensified, and arguments regarding the role of the 
Protestant Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus often emerged in the wake o f Sedan 
Day.36 In their speeches, Protestants and liberals often pointed out that the military 
victory at Sedan had finally brought the victory that Protestants for so long had sought. 
Thus, instead of creating unity, the memory o f this victory served to further alienate 
the two confessions from each other as it confirmed the different fates they had 
suffered as Germans. Catholics also pointed out that the more divided Germans 
became, the more certain sectors o f society insisted on staging public celebrations and 
commemorations. They sarcastically noted that “...if a foreigner would arrive in 
Germany, he would think that we Germans did not have a problem in the world, since 
all we do is celebrate the greatness o f our nation.”37 Catholics offered some stinging 
criticism of this trend and demanded that it stop, otherwise it would completely 
demoralize the German nation. During the last years o f the Kaiserreich, these 
sentiments became commonplace, but Catholics were among the first to criticize this 
trend o f overexposing Germans to commemorative activities.
36 Cramer, “The Cult o f Gustavus Adolphus,” 97-121.
37 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1876.
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After the passing o f the May Laws in 1873, Catholics had been locked in a 
fierce battle with the state. In late August 1874, Bishop Ketteler outlined why 
Catholics should not participate in this commemoration. His criticism focused on the 
divisive character o f this supposedly national holiday. He stressed that if  this indeed 
was a celebration that promoted unity, Catholics would gladly participate in 
commemorating the military victory that was so important for the foundation of the 
Reich, to which they had made such an important contribution. He also advised 
Catholics to pay proper tribute to the sacrifices made by soldiers in the past war. 
However, as long as liberals and Protestants were in charge o f organizing the events, 
no Catholic could identify with the ideological messages that accompanied the 
festivities. Protestants and liberals designed the events so that they did not represent 
the true beliefs o f the German people, but instead only illustrated the sentiments o f an 
elite intent on alienating Catholics and others from the nation-state. Hence, the 
holiday did not adequately represent the collective identity of Germans. Members of 
the Protestant city elite were misrepresenting the true nature o f this celebration: “On 
Sedan Day, they do not celebrate the victory o f the German people against France as 
much as the victory o f their own party over the Church. They want to force the 
Catholic Church to participate in this celebration, to celebrate its own battle 
wounds.”38
Ketteler also argued that as good Christians, Catholics could not participate in 
a celebration alongside the same Protestants who were attempting to eliminate all
38 Ketteler’s text was reprinted in several newspapers; see for instance Freie Stimme, August 29, 1874.
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traces o f Christianity from the new nation-state. Furthermore, in times when the Pope 
was under attack, when German priests and bishops were being imprisoned, and when 
Catholics were subjected to all sorts of discrimination, it would be inappropriate to 
take part in the celebration of a state that was responsible for so many o f these 
problems. Ketteler argued that the few Catholics who had participated in the 
commemoration of Sedan had compromised not only their own characters but the 
characters o f Catholics everywhere. At the end of the tract, the Bishop emphasized 
that as true Germans, Catholics had a duty to pray for the fatherland, but they should 
do this either on the Sunday before or after the official Sedan Day celebration.39
Not surprisingly, Ketteler’s argument initiated an intense debate regarding the 
nature o f this celebration and the overall character o f the German nation. This is a 
good example o f how the discourse surrounding these events was formulated and 
reshaped by the interaction between the Catholic and Protestant press and also how the 
latter contributed to the formation of the German imagined community. Protestant and 
liberal newspapers criticized the Bishop heavily for not respecting the sacrifices made 
at Sedan and other battles and argued that this tract once and for all settled the 
question of the loyalty o f German Catholics. If they could not appreciate the 
commemoration o f the possibly greatest victory in German history, they did not 
deserve to be included in the German nation-state. Some papers even went as far as 
claiming that Ketteler had secretly been hoping for a French victory at Sedan. As 
debates intensified, Badenese papers employed increasingly aggressive rhetoric.
39 Ibid.
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Freiburger Zeitung claimed that Catholics around the state were hoping for a French 
revenge and that drastic measures had to be taken to deal with this very serious threat. 
The paper maintained that “the blacks have chosen 2 September as a test day for the 
pure intentions o f the German Catholics-they are requesting their own Sedan, to 
which they should be assisted.”40 By using the powerful images o f war, they were 
able to evoke a strong response among the population.
Having initially focused primarily on the supposedly anti-German behavior 
Catholics had displayed in the war, Protestants now used Catholic attitudes toward 
Sedan Day to prove their unwillingness to become Germans. Attacks often focused on 
Catholic inability to appreciate the sacrifices made by the soldiers in the last war.
These accusations were especially damaging since much of the commemorative 
discourse surrounding the war and unification justified the loss o f lives by claiming 
that an event of such importance as unification required great personal sacrifice. Since 
Catholics were not willing to honor the fallen soldiers, they did not deserve a place in 
the new nation-state.
This was another instance where Catholics displayed a slightly different 
perception of the unification period and the character of the Empire. As the debates 
surrounding the commemoration turned into a forum for the current state of the 
Empire, Catholics were quick to point out the many problems that had surfaced during 
the last few years. They often pointed out that an increasing number o f cities refused 
to provide financial assistance for the celebrations, citing the strained economy that
40 Freiburger Zeitung, September 1, 1874.
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affected virtually every sector of society during the Grunderkrise. In addition, 
Catholics maintained that there really was not that much to celebrate in Germany at 
the moment. Contrary to the Protestant and liberal claims that the foundation o f the 
Empire meant that Germany was about to assume a very powerful position in 
European and world politics, Catholics cited the deteriorating economy as an 
indication that the official rhetoric was no more than propaganda. They frequently 
centered their criticism on the discrimination that they faced from both national and 
state governments. In addition, they argued that contrary to what Protestants and 
liberals maintained, the German nation was not more unified now than it had been 
before 1871. Indeed, many Catholics complained that by using Sedan Day as a 
vehicle for Protestant, national-liberal policies, bourgeois elites had ruined the 
memory o f a great military victory where Catholics and Protestants from all over 
Germany had stood together in defense of their common fatherland.
Towards the end o f the 1870s, Catholics no longer paid much attention to the 
specific celebrations that were taking place on September 2 but instead used the 
occasion to launch attacks on current conditions in society. As the German economy 
worsened, Catholics were able to utilize their position as outsiders to criticize national- 
liberal policies. Because they had supposedly not been part o f the driving forces in the 
unification process, Catholics did not have to explain the failure to fulfill the promises 
made in the post-1871 exhilaration. Indeed, Catholics often pointed out that none of 
the national-liberal grand visions for the future had been realized, which proved that 
the sacrifices made by German soldiers and civilians had only served to satisfy the
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territorial aspirations o f Bismarck and his Prussian cohorts. Although Catholics were 
careful to point out that their criticism should not be mistaken for anti-Germanness, 
they repeatedly insisted that the Kaiserreich had failed to live up to expectations.
In a lead article published on September 5, 1878, Freie Stimme noted that after 
the first initial economic success, largely triggered by the reparations from France, 
economic, social, political, and religious conditions had deteriorated compared to the 
pre-1871 period. Much o f the Catholic analysis centered on the effects o f the 
Kulturkampf. They pointed out that though they had suffered discrimination prior to 
unification as well, it had increased drastically after 1871. When analyzing Catholic 
impressions o f the first few years o f the Kaiserreich, the importance o f the 
Kulturkampf can hardly be overestimated. For instance, the article in Freie Stimme 
focused largely on how unjustly Catholics were treated in the Empire. Ever since the 
conclusion o f the war against France, civil rights had steadily eroded, and people were 
often imprisoned for no reason other than their religious belief. Adding that the 
economic policies o f the national-liberals had accomplished nothing but enrichment of 
the upper classes, Catholics declared the liberal economic scheme worthless. Finally, 
the last few years had witnessed a steady moral decline so that murders and robberies 
were now part o f everyday life. These observations were tied into the reoccurring 
Catholic complaints concerning the liberal and Protestant determination to modernize 
at all cost. Germans had become too caught up in the financial hysteria that 
accompanied unification and the economic boom triggered by the reparations from 
France. As a result, Christian values had been all but forgotten, and Germans were
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now paying the price for neglecting the spiritual aspects of their lives.41
In conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, Catholics also noted that 
despite all national-liberal promises o f unity and prosperity, none had been fulfilled.
On the other hand, all the rhetoric about freedom and unity had simply fizzled out as 
so many other promises made by Bismarck and the national-liberals. Catholics also 
used these debates to attack one of the common assumptions about the reason for the 
German victory in the last war: the fact that the Catholic faith had hindered France’s 
transition to a modem nation-state. Now, a few years after unification, Catholics 
looked to France and the relative stability that had set in after the Paris Commune and 
contrasted that with their own experiences in the Second Empire. Once again, the 
ghost o f the Kulturkampf loomed large as Catholics noted that the French were well on 
their way to surpass the Germans, despite all of the destruction that the war had 
brought. Freie Stimme argued in 1876 that given the economic circumstances, it did 
not seem appropriate to devote so much time, effort, and money to celebrating every 
significant and insignificant event in the manner that Germans were currently doing.
In a time when hard work, piety and religious faith constituted the proper means to get 
Germany back on track, this constant celebrating was an evil that needed to be 
eliminated. As already noted, Catholics constituted one of the first groups to criticize 
the commemorative craze that spread throughout Germany during the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.42
41 Freie Stimme, September 5, 10, 1878.
42 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1876.
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Interestingly, Protestants and liberals answered Catholic criticism of the failing 
economy by attempting to reconstruct the memory o f the Austro-Prussian War. Once 
again in conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, the Protestant press 
claimed that Catholics had caused this economic crisis. Because o f the reparations 
that Baden had to pay to Prussia-approximately six million-the Catholics had placed 
enormous restraint on the economy that no liberal policies could correct. Protestants 
maintained that in 1866, only Catholics had been willing to fight on the side o f the 
Austrians, and consequently, Catholics were to blame for the hefty reparations.43 Of 
course, Catholics, who during the past few years had spent considerable time and 
efforts trying to uncover the true reasons behind the war of 1866, refuted these 
“ridiculous accusations.” They pointed out that though a few Protestants and liberals 
had supported the reactionary and annexationist policies o f Bismarck, the vast 
majority had championed the Austrian cause.44
The controversy over Sedan Day reached its climax during the 1870s. This 
should come as no surprise as the immediate postunification period witnessed the most 
intense commemorative activities. Although Protestant and liberal papers insisted that 
entire communities participated in the celebrations, a careful reading of these accounts 
reveals that even among people who had previously supported Sedan Day, the 
commemoration quickly lost its relevance. For instance, despite Konstanzer Zeitung 's
43 These claims were discussed throughout the state in 1880. See for instance Freie Stimme, September 
11, 1880.
44 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
claims that by 1876 the commemoration had assumed national importance, the paper 
also noted that the city would not stage any official events to honor the day. Towards 
the end of the 1870s, the paper only published very brief reports on the annual 
festivities organized by the local veterans’ association, which usually attracted a 
respectable number o f participants but without involving the entire community. The 
resistance offered by Catholics and other groups eventually proved too disruptive for 
liberals and Protestants, and as the immediate nationalist exhilaration disappeared in 
the first few postunification years, locals soon lost much of their interest in 
commemorating Sedan. The liberal and Protestant failure to find any meaningful 
political symbols that were accessible and acceptable to the majority o f Badeners 
essentially doomed the holiday from the outset. After the initial enthusiasm, both 
supporters and opponents o f the holiday stopped paying attention to it.45
Although local veterans’ organizations continued to celebrate Sedan Day 
during the 1880s and ‘90s, the commemoration received ever less attention from the 
rest o f the population. Especially after the gradual dismantling of the Kulturkampf, 
organizers o f Sedan Day failed to attract any great number o f participants. To be sure, 
controversies over a particular speech still occurred, but on the whole, both Protestants 
and Catholics lost interest in this holiday. During the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, the only times when Sedan Day attracted attention was when dignitaries 
happened to make some comments that both Protestants and Catholics attempted to 
interpret in such a manner that their own view of the nation would be validated. One
45 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 86.
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such example was Grand Duke Friedrich’s visit to the city o f Uberlingen in 1889. 
Attending the Sedan Day celebration organized by the local veterans organization, 
Friedrich held a speech that citizens in Baden and the rest of Germany discussed at 
length. Apart from the customary remarks about the importance o f remembering the 
sacrifices made by the soldiers and civilians, he also noted that in times such as these, 
it was important for all Germans to defend the interests o f Germany, both abroad and 
at home. Never really defining what or whom he was referring to, Friedrich claimed 
that enemies existed at home who threatened German cities, Heimats, and families. 
Although it is difficult to know exactly what or whom the Grand Duke was alluding 
to, his subsequent remarks regarding the importance o f maintaining an orderly civil 
society indicates that he was concerned about some of the negative effects that was 
accompanying German modernization. His caution to parents to ensure that today’s 
youth do not fall prey to some of the temptations of society could perhaps be 
interpreted as a warning against the ever growing social-democratic threat.46
Immediately following his speech, liberal and Protestant papers offered their 
interpretations o f it. Although some maintained that he had referred to the unions and 
the social-democrats, many immediately seized this opportunity to renew the 
accusations o f anti-German sentiments against the Catholics. These accusations 
should be viewed in the context o f the controversies that emerged regarding the 
monument dedicated to Giordano Bruno in Rome 47 Although taking place in Italy,
46 The speech was cited in a number o f newspapers. See for instance Freie Stimme, September 5, 1889.
47 Debates regarding this monument occupied most o f the space in primarily Catholic, but also
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this was a topic that attracted enormous attention in Germany, especially from 
Catholics, but also from liberals and Protestants. During the late spring and summer 
1889, German Catholics had expressed great indignation at the behavior o f Italian 
liberals and the disrespectful manner in which they had treated the Pope. On June 9, 
Italians had unveiled an imposing monument, located in the heart o f Rome, to 
Giordano Bruno, whom they celebrated as a national hero. Bruno had been a 
sixteenth-century Dominican monk whose interest in newer strands o f thought, 
particularly within astronomy, had drawn the ire o f the Catholic Church. After 
spending most o f his life on the run from the Inquisition, he was finally executed in 
1600. The debates regarding the monument had renewed the animosity between 
Catholics and Protestants, especially regarding their view of history. Thus, the Grand 
Duke’s speech was debated in a public sphere that was already heavily polarized as a 
result o f the Italian monument. The controversies regarding Bruno might seem 
unrelated to the nature of the German national identity, but we must recognize that 
these debates dominated newspapers for several weeks and spilled over into a number 
o f other issues.
In their responses to the accusations, Catholics displayed that their view o f the 
German nation-state and their place in it had changed since the inception o f the 
Empire. Aside from the usual rhetoric condemning the attempts o f Protestants and
Protestant-liberal, newspapers during June 1889.
48 For an overview o f Bruno’s life, see Dorotea Waley Singer, Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought 
(New York: Schuman: 1950). It should also be noted that though Protestant and liberals defended his 
person and reputation in these debates, he had been excommunicated from both the Lutheran and 
Calvinist churches as well.
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liberals to divide the nation, Catholics centered most of their arguments on the positive 
role that they were playing in the modernizing project that Germany was currently 
undergoing. They pointed to the prominence o f the Catholic Church in local 
communities and how the values of Catholicism helped stabilize families throughout 
Germany. Although these arguments were not novel, Catholics were also able to point 
to some additional evidence o f their loyalty to state and Emperor. Having grown 
increasingly strong during the 1880s, the Center Party now occupied an increasingly 
important position in local and national politics. Now, Catholics could cite a variety 
o f statements from Bismarck in which he praised the Center for becoming a party that 
participated in a constructive manner in the governing of the Reich. This was quite 
different from the Kulturkampf years when Bismarck singled out German Catholics as 
enemies o f the nation. Many of these statements were a result o f the shifting focus of 
Bismarck’s domestic politics. After the passing of the anti-socialist law in 1878 and 
the slow reconciliation with Catholics, Bismarck was forced to the let the Center party 
play an increasingly active role in national politics. Thus, Catholics throughout the 
Empire could refer to their active and willing participation in the nation-building 
project. During the Kulturkampf, Catholics would have been hard pressed to cite 
evidence o f their involvement in daily political life. Badenese Catholics were 
especially keen to refer to their involvement in easing some of the social ills that 
accompanied modernization. Referring to the “problems” that the Grand Duke had 
mentioned in his speech in Uberlingen, they pointed to their charitable work as proof
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of their loyalty and dedication to the German fatherland.49
Many Badenese cities ceased to stage official celebrations during the 1890s 
and early 1900s, and only local veterans organizations continued to mark the 
anniversary o f the military victory. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, many 
veterans organizations abandoned the celebrations as well. There were many different 
reasons for this decline in the popularity o f the holiday. First and foremost, the failure 
o f the liberals to “produce any meaningful discourse about localness and nationhood.” 
created a national holiday that excluded much o f the national community.50 Also, the 
political and social changes during the last two decades o f the nineteenth century 
negatively affected the image of Sedan Day. During the 1890s, political Catholicism 
and social-democrats began to seriously challenge the stronghold o f political power 
that the national-liberals had been enjoying since the early 1860s. To be sure, the 
latter were able to retain more of their political power than in most other German 
states; however, they were often forced to enter into a variety of coalitions to remain 
the dominant party. Thus, the principal role that local notables had played in the 
shaping and forming o f the holiday was no longer in existence. The introduction of 
mass politics and the growing strength of the Social-Democratic Party produced a 
society in which the liberal Honoratioren’s view of German history and national 
identity did not correspond to reality. Beginning in the late 1880s, Protestant national- 
liberals could no longer attempt to monopolize the vision of German identity that they
49 Freie Stimme, September 14, 1889.
50 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 86.
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had tried to present during the Sedan Day celebrations.
Consequently, in 1897, the city council in Freiburg sent out a letter to councils 
o f other major Badenese cities asking whether Sedan Day was celebrated, and if  so, in 
which manner. Most councils replied that though they did not stage any official 
ceremonies, local veterans organizations organized small commemorations. However, 
several cities, most notably Mannheim and Karlsruhe, maintained that the day was not 
celebrated at all. As Germany became increasingly infused with nationalist sentiments 
during the first decade o f the twentieth century, Sedan Day drifted into obscurity. 
Despite the growing influence o f imperialism and colonialism, expansion of the 
German Navy, and the growth of nationalist organizations such as Alldeutscher 
Verein, Sedan Day failed to attract support. An illustrative example o f how 
insignificant this day had become is the conflict that broke out in Freiburg in 1913. 
During the previous years, the city council had organized a free concert in the 
Stadtgarten to commemorate the events of September 2. However, the organizers 
often had trouble attracting a respectable number o f spectators; in 1906, they 
contemplated abolishing the concert since the number of musicians often outnumbered 
the audience.51 In 1913, no celebration took place since the Stadtgarten was to be 
occupied by the local theater, which was staging a dress rehearsal of their latest 
production-Don Giovanni. Despite being asked by the city to move their dress 
rehearsal to a different place, the theater director refused, claiming that nobody cared
51 St. AF, C3/472/8, letter to city council, July 30, 1906.
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about Sedan Day anyway.
The exception to this trend o f decreasing interest in Sedan Day was the twenty- 
fifth anniversary in 1895. As we shall see later, this and the following year were 
characterized by more widespread support for war and unification celebrations, even 
from Catholics. In Heidelberg, for instance, both Protestants and Catholics 
participated in joint celebrations, which according to the local press signified how 
unified the German Empire had become. They made a special point to commend the 
city’s Catholics for electing to participate in the festivities. Local Catholic papers 
noted that though they still did not find it necessary to celebrate Sedan Day every year, 
they welcomed the opportunity to commemorate the more significant twenty-fifth 
anniversary o f the military victory. Liberals and Protestants praised Catholics for 
finally displaying proper respect for this momentous event. They also claimed that the 
fact that Catholics now elected to participate displayed that there were bonds to the 
fatherland that were simply impossible to neglect.53 Protestants and liberals compared 
this behavior with that o f the social-democrats, who still refused to partake. These 
sentiments only reinforce how arbitrarily groups were singled out as either supporters 
or enemies of the Reich. The group in charge o f organizing these events always 
sought to determine the ideological message that accompanied the celebrations, and 
depending upon other social, political, economic, or cultural factors, one or more
52 This correspondence can be found in St. AF, C3/472/8, letters to and from city council, August 18,
20, 22, 1913.
53 Heidelberger Zeitung, September 2, 1895.
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groups were often targeted as outsiders.
In the end, Sedan Day failed to serve as the integrating factor that the liberal 
and Protestant forces behind it had hoped. Instead o f uniting Germans around a single 
ideological message, the celebration offered Catholics and other marginalized groups 
opportunities to manifest their own view o f the unification process and the 
characteristics of the German nation. After a couple o f decades in which citizens 
fought over the true meaning of the commemoration, interest declined and even 
veterans organizations placed less emphasis on celebrating the victory over Napoleon 
III. However, it should be noted that though Sedan Day divided the population as 
much as it united, it contributed to an integration o f Catholics and social-democrats 
into the Empire. Although these groups did not subscribe to the notions inherent in 
the official commemorative discourse, their willingness to present publicly their own 
interpretation o f Germanness offered opportunities for integration into the complex 
German nation-state. Many previous scholars have neglected to consider the 
importance o f these manifestations for the construction o f German national identity.
An analysis o f Sedan Day indicates the need to slightly reevaluate how different 
groups in society accessed and employed nationalist rhetoric. Although Catholics 
were largely excluded from the official commemorative discourse, they were still able 
to utilize the debates surrounding these festivities to present their own view of German 
history, the war, and unification. In addition, by challenging many o f the Protestant 
and liberal claims, Catholics were in the end able to alter the official discourse so that 
it would better represent their own view o f Germanness.
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The Commemoration of Other Important Battles and Various Imperial Holidays
Naturally, Badeners did not only celebrate the military victory at Sedan, but 
other significant victories as well. In the middle o f January every year, Badeners 
organized and participated in the commemorations o f two historic events: the 
military victory at Belfort and the subsequent unification. As noted in the discussion 
regarding the construction o f the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, Badeners attached great 
importance to the victory at Belfort. They constructed a memory o f the last stages of 
the war that implied that had it not been for the heroic efforts o f the Badenese troops, 
Germans would not have achieved unification in such a glorious manner. Especially 
considering that Belfort was not a nationally celebrated holiday, Badeners organized a 
ceremony designed to strengthen their own position in the Second Empire by 
reinforcing the important role played by General Werder and his troops. The 
festivities remained similar throughout the years: parades, banquets, religious 
services, and school celebrations.54
Although the commemoration o f Belfort was primarily employed to strengthen 
Badeners local identity, liberals and Protestants also used it to question the 
Germanness o f Catholics. For instance, at a banquet in Konstanz in 1873, Colonel 
Kraus claimed that Badeners and Germans now had to unite in a similar fashion to the 
troops at Belfort to defeat the attacks from the anti-German elements that sought to 
make the new nation-state dependent upon Rome.55 In the midst o f the debates that
54 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 18, 1872.
55 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1873.
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were to lead up to the passing o f the May Laws, these comments should come as no 
surprise.56 The battle lent itself well to criticism of certain features o f German society. 
Many of the images conjured up in these commemorations referred to bravery, 
heroics, courage, and the need to fight for what is valuable, images that were all 
applied in the Kulturkampf. Contemporaries frequently used battle images in the 
commemorative discourse, a trend that was even more common in regards to the 
construction o f the victory at Belfort. These images were quite useful in launching 
attacks on Catholics and other supposedly antinational groups.
Faced with hostile rhetoric, Catholics largely ignored the commemorations of 
the victory. Although some Catholic associations participated in the festivities, most 
simply abstained from partaking in a celebration marked by often strong anti-Catholic 
sentiments. Although the anti-Catholic propaganda diminished as the Kulturkampf 
subsided, by that time, the commemoration o f Belfort had lost most o f its importance 
and no longer constituted a major event in local society. The diminishing importance 
attached to the celebration o f Belfort could also be interpreted as a sign that Badeners 
were becoming increasingly integrated into the German state. After the first decade, 
most Badeners no longer experienced an immediate need to manifest publicly the 
strength o f their own “narrow fatherland,” and while the victory at Belfort was always 
celebrated in a dignified manner, public participation steadily dwindled as the 
nineteenth century progressed.57 The ten-year anniversary o f the battle constitutes a
56 See for instance Badischer Beobachter, January 22, 1873.
57 See for instance the account in Freiburger Zeitung, January 18, 1881.
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useful illustration o f this trend. Although Freiburger Zeitung noted that the day had 
been commemorated in a worthy fashion, they did not offer any detailed description o f 
the festivities. In their brief report o f the day’s events, they also noted that only a few 
locals had heeded the suggestion from the city council to hoist their flags. After a few 
years o f limited popular participation, it soon became a day for veterans’ organizations 
and their families to remember the great battle. The relatively small importance o f the 
commemoration o f Belfort becomes even more obvious when compared to the debates 
surrounding the Sedan Day celebration. While the former was largely ignored by 
Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics alike, the latter triggered intense debates 
regarding the commemoration as well as the nature and character o f the German 
Empire.58
In addition to commemorations of military victories and the foundation of the 
Empire, imperial birthdays played a significant role in the commemorative discourse 
surrounding German unification. Although at first glance a celebration of the 
Emperor’s birthday does not seem to have anything to do with commemoration of the 
war and unification, a closer analysis of the discourse surrounding these events reveals 
that these occasions were indeed used to construct a memory of the unification 
process. Citizens not only used these birthdays to celebrate that the Emperor had 
become one year older but also to present their own view of the course o f German 
history and the Emperor’s role in it, and the new national identity, as well as 
contemporary political, cultural, and economic issues. Especially in the relative
58 Ibid. For a comparison, see for instance Freiburger Zeitung, September 1, 2, 3, 1881.
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turmoil that characterized the immediate postunification period, citizens attached great 
importance to these events. In addition to illustrating the popularity o f the Emperors, 
this also indicates how important public events and the developing public sphere were 
to the consolidation of the new national identity. Quite often, Badeners utilized public 
events seemingly unrelated to the founding o f the German Empire to construct a 
memory of the war that corresponded to their ideological beliefs.
Amid the plethora o f public ceremonies in the Second Empire, the Emperor’s 
birthday occupied a prominent place. Largely due to Wilhelm’s popularity among all 
Germans, his birthday was celebrated with fanfare each year. In Baden, the Emperor’s 
close connection to the well-liked Grand Duke Friedrich I only added to his 
popularity. Although Wilhelm did not visit Baden any more often than other parts of 
Germany, Badeners claimed that they had a closer relationship with him than other 
Germans did. As previously noted, Badenese Catholics held their Emperor in high 
esteem and did not blame him for the injustices that they suffered at the hands o f the 
German and Badenese governments. Catholics respected his religious devotion, and 
they often praised his engagement in religious questions. When addressing his role in 
the Kulturkampf, Catholics (at least publicly) assumed that he had not been supportive 
o f the many unjust laws passed and that Bismarck and Kultusminister Adalbert Falk 
kept him unaware o f the poor treatment o f Catholics.
Wilhelm never declared his birthday a national holiday and he refrained from 
promoting any official celebrations. This attitude did not necessarily stem from an 
unwillingness to mark his own birthday, but reflected Wilhelm’s fear that too many
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imperial celebrations would undermine his role as Prussian king. Despite no official 
endorsement, local communities staged extravagant ceremonies. The festivities 
followed a familiar pattern: cities were decorated, church bells rang, banquets held, 
and parades organized. A procession through the local community often constituted 
the central element of the holiday. In these parades, most local organizations and 
associations participated, irrespective o f their political or confessional views. Since 
the majority o f the members of these organizations belonged to the emerging 
bourgeoisie, they were able to place a bourgeois stamp on many o f the activities. 
Similar to how members o f the bourgeoisie used the construction of monuments to 
establish themselves in the local community, these parades aided the bourgeoisie in 
their struggle to control the public sphere and further advance their positions in 
society. Because o f the bourgeois dominance, it should come as no surprise that the 
Catholics played a relatively modest role in organizing these events. Aside from the 
obligatory church service, Catholics were not able to shape the official discourse to 
any great extent.
Despite the Emperor’s popularity, the Badenese celebrations of his birthday 
often failed to attract the desired number o f people. Naturally, the fact that the 
celebrations often took place on a weekday prevented many from participating. In 
addition, during the Kulturkampf, many Catholics and social-democrats boycotted the 
festivities. Although Catholics were keen to express their loyalty to Emperor, they 
often refrained from taking part in the celebrations, claiming that the Protestant and 
liberal insistence on using an official discourse that was dominated by anti-Catholic
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sentiments prevented them from participating. Catholics frequently complained that 
because o f the anti-Catholic rhetoric, they were unable to display properly their 
devotion and loyalty to the Emperor. Protestants often controlled city councils and 
were thus able to shape the festivities according to their own ideas, which frequently 
meant excluding Catholics. Thus, this constitutes another example o f Catholic 
alienation in the Kaiserreich that they had to overcome to integrate properly into the 
new nation-state.
Liberals and Protestants attempted to link Wilhelm’s Protestant faith to the 
recent string o f military and political successes, often praising him for restoring unity 
to a Germany divided since the Reformation. Speeches, newspaper articles, and 
pamphlets used the birthday celebration to revisit the events o f the war and once again 
commend Wilhelm for the determined manner in which he had dealt with the French 
archenemy. Many o f the speeches held at banquets and parades placed great emphasis 
on connecting the Protestant character o f Wilhelm to the recent military successes and 
the unification of the German people. Hence, the celebration of the Emperor’s 
birthday served as an additional means to commemorate the wars o f unification.
Much of the rhetoric centered on the Emperor’s leadership in solving the German 
question. Protestants and liberals often cited his courage in dealing with the French as 
one of the primary reasons why Germany was now unified and looking forward to a 
bright future. Newspapers often focused on the historical connection between 
Wilhelm and previous German Emperors, most notably Barbarossa. The linking of 
the current Emperor to his predecessor constituted an important part of the Protestant-
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liberal attempts to rewrite the course of German history to fit their teleological view o f 
the process o f unification.59
As noted above, Catholics were ambivalent in their attitudes towards this 
celebration. Although the majority stressed the importance of displaying their love for 
and devotion to the Emperor, many were hesitant about how to express these 
sentiments in a public sphere that was decidedly anti-Catholic. Although most 
Germans were caught up in a nationalist frenzy following the military victory and 
unification in 1871, relatively few Badeners elected to celebrate Wilhelm’s birthday 
only a few months later. The question o f which flag to hoist sometimes created a 
minor controversy. As already mentioned, anti-Prussian sentiments were strong 
among large parts o f the population, and then especially among Catholics, and many 
Badenese Catholics refused to display the Prussian flag. To counteract the prevalence 
o f Prussian symbols, numerous Badeners hoisted the yellow papal flag as well, which 
drew the ire of Protestants and liberals. The latter pointed out that to raise the papal 
flag on the Emperor’s birthday constituted a good indication o f where the loyalties of 
Badenese Catholics were located. This was yet another instance where Protestants and 
liberals failed to understand fully the complexities o f the Catholic version of 
Germanness, which encouraged the nourishing o f loyalties to both Berlin and Rome.
To the vast majority o f Catholics, the two were compatible, and the hoisting of a 
yellow flag on the Emperor’s birthday did not necessarily mean that one harbored anti- 
German sentiments. Much to the chagrin o f both the Grand Duke and Jolly, the
59 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, March 23, 26, 1871.
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celebrations on March 22 failed to attract what they considered an appropriate number 
o f people. They attached much significance to this celebration because it served as an 
indication o f how “German” Badeners were. Contemporaries often compared the 
celebrations in various states as indications o f their loyalty to the Emperor and his 
nation-state. To ensure proper participation, Grand Duke Friedrich in 1872 made an 
official decision that this father-in-law’s birthday would be officially celebrated in all 
major Badenese cities. In a letter from Jolly to Auxiliary Bishop Kiibel on March 11, 
1872, the minister requested that this year’s birthday be celebrated in a festive manner 
befitting a great personality such as Wilhelm.60
Kiibel was conciliatory in his response and decided that on the day preceding 
the celebration, church bells would be rung, followed by a special service the next day. 
This special service presented a dilemma for the clergy. Because Wilhelm’s birthday 
fell in late March, it often interfered with either Lent or Easter. Especially on the few 
occasions when Easter coincided with Wilhelm’s birthday, such as in 1875, heated 
discussions were held regarding whether to move the service honoring the Emperor.61 
This became an issue o f great importance as it forced Catholics to negotiate—in a most 
public manner—between their loyalty to the Emperor and their faith. In his directions 
to local clergy members, Kiibel ordered that a Te Deum be spoken at the conclusion of 
the service. Normally, Te Deum was not spoken during Lent, but due to the
60 EAF, B2-14/13. Kaiserliches und Grossherzogliches Haus: Geburtstagsfeier, letter from Jolly to 
Kiibel, March 11, 1872.
61 EAF, B2-14/13, letters between Jolly, Kiibel, and various congregations. It was finally decided to 
move the birthday service to March 20.
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“extraordinary character o f the day,” the auxiliary bishop made an exception. This 
was a much different attitude compared to the EO’s unwillingness to compromise 
when it came to events surrounding Sedan Day. However, during the next few years, 
it became evident that many clergy members did not share his view on this issue. In 
1876, Jolly complained to Kiibel about the fact that in both 1874 and 1875 several 
clergy members had excluded Te Deum from their service in honor o f the Emperor. 
Although they never stated that they had left out the Te Deum as a formal protest,
Jolly interpreted these actions as disloyal towards the Emperor. Considering the fact 
that most clergy members included the song “Heil unserer Grossherzog” as a 
replacement, it seems fairly certain that their actions were intended as a form of 
political protest. Their choice o f hymn also reveals something about how unwilling 
many Catholics were to accept the course of unification, at least initially. Declaring 
their loyalty to the Grand Duke on a day designed to honor the Emperor constituted a 
strong indication of their determination to maintain as much of their regional identity 
as possible. In addition, by declaring their loyalty to the Grand Duke, they had found 
a “safe” way o f protesting. Liberals and Protestants would be hard pressed to fault 
Catholics for lauding the virtues o f their local ruler. Even Kiibel was critical o f them 
and not only demanded an explanation for their behavior but also required that it never 
happen again, lest they were to suffer disciplinary action.62
Kiibel’s behavior in this matter is indicative o f the more appeasing manner in
62 EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Kiibel to Heilig, March 6, 1876.
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which he treated the events surrounding the Emperor’s birthday. The conciliatory 
attitude o f the Catholic leadership suggests that they were attempting to create a better 
relationship with the Badenese state, despite the fact that many o f the Kulturkampf 
laws were still in effect. They were also more inclined to cooperate with the state 
when it came to matters such as honoring the German Emperor, which did not seem to 
contain any threats towards the Catholic community. It is also interesting to note that 
despite the fact that the Catholic leadership attempted to improve the relationship with 
Protestants and the state, many Catholics in the local communities still complained 
about being mistreated and opposed the EO’s friendly attitude towards Jolly and the 
Badenese government. These disagreements are noteworthy because they provide 
glimpses into a Catholic milieu that does not match what many contemporaries and 
later historians considered to be a homogenized environment. Indeed, these 
complaints reveal that there were sometimes major discrepancies between what they 
EO deemed to be the right solution to a problem and what locals considered 
acceptable. This casts doubts on the common assumption that the Catholic masses 
were tools in the hands o f the high Catholic clergy and suggests that there were many 
more layers to the Catholic milieu than previously thought.
In 1883, clergy member Birk from the small town of Muhlheim outside 
Freiburg, lodged a grievance, accusing Kiibel of failing to protect the interest o f the 
Church in his dealings with the state. Although this complaint reached the EO after 
Kiibel had passed away and been replaced with Johann Baptist Orbin, these 
discussions provide interesting insights to the relationship between Catholics and
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Protestants a decade after unification. Birk was unhappy that in 1878 Kiibel had 
agreed to a suggestion from the Badenese government to hold a common service for 
both confessions on all political Feiertage. Although this was not a new concept 
(many Germans offered similar suggestions in conjunction with the debates 
surrounding Sedan Day), this constituted the first time that the Catholic Church had 
agreed to do it. The suggestion did not pertain to all citizens, only to state employees, 
who were supposed to set a good example for the rest o f the population. Joint services 
would alternate between Catholic and Protestant churches, and city councils were to 
determine in which church a particular service would be held. Birk admitted that in 
theory this was a good idea to improve the relationship between the two confessions; 
however, in reality, it only caused further discrimination against Catholics. The priest 
claimed that because Protestants dominated city councils, services were not altering 
between the churches. Since 1878, eight services had taken place in Protestant 
churches, while only two had been held in Catholic ones. In addition, Birk forwarded 
a number of complaints regarding Protestant behavior during the Catholic services. 
Birk cited a number o f instances where Protestants had to be removed from the 
ceremony because of their laughing, talking, and commenting upon various aspects of 
the service. Thus, he demanded that this idea should be abolished since it only served 
to increase tensions between Catholics and Protestants and reinforced the secondary 
status of Catholics as they were forced to comply with discriminatory measures from 
above.63
63 EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Birk to Orbin, August 1, 1883.
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Birk was not alone in finding it difficult to comply with policies aimed at 
furthering the confessional peace. In 1884, the EO received a similar letter from the 
local priest in Gemsbach. These complaints initiated the beginning o f a lengthy 
conflict that attracted much attention across the state during the 1880s. Initially, Orbin 
answered these grievances by referring to the importance of protecting the improved 
relationship between church and state that had accompanied the gradual dismantling of 
the Kulturkampf. However, Orbin’s attitude did not reflect adequately the feelings o f 
most Catholic civil service employees, who demanded that the law be repealed. 
Eventually, Orbin and his advisors realized how strongly many o f their fellow 
Catholics felt about this issue, especially since the last few political celebrations had 
taken place on a Sunday, forcing civil service employees to miss their regular service. 
Finally in 1886, the EO approached the government with a request to repeal the law.64 
After some debate, the latter decided that this law indeed had not had the desired 
effect and instead o f creating a more unified society had done the exact opposite. 
Consequently, on March 17, 1886, the Badenese government decided that all civil 
servants could attend the service of their own choice. This was an important decision 
as it reflected the newfound power o f the Catholics to alter decisions. Having drawn 
strength and determination from how they had managed to withstand the Kulturkampf, 
Catholics were increasingly able to influence and shape political and cultural matters. 
However, this controversy was not yet over. Apparently, some city councils did not 
follow these new directions and continued to designate a church in which a joint
64 EAF, B2-14/13, letter dated February 4, 1886.
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service would be held. Both in 1887 and 1889, the city council in Baden-Baden 
staged official celebrations and parades that ended at a designated church. Despite 
numerous protests from Catholics, they were forced to participate under the alleged 
threat o f losing their position if they did not comply. When approached by the 
government, the city council in Baden-Baden claimed that they had never forced 
anybody to attend a particular service and that the allegations from Catholics were 
false. The EO continued to press the government to make sure that these new rules 
were being enforced, and it was not until the beginning of the 1890s that things 
returned to normal.65
Wilhelm II and the Change in Official Commemorative Discourse
After the death of Wilhelm I in 1888 and the accession o f his grandson 
Wilhelm II, the character of the Emperor’s birthday celebrations changed quite 
drastically. These modifications were intimately connected to the different perception 
that Wilhelm II had of himself and his imperial status compared to his grandfather. 
While the latter had considered himself a part o f the German state and constitutional 
system, the former regarded his position to be God-given.66 Over time, this view came 
to permeate most aspects o f German society, and Wilhelm II placed strong emphasis 
on using his own birthday as a means o f spreading this message to unify his
65 EAF, B2-14/13.
66 For a good discussion of this difference, see Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Wandlungen des deutschen 
Kaisergedankens, 1871-1918 (Miinchen: Oldenbourg, 1969), 99-107.
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population. As we shall see, Catholics proved more receptive to the ideological 
message presented at these celebrations. One of the major reasons for this was the fact 
that the commemorative discourse surrounding Wilhelm II did not have the 
opportunity to link his birthday to the wars o f unification and the foundation o f the 
Second Empire to any great extent. Furthermore, as far as Catholics were concerned, 
the situation in the Reich had drastically improved since the abolishing o f the 
Kulturkampf, and since Wilhelm II had not had any experience with that or any 
discriminatory measures against the Catholics, they were much more prepared to 
participate in the annual celebrations.
One instance in which the new attitudes towards royal birthdays became 
clearly evident was the 1897 celebration of the centenary birthday o f Wilhelm I. 
Wilhelm II considered the 100th birthday as an excellent opportunity to further 
consolidate the myth o f Wilhelm I as the founding father of the German Empire.
Given the importance that the Emperor and others attached to this celebration, it 
should come as no surprise that it created a few controversies. On January 1, 1897, 
Wilhelm II announced that a three-day celebration would take place, starting on March 
21. The festivities would include religious services, banquets, parades, and a variety 
o f artistic performances. To underscore the importance of the events and to ensure 
proper participation, the Emperor declared these days public holidays. Reinforcing the 
pedagogical value o f this celebration, he also ordered schools to distribute some form 
of pamphlet to their students, highlighting the historical significance of Wilhelm I.67
67 Schneider, Politische Festkultur, 207-209.
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Although the type of pamphlet and/or gift varied, they all emphasized how Wilhelm I 
had made the well-being of the German nation his first priority, which was an attitude 
that should be emulated by the children o f the new generation. This was a lesson that 
elites constantly tried to reinforce when staging these events. According to the official 
discourse, citizens needed to be aware o f the supposedly self-less manner in which 
figures such as Wilhelm and Bismarck had lived their lives so that they could emulate 
these attitudes in their own lives. Germans should always prioritize the well-being o f 
the national community ahead o f their own individual well-being.
No other royal birthday celebration during the Second Empire attracted more 
participants. Contemporaries remarked that even the social-democrats, who normally 
were so hostile to any type o f patriotic celebration, elected to take part this time. 
Although many Badenese Catholics had previously boycotted the annual birthday 
celebrations, this time Catholic clergy and laity partook in the festivities. In many 
parts o f Germany, including Baden, this constituted the first occasion where the 
Catholic clergy actively joined in the civil celebrations outside their own services. 
Contemporaries labeled this to be very significant, and many argued that it proved that 
Germany was now truly a unified state.68 Although this claim might have been a little 
exaggerated, it still reflected the changes that had taken place during the last two 
decades. Despite the fact that Catholics were still not completely integrated into the 
Empire, they were able to play a much more active role in both the local and national 
community. Thus, contemporaries (and later historians) labeled the centenary
68 Ibid., 214-215.
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celebration one o f the most prominent public events o f the Kaiserreich. Heavily 
regulated from above, and with a strong emphasis on militaristic and nationalistic 
motives, the ideological message o f the celebrations fit well with the current domestic 
and international policies of Wilhelm II.
In Freiburg, the city council began planning in February 1897.69 Already from 
the outset, it was evident that the Catholic leadership would play an active role in both 
the preparation and execution of the events. When asked by the council in which 
fashion they wanted to participate, the EO replied that “...on this glorious day, we as 
true sons o f the fatherland want to thank publicly God for the great victories that he 
bestowed on our Emperor, and for granting us a unified German Empire, which God 
enabled our victorious Emperor to create.”70 This reply indicates that not only were 
Catholics now able to participate in the organization o f these events but also just how 
central the founding o f the Empire was to all sorts o f commemorative discourses and 
how determined Catholics were to include religious connotations into this celebration. 
The EO also decided that in addition to ringing the bells on the evening o f March 20, 
there would be a special service the following day.
In their descriptions o f the festivities, locals were proud o f the efforts of the 
Freiburger citizens. All accounts stressed how unified the city had appeared and how 
great it had been to witness people from different classes, parties, and confessions join
69 Information pertaining to this celebration can be found in St. AF, C3/466/2, Feier des 100 jahrigen 
Geburtstages Wilhelm I.
70 St. AF, C3/466/2, letter from EO to city council, February 25, 1897.
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to honor the founding father o f the Empire. Many of the houses in the city were 
decorated, and newspapers described in detail some of the more beautiful ones. A 
grand military parade, headed by the 113th Regiment, which had fought so valiantly in 
the Franco-Prussian War, worked its way through the city and ended in front of the 
military barracks on Karl’s square. Here the main speech was delivered by Professor 
Fabricius, who painted an eloquent picture o f the Emperor as the first German national 
hero. He repeatedly referred to Wilhelm as a character that should serve as an 
example for all Germans, young as well as old. Much of his speech focused on how 
united and powerful Germany had grown since 1871. Reflecting the developments in 
foreign policy and Germany’s entrance into the colonial race, his rhetoric manifested 
the shift towards the more militaristic and jingoistic nationalism that came to 
characterize the last decades o f the Empire.71 He also pointed out that in Berlin at that 
very moment, Wilhelm II was unveiling a grand monument to the honor o f Wilhelm I. 
His attempt to direct people’s attention to the monument in the capital illustrates how 
leading elites in the peripheral areas o f the state often tried to construct an imagined 
community by using the example of monuments and statues. Speakers often made 
references to similar celebrations in other cities in their attempts to create a 
homogeneous national community. By directing the attention of the Freiburger 
citizens to the grand design in Berlin, Fabricius sought to connect the southwestern 
comer o f the Empire with the capital.72
71 Ibid.
72 His speech was reprinted in its entirety in Freiburger Tagblatt, March 24, 1897.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
313
Although Freiburg Catholics participated fully in these events, they still 
offered some criticism of them, which reinforced the notion that though slowly 
integrating into the Reich, they maintained their own understanding of German 
identity. In the days immediately after the festivities, many Catholics complained that 
while most o f the celebrations had been very appropriate, they found the militaristic 
nature o f many of the ceremonies to be unfitting. They pointed out that originally, the 
military parade was scheduled to take place on the evening o f March 22, after the civil 
events. However, the city council altered these plans so that the military parade was 
held at the same time as the civil ceremony in the Festhalle. Catholics maintained that 
this was unfortunate for a variety o f reasons. First o f all, the military parade attracted 
a great number o f people who would normally have attended the Festhalle.
Freiburger Bote remarked that too many Germans became too excited at the prospect 
o f “straight lines o f military men and their shining weapons.”73 This was especially 
unfortunate since it deprived many people of the opportunity to listen to the excellent 
and highly patriotic speeches that were held in the Festhallle. Furthermore, in passing 
by the Festhalle, the military parade had blocked the entrance for a long time, which 
had also prevented people from attending the civil parts of the celebrations.74 A few 
days later, the city council replied in an open letter to the Catholic daily that though 
they were aware o f the conflict between the military and civilian events, the matter 
had been out o f their hands. The council claimed that they had received orders from
73 Freiburger Bote, March 24, 1897.
74 Ibid.
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Berlin that the military parade was to be held at the same time all throughout 
Germany, which left them with no choice but to have the two ceremonies overlap.
If celebrations in Konstanz and Freiburg proceeded without major problems, 
the events in Heidelberg caused greater controversy. In anticipation o f the upcoming 
festivities, the Catholic Pfalzer Bote published a lead article prior to the centenary in 
which they offered some stem criticism of the excess with which Germans celebrated
• 7S ■ •various events. The daily claimed that the true meaning of these celebrations had 
long been forgotten, and people were only interested in enjoying themselves and/or 
making a profit on the various events. In addition, the rhetoric used at the festivities 
had become so exaggerated that nobody really knew the true meaning o f these 
bombastic words. As a consequence, it had became increasingly difficult to honor 
respectable men such as the late Emperor, simply because there was no suitable 
discourse at hand. Furthermore, the abundance o f celebrations indicates that Germans 
had forgotten what made both Prussia and the rest o f the country so great: the simple 
life, hard work, and piety. Catholics often voiced these and similar sentiments in their 
attempts to reappropriate the commemorative discourse from liberals and others who 
had mined it with their inflated rhetoric, which depleted the discourse o f true meaning.
The paper also complained that though the accusations o f treason and 
disloyalty towards the fatherland had decreased during the last few years, it was still 
quite difficult to offer any sort o f criticism of these festivities.76 Dissatisfied that
75 Pfalzer Bote, March 18, 1897.
76 Ibid.
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Catholics did not feel part of the discourse, the paper also noted that the celebration 
brought back bad memories from times when Badenese Catholics were not accepted 
as worthy members o f the German nation. To reinforce their arguments, they 
recounted the story o f Pater Clemens Faller, one o f the most prolific and active Jesuits 
at the outset o f the German Empire. Pfalzer Bote listed all o f his great achievements, 
including founding a number o f schools and seminaries, and his heroic efforts in the 
Franco-Prussian War as a doctor. However, instead o f being honored, the May Laws 
forced him to flee his fatherland. He eventually ended up in South America, where he 
played important roles in a number o f countries. By retelling the tragic story o f Faller, 
the paper illustrated that brave, courageous, and able men such as he deserved better 
treatment from the fatherland that they had served so valiantly. Catholics often used 
this line o f reasoning to illustrate how severely Protestants and liberals had damaged 
the national community by depriving it of such capable and talented men. These ideas 
assumed increasing importance as the nationalist rhetoric grew increasingly hostile 
towards the foreign Other, which most often was portrayed as a Slavic threat to the 
national community.
During the celebrations, Catholics were both directly and indirectly targeted. 
Prof. Schafer delivered the main speech, in which he made a number o f false 
statements regarding the role o f the Catholics in the unification process.77 Catholics 
criticized the professor for not being able to abstain from party politics on this day of 
supposed national unity. They claimed that his speech reflected how determined
77 Pfalzer Bote, March 24, 1897.
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liberals and Protestants still were to exclude Catholics from the public discourse.
Many Catholic papers also tied these attacks to the current domestic political crisis.
The centenary celebration came in the midst o f the debates over the Tirpitz Navy bills, 
and many Catholics suspected that the celebration was being used to rally nationalist 
sentiments, which in turn would increase the support for the naval bills.78 Catholics 
openly questioned the liberal and Protestant claims that Germany was facing a serious 
foreign policy crisis. The latter also attempted to divide the German nation by 
labeling the opponents o f the naval bills “unpatriotic.” Catholics, though the Center 
Party had been one o f the supporters o f this bill, still resented the practice o f excluding 
parts o f the population from the national community. The memory o f the Kulturkampf 
was still strong in the Catholic community, and most resented the use o f public 
festivities such as the centenary celebration to strengthen a political agenda.
Despite the fact that controversies emerged on occasion in conjunction with the 
Emperor’s birthday, most often Catholics and Protestants were able to, if  not jointly, at 
least side by side, celebrate their Emperor. These ceremonies proved to be o f great 
importance to Catholics as they were able to use these occasions to participate actively 
in the construction o f a commemorative discourse. Although this discourse did not 
specifically address war and unification, these themes were ever present, and Catholic 
participation in the shaping of these events provided them a means to integrate into the 
new national state on their own conditions.
78 See for instance Pfalzer Bote, March 24, 28, 1897.
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Celebrations of the Grand Duke’s Birthdays
To an even greater extent than the celebrations o f Emperor Wilhelm’s 
birthday, Badenese Catholics willingly participated in the festivities surrounding 
Grand Duke Friedrich’s birthday. Although both a Protestant and a staunch liberal, 
Friedrich enjoyed great acceptance among Badenese Catholics. Most of the time, the 
birthday celebrations followed a similar pattern to the ones staged for the Emperor, 
including parades, religious services, and banquets.79 The only time in which they 
caused some controversy was during the most intense stages o f the Kulturkampf As 
was the case with the discourse surrounding the construction of the Siegesdenkmal in 
Freiburg, Badenese Catholics tended to be more accepting o f the official discourse 
when it stressed the value o f the regional and local over the national, which was the 
case with most o f the celebrations honoring Friedrich I. Although he had been a 
strong supporter o f the kleindeutsche solution to the German question and actively 
strove to promote and support the policies o f the same national-liberal government 
that staged one of the fiercest Kulturkampfe in Germany, Catholics seldom engaged in 
any criticism of his rule. In a similar fashion to the reluctance to criticize the 
Emperor, Catholics were keen to display their love and devotion to their Grand Duke. 
This was not only because of their sincere love for him but also because they could 
use him as a means of integration into the Empire. By associating themselves with 
Friedrich and his actions during the process o f unification, though the overwhelming
79 For descriptions of the planning o f these events, see for instance St. AK, S II 7201, Grossherzogliches 
Haus. Veranstaltung von Festlichkeiten zu Ehren seiner Koniglichen Hoheit des Grossherzogs. 1849-
78. For aspects involving the Catholic Church, see EAF, B2-14/13.
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majority of Catholics had opposed his policies, Catholics attempted to highlight their 
own importance in the unification process. As has already been evident, this view did 
not accurately represent reality and was more representative o f Catholic attempts to 
rewrite history.
Despite the fact that most birthday celebrations proceeded without major 
problems and/or controversies, exceptions existed. For instance, in Freiburg in 1873, 
liberals and Protestants used the Grand Duke’s birthday to add to the current 
controversies surrounding Sedan Day and the emergence of the Old Catholic 
Movement. Although liberals and Protestants both agreed that the birthday was 
usually celebrated in a dignified manner, this year recent events had produced some 
complications for the upcoming festivities. The Protestant-liberal Freiburger Zeitung 
claimed that in the past, though Catholic clergy had participated in the special services
designed to honor the Grand Duke, they had always done so reluctantly and with
80“hatred burning in their eyes.” According to liberals and Protestants, it was clearly 
evident that Catholic clergy members harbored little love for the Grand Duke and that 
they were only interested in undermining Friedrich’s position. They offered some 
scathing criticism of Kiibel and his associates, who were allegedly attempting to ruin 
the German national character and the Badenese state. The paper did not mince 
words, claiming that the Catholics who supported the doctrine of papal infallibility 
were allied with the devil and trying to bring about the ruin of humankind.81
80 Freiburger Zeitung, September 9, 1873.
81 Ibid.
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Consequently, the paper argued, most Freiburgers had been dissatisfied with these 
services and had long been searching for more dignified alternatives. Until this year, 
no such alternative had existed; however, with the foundation o f the Old Catholic 
Church, Freiburgers could once again honor their Grand Duke in an appropriate 
manner. The paper welcomed Bishop Josef Reinkens, the most prominent Badenese 
Old Catholic clergy member, to the city. Freiburger Zeitung stressed that Bishop 
Reinkens had only decided to come to Freiburg to provide the city’s Catholics with an 
opportunity to partake in a religious service that would not be directed against the 
Grand Duke and his state. Since this celebration took place in close proximity to the 
Old Catholic congress in Konstanz, the daily hoped that Reinken’s visit would 
jumpstart the Old Catholic community in the city.
Despite a few of these instances in which Protestants and liberals utilized the 
birthday o f the Grand Duke to exclude Catholics from the local, regional, and national 
community, the latter were most often able to participate fully in these celebrations. 
Furthermore, since this was one o f the few public celebrations that remained relatively 
free from hostile rhetoric, many Catholics used it as a means o f integrating into the 
German Empire. The figure o f the Grand Duke was especially suitable for this 
purpose. In addition to being the son-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm, he had also played 
an important role in the unification process. Despite the fact that the vast majority of 
Catholics had opposed the philo-prussian policies o f Friedrich in the pre-1871 period, 
they praised his activities in the post-unification Empire. They often referred to him 
as “Friedrich the German,” and it was clear that they attempted to use their love and
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devotion to him as a means o f proving their Germanness. Although most regular 
birthday celebrations contained relatively few references to the events during the 
1860s, the celebration o f major birthdays such as his sixtieth and seventieth were 
littered with references to his important role not only as a ruler o f Baden but also as a 
man who cared deeply about all Germans.
The image o f the Grand Duke was an important tool for all Badeners in their 
attempts to negotiate regional and national identities in the postunification period. As 
has been evident, citizens attempted to protect and preserve as much as possible of 
their local and regional identities while still portraying themselves as Germans. In the 
instances where regional and national identities competed for the loyalties of 
Badeners, less internal strife existed between Catholics and Protestants. Although 
both camps used Friedrich on occasion as a tool in their struggle with each other, the 
constructed image o f the Grand Duke remained fairly homogeneous. Catholics often 
remarked that though a Protestant and a liberal, he had been able to make room for the 
Catholics in his state, which was not something that all state rulers had accomplished.
Additional Catholic Displays of Their National Identity
As we have already seen in conjunction with various celebrations o f papal 
anniversaries, Catholic congresses, and the activities o f Catholic associations and 
organizations, Badenese Catholics strove actively to counter the official discourse 
surrounding the wars o f unification. We have already discussed how they used papal 
anniversaries and similar events to display publicly their own understanding of
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Germanness. In a similar fashion to how the birthdays o f emperors and grand dukes 
were utilized not only to honor them but also to celebrate the founding o f the Second 
Empire, Catholics often used purely religious celebrations as means o f demonstrating 
their status as Germans. One o f the more controversial religious celebrations during 
the Second Empire was the Fronleichnahmsfest (Corpus Christi Celebration). The 
Protestant and liberal attempts to curtail the celebration triggered intense Catholic 
protests, and many o f these debates offer insights into how Catholics viewed 
themselves and their place in the German nation-state.
The Corpus Christi Celebration had been part o f the Catholic festive calendar 
since a 1264 decree by Pope Urban IV declared that a procession would be held in 
which the consecrated bread would be paraded through city streets and admired by 
people as the body o f Christ. Thus, the Corpus Christi ceremony is a public 
celebration o f the Holy Communion. Given its public nature and the increasing 
importance o f controlling public space, Catholics attached great importance to this 
event. In Freiburg, for instance, following the resumption o f the festivities after the 
Napoleonic Wars, the celebration developed into one o f the major events o f the year. 
Taking place sometime between late May and mid-June, it often brought thousands of 
people into the streets to witness the extravagant processions. When the Catholic 
Church underwent a revival during the mid-nineteenth century, the Corpus Christi 
Celebration became one o f the most important ways o f showcasing the increasing 
strength o f the Church.82 At the same time, as the confessional tensions in Baden
82 Eva Kimmich, Prozessionsteufel, Herrgottmaschinen und Hakenkreuzflaggen. Zur Geschichte des
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increased, the opposition from Protestants and liberals to this celebration grew 
steadily. The latter frequently attempted to disturb the festivities, and physical
0 -5
confrontations were not uncommon.
As the nineteenth century progressed, Catholics began to change their view of 
the CCC. Although they still placed most o f their emphasis on the religious aspect of 
the celebration, it became increasingly evident that many Catholics viewed this event 
as an opportunity to display publicly that despite all o f the injustices done unto them, 
the Catholic community was growing in strength. Although these festivities and 
rituals did not directly address issues o f war commemoration and/or national politics, 
they still served as an important means o f establishing a Catholic presence in the 
public sphere. For one day, Catholics completely dominated the urban landscape.
They often approached city councils with requests to ensure their safety during the 
parades, and they also tried to convince cities to pay for the decorations of houses 
throughout the cities.84 The conflicts with Protestants illustrate how seriously 
contemporaries treated these events. In a similar fashion to the General Assembly of 
Catholics and the many papal anniversaries, Catholic showcasing of their identity 
further assisted their integration into Baden and the Kaiserreich. To them, these 
processions offered an opportunity to ritually confirm their roles in the community. 
Protestants, on the other hand, viewed them as an attempt to reintroduce religious
Fronleichnamsfestes in Freiburg und Baden (Freiburg: Schillinger Verlag, 1983), 26.
83 Ibid., 37-38.
84 For some o f these complaints and requests, see EAF, B2-16/6, Disziplin. Dekanatsberichet iiber die 
Feier des Fronleichnamsfestes.
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fanaticism.85
The four hundredth anniversary o f Martin Luther’s birthday was another 
religious commemoration that created great debate among both Catholics and 
Protestants and further radicalized their arguments about the nature o f German history 
and national identity. As has been evident throughout our discussions, Luther and the 
Protestant Reformation played an important role in German commemorations of the 
wars o f unification and the construction o f a national identity. Especially with regards 
to unification, Protestants frequently noted that the German nation was reunited for the 
first time since the Reformation. To most Protestants, Luther was not only celebrated 
as a religious reformer but also as a national hero who rid the German nation o f the 
evils spread by the Roman papacy. According to the official discourse, the true 
German national spirit had only survived the Reformation in the Protestant parts o f the 
country, while Catholics had nurtured a spirit alien to the German character. Thus, the 
Protestants turned their cause into one o f national significance, and to them, Luther 
was the most German of Germans (der Deutschesten der Deutschen). To celebrate 
and honor Luther became equivalent of celebrating and honoring what was truly 
German. Most o f the celebrations in 1883 ended with singing o f the Deutschlandslied, 
which reinforced the connection between Luther and the German national identity.86
83 Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 100-101.
86 For an introduction to the relationship between Luther and the German nation see Johannes 
Burkhardt, “Reformations- und Lutherfeiem. Die Verbiirgerlichung der reformatorischen 
Jubilaumskultur,” in Offentliche Festkultur, eds. Dtiding, Friedemann, and Munch, 212-236, and 
Hartmut Lehmann, “Martin Luther als deutscher Nationalheld im 19. Jahrhundert,” Luther. Zeitschrift 
der Luthergesellschaft 55 (1984): 53-65.
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Naturally, Catholics disagreed with these ideas, claiming that it was only because of 
Luther’s heresies that the German nation had suffered for so long. If not for Luther’s 
division o f the Church, Germany would have remained unified and strong and would 
had dominated European politics. In the wake o f unification, as Germans used their 
history as one o f the building blocks for their national identity, the controversies over 
Luther assumed great significance. This celebration served as an important 
opportunity for Protestants to try to rewrite history to lit their own notion o f German 
history. Protestants were especially keen to connect Luther and the Reformation to the 
idea of progress. As we have seen on a number o f occasions, Protestants always 
portrayed themselves as the bearer o f progress while stressing the need to limit 
Catholic influence in the Second Empire lest Germany be left behind in the 
development o f a modernized society. Thus, many speakers claimed that not only 
would Luther have been very happy about the rebirth of the Protestant Empire, but he 
would also have welcomed the Protestant liberal advances in the realm of 
industrialization.
Throughout Germany and Baden in 1883, citizens placed great efforts into the 
planning o f the 400th anniversary of Luther’s birthday. Protestants organized a variety 
o f parades, banquets, and religious services. Many viewed this as an excellent 
opportunity to upend the Catholic celebrations of various papal anniversaries.
Because of the magnitude of this event, the Catholic and Protestant communities 
engaged in fierce debates regarding Luther and the character o f the German national 
identity. Although at first glance, these debates might seem to pertain to Luther only,
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a closer examination reveal that they grappled with more fundamental issues about 
who constituted the driving forces in the nation-building project. In Konstanz, Freie 
Stimme dedicated several lead articles to the celebrations, rebutting many o f the 
accusations against the Catholic Church that surfaced in conjunction with these 
debates. In a similar fashion to events such as Sedan Day, Catholics, though naturally 
excluded from the celebratory discourse, were able to use the controversies 
surrounding these events to present their own view of German history and their own 
understanding of Germanness. Although the end of the 1870s and the beginning o f the 
1880s had witnessed an easing of the Kulturkampf in Baden, relations between the two 
confessions remained strained. Confessional conflicts still dominated local society, 
and an event such as the Luther celebration triggered an intensification of current 
conflicts. In many cities, the Protestant request to stage public celebrations caused 
great controversy. Catholics strongly opposed this idea, arguing while it was 
acceptable for Protestants to hold religious services, Luther was not deserving of 
public celebrations. Simply put, he had caused too many Germans too much pain. 
While Catholics maintained that only Protestants wanted to honor Luther, the latter 
claimed that because o f his status as a national hero, Germans o f all confessions would 
come out into the streets.
Catholics offered several arguments why Luther should not be celebrated as a 
German national hero, highlighting the difference between the Catholic and Protestant 
views of history. Catholics pointed out that despite the Protestant claim that Luther 
had accomplished so much for the German nation, history did not support their
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arguments. On the contrary, the centuries following Luther’s death had been 
characterized by a very poor German cultural and artistic life. Indeed, during this 
time, French literature and culture dominated German society, a fact that did not speak 
well o f the influence of the religious reformer. Consequently, from a national
• 87standpoint, the period after the Reformation must be considered a negative one. 
Catholics also reminded Protestants that Luther had revolted against his Emperor, 
which should not be celebrated as a memorable deed. If someone were to take similar 
action today, Protestants and liberals would be the first ones to demand the 
imprisonment and/or execution of this traitor. Catholics further questioned how 
Protestants could honor Luther’s rebellion against the Emperor while at the same time 
condemning Catholic passive resistance against the May Laws.
Catholics also criticized Protestants for returning to rhetoric and action of the 
Kulturkampf when planning these events. They remarked that this was an unfortunate 
development, especially since conditions for Catholics in Baden had slightly improved 
during the last few years. Now this celebration threatened to reverse these positive 
developments and relaunch the Kulturkampf. Catholics used this argument to prove 
that Protestants were not at all interested in consolidating national unity but were 
instead still trying to exclude Catholics from the national community.88 Indeed, many 
Catholics labeled the two-day celebration “days o f sorrow and pain.”89 They
87 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 6, 1883.
88 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 8, 10, 1883.
89 Freie Stimme, November 10, 1883.
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questioned the Protestant understanding o f patriotism since it was clearly evident that 
the Reformation had caused such great problems for Germans. Catholics portrayed 
themselves as better Christians, who would pray for their lost brothers, who failed to 
understand properly the true meaning of patriotism. This conciliatory approach to the 
conflict provided Catholics with the opportunity to present themselves as benevolent 
and good Germans who would be patient with the mistakes o f their fellow
90countrymen.
An analysis o f the articles published by both Protestant and liberal papers 
reveals that most of their efforts were spent on discussing Luther’s role as a national 
figure and not his religious teachings. To be sure, Catholics outlined what they 
considered the most severe flaws in Luther’s theories, but that really constituted a 
minor part o f all the material published. Instead, they tirelessly debated Luther’s role 
as a German national hero. Despite the Catholic resistance to the celebrations, 
throughout Baden most events were staged without any major problems. Although a 
few minor altercations were reported, the majority o f events proceeded as planned. In 
the end, Catholics simply decided to stay home and ignore the festivities, much in the 
same manner as most Protestants behaved during the papal celebrations.
As has been evident throughout this chapter, Badenese Catholics were able to 
shape much o f the commemorative discourse during the Kaiserreich. Their fierce 
opposition to Sedan Day illustrates not only their determination to be included in the 
new national identity, but it also depicts their readiness to use the emerging Catholic 
90 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 13, 1883.
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press to combat the propaganda against them. Indeed, the Catholics that emerge in the 
wake o f the struggles surrounding Sedan Day represent members o f a community that 
were determined to integrate into the new Empire on their own terms. The debates 
surrounding Sedan Day also illustrate how contested the creation o f the German 
national identity was. While many Protestants were able to celebrate annually the 
capture o f Napoleon III as evidence o f the strength o f the German nation, many 
Catholics traced the origins o f the Kulturkampf back to those days in the early part of 
September 1870. Although there were certainly other reasons besides Catholic 
resistance involved in the demise of this public holiday, no other factor played such an 
important role. Both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed Sedan Day as a 
vehicle to propagate the Kulturkampf measures, which was one o f the many reasons 
why the celebration became so contested. The fact that the celebration ultimately 
failed indicates not only that Catholics were successful in maintaining their own view 
o f national identity but also that Catholics and Protestants used nationalist vocabulary 
to debate their differences in society. Thus, nationalist sentiments did not only unify 
but at times served to divide the nation, which was certainly the case during Sedan 
Day. The Catholic success in repelling the accusations o f anti-Germanness and 
treason, in addition to the increasing political success of the Catholics, enabled 
members of the Catholic community to shape the formation of the public sphere, 
something that became highly evident in their celebrations o f the Corpus Christi 
Celebration. Catholics utilized these parades to manifest both their religious and civic 
identity as Germans. Furthermore, the fact that Catholics in all three cities under
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investigation opposed Sedan Day also indicates that their opposition aided them in 
creating a more cohesive society. Although our analysis indicated some differences in 
how Catholics in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg viewed unification, the fact that 
all of them opposed Sedan Day suggests that events such as these served to smooth out 
some of the differences and made for a stronger sense of Catholic identity, though 
there o f course still existed certain differences within this community.
Catholic participation in the celebrations o f imperial birthdays also testify to 
their ability to participate in the local commemorative discourse without 
compromising their own understanding o f Germanness. Indeed, the celebrations of 
the Emperor’s birthday offered Badenese Catholics in all three cities an excellent 
opportunity to presents themselves as loyal subjects and true Germans. Despite 
having to endure some hostile rhetoric at these events, Catholics were able to manifest 
their dedication to the newly formed nation-states. However, our discussions also 
revealed that not all members of the Catholic community agreed with the conciliatory 
policy that the EO adopted towards these celebrations. These instances o f dissonance 
suggest that the Catholic milieu was much more complicated and heterogeneous than 
both contemporaries and many later historians have assumed. As will become evident 
in the next chapter’s discussion regarding some o f the nation-building projects that 
Catholics initiated and supported during the last decade of the Kaiserreich, the 
Catholic community was often quite divided on how to approach these issues once the 
immediate threat o f the Kulturkampf laws had been removed. During the 1870s, and 
to a certain extent the 1880s, the great majority o f the Catholic community had been
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highly unified due to their common opposition to the Kulturkampf. However, once 
that immediate threat was removed, some Catholics disagreed on how to protect and 
further their own interest. In the next chapter we will trace how the more established 
role o f Badenese Catholics affected their integration into the new national identity.
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CHAPTER 7
REACHING AN UNEASY CONSENSUS: CATHOLIC VIEWS OF THE 
UNIFICATION DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES PRIOR TO THE GREAT
WAR
As we saw in the last chapter, the status o f Badenese Catholics was changing 
towards the end o f the nineteenth century. Although they remained socially, 
culturally, politically, and economically disadvantaged, there were increasing signs 
that the state’s Catholics were beginning to integrate successfully into both their 
regional milieu and the German nation-state. Especially after the reconstitution o f the 
Catholic People’s Party as the Badenese Center Party in 1888, Catholics played a 
prominent role in Badenese politics and society. Throughout the Kaiserreich, the 
Badenese Center Party was one of the strongest political groupings, thus enhancing the 
status o f its constituency. Their increased political strength, coupled with a strong 
Catholic presence in the colonial movement and a growing associational life, enabled 
Baden’s Catholics to escape the status o f second-class citizens.
This chapter traces how Catholics viewed and helped shape the changing 
commemorative discourse surrounding the unification o f the Kaiserreich during the 
final two decades o f the Second Empire. Although contemporaries agreed that 
Catholics were becoming more “German,” in many cases their view of Germaneness 
still conflicted with the state-sponsored version. This tension was most evident in the
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commemorations of former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The debates concerning 
the old statesman underscored that though Germany was now many years removed 
from the Kulturkampf, many of Baden’s Catholics were still uneasy about Bismarck’s 
role in these events. Analysis o f how Catholics viewed the widespread construction of 
Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm monuments that took place in Baden and the rest of 
Germany at the fin de siecle will illuminate their attitudes towards the founding fathers 
o f the Empire. Although not directly connected to the unification, these projects are 
still relevant as most o f the ideological messages connected to these celebrations 
centered on the process surrounding unification. Badenese Catholics approached these 
celebratory efforts with greater enthusiasm than previously. However, despite the 
increased acceptance o f and inclusion in the official commemorative discourse, 
Catholics still struggled to reconcile with parts o f it. Although they were now better 
able to shape this discourse to suit their own view of the last twenty-five years, they 
were still reluctant to accept parts o f the official discourse. Celebrations were held 
throughout Baden in 1895 in conjunction with Sedan Day and in January 1896 to 
commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the founding o f the Empire. As was 
seen in the last chapter, though initially controversial, celebrations o f Sedan Day had 
become inconsequential during the last decade. In anticipation o f the twenty-fifth 
anniversary, however, Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg all organized large 
celebrations. In contrast to earlier celebrations, in 1895, Catholics and Protestants 
both actively participated in remembering the events of 1870. Celebrations followed a 
similar pattern around the state as organizers attempted to include the entire
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population in the festivities.
Celebrating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of War and Unification
On September 2, cannons were fired in Freiburg at 6 o ’clock in the morning to 
remind people o f the events of a quarter century before. During the morning, the three 
major confessions held celebratory church services, in which clergy asked citizens to 
remember and honor the sacrifices made by their fellow Germans. From the outset of 
these celebrations, it was evident that most of the commemorative discourse centered 
on the efforts o f the Badenese soldiers and their efforts in the Franco-Prussian War. 
Following the services, the city council staged a parade of the city’s dignitaries and 
surviving veterans from the city center to the Siegesdenkmal and then to the graveyard 
where veterans placed wreaths on both German and French graves. Newspapers 
reported that it was nice to see that the French victims were remembered as well, yet 
another indication o f the noble German spirit.1 It is evident from the speeches at the 
cemetery that this celebration was different from many others during the first few 
decades o f the Kaiserreich. In other commemorations, speakers not only praised the 
efforts o f the German soldiers, but they also stressed how much Germans had 
accomplished since unification. Often, this part o f the commemorative discourse 
became the most contested because citizens had different memories o f the first few 
years o f the Second Empire. For the state’s Catholics, the recommencement o f the 
Kulturkampf meant that the immediate postunification years did not have the same
1 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, September 3, 1895.
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positive connotation as it had for many Protestants and liberals. But, since most o f the 
speeches ignored the postunification years, it was easier for the state’s Catholics to 
participate in these festivities.
Following the ceremony at the cemetery, participants paraded to city hall 
where the celebration continued with a banquet. The city orchestra initiated the 
celebrations with a rendition of “Hymn to the Honor o f the German Empire,” which 
according to newspapers set the tone for the rest o f the celebration. Mayor Winterer 
gave the plenary speech in which he praised the efforts o f the local veterans. He also 
noted that today’s generation should follow the veterans’ example. Instead of being 
satisfied with Baden and Germany’s progress during the last twenty-five years, locals 
must remain pious, hard-working, and disciplined to honor the veterans’ sacrifices.2 
This was not an uncommon theme when cities honored the efforts o f war veterans. 
Many members o f the war generation believed that younger Germans simply took 
Germany’s strength and unity for granted. However, for Germany to continue to grow 
stronger and more powerful, the spirit o f 1870-1871 had to be at the forefront o f the 
German consciousness.
Despite the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, Catholics in Freiburg 
participated in these events. Freiburger Bote labeled the celebration one o f the best 
ever in the city, and there was no trace of Kulturkampf rhetoric during these events.
To be sure, the fact that the speeches held during these ceremonies centered on the 
efforts o f the local soldiers made the celebration much easier to support for local
2 See for instance Freiburger Bote, September 3, 1895. For information in regards to the planning of 
these events, see also St. AF, Cl/Festlichkeiten/lB/8.
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Catholics. The Catholics’ unconditional acceptance of the commemorative discourse 
surrounding such an important event as the foundation o f the Reich certainly indicates 
that they were much more integrated in the Empire than had been the case just a few 
years earlier. As will become evident later in this chapter, much o f this integration 
was due to their increased political strength, as well as an increasingly strong 
associational life, which enabled increasing Catholic participation in the shaping of 
local and national society.
Local veterans were honored in similar ceremonies in Konstanz and 
Heidelberg. Veterans in Baden paraded through their communities and attended 
speeches lauding them for their sacrifices to the German fatherland. The city council 
in Konstanz also provided the veterans with a commemorative plaque, which thanked 
them for their efforts during the unification process. The plaque noted that if  not for 
these select individuals, Germany would not be as unified and strong today.3 As 
another means o f ensuring that these events were remembered properly, cities also 
published accounts of the events of 1870-1871. In Freiburg, the local history 
professor Franz Albert chronicled the great efforts of the Badenese soldiers. In his 
book, he once again stressed the proximity o f Freiburg to the French border and how 
grateful all citizens should be towards the soldiers who had so valiantly protected the 
Badenese fatherland.4 Before the anniversary, city councils had stressed how 
important it would be to honor the veterans in a worthy manner. For the most part,
3 Ibid.
4 The booklet can be found in St. AF, Cl/Festlichkeiten/lB/8.
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veterans led an anonymous existence in their towns, and leading politicians now noted 
how important it would be to ensure that locals were aware o f their existence and what 
they had accomplished for their local and national communities.5 Judging from this 
correspondence, it is evident that public officials experienced a need to remind their 
constituencies that the veterans’ efforts must not be forgotten. In addition, by 
stressing the veterans’ great character, they would be able to use these men as models 
for today’s generation. Hence, they deemed it important to ensure that the veterans 
were given a prominent place in these celebrations.
During the fall o f 1895, both the Catholic and Protestant press ran series o f 
articles recalling the events o f 1870. Especially in conjunction with Sedan Day, 
newspapers published descriptions of the most important battles as well as lists o f the 
Badeners who had died while serving their fatherland.6 Pfalzer Bote published a 
series o f articles entitled “The German Soldier in War” in which they portrayed him as 
more courageous, pious, and skilled than his French counterpart. In these articles, 
they also reprinted a telegram that Wilhelm I had sent to Bismarck, in which he stated 
that once Germany had become unified, it would be very important for citizens to 
honor these events by constructing different kinds o f monuments. These monuments 
would serve as means o f integration for Germans and would also ensure that Germans 
never forget the sacrifices that these men had done in the service of Germany.7
5 St. AK, S II 5375, letter from the city council o f Konstanz to the one in Pforzheim, July 22, 1895.
6 See for instance Pfalzer Bote, September 6, 1895.
1 Pfalzer Bote, September 10, 1895.
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Although Protestants and Catholics displayed remarkable unity in celebrating 
the events surrounding Sedan Day, and though these celebrations reflected increased 
Catholic integration into the Second German Empire, Catholics also had a different set 
o f memories from those days in 1870. To be sure, Catholics and Protestants both 
agreed in their assessment of the events o f the Franco-Prussian War, but in 1895, 
Catholics again lamented the fate o f Pope Pius IX in 1870. During the Franco- 
Prussian War, Catholics had been very concerned about the fate o f the Pope as French 
forces left Rome to fight the Germans. These sentiments had caused much strife with 
the Protestants both during the conflict with France as well as in the immediate post- 
unification period. Often, Protestants cited these sentiments as proof that Catholics 
were not true Germans and that their Heimat was Rome rather than Baden. As the 
twenty-fifth anniversary o f the sequestering o f the Pope to the Vatican approached, 
Catholics focused much of their attention on this anniversary.
On September 19, the lead article in Pfalzer Bote condemned Italians for 
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary o f what the latter labeled their true unification. 
The title o f the article, “The Italian Robbery,” reflected the Catholic view of these 
events. The paper noted that it was evident that Italians failed to understand properly 
what constituted patriotism. Italians now claimed that the removal o f the Pope had 
constituted an act o f nationalism, which had strengthened Italy. Catholics accused 
Italians o f distorting history and misunderstanding the proper meaning of nationalism. 
Catholics argued that diminishing the power of the Pope should never be celebrated as 
a nationalistic deed. Thus, it was evident that Italians were far behind the modem
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times in comprehending the requirements of nationalism. They were also critical of 
the fact that the Protestant press noted that the anniversaries o f the unifications o f Italy 
and Germany constituted two major events that had ushered in a long period of 
prosperity and peace for both populations. Catholics argued that true Germans would 
understand how fundamentally different the two events were. The Italians did not 
deserve to be commemorated in a similar fashion to the Germans who valiantly fought 
to protect their fatherland. On the contrary, the Italians had succumbed to greed as 
they removed the Pope from Rome for materialistic reasons. More importantly, it was 
un-German of the Protestants to celebrate the German and Italian victories in the same 
way, thus cheapening the German heroic deeds. Catholics attributed the celebrations 
in Italy to the whims o f a few elite politicians and not representative o f the true wishes 
o f the Italian people. They also noted that Protestants had previously ridiculed 
countries such as Spain and Italy for the lack of progress that they had displayed 
during the past twenty-five years. Thus, their compliments on the Italian 
accomplishments since they had limited papal influence rang hollow. Pfalzer Bote 
ended the article by noting that Rome had been, and always would be, the domain of 
the Pope.8 This is o f course interesting as these sentiments were antithetical to the 
principles o f national sovereignty and nationalism, which were so prevalent during the 
later part o f the nineteenth century.
During the following days, the Catholics returned to these events several times, 
noting that the church had constituted the oldest basis for a state and that a proper
8 Pfalzer Bote, September 19, 1895.
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understanding o f nationalism must recognize this fact. They also maintained that 
these celebrations were not representative of the spirit o f the Italian people. Instead, 
the people who organized these celebrations were only interested in making money on 
these commemorations, sentiments alien to the true Italian spirit, which was still 
enumerating from the Pope. Catholics also protested the Protestant assertions that the 
Pope was reduced to a powerless prisoner in the Vatican. They maintained that the 
Pope was more powerful than ever before and that the colonial movement had 
enhanced his power throughout the world. Last, they repeated the argument that 
Protestants were not able to comment on the status o f the Pope since they were not 
able to understand properly the relationship between the Vatican and the rest o f the 
world. Indeed, they noted that people during these last twenty-five years had 
constantly misrepresented this relationship. While German Protestants had argued that 
Catholic loyalties to Rome constituted proof that the latter could never be true 
members o f the nation-state, the relationship was not that simple. Instead, Catholics 
around the world were able to be loyal to both their nation-state as well as their Pope, 
and the fact that they were able to maintain both of these relationships actually made 
them better citizens o f their respective states.9
What is interesting to note here is that Protestants largely ignored these 
Catholic sentiments. Although the role of the Pope had been a hotly contested subject 
between Catholics and Protestants during the initial years of the Kaiserreich, these 
viewpoints were not as controversial anymore. To be sure, this illustrates the fact that
9 Pfalzer Bote, September 23, 24, 1895.
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Catholics had become more integrated into the Second German Empire, but it is also a 
reflection o f the improved relationship between the Empire and the Vatican. Ever 
since the death o f Pius IX, the tone between the two parties had been much more 
conciliatory, which contributed to a greater Protestant acceptance o f Catholic loyalties 
to the Pope. Furthermore, due to the fact that Catholics had played an important role 
in supporting the strengthening of the military, most notably against the wishes o f Leo 
XIII in 1888, they had proved to the rest o f Germany that they were interested in 
protecting Germany rather than blindly obeying the wishes o f the Vatican. Comparing 
these sentiments to the demands Catholics had made in the early 1870s that the 
German government ensure the protection o f the Pope, it was clear that Catholics were 
in a much different situation in the 1890s compared to the 1870s.
Following the celebrations o f Sedan Day in 1895, Badeners commemorated the 
twenty-fifth anniversary o f the foundation o f the Empire in January 1896. However, 
instead of celebrating the anniversary o f the proclamation o f the Reich, Badenese 
cities focused their efforts on the anniversary o f the victory o f the 113th Badenese 
Regiment at Belfort. City councils did not participate to any great extent in these 
celebrations, which were instead organized by the local veterans associations. 
Nonetheless, these celebrations resonated very well with citizens, and locals observed 
this anniversary with great reverence. Celebrations in Heidelberg and Freiburg were 
relatively minor compared to the rest o f the state, but in Konstanz, the veterans 
association organized a more extensive two-day celebration. On January 14, local 
veterans, as well as some who had been stationed in Konstanz during the war, were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
paraded throughout the city. Konstanzers had decorated their houses in customary 
fashion, with the willing participation o f both Protestants and Catholics. This should 
come as no surprise since the commemoration o f the battle o f Belfort had always been 
a relatively uncontroversial celebration. Following the parade, veterans and local 
dignitaries assembled at the theatre. Here, Lieutenant Baumann gave a speech in 
which he outlined the achievements of the local soldiers during the past fifty years. 
Throughout his remarks, Baumann stressed the important role that local soldiers had 
played in local, regional, and national history. He emphasized that locals should not 
forget that though soldiers had played decisive roles on the battlefields, they had also 
been instrumental in turning Konstanz into a better city. He argued that the local 
economy had benefited from the presence o f these soldiers and that they had always 
played a constructive role in the development o f the city.10
Following Baumann’s speech, the local theatre association performed a play 
entitled “We Deserve the Entire Germany,” in which the events of the war were 
replayed. In addition, the play also chronicled some o f the key political developments 
during the past twenty-five years, and especially how the city o f Konstanz had 
benefited from the efforts of the three Emperors. Most o f the play centered on the war 
and the valiant efforts of local soldiers who had saved the Badenese fatherland from 
French threat. Konstanzer Nachrichten reported that the audience had been very 
appreciative o f the play and that it had constituted a nice way for people to remember
10 Konstanzer Nachrichten, January 16, 17, 1896. See also St. AK, S II 5375.
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the valiant efforts o f local soldiers.11 At the end o f the day, Grand Duke Friedrich 
arrived in the city, and people greeted him at the train station, where it was noted that 
he had been one o f the instrumental figures in bringing about German unity. The 
celebrations ended the following day with celebratory masses in all o f the churches, 
and it is noteworthy that the Grand Duke elected to attend both Protestant as well as
Catholic services, which indicated that the city enjoyed a much greater confessional
• 12 harmony than in previous years.
Judging from the unified response that Badenese Catholics and Protestants
displayed towards the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German unification, it was clear
that the state’s Catholics were in a much better position than during most of the last
twenty-five years. However, none o f these celebrations contained much potential for
controversy. To be sure, Sedan Day had been perhaps the greatest source of
controversy during the first few years of the Kaiserreich, but during the past decade,
both Catholics and Protestants had largely neglected this holiday. Thus, when it was
once again revisited, both confessions were able to embrace the commemoration of
this important military victory without engaging in confessional polemics.
Furthermore, since the vast majority o f these commemorations centered on the efforts
o f local soldiers, it was relatively easy for the state’s Catholics to participate fully in
these festivities. Although the efforts o f Catholic soldiers during the war had been a
source o f controversy for the first few years o f the Second Empire, Protestants had
11 Konstanzer Nachrichten, January 16, 1896.
12 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 17, 1896.
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ceased their accusations o f Catholic un-German behavior relatively soon after the 
foundation o f the Kaiserreich, which enabled both confessions to honor properly the 
efforts of all German soldiers. Although it is clear that the twenty-fifth anniversary o f 
the Empire indicated a greater Catholic integration into the Second Empire, events 
such as the commemorations tied to the persona of Bismarck displayed that there were 
still certain topics related to the unification that caused great conflict between the 
state’s two predominant confessions.
Catholic Reactions towards the Development of a Bismarck Cult
In conjunction with Bismarck’s eightieth birthday in 1895, controversy ensued 
that illustrates how Catholic and Protestant attitudes had changed towards the old 
statesman. Following the death o f Wilhelm I and the brief reign o f his son, Friedrich 
III, Wilhelm II became the new German Emperor on June 15, 1888. Whereas his 
grandfather had almost reluctantly accepted his role as Landesvater, Wilhelm II 
embraced and cherished his role as the premier figure in German society. This attitude 
led to an almost immediate conflict with Chancellor Bismarck, who had been 
accustomed to conducting his political affairs relatively independent o f the Emperor. 
The new Emperor’s insistence on shaping especially foreign policy irked the 
Chancellor and their relationship was strained from the outset. It came therefore as no 
great surprise when it was announced on March 18, 1890, that Bismarck had resigned. 
Germans around the Empire greeted this news with mixed emotions. Careful not to 
seem opposed to the recently crowned Emperor, many remarked that though Bismarck
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had offered invaluable services to the fatherland, his age made retirement appropriate 
at that moment. Naturally, especially in conservative and liberal circles, many were 
aghast at the disrespectful manner in which Wilhelm II had dismissed the greatest 
German statesman in history.13
Catholics in Baden greeted the news of Bismarck’s resignation with a more 
modest approach than conservatives and national-liberals. Their judgment of 
Bismarck’s legacy was surprisingly neutral, and in some instances almost positive, 
which serves as an indication that their status in the Reich had changed since the days 
o f the Kulturkampf, when they considered Bismarck their greatest enemy. Badenese 
Catholics did of course note that Bismarck had been one of their fiercest political 
opponents, especially in conjunction with the Kulturkampf. However, they also 
admitted to a reluctant respect for the great statesman and his efforts to unify 
Germany, an event that they now labeled the greatest achievement in German history. 
Catholics also claimed that for most o f the last quarter o f the nineteenth century, 
people around the world had considered Bismarck and German Catholics the two most 
important societal forces in Germany, which they interpreted as proof o f their 
important status in the Empire. They claimed that Bismarck had learned much from 
the Catholics, and their unwillingness to bow to his pressure had left him in awe of 
their strength and caused him to alter his policies towards the Church. In addition, 
they also credited Bismarck with strengthening the Catholic Church and facilitating 
the integration o f Catholics into the nation-state. By launching the Kulturkampf,
13 See for instance Gall, Bismarck, 693, 711-713.
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Bismarck had forced the Catholics to rally together and unite in the face o f this fierce 
opposition, and this newfound strength had served the Catholic community well as 
they gained acceptance as members o f the nation-state.14
After his resignation, Bismarck lived in an uneasy retirement. Initially inclined 
to remain involved in German politics, he relatively quickly drifted into status o f the 
revered old statesman who nonetheless was kept outside the political life.
Occasionally, a controversy would emerge as conservatives and national-liberals 
expressed dismay at the policies o f the new political leadership, and calls for 
reinstatement o f Bismarck would ensue. However, the relative peaceful existence of 
the old Chancellor ceased in 1895 when Germans began to plan for celebrations o f his 
eightieth birthday on April 1.
As far as the Badenese cities were concerned, on January 15, 1895, Mayor 
Wilckens o f Heidelberg suggested to Mayor Schnetzler of Karlsruhe that the major 
Badenese cities should plan a joint celebration o f the upcoming birthday.15 The 
affirmative response came quickly from Karlsruhe, in which the mayor noted that such 
a momentous event deserved the full attention o f Badeners. After this initial contact, 
letters were distributed to the mayors o f the other large cities, asking them to 
participate in this venture and to ensure that Bismarck was bestowed the title of 
Honorary Citizen o f the cities in question. At the Oberburgermeisterkonferenz on
14 See for instance Freie Stimme, March 22, 25, 27, 1890.
15 St. AH, Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 219-5, Ehrungen des Fiirsten Bismarcks, letter from 
Wilckens to Schnetzler in Karlsruhe, January 15, 1895.
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January 25, the mayors also decided to let Direktor Goetz from Karlsruhe draw up the 
official letter denoting the title o f Honorary Citizen on Bismarck. Indicating that the 
mayors were well aware that this could prove to be a thorny issue with their 
constituencies, they also noted that if  any of the cities in question would decide against 
the idea, the remaining ones would still proceed with the initiative.16 Following this 
meeting, the mayor o f Karlsruhe privately alerted Wilckens to the fact that this matter 
would likely cause conflict among the local population. In a January 29 letter, he 
wrote Wilckens that though the vast majority o f Badeners would agree that Bismarck 
had served the fatherland well, his domestic policies, especially in regards to the 
Catholic Church, would cause debate whether Baden should honor the old 
Chancellor.17
During the following days, city councils around the state discussed this issue, 
and already from the outset, it was evident that this was to be a hotly contested topic.
In the January 31 meeting in Konstanz, a fierce debate broke out as members of the 
council voiced their opinions on Bismarck’s legacy. Although many were in favor, 
several Catholics expressed dismay at the notion of honoring Bismarck. In a very 
lively debate, Dr. Mon wanted it on the record that as a faithful Catholic, he could not 
support this idea. He admitted that Bismarck had certainly served Germany well, 
especially in regards to foreign policy, but his war on the Church was something that
16 St. AK, S II 5576, Staatsorganisation, Reichssachen. Ehrung des Fiirsten Bismarcks, report from OB 
meeting, January 25, 1895.
17 St. AH, HUA 219-5, letter from Schnetzler to Wilckens, January 29, 1895.
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no Catholic could ever forget and which should disqualify him from any public 
honors. After an intense debate during which the chairman several times had to call 
members to order, the motion was passed. Out o f the sixty-two members present, 
fifty-two voted in favor, four against, and six abstained. However, Catholics noted 
that twenty-four members were missing, which they interpreted as a clear sign o f their 
disapproval.18
Having initiated the idea, Mayor Wilckens eagerly awaited the results o f the 
voting throughout the state. In his correspondence with the other mayors, he noted 
with pride that his own city council had passed the motion unanimously. However, as 
soon became evident, many cities around the state were much more hesitant towards 
this idea. Although they finally passed the motion, both Mannheim and Pforzheim 
had large numbers voting against the initiative.19 Catholics offered the fiercest 
resistance, but democrats were also in opposition to the idea. Nonetheless, the mayors 
declared that they would proceed with planning o f the individual festivities throughout 
the state. In the beginning of March, conflict ensued as some cities decided that they 
did not have the financial means to contribute to the proposed honorary gift. Wilckens 
and Schnetzler solved this problem by reassuring the other mayors that they would 
only pay an amount commensurate to the size o f each city. In the end, all o f the other 
mayors, despite some misgivings, agreed to pay the suggested amounts.20 These
18 St. AK, S II 5576, report from city council meeting, January 31, 1895.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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events also illustrate how sometimes these commemorative efforts could be 
misrepresentative o f public opinion. In the end, mayors presented all o f these cities as 
equal participants in this project, which obviously was not true.
Until this point, most o f these debates had been carried out within the confines 
o f the local political elite, without any direct involvement from local citizens or the 
press. However, this changed on March 23 when the German Parliament voted not to 
recognize Bismarck’s birthday. The most commonly cited reason why parliament 
should not congratulate Bismarck was that it would constitute a political act. Because 
o f the politics that Bismarck had advocated, the Center Party and others declared that 
they would not be able to support the idea. These debates clearly illustrate how 
closely commemorative efforts were associated with politics, and it furthermore 
displays just how aware Catholics were of the political importance associated with the 
official commemorative discourse. What is interesting to note is the fact that this 
constituted one o f the first occasions on which the Center Party was strong enough 
politically to be able to shape the official commemorative discourse that was so 
closely tied to unification.
This decision triggered an intense debate concerning the past and present 
character o f Bismarck, in which everybody from the Emperor to the common man 
voiced their opinion. Because these debates centered on the statesman’s political 
career, they serve as a good illustration of memory construction and how Badenese 
Catholics and others viewed the course of German history during the preceding thirty 
years. At the outset of these debates, the national-liberals attacked what they labeled
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one of the greatest injustices o f German parliamentary history. They interpreted the 
poor decision o f Parliament as another indication o f the dangers of a popular 
democracy. In a leading article on March 26, Konstanzer Zeitung issued a stem 
criticism of the behavior o f the Parliament. They stressed that nowhere else in the 
world would a parliament refuse a simple birthday wish to one of its greatest men, 
especially not on his eightieth birthday. The paper claimed that the reason for this 
shameful decision was that Catholic and social-democratic parliamentary members 
were unable to recognize Bismarck’s greatness as a German and instead focused 
exclusively on his party politics.21
The injustice done to Bismarck continued to dominate the pages of Konstanzer 
Zeitung for the following days. They noted that Germans throughout the Empire were 
incensed at the poor taste o f the Parliament in Berlin. In these discussions, several 
recognizable themes soon became evident. The paper argued that all citizens who 
possessed a proper understanding o f what it meant to be a true German and who 
understood how to support the construction o f a strong nation-state were in favor of 
congratulating Bismarck. They labeled the old Chancellor the founder o f the German 
Empire and the man responsible for bringing Germany to its place in the sun. Thus, to 
oppose this motion was not only a sign o f how far removed from their constituencies 
the members o f Parliament were, but it also showed that they were lesser Germans 
than the rest o f their colleagues. The paper also questioned why Catholics and
21 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 26, 1895.
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democrats had not opposed the celebration o f Bismarck’s seventieth birthday.22 
Although the Catholics never responded to this particular charge, their change of mind 
should be attributed to the altered political situation in the Empire. Not only was 
Bismarck no longer in office, which made it less important to placate him, but the 
Center Party had grown considerably in strength during the last decade and was now 
in a better position to oppose these kinds o f initiatives.
On March 30, Professor Gottlob Egelhaaf published an essay entitled 
“Bismarck and the South Germans” in Konstanzer Zeitung. The purpose o f this article 
was clear. By taking a historical look at Bismarck’s life and political career, he 
attempted to solidify the official view o f the retired Chancellor as somebody who had 
always sought to improve the lives o f all Germans. In addition to the usual praise for 
his foreign policy successes, Egelhaaf noted that Bismarck had a jovial character that 
had always been very close to the sympathetic south German one. He alleged that the 
Kulturkampf had not been aimed at German Catholics but rather to clear the Church of 
undue papal influence and dogma as well as to eliminate the antinational efforts o f the 
Jesuits. Still, the tone of these accounts had changed slightly during the past few 
years. National-liberals and Protestants such as Egelhaaf now admitted that Bismarck 
had made some mistakes in conducting the struggle against the Church. However, 
despite this more conciliatory tone, Egelhaaf claimed that any true Christian and 
German would be able to forgive Bismarck for his political sins. Hence, it now 
became un-German to still hold a grudge for the few mistakes that the Chancellor
22 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 27, 1895.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
351
might have made.23
Protestants and national-liberals also used the discussion regarding this event 
to voice misgivings about the development of German society. Not only in Baden, but 
throughout the Empire, national-liberals experienced difficulties adapting to the new 
mode of mass politics that developed in the 1890s. Although the Badenese National 
Liberal Party was able to remain in power, they suffered heavy political setbacks as 
they struggled to adjust from the mode of Honoratiorenpolitik to the more inclusive 
mass politics that challenged their political hegemony. As a result, they viewed this 
latest controversy as proof that today’s Germans did not understand what was truly 
important and that they had taken for granted Germany’s preeminence in Europe. 
Resorting to the often-used argument that a people who could not honor its important 
figures properly was a people in deep crisis, they stressed that ever since the death of 
Wilhelm I in 1888 there had been several signs that the German nation was 
deteriorating quickly. They stressed that celebrations such as these had in the past 
helped strengthen and unify Germans and constituted one o f the major reasons why 
Germany had so quickly been able to establish itself as a world power. Engaging in a 
rewriting o f history, national-liberals and Protestants argued that in the past, all 
national holidays had been celebrated in a worthy and respectful manner by the entire 
nation, which had served to further solidify Germany’s strength. Lamenting that the 
recent liberal political setbacks illustrated that Germans no longer respected what 
made them successful and German, they claimed that materialist ideas were ruining
23 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 30, 31, 1895.
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German society and the national character. They especially singled out the social- 
democrats and their notion o f class struggle as one o f the main reasons why liberalism 
was in decline and threatened to be replaced by an individualistic struggle for 
materialistic self-fulfillment. They claimed that this individualism, which most 
Catholics and democrats would have attributed to liberals themselves, was threatening 
to tear apart German society and weaken the nation-state.24
National-liberals also used this opportunity to question the politics o f the 
Center Party. At a time when the party was assuming an increasingly important role 
in German politics, this conflict provided the national-liberals with an opportunity to 
revisit some o f the supposedly antinational policies o f the Center from the past 
decades. They stressed the continuously fierce Catholic opposition towards Bismarck 
and the Reich, which allegedly had inhibited the development o f the German Empire. 
Furthermore, Catholics were seen as defenders o f the Polish minority in the Reich, and 
calls for removal o f the “Polish supporters” became common during these debates.
This constitutes another example o f how commemorations such as these were closely 
interconnected to current political issues. Many Germans had always been ambivalent 
towards the sizeable Polish minority in the eastern parts of the Reich. The formation 
and increased popularity o f mass organizations such as the Society for the Eastern 
Marches, which had as one o f its main goals to Germanize the eastern parts of the 
Empire, indicate that this was a topic that assumed ever more popular attention. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many Catholics were uneasy about the Polish issue, and
2AFreiburger Zeitung, March 24, 1895.
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that many o f them even openly opposed an increase in minority rights for the Poles, 
the Catholics were assumed to be strong supporters o f their Catholic brethren. Once 
again, this was another instance in which the Catholics were accused o f placing their 
religious loyalties above their ethnic ones; they were more interested in enhancing the 
status o f their church in Germany than they were in protecting the national community 
o f Germans.25
Faced with this criticism from fellow Germans, Catholics responded in kind to 
the accusations o f anti national feelings. O f course, this was not a novel phenomenon, 
as they had been forced to do so during the entire existence o f the Second Empire, 
however, the Catholics were now in a better position to offer some constructive 
arguments as to how the nationalist discourse should be constructed. One of their 
earliest responses to the criticism was to downplay the importance of this event. 
Complaining that national-liberals and Protestants treated this controversy as a sign of 
the apocalypse, Catholics ridiculed the national-liberal and Protestant outrage. Due to 
their more established political, economic, and social situation, Catholics could now 
afford to question the inherent importance o f these types of events, something that 
would not have been possible before. Otherwise, Catholics were somewhat more 
conciliatory in their approach to Bismarck, pointing out that he had indeed been a man 
who had accomplished good things for Germany, especially in regards to the 
unification. Accusations o f Bismarck’s bullish and reactionary behavior, especially 
towards the south German states and Austria, were absent, and overall, unification was
25 Ibid.
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regarded in a positive light, despite the manner in which it had taken place.
After remarking that the importance of Bismarck’s birthday had been vastly 
exaggerated, Catholics noted that Bismarck had for several decades bullied the 
Emperor, the Parliament, and the German people. However, with the arrival o f a new 
Emperor, Bismarck was quickly reduced to a less important figure, and his power 
diminished rapidly. This was something that did not fit his temperament, and he 
quickly decided to resign. By offering this relatively mild criticism of Bismarck, as 
well as Wilhelm I, Catholics were able to voice their support for the current Emperor. 
They openly praised him for restoring his position as the most powerful man in 
Germany and indicated that for national-liberals and Protestants to be upset about this 
latest turn o f events indicated their faltering support for Wilhelm II.26
Catholics further argued that one o f the main reasons why Bismarck had been 
denied an official congratulation from Parliament was that he had never been able to 
reconcile himself to the more democratic mode o f politics. This argument positioned 
Catholics as advocates o f a more modem and inclusive society. They portrayed 
Bismarck as a representative o f an outdated world, which was now giving way to a 
more democratic political process. Thus, they were able to present themselves as the 
bearers o f progress, a role that had been reserved for national-liberals and Protestants 
ever since the foundation o f the Reich. They noted that the same people who in the 
past had criticized Catholics for opposing democracy were now disputing the 
democratically taken decision not to honor Bismarck. They argued that though not all
26 See for instance P faker Bote, March 23, 1895.
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Germans might agree with the decision, this was part o f a democratic society, which 
they had supposedly supported for a long time. Catholics also claimed that this latest 
turn of events displayed the true colors o f their opponents. They had never been 
honest proponents o f democracy, but only supported it when it suited their agenda. 
Now, when Catholics and other elements o f German society were able to shape the 
political process to a much greater extent, liberals were no longer interested in 
promoting popular democracy.27
Catholics furthermore maintained that though they would certainly not have 
been pleased with the decision o f the German Parliament had they been nation- 
liberals, they would have had to accept the voice o f the German people, who clearly 
did not want this type o f attention bestowed upon Bismarck. By using this argument, 
Catholics portrayed themselves as better representatives of the German people. To be 
sure, Catholics had always presented themselves as better Germans and more in touch 
with the true nature o f the German character, but they had previously always been 
forced to present these arguments in a defensive manner. Now, for the first time, they 
were able to point to the decision o f the Parliament as proof that the Catholic version 
o f Germanness was closer to what the great mass o f Germans espoused.
In addition, the fact that this controversy was based on the persona of 
Bismarck also lent some further credibility to the Catholic accusations about the 
brutish character of the old Chancellor. They did not fail to note that these sentiments, 
though belated, certainly served as a strong indication of what Germans all along had
27 Konstanzer Nachrichten, March 28, 1895.
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thought o f the Prussian Junker. The only difference now was that with a more 
democratic society in place, these views were not only represented in the public sphere 
but in the political realm as well.28 In the March 28 edition o f Konstanzer Zeitung, the 
paper quoted an incendiary poem dedicated to the follies of the Parliament, published 
in several national-liberal papers.29 Using this poem as evidence of how their political 
opponents really viewed society, Catholics claimed that the Center Party, despite all 
the abuse it had suffered throughout the first few decades of the Reich, was the only 
party that truly understood what would strengthen Germany. Citing their recent 
support for the military bills, the paper claimed that Catholics were now the ones who 
best understood the German national character. They also argued that whether a 
member o f Parliament supported the initiative to honor Bismarck was no true 
indication o f his Germanness; instead, people should observe what kind o f respect 
these members displayed for the political institutions o f the Reich. Last, they gleefully 
noted that Bismarck had never been able to defeat the Catholics: not during the 
unification process, not during the Kulturkampf or during any other time of his reign 
as Chancellor, and certainly not during his time as political retiree.30
Despite the great controversy regarding the German Parliament’s decision not 
to honor Bismarck officially, Konstanz, Heidelberg, and Freiburg all organized 
celebrations on his eightieth birthday. The festivities followed similar patterns
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Freie Stimme, April 1, 1895.
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throughout the state, with the most emphasis being placed on a banquet in honor of 
Bismarck. City councils sent congratulatory telegrams to Friedrichsruh, a gesture that 
was deemed appropriate even by most Catholics. This fact also serves as an indication 
o f the increased confidence with which Catholics participated in Badenese and 
German society. Despite the complicated history that characterized Bismarck’s 
relationship with the state’s Catholics, only a handful o f people opposed sending the 
telegram, a sign that they were no longer too concerned about the long shadows cast 
by Bismarck’s figure. People in the three cities were asked to flag their houses; 
however, according to most contemporary reports, many chose not to do so.31
On the eve o f April 1, city elites gathered to celebrate Bismarck and his 
contributions to the German nation. Among elaborate decorations, dignitaries gave a 
number o f speeches, outlining the great character of the old Chancellor. Two o f the 
most commonly addressed themes were the need to express how grateful Germans 
were for Bismarck’s lengthy service to them and the importance o f these types of 
events to solidify the national consciousness. Most speakers referred to the 
discussions o f the last few days as signs that Germans were becoming increasingly 
disassociated from their nation-state and that much work needed to be done to ensure 
that Germany would remain strong, even though Bismarck had left office. Speakers 
remarked that Germany was more divided now than it had been for a long time and 
that it was not inconceivable that they would return to the state of disunity that had 
existed for over 1,000 years prior to unification. These sentiments served as a
31 See for instance Konstanzer Nachrichten, April 4, 1895.
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criticism of the latest actions and growing presence of Catholics and social-democrats, 
but they also underscored how important unification had been to the Germans. They 
portrayed Bismarck as the one man who had been able to alleviate Germans from 
centuries o f division, during which the thought o f a unified state had remained nothing 
but an idea. They revisited Bismarck’s political career, stressing how he had always 
placed Germany’s interests above both Prussia and himself. The speeches centered on 
the 1860s and ‘70s, and speakers presented a historical interpretation that fit quite well 
with the official commemorative discourse that had been prevalent in the first few 
years o f the Empire. Bismarck’s spirit had shaped Germany into the grand state that it 
had achieved, and Germans must not forget that spirit, lest they risk falling back into 
political and diplomatic obscurity again.
Speakers described Bismarck as the guiding light of German history who had 
set a great example for Germans to follow. Most o f these speeches focused on his role 
in the unification, which was a little bit different from previous commemorative 
efforts. Although his domestic policies were mentioned, it was usually just in passing. 
This emphasis on Bismarck’s role as the unifier o f Germany should not be surprising, 
given the recent controversies. Since Bismarck’s supporters now found themselves in 
a more defensive position than during the first few decades of the Reich, they chose to 
stress the accomplishments that almost all Germans appreciated. As we have seen in 
our discussions, the way in which the nation-state had been unified had become 
increasingly accepted even by social-democrats and Catholics during the past few 
years, and it was unlikely that they would offer any strong opposition to these views.
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Thus, the commemorative discourse surrounding these events indicated not only how 
the memory o f Bismarck’s career was being constructed, it also reflected the new 
political situation in the Reich. One o f the last things that speakers did at these 
banquets was to read a variety o f telegrams that had been sent to Friedrichsruh from 
all over Germany, which served to enhance the national character o f the celebration as 
all of these telegrams tied Germans into a commemorative web that spanned across 
national boundaries.32
While the first few reports from the festivities contained little political 
commentary, the national-liberal papers sharpened their tone in the following days as 
it became clear that Catholics were critical o f some of the parts o f the discourse. 
National-liberal and Protestant newspapers focused less on the content o f the 
celebration and instead reflected more on the political career o f Bismarck, especially 
how he had always had enemies who did not understand what was best for Germany. 
Although they seldom singled out Catholics, it was still evident that the majority of 
the criticism was directed at them. On April 3, Freiburger Zeitung noted that 
Bismarck had always been a man o f the highest integrity who served his country on 
the basis o f his strong moral code and religious beliefs. Even during times when his 
enemies resorted to lies and deceit to prevent Bismarck from protecting German 
interests, he always remained true to his Christian policies. This serves as another 
useful example of the fluidity o f the commemorative discourse. Faced with Catholic 
criticism of the celebration, Bismarck’s supporters resorted to questioning the
32 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, April 1, 1895.
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Germanness o f their opponents. They then began to claim that Catholics, by opposing 
Bismarck on numerous occasions, had stymied the growth of the Empire, and had it 
not been for Bismarck’s steadfast resolve, the Reich would never have reached the
33strong position that it currently occupied in the world.
The national-liberal and Protestant papers all published extensive accounts of 
the celebrations in Friedrichsruh. The arrival o f the Grand Duke on March 29 was 
described in great detail, and naturally, the jovial relationship between the two men 
was heavily emphasized. Papers noted that Bismarck certainly knew that the 
Badenese Grand Duke had played one o f the most important roles in the unification 
process. The papers dedicated even more space to the visit that Wilhelm II paid to the 
home o f his first Chancellor. Noting that their relationship certainly had been rocky at 
times, the papers placed most of their emphasis on noting how well the two got along 
now, and how critical the Emperor was o f the decision taken by the German 
Parliament. The implication was of course that these were the two men who really 
understood how Germans felt about this whole affair and that they were the true 
representatives o f popular national sentiment. Once again, this serves as an indication 
o f just how apprehensive some o f the old elites were at the prospect o f a new mass- 
based society.
So what were then the Catholic responses to this celebration as it was carried 
out around Germany? As we have already noted, though willing to credit Bismarck 
with some accomplishments, they were still hesitant about certain aspects o f this
33 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, April 3; Konstanzer Zeitung, April 5, 1895.
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project. Compared to many of the earlier commemorations, April 1 did not provide 
any major controversies. Still, Catholics did not participate to any great extent in 
these festivities. Many national-liberal papers offered the standard criticism of 
Catholics, pointing out that they had not flagged their houses. However, given that 
many Protestant citizens failed to do the same thing, this should not be considered any 
major divergence from the main ideological currents. What is interesting to note is 
that for the most part, Catholics were not overly critical of the speeches held at these 
events. Konstanzer Nachrichen for instance opened their account o f the festivities by 
praising Mayor Weber for his speech, noting that it was free from any kind of political 
content and instead focused solely on Bismarck the man, an effort for which the 
Catholics were quite grateful, noting how different things had been in the past.34 
Furthermore, the paper noted that the speakers had mostly omitted any references to 
Bismarck’s domestic policies, since it would have caused controversy. They forgave 
speakers for only praising Bismarck, noting that if  Catholics were to celebrate one of 
their own, they would do the same thing.35 However, the paper could not refrain from 
pointing out that the Kulturkampf and Bismarck’s treatment o f the Jesuits should serve 
as reminders that there had been both positive and negative sides to his reign.36
Other than these relatively mild statements, the only thing that the Catholics in 
Konstanz were upset about in regards to the celebration was the hoisting of a flag on
34 Konstanzer Zeitung, April 3, 1895.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
362
the Catholic cathedral. They noted that many of the city’s religious men and women 
had been surprised and angry when they saw the flag. However, it turned out that this 
was a prank done by two men who had somehow gained access to the church without 
the knowledge of the religious leadership in the town. Leading clergy members 
pointed out that no official order had been given to hoist the flag and that the mistake 
had been corrected as soon as people had made them aware o f it.37 Thus, the 
celebrations in Baden and in the three cities under investigation here proceeded 
smoothly, which, given the contentious status o f Bismarck, illustrate how integrated 
Catholics had become into the Empire. Still, we should note that the Catholic papers 
around the state remained critical o f some of the events that had taken place elsewhere 
in Germany. In the days and weeks following this event, they paid close attention to 
how other areas o f the Empire had celebrated the Emperor, and these discussions are 
indicative how Badenese Catholics had begun to view themselves, their state, and its 
role in the German Empire. A few days after the celebrations, Pfalzer Bote cited 
several of the poems that various speakers and newspapers had proclaimed to the 
honor o f Bismarck. In contrast to most o f the speeches held around Baden, these 
placed strong emphasis on Bismarck’s domestic policies. It is interesting to note that 
the paper criticized these efforts from a Catholic viewpoint and also used them to 
portray the Badenese people, both Catholics and Protestants, as better Germans than 
most. They claimed that despite the complicated relationship that had existed between 
the two confessions in Baden for many decades, they commended the state’s
37 Konstanzer Nachrichten, April 4, 1895.
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population for coming together and celebrating this event in a worthy manner. These 
arguments were used to emphasize that Badeners understood how to be true Germans 
while others, who were apparently still stuck in a Kulturkampf mood, did nothing to 
further the German cause. These sentiments are interesting as they clearly display that 
as Germany had established its role in Europe, and as foreign policy centered on 
supporting colonial ventures and a military build-up, both o f which Catholics had 
promoted, the latter could use these arguments to portray themselves as true 
Germans.38 It also provides evidence that the old north-south split that had 
characterized the years prior to and immediately after unification was still present. 
Badeners, whether Catholic or Protestant, argued that they were better Germans and 
more prepared as their nation-state faced new challenges.
These sentiments were also evident as newspapers reported on the last aspect 
o f this celebration, the visit by the Badenese delegation o f mayors to Friedrichsruh on 
June 14. Many of the state’s newspapers, irrespective o f political or confessional 
leanings, reported at length about this event. The conversations between Bismarck 
and the members o f the delegation were reprinted in detail, and they offer some 
interesting insights into how the Badenese delegation viewed themselves and their role 
in this commemorative effort.39 The delegates emphasized how grateful the state of 
Baden was towards the old statesman for his efforts throughout his career. They noted 
that in times of severe crisis, such as in the beginning o f the Franco-Prussian War, the
38 Pfalzer Bote, April 7, 1895.
39 See for instance Freie Stimme, May 17, 1895.
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Chancellor had ensured that the Badenese state was secure in the face o f the French 
threat. Furthermore, the conversation also focused on how the Badenese people had 
united as one in defense o f the fatherland, led by Grand Duke Friedrich. Bismarck 
was o f course very complimentary in his remarks, noting that the state had played a 
very important role in unifying the Empire, and then especially the Grand Duke. 
Bismarck remarked that while many citizens had forgotten how to be true Germans, 
the people o f Baden had become ever more German as the Empire grew and expanded 
its influence. The old Chancellor even made a joke about the fact that the Badenese 
Parliament must be a much nicer place to work these days, at least when compared to 
the German Parliament. Furthermore, he noted that Baden had always played a strong 
role in the creation and consolidation o f the Empire. During the unification process 
the state ensured that the rest of the southern states would support the unification 
effort, and after the unification had been completed, Baden had always attempted to be 
one of the premier states in the Empire. The Badenese delegation used these remarks 
to further bolster their case as one o f the important states in the Empire. Claiming that 
they had played one o f the key roles in unifying the Reich, they also stressed their 
continued support for the Reich and its policies, even when other areas o f Germany 
had been more hesitant to follow suit. Bismarck had also inquired as to how the 
celebrations o f his birthday had proceeded, and the press noted that the Badenese 
bourgeoisie had celebrated the momentous occasion in a worthy fashion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
365
The Death of Bismarck and Construction of Bismarck Towers
Throughout his political career, Bismarck had been one o f the most 
controversial figures o f the German Empire. Although Bismarck’s relationship with 
German Catholics improved after the easing o f the Kulturkampf \ the old Chancellor 
had remained a symbol for the mistreatment that many Catholics felt that they had 
been exposed to for the first few decades o f the Second Empire. Nonetheless, 
Bismarck was obviously one o f the most revered men in Germany during the last half 
o f the nineteenth century, and it should come as no surprise that his passing on July 
31,1898, constituted a major event in Germany. For many Germans, the death of 
Bismarck, approximately a decade after the passing o f Wilhelm I, meant that the two 
giants o f the generation that founded the Empire were now gone. For many, this 
symbolized a generational shift in German politics and society that ushered in a new 
era in Germany. To Protestants and national-liberals especially, this was vaguely 
unsettling, especially considering that the policies and actions o f the new political and 
economic leadership often left the old elites unsure about their status. O f course, the 
advent of a more modem society with a mass-based political system and a more 
diversified economy did little to alleviate the fears o f the old elites, which is one o f the 
reasons why they reacted so strongly to the news o f Bismarck’s death.
Although the death o f Bismarck came suddenly, it was not necessarily 
unexpected. He had been in declining health for some time, and during the last few 
days leading up to his death, newspapers published accounts about what was sure to be 
the end of an era. When the news of his passing was announced, city councils around
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Baden met in emergency sessions to decide what would be the proper way o f marking 
the tragic event. All council members, even the most staunchly ultramontane ones, 
agreed that this constituted an event that needed to be recognized in a variety of ways. 
In Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg, the councils decided to ring the church bells 
between 12-1 pm to let people know of the passing of the old Chancellor. Also, on the 
same day, members decided to send a telegram to his son and to place a wreath on the 
cities’ Bismarck monument. National-liberal papers carried a black band across the 
top, and cities were decorated in Trauergeschmuck.40
Immediately after Bismarck’s death, city councils around Baden, as they had 
done on so many other occasions, asked each other how they would mark this sad 
occasion. The commemorative discourse and protocol was still not solidified, which 
serves as another indication o f how citizens reevaluated it as they approached new 
situations. The celebrations were quite similar in all cities and included two official 
celebrations, one organized by the city and one staged by the university.41
Following these initial displays o f grief, the cities of Konstanz, Heidelberg, 
and Freiburg all organized official Traurfeiers. These events followed a similar 
pattern to the ones that had taken place following the death o f Wilhelm I, with no 
major differences between the cities 42 The event took place in one o f the main 
banquet halls in the city, which was decorated with flowers, wreaths, busts, and
40 St. AH, HUA 219-6, Landes und Reichs-sachen. Die Tod des Fiirsten Bismarcks.
41 Ibid. See also St. AF, C3/79/2, Landessachen. Ehrung des Fiirsten Bismarck.
42 For a detailed description of Germans’ reactions to Bismarck’s death, see Lothar Machtan, Bismarcks 
Tod und Deutschlands Tranen: Reportage einer Tragodie (Miinchen: Goldmann Verlag, 1998).
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portraits o f Bismarck. It is interesting to note that all three cities also had famous 
quotes from Bismarck on display, among which “We Germans fear nothing but God” 
was the most popular one. Reporting on these events dominated the national-liberal 
and Protestant newspapers for the next few days. Similar to the events in 1888 and in 
1895, the papers focused most of their coverage recounting Bismarck’s life while 
stressing the contributions that he had made to the German fatherland. This should not 
come as a great surprise, given the fact that this was standard procedure when any 
dignitary passed away; however, we can also trace a different underlying motive to 
these detailed accounts o f Bismarck’s death.
Among the things that many national-liberals and Protestants were concerned 
about as the century drew to a close was the fact that people were beginning to forget 
just how much men like Wilhelm I and Bismarck had meant to the German fatherland 
and how difficult unification had been. They emphasized how Germany had failed to 
unify on many other occasions throughout history and that it was not until the arrival 
o f these great men that Germany had been able to achieve the goal that so many had 
desired for such a long time. Hence, it was not so much the fact that the middle and 
end o f the nineteenth century constituted a time when nationalism and national 
unification were becoming staples o f European society, but instead the greatness of 
these two men that had enabled the creation o f the Second Empire. Thus, not only did 
they enhance the reputation o f Bismarck and Wilhelm I, they also tied the fates of 
these two men to the unification and subsequent rise o f Germany, which served to 
further enhance the official version of German nationalism that Protestants and liberals
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had championed ever since the unification.
The ceremony held in Heidelberg will serve as a representative illustration of
the nature o f these events.43 After having placed a wreath on the city’s Bismarck
monument on the day of his passing, the city council decided to hold an official
ceremony on August 2 in the main auditorium of the university. To honor the
deceased, the room was decorated with black lace and a variety o f flower
arrangements. All o f the city’s dignitaries were present, including members o f the city
council, the rector o f the university, and a variety o f high-ranking militaries. Professor
Schafer gave the main speech, in which he emphasized that not only Germany had
suffered a great loss, but the entire world. Similarly to other speeches around the
state, Bismarck was portrayed as the most important man of the nineteenth century,
who had always striven to preserve world order and peace. Considering Bismarck’s
career, this might seem a highly debatable argument; however, this interpretation of
Bismarck’s actions suited the official version of nationalism very well. By stressing
that Bismarck had always wanted to preserve peace, speakers could make the
argument that a strong and unified Germany constituted the best means for Europe to
maintain its peace and harmony. Dr. Schafer even suggested that for France,
Bismarck’s actions had been a blessing, as they were better suited to modernize their
country without Alsace and Lorraine. He also noted that due to the fact that France
had always harbored revenge feelings towards Germany, Bismarck had been wise to
maintain a strong German military. As with many other commemorative events, this
43 An extensive description o f these events can be found in Heidelbergs Trauerkundgebung anlasslich 
des Todes des Fiirsten Bismarck (Heidelberg: Carl Pfeifer, 1898).
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fit well into the current political context as Germany was debating whether to support 
the Tirpitz naval bills. This was also a means o f trying to ensure that Bismarck’s 
perceived legacy—the foundation and transformation o f the German Empire into a 
major international power—was not lost on the current generation who had not lived 
through the humiliating preunification years. Dr. Schafer argued that the reason why 
Bismarck was such a great man was that despite what some of his critics argued, he 
had championed causes for every class, ethnicity, and confession. As in any type of 
commemorative effort, these sentiments were stressed to enhance Bismarck’s 
reputation and legacy.
Although certain members o f the population were present at this ceremony, it 
was not open to the public. To ensure that the German people received ample 
opportunity to take leave o f their esteemed Chancellor, city councils around the 
Empire organized public celebrations as well. As the century was nearing its end, 
mass politics were quickly becoming the new mode o f politics, and in order to control 
this discourse, liberals wanted to control the content of the public celebrations as 
well.44 Considering that Bismarck had been one o f their closest allies, they attempted 
to take this opportunity to recapture some o f the political momentum. The speeches 
held at these public ceremonies were dominated by the notion that when Bismarck had 
been in power, things had been much more stable. To be sure, speakers stressed that 
Germany was strong as it entered the new century; however, these speeches and texts 
also contained a certain amount o f trepidation as new political currents were sweeping
44 See for instance Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 19-40, 203-205.
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across the country.
In Heidelberg, the public ceremony commemorating Bismarck’s death took 
place on August 7. City council members asked residents to hoist flags on this date, 
which many did.45 The main auditorium was decorated with flags and banners, and all 
local organizations, even Catholic ones, were represented with their flags. The 
ceremony began with a rendition o f Richard Wagner’s funeral march, “Siegfried’s 
Death,” which set the tone for the commemorative discourse.
Prof. Adalbert Rohrhurst from Heidelberg delivered the main speech, in which
he outlined many o f the same facts that had been repeated in newspapers and speeches
during the last few days. Most o f his speech was focused on the great deeds that
Bismarck had done for the fatherland rather than the struggles that he had encountered
with the Prussian Parliament, the Catholics, and the social-democrats. These
sentiments were representative of the speeches in all o f the Badenese cities, and it is
noteworthy that they omitted Bismarck’s struggle with the Catholics, though it
constituted a sizeable part o f his political career. Thus, speakers focused on
Bismarck’s actions that everyone agreed had benefited Germany. There were several
different reasons for this. For one, both the struggles against the Catholic Church and
the social-democrats did not fit well into the commemorative discourse that the
leading members o f society were trying to propagate. After all, they were more
interested in portraying Bismarck as the great unifier and not somebody who had
fought against certain elements o f the German population, no matter how contrary
45 St. AH, HUA-219-6, record from city council meeting, August 1. For information on the 
organization of the celebrations in Konstanz, see St. AK, S II 5576; for Freiburg, see St. AF, C3/79/2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
371
their ideas might have been to liberal and Protestant elites. Furthermore, towards the 
end o f the nineteenth century, it had become evident especially that the Kulturkampf 
had not been a great success as it had left Catholics stronger and better organized than 
before. In addition, the 1890s witnessed the rise o f the Center Party to a position of 
national prominence, and with the rapid growth o f the national Catholic Association, it 
was clear that the German Catholics had not been marginalized but instead were in a 
position to play important political, social, and cultural roles in the German Empire.
Turning to the Catholic responses to the death o f Bismarck and the subsequent 
celebrations, their responses were measured towards the old Chancellor. To be sure, 
Catholics were in general a little more reserved when it came to passing judgment on 
the recently deceased; however, their apparent appreciation for the character of 
Bismarck was still remarkable, considering the antagonistic relationship between the 
two sides.
In all three cities, the Catholic papers carried the news on their first page. The 
Pfalzer Bote labeled Bismarck the “greatest political genius.. .the greatest statesman of 
the nineteenth century.. in their ingression.46 Although they were respectful in their 
tone, the way in which they described his life was still different than to some o f the 
liberal and Protestant papers. For instance, Pfalzer Bote noted that though Bismarck 
had unified Germany, he did so with questionable means, especially when dealing 
with the Prussian parliament. Furthermore, they took issue with the liberal and 
Protestant assertion that Bismarck had been a supporter o f individual rights and
46 Pfalzer Bote, August 1, 1898.
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freedoms. They pointed to both the Kulturkampf and the anti-Socialist laws as 
examples o f the fact that he sometimes had operated outside the law. Still, these 
aberrations should not divert Germans from all that he had done for them. After all, 
this had been a man whose body and soul were consumed by politics, which 
sometimes caused him to act against better judgment.47 Also, by linking their own 
fate to the social-democrats, whom they normally were very critical of, the Catholics 
seemed to be the force that worked for democratizing Germany, which was very much 
a part o f the times.48
In regards to the ceremonies to honor Bismarck, the Catholic press maintained 
a relatively low profile. They focused on his role in unification but also discussed the 
Kulturkampf in some detail. They now thanked Bismarck for launching this battle, 
since it had helped them grow even stronger as they had to face challenges from the 
state. They also claimed that the Kulturkampf had contributed to integrate Catholics 
better into the general population. They maintained that because Catholics had been 
forced to organize to survive in such a hostile climate, they were better adapted to this 
new and modernized world. O f course, it is questionable how much the Kulturkampf 
helped Catholics become integrated into the new German state, though there is no 
question that the 1870s made them stronger and stressed the need for political, 
cultural, and social representation. Catholics were still underrepresented in regards to 
the sheer number o f people participating in the new social fabric in Germany, but their
47 Ibid.
48 See for instance Freiburger Bote August 2, 1898.
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increased embrace o f various forms o f associations and organizations displayed that 
they were well on their way to adapting to a more modem society.
Despite all this positive attention that Catholics heaped on the recently 
deceased Chancellor, there were still some signs that they were not entirely 
comfortable with the commemorative discourse. On August 8, Freiburger Bote ran an 
article questioning why all o f the speakers at these events were Protestant and 
national-liberal. After all, if  Bismarck had been such a wonderful German, would it 
not be fair to assume that persons o f other political and/or religious views were 
included in this discourse? They were especially critical of the fact that the city 
council in Freiburg had invited the national-liberal Dr. Fabricius, a known opponent of 
the Church, as the main speaker. Their insistence that he was not an appropriate 
choice shows that they were clearly aware o f the stakes at hand. They once again 
stressed that they were not opposed to honoring Bismarck; however, it should be done 
in the appropriate manner.49 However, due to the fact that even such a staunch 
opponent o f the church refrained from making any incendiary comments against the 
Catholics during the service shows just how far removed Germany around the turn of 
the century was from the heydays of the Kulturkampf.
Although the Catholic responses to the death o f Bismarck are illustrative in 
displaying just how much they had become integrated into the national 
commemorative discourse that surrounded the unification and the founding fathers of 
the German Empire, it is even better for our purposes to analyze their responses to the
49 Freiburger Bote, August 8, 1898.
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almost hysterical desire to construct Bismarck monuments in the wake o f his death. 
After all, it is much easier to refrain from harsh words in a eulogy that will relatively 
soon be forgotten; it is much more difficult to do so in regards to a permanent fixture 
of the commemorative landscape, which these monuments were destined to be.
The so-called Bismarck tower occupies a special place in the German 
commemorative history. As Reinhard Alings has noted, these monuments were 
constructed largely after the death o f the Chancellor, and like no other national 
monument, they were relatively evenly distributed throughout Germany. Most of 
these monuments were located at a beautiful place, often on a hill as they were also 
used as towers from which one could see far into the surroundings. Most o f these 
monuments were a combination o f national and local efforts. To be sure, national 
organizations had on other occasions attempted to have a particular monument 
constructed in many different places throughout the country, however, none had more 
success than the Bismarck towers. Hans Walter Hedinger estimates that over 700 
monuments were planned and over 500 were build at an estimated cost o f almost 
fourteen million Marks.50
On December 3, 1898, the German Student Organization distributed an appeal 
to all cities larger than 5,000 people that they should construct one o f these towers to 
honor the great statesman. In the appeal, they emphasized that these towers should 
serve as symbols o f the great unity that Germany now enjoyed. These towers would
50 Alings, Monument und Nation, 139-140, 235. See also Hans Walter Herdinger, “Bismarck- 
Denkmaler und Bismarck-Verehrung,” in Kunstverwaltung. Bau und Denkmalspolitik im Kaiserreich, 
ed. Ekkhard Mai and Stephan Waetzoldt (Berlin: Mann, 1981), 279-304.
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connect Germans from all different parts of the Empire, especially on those occasions 
when huge fires would be lit from them, which would connect them as dots throughout 
the German landscape. This notion was concurrent with the current view of 
monuments, which should serve as focal points throughout the German landscape that 
citizens could use to strengthen their ties to each other and the fatherland. They held a 
competition to determine which form would be used. The architect Wilhelm Kreis 
won with an entry that envisioned a tall, ten meters or higher, monument that would 
have a fire pit at the top that could be used on Bismarck’s birthday as well as on the 
summer solstice, which students celebrated as their national holiday. The Student 
Organization placed great emphasis on the fact that these monuments should not be 
too expensive to construct, which would make it easier for cities o f all sizes to comply 
with this request.51 In addition, Kreis’s model was made available to all cities so that 
they would ensure that all monuments had the same size, shape, and function. To 
make things even easier, students suggested that if  a particular city still could not 
afford the monument, they could form joint ventures with neighboring towns to share 
the cost.52
The city council in Heidelberg was one o f the first to get involved in this 
process, though not entirely on its own behalf. In January o f 1899, even before the 
announcement o f Kries’ winning entry had been made public, the National Student
51 Parts o f the text from the Student Organization can be found in Alings., 235-236.
52 The entire text can be found in St. AH, AA 79/13, Gemeinde Vermogen. Die Errichtung einer 
Bismarksaule.
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Organization contacted the city council and asked that it begin a collection for this 
project. Since Heidelberg was one o f the oldest and most prestigious university towns 
in Germany, if  it supported this project, other German cities were sure to follow.53 In 
June 1899, the city council asked the city’s inhabitants for donations, stressing how 
important it was that Heidelberg stood at the forefront o f this movement. In this 
appeal, the organizing committee, which contained prominent members such as Mayor 
Walz, claimed that over 170 German communities had already signed up to join this 
project, and it was o f utmost importance that Heidelberg did not appear less patriotic 
than other German cities. They also pointed out that this was not a monument that 
was associated with a particular political or religious affiliation, but instead one that 
would be accessible to all citizens.
The project in Heidelberg generated numerous donations from both students 
and the general population. By late 1901, the organizing committee had signed a 
contract with Kreis, who agreed to construct a roughly fifteen-meter-high tower at an 
approximate cost o f 15,000 Marks. The only issue o f contention between Kreis and 
the committee was the size o f the monument. The latter kept pushing for a taller 
monument, which he argued would better serve the dignified character o f a city such 
as Heidelberg.54 This of course should come as no surprise as it was in Kreis’s interest 
to construct as expensive a monument as possible. This correspondence also
53 A good description of this process can be found in Ursula Schmitt, “Die Bismarksaule von 1903 auf 
den Heiligenberg,” in Heidelberger Denkmdle, 7755-1981, ed. Autoren Kollektiv an der Institut det 
Universitat Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Verlag Brausdruck, 1982), 51-56. See also St. AH, AA 79/13.
54 St. AH, AA 79/13, letter from Kreis to organizing committee, October 17, 1901.
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illustrates how many factors were involved in the construction o f this monument.
These monuments were not only intended as symbols of national unification and 
strength, but there was also a business side to this that was not to be taken too lightly.
On July 29, the organizing committee and Kreis reached a final agreement, and 
construction was started shortly thereafter.55 The construction proceeded without any 
major problems, and it was unveiled with a torch parade from the city center to the 
tower on January 19, 1903, the anniversary o f the foundation o f the Reich. The choice 
o f date signifies that not only was this a monument to honor Bismarck, but it also 
commemorated his greatest work: unification. The fact that so many cities 
throughout the Empire were constructing these kinds of monuments and their intent to 
have them serve as unifying symbols indicate that they were closely connected to the 
commemorative discourse framing unification, not just Bismarck himself. The 
population’s reception o f the monument was warm, and there were no dissenting 
voices in regards to the cost and/or the appearance o f the monument.56 It is 
noteworthy that even Pfalzer Bote participated actively in this process. The 
newspaper served as a drop-off station for donations, and the paper also did not voice 
any particular criticism in regards to the construction or the reception o f the 
monument.57 Once again, this instance serves as a clear indication that the Catholics 
in Heidelberg had become very closely integrated into the commemorative discourse.
55 St. AH, AA 79/13, protocol from meeting of the organizing committee, July 29, 1902.
56 See for instance the favorable account in Pfalzer Bote, January 20, 1903.
57 Noted in St. AH, AA 79/13.
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It should also be noted that this integration process sped up considerably during the 
last few years o f the nineteenth century, as the city had been engulfed in confessional 
rhetoric just a decade earlier.
If there were no apparent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in 
Heidelberg, the situation was slightly different in Freiburg and Konstanz. In Freiburg, 
the process to collect money for a monument was quickly underway. The city was 
actually ahead of the National Student Organization, having on August 12 published in 
all newspapers, including the Catholic ones, a call for donations to a proposed 
Bismarck monument. The Freiburger Bote played an active role in the process, 
publishing the appeal and also serving as one of the sites where donations could be 
made. Initially, the city council sought to combine the proposed monument to 
Wilhelm I with the one to Bismarck. As news spread o f the students’ initiative, 
however, they decided to construct a separate monument to Bismarck.58 Catholics in 
Freiburg, though not opposed to constructing a monument to Bismarck, still 
questioned this decision. They argued that given the great services that men such as 
Wilhelm I, Bismarck, and General Helmuth von Moltke had rendered the German 
Reich, it would be more appropriate to construct a monument that would honor all 
these important men.59 Catholics claimed that a joint monument would be more
58 See Freiburger Bote, August 12, 1898. Also, see relevant documentation in St. AF, C3/472/6, 
Errichtung eines Denkmals fur den Ehrenbtirgem Bismarck and C3/472/7. Errichtung einer Saule fur 
den Ehrenbiirgem Bismarck. It should be noted that the original funds set aside for a joint monument 
were never used, instead, another collection was taken up and used for the construction of the Bismarck 
tower.
59 Freiburger Bote, March 24, 1899.
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representative o f the unity o f Germans, and it would serve as a good reminder to the 
younger population o f the great services that these men had rendered the fatherland.
The city council decided to proceed with the construction o f a tower, to 
comply with what the rest o f Germany was doing at that time. Slightly differently 
than in Heidelberg, the city council reached an agreement with the student 
organization at the university. Both sides agreed that the students would receive the 
property on which to build the monument, as well as the financial resources. In return, 
they would be responsible for the construction. Interestingly, the Catholic Church 
actually donated the property, which would have been unthinkable a few years back.60 
Because the student organization had long been preparing for this moment, they had 
already chosen a model constructed by the local artist Oscar Geiges. On July 22, the 
groundbreaking ceremony was held, accompanied by a grand celebration in the main 
Festhalle in the city. Professor Alfred Dove delivered the main speech, entitled 
“Bismarck’s Importance for Old and Young.”61 The speech spanned from the 
beginning o f the nineteenth century up until the foundation of the Empire. Dove 
provided his audience with a brief lecture on the course of German nationalism and 
how important Bismarck had been as the man who realized the German dream of 
national unification. He noted that Germany today would not have been so strong had 
it not been for the man to whom this monument was dedicated and that especially 
today’s generation would be well served in remembering the harsh preunification
60 St. AF, C3/472/7, city council records, June 27, 1899; July 5, 11, 1899.
61 Alfred Dove, Bismarcks Bedeutung fur Alt und Jung (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899).
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times.62 According to newspaper reports, Catholics greatly appreciated this speech, 
which was without political commentary.63 The speech also illustrates how important 
it is for nations to be able to not only collectively remember things but also to 
collectively forget certain aspects of history. We have seen throughout this work how 
extremely volatile the relationship had been between Bismarck and the Catholics in 
Freiburg, yet when faced with the proposition of joining the German Protestants in the 
process o f collective forgetting, they showed no hesitancy of doing so. Freiburger 
Bote even remarked how nice it was to have such a beautiful speech at an event 
designed to honor one of the most important Germans o f the nineteenth century.64 
They also pointed out that no Catholic should be criticized for participating in this 
event, since it was truly a patriotic one.65
The monument was quickly completed and unveiled on July 30, 1900. The 
well-attended ceremony included people from all walks of society, and Mr. Pflieger of 
the student organization officially thanked the church and city for being so generous in 
donating the land for this great monument. The local papers complimented the 
monument, which was described as a fitting tribute to one of the greatest statesmen of 
the nineteenth century.66 During the next few years, the students o f the city, in a
62 Ibid, esp. 6-8.
63 Freiburger Bote, July 25, 1899.
64 Ibid.
65 Freiburger Bote, July 28, 1899.
66 Heidelberger Tagblatt, July 31, 1900; Freiburger Zeitung, July 31, 1900.
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similar fashion to students in Heidelberg, used the monument on April 1 and June 21 
for celebrations o f Bismarck’s birthday and their national holiday. In Freiburg, even 
the Catholic student organization took active part in these celebrations as they 
repeatedly asked the city council for their help in decorating the city hall, providing 
money to buy torches, etc.67
If the construction o f the two monuments in Freiburg and Heidelberg 
proceeded without problems, the one in Konstanz proved more difficult to complete. 
As in the other cities, in 1898, the city council quickly launched an initiative to collect 
money for a monument. On August 19, Mayor Weber appointed a committee to 
spearhead the project.68 After some initial research into what other cities planned to 
do, the members o f the committee decided to publish an appeal to the city’s 
inhabitants to donate money to this project. The appeal stressed the important role that 
Bismarck had played in founding the German Empire and his continued service for the 
German people throughout his political career.69 It is interesting to note that though 
most Badenese cities had employed Catholic papers in this venture, the people in 
Konstanz did not contact Freie Stimme, nor was the appeal published in the Catholic 
paper. The organizing committee was initially relatively successful in collecting 
donations. They received substantial amounts from the local officer corps, some
67 The correspondence between the city council and the various student organizations is documented in 
St. AF, C3/472/7.
68 St. AK, SII 5577, Staatsorganisation. Reichssachen. Errichtung eines Denkmals fur den Fiirsten 
Bismarck, protocol from city council meeting August 19, 1898.
69 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung September 25, 1898.
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business men, and local citizens.70 However, as time passed, the rate o f donations 
slowed. In March 1900, the committee met and noted that to date they had only 
received a little over 5,000 Marks, which would not be enough to construct the kind of 
monument worthy o f a man of Bismarck’s greatness. Still, they continued to discuss 
which shape the monument would take, and they noted that it would be a good idea to 
hire a local artist, which would perhaps encourage Konstanzers to provide more 
donations.71 After deciding that they wanted a life-sized figure o f Bismarck, the 
committee invited several local artists to submit models/plans o f their works.
Despite this initiative, Konstanzers provided little support for this project. In 
January 1902, local businessman Gustaf Prym asked the other members o f the 
committee why they had not met in over nine months. He also noted that people had 
now forgotten about the models that were put together, so that they would have to start 
from the beginning again if  they were to continue this project. In October 1902, the 
committee finally met again but came to no conclusion about how the project should 
proceed.72 Finally, in October 1903, the city council reprimanded the committee for 
its sloppy work, claiming that it was a shame for the city not to have a monument 
when other German cities had been successful in honoring the old Chancellor.73 To 
make matters worse, in 1904, the city council received a letter from the Alldeutscher
70 Documented in St. AK, SII 5577.
71 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, March 31, 1900.
72 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, October 23, 1902.
73 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from city council meeting, October 18, 1903.
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Verband, inquiring about the project. They noted that many cities around Germany, 
several o f them smaller than Konstanz, had been able to construct a monument and 
that it was really a shame that such a historically important city as Konstanz was 
dragging its feet when it came to producing a suitable monument.74 This letter 
displays that the construction of a local monument was a very complicated process 
that did not only reflect local circumstances but national ones as well.
Spumed by this letter, the organizing committee began to contemplate building 
a fountain instead. This form of memorial would be less expensive while still 
honoring Bismarck and integrating Konstanz into the national commemorative canon. 
However, despite several suggestions for potential designs, it did not encourage more 
donations. Around this time, news about the failings of the committee was beginning 
to cause discord in the local population. In the November 18, 1908, issue o f 
Konstanzer Zeitung, an angry reader complained that it was really a shame that the 
city had not been able to do anything yet. The reader argued that though not all o f the 
city’s inhabitants supported Bismarck’s ideas, there should still be enough support 
among locals to produce a monument that would make citizens proud of their city.75 
This letter reflects that this project, despite the official fanfare at the outset, had 
generated very little support from the local population, including national-liberals and 
Protestants. Compared to the heavily debated nature o f Sedan Day, the project failed 
to cause any type o f reaction among the local population, negative or positive. This
74 The letter can be found in St. AK, SII 5577.
75 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 18, 1908.
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indicates that residents lacked a strong desire to commemorate Bismarck and that they 
were tired o f the ongoing commemorations throughout their province. As our 
discussions have revealed, there were numerous projects commemorating many 
different events and people, and citizens in Konstanz seemed unenthusiastic about yet 
another project.
In late 1910, Gustaf Prym donated 1000 Marks to the project and proceeded to 
form his own committee, independent o f the city council. In a meeting with the latter, 
he informed them that he would not stop until the city had its own monument, and it 
would be a tower, similar to many other cities. Prym announced that Prof. Georg 
Wikorp would build the monument on the Raitheberg, just outside the city. Being a 
savvy businessman, he also informed the city council that he would construct a new 
housing development right below the tower, which should make the council more apt 
to support him.76 Following this sales pitch, on February 22, 1911, the city council 
proclaimed that the tower would be constructed.77 In 1911, Prym and his committee 
put out another appeal to locals that stressed that as a celebration o f the forty years of 
peace that Germans had enjoyed as a result o f the actions of Bismarck, they should 
now donate to this monument. This appeal serves as a reminder that supporters of 
various commemorative efforts used current political, cultural, and economic contexts 
to gather support for their projects.
76 St. AK, SII 13008, Gemeindeverwaltung. Gemeindevermogen. Gebaude. Die Errichtung eines 
Bismarck-Turmes auf dem Raitheberg bei Konstanz, protocol from city council meeting, November 4, 
1910. See also Martin Stather, ‘“Uber Alles das Vaterland.’ Wie Konstanz zu seinem Bismarckturm 
kam,” Konstanzer Allmanach 34 (1988): 65-66.
77 St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, February 22, 1911.
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This latest appeal resonated better with the local population, and even the 
Catholic Church, which owned the land where the monument was to be built, decided
78to donate the property to the city. Boosted by this news, Prym went hard to work to 
collect money for the monument. There are several letters in the files from companies 
and businesses that declared that they at first did not want to give any money, but after 
a personal visit from Prym, they decided to do so anyway. This is another indication 
of the difference one person, especially if  s/he is an influential member o f the 
community, can make for a project o f this nature. Thus, it is important to conduct a 
detailed analysis o f these projects, as their origins might not always be as simple as at 
a first glance. Prym was also able to attract almost all o f the famous people in 
Konstanz in this project. The famous aviator Count Zeppelin donated 1,000 marks, 
and when locals witnessed these kinds o f actions, it became much easier for them to 
support this venture. In late 1911, construction began, and after less than a year, the 
monument was finished. Although Prym had originally told the city council that the 
monument would cost about 30,000 Marks, the final tally came to over 36,000. The 
city council decided after much debate to subsidize the difference.79
The monument was unveiled on October 18, 1912, with great fanfare. Most of 
the speeches proclaimed how the magnificent tower represented a symbol o f the 
German unity and strength. The architect Prof. Georg Wikorp gave the plenary 
speech, which was littered with references not only to Bismarck but to German history
78 Stather, ‘“Uber Alles das Vaterland,’” 66.
79 St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, August 26, 1912.
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in general. He noted that next year would be the centenary anniversary o f the Battle o f 
Leipzig, where Germans took their first steps towards a unified nation-state. His 
speech was steeped in references to German mythology, and Bismarck appeared as a 
man of almost god-like proportions who brought unity and happiness to the German 
people. (This was not an uncommon theme, as many speakers throughout Germany
O A
portrayed Bismarck in terms of a deity.) He finished by noting that though Bismarck 
had ensured that Germany had been strong and peaceful for many years, different 
foreign powers now threatened its position. Thus, Germans could not rest on their 
laurels; this was a critical time in European history, and Germans must continue the 
great work that Bismarck had started.81
What is interesting about this the fiery speech at the unveiling is its positive 
reception by Catholics. The Catholic Konstanzer Nachrichten noted that the 
celebration had been one of the best ever in Konstanz. They claimed that it had not 
been characterized by the “Hurra Patriotismus” that the national-liberals and 
Protestants had previously propagated. Instead, this was a celebration o f a true love 
for the fatherland and a measure o f the respect that all Germans had for Bismarck, 
who had done so much for the German people. They also claimed that this monument 
was well worth waiting for since it represented a good indication o f how much locals 
valued what Bismarck had done for the fatherland. These sentiments reflected an 
increased Catholic acceptance o f Bismarck and his legacy, but they also illustrated that
80 Hedinger, “Bismarck-Denkmaler und Bismarck-Verehrung,” 297.
81 The speech can be found in its entirety in St. AK, SII 13008.
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Catholics were being swept up in the new and more aggressive nationalism that was 
spreading in Germany at this time. Germany had recently suffered several foreign 
policy setbacks, and they maintained that it was in the best interest of Germans o f all 
classes and confession to stress their own strength and unity in the face o f harsher 
times.
Catholics were more receptive to the commemorative discourse to a much 
greater extent towards the end o f the nineteenth century than in the immediate post- 
unification years. On the one hand, this was because the commemorative discourse 
had changed. Especially after the conclusion of the Kulturkampf, national-liberals and 
Protestants were no longer inclined to use these occasions to launch anti-Catholic 
tirades. On the other, this new commemorative discourse also suggested an increased 
acceptance of Catholics in the nation-state. Catholic determination to present their 
own version of Germanness had certainly played a role here, but there were also 
additional reasons for the increased acceptance of Catholics as worthy members of 
German society. As Germany entered the twentieth century, colonial ventures and a 
sharp growth in the size and importance o f organizational life became two primary 
staples o f their society. Catholics played important roles in both of these 
developments, which contributed greatly to their integration into German society. 
Hence, to understand better Catholic changes towards the commemorative discourse 
surrounding the foundation o f the German Empire, a brief analysis o f their 
involvement in colonial ventures and associational life is necessary.
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Catholic Involvement in the Colonial Movement
As historian Wilfried Loth has noted, German Catholics and the Center Party 
were initially reluctant to support Bismarck’s imperialistic policies.82 However, as the 
Catholic bourgeoisie grew in strength, both economically and politically, their interest 
in colonization increased. Beginning in the 1890s, Catholics began to view 
colonialism as a religious duty as well as a vehicle to better their status in German 
society. After experiencing a political backlash following its decision to reject the 
1893 bill to strengthen the military, the Center Party embraced colonialism and a 
military build-up. Until the 1907 elections, the Center consistently supported 
increased spending on military and colonial ventures, which established them as a 
more patriotic party. At the same time as the Center became more accepted on the 
national level, the Badenese Center Party established itself as a government-friendly 
party on the local level. Throughout this period, Badenese Center politicians went to 
great lengths to portray themselves as supporters o f the Reich, the Emperor, and 
Baden. Colonialism played an important role in this process as it enabled Catholics to 
support these initiatives for the same reasons that the Emperor stressed: to strengthen 
Germany’s presence in the colonies, make Germany a stronger world power, gain 
important natural resources and markets, and promote the spread o f Christianity. 
Finally, because relative confessional peace characterized this period, Catholics
82 Wilfried Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” in Die Verschrankung von Innen-, Konfessions- und 
Kolonialpolitik im Deutschen Reich vor 1914, ed. Johannes Horstmann (Schwerte: Katholische 
Akademie, 1987), 68.
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enjoyed better relationship with the ruling national-liberals.
From the 1890s, the Center Party occupied a powerful position in German 
politics. Because o f their increased strength, they alone could decide the outcome of 
votes on bills associated with the military and colonialism. Catholics assumed that 
supporting these bills would facilitate integration into the Reich and increase their 
chances o f eliminating some of the remaining anti-Catholic legislation, most notably 
the ban on certain religious orders. Throughout the 1890s, conservatives and national- 
liberals both courted the Center, attempting to strengthen the bond between throne and 
altar. Although they refused to permit the Jesuits back in the country, there was a 
marked decline in anti-Catholic rhetoric.84
The Center Party, both nationally and locally, tried to convince their 
constituency that supporting colonialism would also benefit Catholic missions as 
missionaries attempted to convert souls. To be sure, Catholics acknowledged that 
there were material reasons for supporting colonial ventures; however, they considered 
these secondary to the religious purpose. Catholics also suported colonialism because 
it represented an opportunity for the Catholic bourgeoisie to enhance their societal 
status. By becoming involved in these projects, Catholics were able to present 
themselves as driving forces in Germany’s attempt to enhance its influence around the 
world. Some scholars have argued that the emphasis on the missionary element of 
colonialism only served as a way for elite Catholics to sell these ideas to the Catholic
83 Kremer, ed., Mitt Gott, 54-55.
84 Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” 70-71.
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masses. Although bourgeois Catholics certainly used the missionary aspect to gam 
mass support for these ideas, it was also evident that Badenese Catholics embraced the 
missionary goals wholeheartedly. Throughout the 1890s and the first few years o f the 
1900s, local Catholic newspapers stressed how important it was for Catholics to 
support the colonial movement, as it constituted one of the best ways to spread the 
Catholic faith. At a time when both the Catholic and Protestant churches struggled 
with secularizing trends in society, this became a very important topic for both 
confessions.86 Another important factor here was the fact that the Catholics had fallen 
behind the Protestant missions in trying to establish themselves in the colonies.87 An 
analysis o f the content o f the Catholic press and the Katholikentage during the first 
few years o f the twentieth century demonstrates that the colonial movement and the 
need to close the Protestant gap in the colonies were topics o f great concern to many 
Catholics. The local press often stressed the efforts of local missionaries or orders, 
and citizens throughout Baden were encouraged to support the efforts o f these 
individuals. This approach made it easier for locals to identify with the colonial 
missions and increased their appeal.
The Katholikentage also served as a tool to propagate and popularize the 
missions. During the meeting in Breslau 1909, the Catholic Alois zu Lowenstein held 
a speech in which he outlined the reasons why Catholics should support these
85 Ibid., 74.
86 For illuminating examples o f  this, see Freie Stimme, June 9, 1899; January 22, 1907.
87 Karl J. Rivinius, “Das Interesse der Missionen an den deutschen Kolonien,” in Die Verschrankung 
von Innen-, Konfessions- und Kolonialpolitik, ed. Horstmann, 46-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
391
initiatives. In addition to being a good opportunity for the Catholic faith to grow, 
missionary activities were also part o f the duties that every Catholic should fulfill as 
part of their faith. Catholics needed to support missions with both people and money, 
otherwise “ .. .Buddha, Mohammed, and Confucius would defeat the Catholic 
Church.”88 At the end of the congress, delegates passed a resolution in which they 
proclaimed it a religious and nationalistic duty for Catholics to increase their support 
for the missionaries.
Catholic papers in Baden published long excerpts from Lowenstein’s speech 
and noted that all delegates had supported his ideas. Freie Stimme claimed that it was 
imperative for local Catholics to follow Lowenstein’s advice, and they must not allow 
the Protestants to win the race for the hedonistic souls.89 The missionary movement 
made it possible for Catholics to support something close to their faith while at the 
same time promoting issues that were close to the Emperor’s heart. Catholics could 
now claim that their actions would strengthen the German nation. By supporting 
Wilhelm II’s fervent desire to increase the number o f German colonies, Catholics were 
able to present themselves as patriotic Germans. While there were some 
disagreements within the Catholic camp in regards to colonialism, most Badenese 
Catholics supported these projects. Although Protestant and liberal accusations of 
Catholic anti-German sentiments grew increasingly rare, they still existed, especially 
in conjunction with local and national elections. During these times, Catholics often
88 Quoted in ibid., 49.
89 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1909.
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had to defend themselves against accusations o f un-German behavior, and the colonial 
issue was one o f their most commonly cited defenses. To be sure, the confessional 
rhetoric was weaker than it had been during the first decades o f the Second Empire, 
but remnants o f Kulturkampf arguments occasionally surfaced. Catholic support for 
military build-up and colonial ventures protected them against these Protestants 
accusations.
Coupled with their growing political strength, the Catholics’ support for 
colonialism also increased their presence and confidence around Baden. When faced 
with accusations o f un-Germanness, they could point to several positive remarks 
offered by the Emperor in regards to the work o f Catholic missionaries. Center 
politicians also claimed that they were involved in these ventures for noble reasons, 
not just for material gains. These types o f sentiments became visible in 1905 as the 
leading Center politician Mathias Erzberger uncovered many instances of colonial 
mismanagement and poor treatment o f indigenous populations. An intense debate 
followed, during which Germans were alerted to some o f the more negative aspects of 
colonialism. Although the end result of these debates that continued for two years was 
that overall funding for colonialism was cut, Center politicians were still able to use 
these debates as proof that they were involved in colonialism for noble reasons. In the 
aftermath of the 1907 Hottentot elections, the Center Party refused to allow more 
German troops to be sent to put down the rebellions in the colonies, a decision that 
Protestants criticized as un-German.90 Answering their critics, Catholics maintained
90 Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” 79-80.
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that they had been among the strongest supporters o f imperialist and colonialist 
policies and that they had done more during the last few years than the Protestants to 
help spread the Christian faith.
The Development of Catholic Associational Life
Catholic embrace of imperialism and colonial ventures helped establish them 
as more “trustworthy” Germans in the eyes o f Protestants; however, this was not the 
only way in which Catholics became more integrated into the German nation-state. 
Another means o f Catholic integration was the growing strength o f Catholic 
organizations, and then especially the Volksverein fiir  das katholische Deutschland. 
This organization was founded in 1890, largely due to the influence o f Ludwig 
Windthorst, who viewed it as the most important way to combat the growing threat of 
social democracy. In Baden, this initiative came timely as it coincided with the 
reconstitution of the Badenese Center Party. The latter viewed this new organization 
as a useful tool in unifying and strengthening the state’s Catholics. Catholic clergy 
also supported this new initiative and as early as 1890 Archbishop Roos stressed the 
importance o f this association. From the inception o f the Volksverein, leaders were 
clear that it should serve to educate and teach Catholics how to become more 
successful citizens.91 In addition, as Hans-Jiirgen Kremer has pointed out, the
91 Hans-Jiirgen Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933. Ein 
Beitrag zur Organisations-und Wirkungsgeschichte des politischen und sozialen 
Verbandskatholizismus,” Freiburger Didzesan-Archiv 104 (1984): 211-212; Haider, Katholische 
Vereine, 249-251.
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foundation of this organization should also ensure that the Catholic lower classes did 
not succumb to the social-democratic rhetoric.92 The formation of a local chapter in 
Baden was closely tied to the Center Party as nine of the fifteen members of the board 
were also members o f the Badenese Parliament. The well-known Freiburger Catholic 
Ludwig Marbe was elected the first president.93
Despite the support from the Archbishop and leading politicians, it took a 
while before the Volksverein began to take root in Badenese society. During most of 
the 1890s, leaders in Baden were frustrated at the slow growth o f the organization, and 
they blamed the lack o f success on the reluctance of local clergy to participate. Many 
of the older clergy members who were still active during the 1890s were unwilling to 
commit to this organization, often a result o f the fact that they subscribed to an 
outdated version of a more static society. It was not until the turn o f the century that 
the Volksverein began to make inroads among the Catholic population, and then 
largely due to the fact that many younger clergy members were appointed parish 
priests. Having come of age in the 1890s, they embraced the new mass-based society 
that had developed during the last two decades. Many o f them had become members 
in the Volksverein during their time at seminaries, and it was natural for them to 
continue their efforts as they got out into the parishes. The lack o f much confessional 
strife in the 1890s also negatively affected the movement. Because Badenese 
Catholics witnessed their political party grow in strength, they were less inclined to
92 Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933,” 214.
93 Ibid., 215-216.
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realize the need for these organizations. However, the controversy surrounding the 
proposed re-admittance o f the Jesuits in 1901-1902 as well as an intense advertising 
campaign by the leaders around the turn o f the century contributed to a strong growth 
rate.94 In addition, though the Volksverein did not grow so rapidly, other Catholic 
associations did. The Workers Association especially experienced strong growth in 
the beginning of the 1890s, particularly after Pope Leo XIII gave his blessing to these 
organizations.95
After the turn o f the century, and especially after Josef Schofer took over the 
reins o f the Volksverein in Baden in 1905, it began to grow rapidly and started to play 
a very important role in local societies. The organization only had some 9,000 
members in 1900, but in 1905, the number had almost tripled. By the outbreak of 
World War I, the organization had about 65,000 members, which constituted the third 
highest percentage of Catholic membership among all the German states.96 The 
increased cooperation among various Catholic associations also strengthened the 
Volksverein. In addition, out in the communities, leading Catholics stressed how 
important it was for Catholics to be members of as many of these organizations as 
possible, and if  locals could not afford membership fees, local dignitaries often 
subsidized the costs.
One o f the main reasons why these organizations, and especially the
94 Ibid., 225.
95 Haider, Katholische Vereine, 267.
96 Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933,” 226-227.
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Volksverein, were able to contribute to Catholic integration into Baden and the Second 
Empire was their efforts to eliminate remnants o f the reactionary thinking that had 
characterized many Catholics during the first few decades o f the Kaiserreich. They 
emphasized that Catholics should be active participants in their nation-state, which 
would enable them to shape social and cultural aspects o f society as well as help them 
in the business world. The Volksverein in Baden also stressed that Catholics should 
take advantage of the progress that Germany had made since 1871.
To accomplish these goals, the Volksverein staged numerous events designed 
to educate the Catholic population. Every year after 1892, the association organized 
workshops in all major Badenese cities. Participants listened to speeches on how to 
improve their lives. They also held courses that spanned over several days, such as the 
“social courses” in which workers were taught to avoid the temptations of the social- 
democrats and instead to be active within the Catholic associational life. In addition, 
in major cities, the association would invite famous speakers on a biannual basis.
Last, in the local parishes, clergy members were encouraged to hold monthly meetings 
to discuss these topics. Furthermore, in 1905, the Volksverein founded its own press, 
which contributed to raising its profile. Catholics were now exposed to workshops 
and speeches as well as different pamphlets which they could take home and study on 
their own time. Officials encouraged Catholics to spread these pamphlets and 
booklets among their neighbors so that as many people as possible would receive these 
messages. The Volksverein also published a brochure for their members, which 
appeared every two months. The fact that the organization in Freiburg sold two
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thousand brochures on the topic of social education in 1912 serves as evidence that
07Catholics were ready and willing to take part in this information. This serves as an 
illustrative example o f a formation of an imagined community. By sharing the same 
printed material, Catholics became closer connected to each other, but also better 
integrated into the German nation-state. Through these meetings and pamphlets, 
Catholics in Baden were kept abreast o f developments in their state and in Germany, 
which enabled them to play a more active role in the cultural, social, political, and 
economic affairs o f Baden and Germany.
The close cooperation between the Volksverein and the Badenese Center Party 
also ensured that Catholics became more integrated into Baden. Especially after the 
formation o f the Great Coalition in 1905, there were increased efforts to coordinate the 
work o f the association and the party. Although the organization claimed to be non­
political and only a vehicle for the cultural and social education o f Catholics, it was 
evident that these two entities served each other’s interests very well. Through their 
immediate contact with the Catholic population, they were able to propagate the 
Center Party’s political goals, and they contributed greatly to Catholic identification 
with the Center Party. This work also enabled the Center Party to homogenize their 
party, which was important since their supporters stemmed from many different 
classes and sometimes struggled to find common reference points. In addition, since 
the Volksverein did much o f the political work for the party, it enabled members o f the 
latter to focus on other important work, which constituted a distinct advantage to other 
97 Ibid., 232-235.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
398
political parties. The Volksverein was also very instrumental in aiding the Workers 
Association. There was a great deal of cooperation between the two, both financially 
as well as otherwise. As Kremer has pointed out, there was a close correspondence 
between the topics that the two would discuss. As soon as the Volksverein began to 
stress some kind o f topic, the Catholic Workers Association would take up these
98demands in a more political way very quickly thereafter.
What this meant for the Catholic population is easy to see. Especially during 
the latter part of the 1890s and the first few years o f the 1900s, the importance o f the 
Catholic associations for the continued integration of Catholics into Baden and the 
Reich cannot be overstated. Not only were Catholics able to take better advantage of 
economic opportunities, but they were also able to strengthen their own cause in every 
way to a much greater extent than before. Even for the people who were not members 
o f these organizations, they were still able to get some of the information that was 
distributed. Catholic papers reported at length about the activities of these local 
associations, and topics were repeated throughout the pages o f the Catholic press.
The Construction of Monuments to Honor Wilhelm I
Finally, we will turn to the construction of monument honoring the late 
Emperor Wilhelm I. Throughout the Second Empire, Catholics were supportive o f the 
Emperor and honored his birthday and other important milestones. Thus, the 
construction o f monuments to his honor were not nearly as controversial as some of
98 Ibid., 239-241.
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the other commemorative efforts, but their prominence in Baden and the Empire 
towards the end o f the nineteenth century merits a brief look at the discourse 
surrounding these events. As many scholars have pointed out, the persona of the 
Emperor was perhaps more than anybody else tied to the successful unification of the 
Empire and the rise o f Germany on the international scene." Although Bismarck and 
military leaders such as Moltke were considered instrumental in unifying the nation­
state, Wilhelm I stood above everybody else in this category. The fact that the vast 
majority o f Germans, irrespective o f class, ethnicity, or confession, appreciated his 
personality, especially compared to Wilhelm II, contributed to making him a very 
popular figure to commemorate. Badeners constructed monuments to his honor not 
only after his death but also in conjunction with his centenary birthday in 1897, an 
event that was celebrated with great fanfare throughout the Empire.
Konstanz, though it celebrated the centenary anniversary o f Wilhelm’s birth in 
grand style, did not construct a monument to his honor after his death. Although in 
1879 local artist Emil Einhardt had presented a bust to the city, which was placed in a 
park in the center o f the city, no additional ventures were undertaken.100 As became 
evident during the construction of a Bismarck monument, the city and its locals 
seemed reluctant to participate in the monument hysteria that was characterizing 
Germany at the time, so the lack of monument should not come as a great surprise.
On March 23, 1888, shortly after Wilhelm’s death on March 9, the Freiburg city
99 See for instance Alings, Monument und Nation, 105-107.
100 See St. AK, SII 2955, Gemeinde-Vermogen. Die Colossalbtiste des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I.
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council began collecting money for a monument honoring the man who had done so 
much for the German nation.101 They encountered numerous difficulties from the 
outset o f this project. To be sure, in the immediate aftermath o f Wilhelm’s death, the 
organizing committee received a good number o f sizable donations, but as time 
passed, donations were far and few between. In addition, the committee argued about 
what type of monument they should build. Some claimed that since the money was 
not sufficient for a full-sized statue, they should just construct a bust, while others 
argued that a bust was not worthy enough, especially since just about every city in
1 A A
Germany already had one of these. Furthermore, as the death o f Wilhelm became
more distant, people maintained that it might be a good idea to include other people 
who had been instrumental in unifying Germany as well. Among the names that were 
brought up, Bismarck, Moltke, and Crown Prince Friedrich were among the most 
popular ones. These were not unusual sentiments, as these three figures were all tied 
closely together to the unification of the Reich. Towards the later part of the 
nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for Germans to commemorate several 
different individuals in one and the same monument. Given the number of statues that 
were being constructed all over Germany, this was one o f the ways in which local 
communities cut down on expenses while still ensuring that they participated actively 
in the honoring o f important people and events.
Despite the initial effort o f the members o f the organizing committee, they
101 St. AF, C3/467/1, Staatsachen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I, 
protocol from city council meeting, March 23, 1888.
102 St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from committee meeting, May 4, 1889.
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were not able to collect enough funds to construct what they considered a worthy 
monument. During the last years o f the nineteenth century, there was a new push for 
creation o f a monument, largely sparked by the centenary celebrations o f Wilhelm I’s 
birth in 1897, but once again, despite a promising start, the collection drive was unable 
to sustain enough momentum. From time to time over the next few years, there were 
attempts to revive the project, but to no avail. Throughout the entire process, 
committee members could not reach a decision on what type o f monument to construct 
nor where to place it. As in Konstanz, the success of the projects was not only 
dependent on the willingness o f the people to donate money but also on the abilities of 
the organizing committee to act decisively. No doubt the slow manner in which the 
committee in Freiburg was handling this manner did not make it any more enticing for 
people to contribute money to this project. This also provides evidence that as 
Germany was entering the twentieth century, many Germans had become rather tired 
o f these commemorative efforts. Since the collective memory o f the unification had 
been secured in statues, text books, and various holidays, the perceived need for new 
monuments and ceremonies as means to consolidate the German nation-state was not 
as immediate as it had once been. In late 1913, the committee decided to abandon the 
project and instead use the money on rebuilding and strengthening local society.103
Although citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg failed to produce a monument to 
Emperor Wilhelm, the people o f Heidelberg managed to do so. On March 29, 1888, 
shortly after the death o f the Emperor, the city council voted to construct a monument
103 St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from city council meeting, September 15, 1913.
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to honor the great achievements of the late Wilhelm, especially his actions as leader of 
the great German army that unified Germany in 1871.104 They formed a committee 
and began to debate what type of monument that they should build. After the initial 
collections, in which all types o f associations and organizations participated, including 
the local Catholic student association, they decided on constructing a bust, which at 
the time was all they could afford. On July 1, 1899, the city council published an 
appeal in all major newspapers emphasizing how important it was for the city of 
Heidelberg to construct a monument to Wilhelm’s honor. Not only were many other 
German cities doing the same thing, but they also noted that the city had enjoyed a 
prosperous economic period, so that there should not be a problem to collect enough 
money for a great monument.105 The city council took a very active role in collecting 
money as they helped organize concerts, plays, and other cultural events where the 
proceeds would go to the fund for constructing a monument.106 Over the next few 
years, donations arrived at a steady pace, and the organizing committee actually 
decided that they had more money to spend than what was required for a bust.107 
Throughout this whole process, the organizing committee also took great care to
104 St. AH, UA 73-1, Gemeinde Vermogen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals fur Kaiser Wilhelm I, 
protocol from city council meeting, March 29, 1888. See also Meinhold Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser 
Wilhelm I. auf dem Ludwigsplatz in Heidelberg. Ein Symbol der wilhelminischen Gesellschaft. 
Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universitat Heidelberg. Veroffentlichungen zur Heidelberger Altstadt. 
Heft 11, 1975, 1; Ellen Aamot Pabst, Das Reiterdenkmal fur Wilhelm I. auf dem Uni-Platz von K.A. 
Donndorf (Heidelberg: Unpublished thesis, University of Heidelberg, 1981), 1.
105 See for instance Heidelberger Zeitung, July 1, 1889.
106 See for instance St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, March 22, 1890.
107 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from meeting of the organizing committee, February 19, 1897.
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involve the general public. As the plans changed from a bust to a fountain with a bust, 
they placed the model o f the proposed monument on display in the city, encouraging 
locals to offer their opinions. This shows that this project was much more closely tied 
into the daily lives o f the local population. One of the reasons why the other two 
projects failed was that they remained hidden from public view. The people in 
Freiburg and Konstanz had little or no idea what the organizing committee was doing 
and thus could not offer their opinions, negative or positive, on the proposed models 
or places for the monument.
On April 4, 1898, Heidelberger Zeitung remarked that though it was nice to 
see that the city had collected enough money to have something other than a bust 
constructed, and they noted that the structure certainly was innovative, they disliked 
its aesthetics, which was much too complicated.108 No doubt influenced by local 
popular opinion, the organizing committee invited Professors Janssen and Schill, who 
had designed the structure, to a discussion about how the model could be improved. 
Although the two artists agreed to the changes that the organizing committee 
suggested, the latter finally decided to reject their design at the end of 1900. In their 
justification of their decision, the city council members noted that they did not want to 
proceed with a monument that obviously did not resonate with the local population.109
The committee, bolstered by the fact that people were still donating money to 
the project, now decided to construct a full-sized equestrian monument of Wilhelm,
108 Heidelberger Zeitung, April 13, 1898.
109 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meetings, November 13, 14.
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similar to the famous statue o f the Emperor erected on the Hohensyburg.110 They 
invited Prof. Alfred Donndorf from Karlsruhe, who had constructed a Bismarck bust 
in the city, to come up with a model o f the monument.111 On May 10, 1900, Donndorf 
presented a model to the city council. Originally, the organizing committee wanted to 
place only the top o f the monument on display; however, since they feared that people 
might confuse this monument with the last model, they asked Donndorf to construct
119an entire replica of the proposed monument. The monument was put on display in
city hall on October 16, presenting the public yet another opportunity to offer their 
opinions on the proposed statue. This time, the local reception was much warmer, 
though the organizing committee still had some minor suggestions to offer
113Donndorf. After some negotiations between the committee and the artist, on April 
30, 1901, a contract was signed between the two parties that declared that he would 
build the proposed monument on the Ludwigs Square, and that it would be unveiled 
on October 18, 1901 (Figure 2). Given the short time Donndorf had to complete the 
project, it should come as no surprise that the date for the unveiling was postponed to 
December 5, the birthday o f Grand Duchess Luise o f Baden, Wilhelm’s daughter, a 
fact that was not lost on the organizing committee.114
110 For a detailed discussion o f this monument, see Alings, Monument und Nation, 125-126.
111 Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I, 5.
112 Ibid.
113 Heidelberger Zeitung, October 17, 1900. The proposed changes were discussed during a city 
council meeting on January 7, 1901.
114 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, September 21, 1901.
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Figure 2. Emperor Wilhelm I monument in Heidelberg. (Reprinted from Erich 
Marcks, Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthiillung des Kaiserdenkmals zu Heidelberg am 5 
Dezember 1901. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
406
The unveiling took place in the presence of a number o f famous guests, 
including Grand Duke Friedrich, his wife, their two sons, and a number of important 
Badenese military and political officials. The day began with a reception at the train 
station as the royal family arrived in town. After locals had received an opportunity to 
greet their rulers during a parade through the city, the dignitaries arrived at city hall. 
Interestingly, the first piece o f music that was played was the same piece that had been 
played at the peace celebration in 1871, indicating how closely the persona of 
Wilhelm I was still tied into the unification o f Germany. History professor Erick 
Marcks gave the plenary speech, which was well received by those in attendance.115 
His speech was divided into three parts, the first one outlined why the city of 
Heidelberg had decided to honor Wilhelm with this monument. Marcks pointed to the 
fact that the city had come together admirably in the commemorative project to honor 
the Emperor. He asserted that the monument should be interpreted both as a symbol 
o f all o f the great things that had happened to Germany, but also as a symbol o f the 
admirable characteristics that Wilhelm I had possessed. He also claimed that this 
monument served as a good illustration o f the fact that Wilhelm really was the 
embodiment o f the greatness o f Germany. As had become evident ever since 
Germany was unified, it had acquired a more and more important position in Europe, 
and much of this was of course due to the work of the Emperor. Wilhelm both
115 The speech in reprinted in Erich Marcks, Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthullung des Kaiserdenkmals zu 
Heidelberg am 5 Dezember 1901 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).
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provided a good role model and personified the Empire.116
In the second part of his speech, he outlined Wilhelm’s life. Highlighting 
certain parts of his personal history, Marcks sought to demonstrate that the Emperor 
had possessed admirable characteristics such as courage, honor, dignity, and faith. 
Although surrounded by many strong-minded statesmen, Wilhelm had always been 
able to maintain power with a firm grip, and the Emperor was always the one who 
made the final decision, though he was not above taking sound advice. Naturally, 
Marcks emphasized the fact that Wilhelm I had been one of the first people to 
recognize the German desire for unification, and he was the one who enabled the 
realization o f this dream. Marcks left others such as Bismarck out o f his speech and 
credited Wilhelm with having single-handedly led Germany to unification.117 In the 
third part o f his speech, Marcks noted that the equestrian statue was very fitting as it 
provided locals with a suitable picture o f the grandiose and noble nature o f the late 
Emperor, which also symbolized the German spirit.118
After the speech, people walked over to the Ludwigs Square, where the mayor 
held the unveiling speech. In his remarks, Mayor Wilckens noted that it was 
admirable that the city had decided to construct one o f these monuments as Germany 
was now dominated by a new generation, which had not been fortunate enough to be 
part of the momentous events of 1870-71. Indeed, there was a risk that this new
116 Ibid., 4-7.
117 Ibid., esp. 10-13.
118 Ibid., 31-32.
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generation would forget the great deeds that people such as Bismarck and Wilhelm 
had done for the German people if they were not reminded o f it by statues such as this 
one. He furthermore noted that for the older generation, this was also nice because it 
reminded them that they should be very grateful for these new and better times and 
that the monument should always serve as a reminder o f how Germans had struggled 
for unity for so long. Last, he noted that these types o f monuments should serve as 
glue that ties the German people ever closer together, neatly summarizing what 
contemporaries thought about these monuments.
After the unveiling, there was a banquet, during which even representatives of 
the Catholic Church were among those giving the many speeches. In his short 
remarks, Catholic Professor Hausrath noted that this statue served the city well, and he 
also thanked the mayor for being such a good leader, one who long avoided any strife 
between church and state.119 In the aftermath o f the celebrations, Pfalzer Bote noted 
that they approved of the ceremony and that the monument lacked any offending 
symbolism. As further proof o f how integrated the Catholics had become into the new 
nation-state was the fact that the paper did not offer any type o f criticism o f the 
celebrations. To be sure, the Catholics had always held more positive attitudes 
towards the Emperor than other officials. It is, however, still interesting that just a few 
years after Bismarck’s death, the Catholics now did not attempt to challenge the 
official discourse at all. Indeed, they participated in the cementing o f the national 
identity, though they were still a bit more neutral than the national-liberal papers, in a
119 Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I, 13-15.
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fashion similar to the rest o f the German population.120
Catholic attitudes towards the efforts to honor Wilhelm I illustrate the 
widespread acceptance o f the commemorative discourse surrounding the Emperor. To 
be sure, there had never been a great deal of controversy in regards to the Emperor, 
but the early years o f the Kaiserrerich witnessed some minor disagreements between 
Catholics and Protestants about how to celebrate him. However, as the nineteenth 
century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants were able to find sufficiently large 
commemorative space to remember Wilhelm, further uniting the Germans. Catholic 
acceptance o f and inclusion in the commemorative discourse relating to events and 
persons associated with the unification o f the Reich also indicate that they had become 
accepted as worthy members o f the German nation-state. Although other factors such 
as a growing political strength and a strong presence in the colonial movement aided 
Badenese Catholics as they struggled to become Germans, their refusal to be 
submerged in the Protestant and national-liberal version of nationalism in the end 
helped to facilitate their integration into the German nation-state. Although the 
commemorations o f the foundation o f the Reich and o f such historic figures as 
Bismarck and Wilhelm I remained somewhat controversial in the 1890s and early 
1900s, they were much more coherent than in previous years. Most notably, 
Protestants and national-liberals usually refrained from including any anti-Catholic 
rhetoric in these events. This decision reflects both their loss o f political and 
economic power and their inability to shape the commemorative discourse in a way
120 Pfalzer Bote, December 6, 1901.
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that they desired. Catholic insistence on presenting and promoting their sense of 
Germanness enabled integration into the Empire as Protestants and Catholics were 
forced to reconcile their competing versions o f what it meant to be German. Of 
course, this did not mean that these commemorations were completely harmonious, 
but compared to the first few decades o f the Second Empire, the commemorative 
discourse was more homogeneous, reflecting a greater sense o f unity. Protestants 
were prepared to accept Catholic versions o f patriotism while Catholics were prepared 
to honor figures such as Bismarck, who had been one o f their greatest enemies for 
much of the Kaiserreich. To be sure, there was still confessional conflict as World 
War I erupted, but Catholics and Protestants lived in greater harmony at that time than 
they had for many years.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this work I have attempted to shed light on how Badenese Catholics 
negotiated a complex web of loyalties as they integrated into the Second German 
Empire. Although most Catholics in Baden as elsewhere in the Empire had supported 
a Grossdeutsch solution to the German question, the 1871 unification forced them to 
accept a new nation-state where they constituted a minority. Many previous scholars 
have characterized Catholic integration into the Kaiserreich as a gradual acquiescence 
into a dominant Protestant milieu. However, this investigation o f Catholic attitudes 
towards the commemoration of the wars o f unification has illuminated how Catholics 
maintained and manifested their own version o f Germanness within the larger 
Protestant Germany. Despite opposition from Protestant-dominated national and state 
governments, Badenese Catholics successfully preserved parts o f their pre-1871 
identities. These sentiments, most notably loyalties to Catholics in Austria and the 
Pope in Rome, were incorporated into the new Catholic national identity.
We have been able to reach these conclusions by analyzing how Badenese 
Catholics view ed the official com m em orative discourse surrounding the unification o f  
the Empire. By opposing parts o f the Prussian and Protestant-dominated nationalist 
message that surrounded these commemorations, Catholics constructed an alternative 
discourse that better represented their identities. Thus, throughout the Second Empire,
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two different versions o f German national identity coexisted, if  uneasily. One of the 
central arguments o f this work is that the construction of German national identity in 
the Kaiserreich should be viewed as a continuous debate between the Protestant and 
Catholic versions o f Germanness. These two versions interacted with each other and 
helped shape the new national identity. The regional and religious affiliations of 
Badenese Catholics were not subsumed by a Protestant and Prussian-dominated 
national identity. Instead, competing Catholic and Protestant understandings of 
German national consciousness constituted national identity in Imperial Germany. 
Thus, despite being politically and economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics 
were able to exercise great influence on the construction of identity in the new nation­
state.
In the initial postunification period, liberal and Protestant elites largely 
controlled the commemoration of unification, which served as one o f the most 
important building blocks for the new national identity. Because they controlled most 
o f the economic, political, and cultural capital in Imperial Germany, they were able to 
shape the official discourse to their liking. Already from the outset o f these 
commemorations, it was evident that they would contain an anti-Catholic bias. The 
fact that Protestant Prussia had defeated two Catholic powers, Austria and France, on 
the road to unifying Germany was certainly not lost on Protestants in Baden.
Although Baden had sided with Austria in 1866, Protestants and liberals elected to 
neglect this war in their attempt to create a homogeneous national identity based on 
Protestant values. As Ernst Renan noted over a century ago, collective forgetting is
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part o f what makes up a nation, and Badenese Protestants conveniently forgot their 
own pro-Austrian policies in their attempt to fit into the new national identity. In 
addition, the struggles between church and state in Baden, which witnessed the first 
German Kulturkampf meant that Protestant and liberal elites utilized commemorations 
o f the unification to attack the Catholic Church. Hence, these commemorations 
became vehicles that Protestants and liberals used to consolidate their political, 
economic, and cultural power, which is one o f the reasons why they became so 
contested. These ceremonies were not just a reflection of a community’s desire to 
remember a certain event, but they also constituted means o f acquiring and 
consolidating power in society.
In conjunction with most official acts o f commemorating the unification, 
especially during the first decade of the Empire, Catholics faced various anti-Catholic 
sentiments. Although this discourse initially placed Catholics on the defensive, their 
response was anything but conciliatory. Instead of acquiescing to the pressures from 
the Protestant and liberal elite, Badenese Catholics insisted on maintaining their own 
view o f the German nation, which contained loyalties to both the Pope as well as their 
fellow Catholics in Austria. By opposing much o f the official commemorative 
discourse, Catholics were able to use the celebrations o f German unification to 
manifest their own identities. With the exception o f Sedan Day, previous scholars 
have often ignored the contested nature o f the commemorative discourse, which led to 
an underestimation o f how successful Catholics were at influencing the construction of 
German national identity. For instance, by utilizing the debates surrounding the
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construction of monuments such as the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, Badenese 
Catholics drew attention to the plight o f veterans of the Austro-Prussian War. By 
doing so, they ensured that this war, or perhaps more importantly, Bismarck’s 
behavior in the period leading up to the war, was not forgotten. In a similar fashion, 
Catholic opposition to Sedan Day guaranteed that the often virulent anti-Catholic 
rhetoric that was part o f this celebration never became part o f the new national 
identity. By boycotting official celebrations, by keeping their children home from 
school, by staging counter-celebrations, and by using the press to debate the merits of 
the celebrations, Catholics created an alternative discourse.
Throughout these debates, Catholics had to endure frequent accusations of 
harboring anti-German feelings. Rather than ignoring liberal and Protestant 
allegations that Catholics were Vaterlandslose, Catholics utilized these debates to 
present themselves as better Germans. Contesting the official discourse, Catholics 
insisted that Protestants were lesser Germans who simply used nationalist sentiments 
for other means, such as gaining political or economic power. Hence, Protestants and 
liberals did not understand the true requirements o f patriotism, whereas Catholics 
nurtured purer nationalist feelings. In these debates, Catholics utilized the Protestant 
accusations o f anti-German sentiments to prove that they were more intent on 
preserving the strength o f the German nation. In a sense, Catholics presented 
themselves as being the opposite o f the stereotypical Protestant, who was allegedly 
materialistic, divisive, and shallow. In fact, these debates, which most often took 
place in the press, became one o f the most important means for Catholics to manifest
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their own identity. Especially during the first two decades o f the Kaiserreich,
Catholics were very adept at using the Protestant Other to construct and strengthen 
their own identities.
While Catholic opposition to the official commemorative discourse 
surrounding unification constituted one o f the most important means o f manifesting 
their identities, they also used other ways o f exercising influence on the process of 
nation building. By publicly celebrating events such as papal anniversaries and other 
religious holidays, Catholics not only staked claim to the public sphere but also to part 
o f the new German identity. Catholic loyalties to the Pope and Rome constituted the 
most contentious issues during the initial decades o f the Kaiserreich. Protestants were 
reluctant to accept that Catholics were able to maintain loyalties to both Rome and 
Berlin. To German Protestants, whose church was organized on the state level, there 
was something inherently anti-German about these loyalties. However, what they 
failed to understand was that these two identities were not exclusive, but 
complementary. Badenese Catholics were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the 
German Empire, as was evident in the Franco-Prussian War, while simultaneously 
professing a genuine concern for the well-being o f the Pope. When Badenese 
Catholics gathered in the streets to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pope 
Pius IX’s election as Pope in June 1871, they honored him, but they also engaged in 
an act o f nation building. Especi ally during the first decade o f the Kaiserreich, which 
was characterized by harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric, Catholic displays of their identity 
enabled them to claim an important part o f the public sphere. Considering that the
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construction o f national identity largely took place in the rapidly growing public 
sphere, it became crucial for Catholics to exhibit a strong presence in the public arena.
These debates also illustrate how central confessional affiliations were to the 
construction of national identity. When Catholics and Protestants debated the nature 
o f national identity, they most often did it in confessional terms. The great 
controversy surrounding the question of how to commemorate Bismarck’s eightieth 
birthday serves as a good example o f the fact that confessional sentiments always 
became a part of the discussion. As Catholics and Protestants debated whether to 
honor one o f the founding fathers o f the Empire, they were carrying out a very public 
debate about the composition o f their national identity, and most o f this debate 
centered on religious questions. Although Catholics agreed that Bismarck had 
rendered great services to the fatherland, they still could not ignore the injustices that 
he had done to the Catholic Church. By highlighting how Bismarck, who occupied 
one of the central positions in the Protestant version o f national identity, had abused 
Catholics, the latter presented their own view of their identity and recent German 
history. By using Bismarck and his supporters as Protestant Others, Catholics were 
able to present themselves as better patriots. These very public controversies reinforce 
the notion that the construction o f German identity was not very cohesive, but should 
rather be viewed as a constant source of conflict between different groups in German 
society.
The debates about how to commemorate Bismarck also point to a different 
Catholic interpretation o f nationalism. Supported by the recent historical events,
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Protestants and liberals viewed nationalism and nationalist sentiments as a driving 
force that had unified Germany and would enable the Empire to assume the most 
powerful position in European society. Thus, the Protestant and liberal version of 
nationalism did not only look backwards in history, but forward as well. Catholics on 
the other hand were more hesitant about the absolute value of the nation-state and less 
optimistic about the future. To be sure, these fears stemmed partly from the 
Kulturkampf and their new minority status in the Empire, but they also reflected the 
fact that Catholics based their new national identity on old cultural and religious ties 
that predated the advent o f the nation-state. Although consolidation o f national states 
constituted one o f the key features o f nineteenth-century European society, Badenese 
Catholics still clung to older non-national aspects o f their identity, including loyalties 
to the Pope. It is important to recognize that this did not mean that Catholics were 
disloyal to Wilhelm I and the Empire, it simply meant that they comprised their 
loyalties in a slightly different manner. No matter how fiercely Protestants opposed 
this version o f Germanness, it still became part o f the national fabric.
The different Catholic and Protestant interpretations o f their national identity 
also illustrate the need to reconsider the unifying effects of nationalism. To be sure, as 
the nineteenth century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants grew more integrated 
into an increasingly homogeneous nation-state, but the level o f homogenization must 
not be overestimated. By applying the newly popularized language of nationalism, 
Protestants and Catholics in Baden often used the commemorative discourse 
surrounding unification to preserve and sometimes intensify already existing
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differences. Towards the backdrop of an emerging fixation on the creation o f national 
identity, Catholics and Protestants used the rhetoric surrounding these 
commemorations to solidify their own views of German history and society. As 
scholars have demonstrated over the last decade, confessional antagonisms constituted 
one o f the most important aspects o f Imperial Germany, and it would be incorrect to 
assume that nationalist sentiments simply glossed over these differences. Instead, to a 
large extent, confessional differences came to constitute important parts o f German 
nationalism, which often meant that nationalist sentiments divided as much as they 
unified.
Given the fact that Protestants and liberals controlled much o f the official 
discourse surrounding unification, did this mean that Badenese Catholics were not as 
integrated into the Kaiserreich as Badenese Protestants? During the first few years of 
the Second Empire, and especially during national and local Kulturkampfe, Catholics 
often complained about being labeled second-class citizens. However, Catholic 
refusal to be marginalized, and their determination to display their identity in a public 
manner, enabled them to achieve a degree o f national integration that they would 
otherwise not have been able to reach. Here it is important to note that they were not 
integrated into a Protestant national identity, but into an identity that comprised both 
Catholic and Protestant sentiments. Furthermore, this means that the level o f Catholic 
and Protestant integration into the Second Empire needs to be reconsidered. Neither 
confession was able to incorporate the other into an exclusive version of national 
identity; instead, the two versions coexisted, sometimes uneasily, throughout the
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Second Empire. To some extent, it is misleading to speak about Catholic and 
Protestant integration into the new nation-state. Instead of discussing confessional 
integration into the new national identity, it would be more appropriate to analyze how 
Catholic and Protestant versions o f identity interacted with and shaped each other to 
comprise German national identity
Most scholars now agree that Catholic resistance towards the Kulturkampf and 
its attempt to create a nationally unified culture left them stronger and more unified 
than prior to the conflict between church and state. However, what most scholars have 
failed to recognize is what this meant for the creation of a German national identity. 
Because Catholics were able to maintain and manifest their version o f national identity 
throughout the Kulturkampf years, and because they were strengthened by this 
experience, the Kulturkampf to some extent divided the German nation. Rather than 
eliminating the Catholic version o f Germanness from the national consciousness, the 
Kulturkampf strengthened Catholic determination to prove their worth and value to 
Germany. Hence, the Kulturkampf did not unify Germans but rather offered 
Protestants and Catholics opportunities to manifest their different versions o f national 
identity. Furthermore, this illustrates that the German national identity was not a 
Protestant or Catholic construct, but rather comprised an ongoing debate about what 
constituted “German.” This in itself does not diminish the power o f German 
nationalist feeling, but it forces a reevaluation o f how national identity is composed 
and recognition that competing versions o f Germanness could be part o f the national 
fabric. The internal mechanisms of the construction of national identity were more
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complicated and divisive than scholars have previously recognized. In a similar 
fashion to how Alon Confmo and Celia Applegate have shown how the Heimat 
constituted an important building block for German national consciousness, 
confessional differences also made up different components o f the nationalist 
framework. Just as the local Heimat became a vehicle to understand the national, 
Catholic and Protestant sentiments became vehicles that Badeners used to adapt to the 
new national identity. If Badenese Catholics could infuse the new national identity 
with enough familiar sentiments, the adjustment to a new identity would not be as 
difficult as if  they had to adapt to a completely new construct.
In addition to the increased strength that Badenese Catholics gained from 
surviving the Kulturkampf, their increase in political power, the growing success of 
Catholic associations, and Catholic support for the colonial movement all enabled 
them to exercise more influence on the creation o f national identity. It has been 
evident throughout this work that Badenese Catholics utilized many aspects of a more 
modem society to manifest and strengthen their identity. Although during the past 
decade scholars have begun to revise the traditional view of Catholics as backwards 
and antimodem, there still needs to be more research done in regards to the Catholic 
embrace o f modernity. Especially after 1890, as mass politics and a growing public 
sphere increasingly defined German society, Badenese Catholics proved adept at 
taking advantage o f these new conditions. The growing political power of the 
Badenese Center Party after 1888 enabled their constituents to manifest better their 
view o f German national identity.
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After the first couple of decades o f the Kaiserreich, there were not nearly as 
many heated debates about the commemorations o f the wars o f unification. To some 
extent, this reflected the fact that enough time had passed for Germans to become 
more comfortable in their new nation-state. However, the decreased tension also 
stemmed from the fact that Catholics were in a much stronger political, social, and 
economic position compared to the first decade of the Second Empire. Although still 
politically, socially, and economically disadvantaged compared to Badenese 
Protestants, Catholics were closing the gap, which enabled them to exercise more 
influence on the construction o f national identity. O f course, this did not mean that 
confessional discord was disappearing from Baden and Germany. Indeed, it is one of 
the central tenets o f this research that throughout the Kaiserreich, confessional 
affiliation largely determined how citizens lived their lives. However, during the last 
couple o f decades o f the nineteenth century, Catholics and Protestants were more 
prepared to accept each other’s version of national identity. This also reinforces the 
idea that we have to view nationalism and national identity as a constant negotiation 
between different forces. Although this negotiating process was not as conflict-ridden 
by the early twentieth century, it was still fraught with tension as Catholics and 
Protestants debated the nature and character o f the German nation. At the same time, 
the growing political, social, cultural, and economic power o f Catholics meant that 
Protestants and liberals were not in a position where they could dismiss Catholic 
versions of Germanness. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had reached 
more agreement on what constituted their national identity. Here, it is important to
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note that this did not mean that one confession had been subsumed by the other’s 
version o f Germanness, but rather that they had agreed on the very complex and 
varying nature o f national consciousness.
In this context, we should also note that the different situations that Catholics 
in Konstanz and Freiburg encountered compared to the ones in Heidelberg supports 
these conclusions. During the 1860s and early ‘70s, Catholics in Heidelberg were in a 
situation more similar to what Catholics all around Baden were in the 1890s. They 
were better established; they enjoyed more amicable relationships with the Protestants, 
and political, economic, social, and cultural power was more evenly distributed. This 
meant that the two different versions o f Germanness were able to coexist better. To be 
sure, there were still many conflicts between Protestants and Catholics; however, 
around the fin-de-siecle, they had reached an understanding that they needed to coexist 
in the Empire. This understanding, though it was uneasy at times, still provided for 
relatively peaceful relations between the two confessions.
Germany’s increased involvement in European diplomatic and colonial affairs, 
which precipitated a slow but steady move of nationalism to the right, also meant that 
it was easier for Catholics and Protestants to overlook some o f their internal 
differences. As has been already noted, they were both prepared to die for their 
Emperor, and the fact that the last two decades o f the Empire were focused less on the 
persecution o f internal enemies and more on external ones aided in the elimination of 
some o f the differences. O f course, the fact that the focus was more on external 
enemies than internal also illustrates that the nation-state had grown more stable. By
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the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants were more inclined to agree on the purposes of 
nationalism though they still might disagree on the exact nature o f the German nation­
state. As the international situation grew increasingly tense, both Catholics and 
Protestants subscribed to the notion that nationalism should serve to strengthen the 
German nation. Especially after some o f the foreign policy setbacks during the first 
few years o f the twentieth century, both confessions utilized nationalism to strengthen 
Germany’s position on the European diplomatic and political stage. These sentiments 
were no more evident than in the 1912 Catholic reception of the Bismarck statue in 
Konstanz. Although this was a man whom they had refused to honor before, they now 
appreciated the radical nationalist message that accompanied the unveiling o f the 
statue. In the years immediately prior to World War I, both Catholics and Protestants 
used nationalism to strengthen their own nation in times when the European 
diplomatic climate was becoming increasingly hostile.
Although this work has mainly focused on the centrality o f confessional 
loyalties to the construction of German national identity, the research into the official 
commemorative discourse surrounding unification also provided some clues about 
how Badeners integrated into the Second Empire. Following the theories first 
proposed by Applegate and Confmo, my research supports the notion that though 
Badeners were not opposed to the unification of the Empire, they were still intent on 
preserving their own regional identities as part o f their new national identity. The 
symbolism inherent in the Siegesedenkmal leaves little doubt that Badenese Catholics 
and Protestants were unwilling to give up their pre-1871 identities for a new Prussian-
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dominated construct. The Grand Duchy of Baden had enjoyed a long and illustrious 
history, and it should come as no surprise, especially given Prussia’s reactionary 
reputation, that Badeners were unwilling to be engulfed into the new national identity. 
Intent on preserving as much of their local and regional identity as possible, the 
commemorations o f the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification always 
stressed the centrality o f the Badenese troops to the success o f these events. The 
commemorative discourse almost seemed to indicate that had it not been for the 
Badenese troops and the political efforts o f Grand Duke Friedrich, Germany might not 
have unified. Although this was an invented history, the ideological message enabled 
Badeners to hold on to their regional identities while negotiating the creation o f a 
national identity. Naturally, this meant that they created a slightly different view of 
the German nation than existed in Saxony or Prussia. The federalist structure o f the 
Empire also ensured that it was relatively easy for Badeners to maintain parts o f their 
regional identities as they negotiated the integration into the new nation-state. To 
some extent, the fact that the Empire was so federalized actually enabled Germans to 
create a stronger sense o f national identity as they utilized regional parliaments or 
royal houses as means to manifest their identities as Germans and Badeners at the 
same time. Although the negotiation between the local and national was not carried 
out in the same public and obvious manner as the conflict between the Protestant and 
Catholic versions o f Germanness, the processes were quite similar.
Despite facing opposition and sometimes outright discrimination between 
1871-1914, Catholics in Baden were able to maintain their own sense o f Germanness
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during the Second Empire. Using the commemorations of the wars o f unification, 
Badenese Catholics manifested their own view of German history, the unification 
process, and the nature o f their new nation-state. Despite accusations o f anti- 
Germanness, Badenese Catholics were not lesser Germans, only different from their 
Protestant counterparts. As the Second Empire grew more stable, and as Catholics 
grew more politically, economically, socially, and culturally powerful, Catholics and 
Protestants were able to reach a consensus o f what constituted national identity, 
though this consensus was uneasy at times. This work has demonstrated that 
confessional attitudes constituted a large part o f national identity as well as the fact 
that Catholics were much more successful in maintaining their own version of national 
identity than many previous scholars have argued. By actively interacting, often in a 
hostile manner, with the Protestant versions o f German identity, Catholics were able to 
shape the new national identity to a great extent. Their public manifestations o f their 
version o f Germanness ensured that they were able to negotiate their existence in the 
new nation-state on their own terms, rather than simply being subsumed in a 
Protestant-dominated national identity.
What emerges here is a multifaceted view o f nationalism. It was not simply a 
cohesive force that unified several different groups in society under one ideology. 
Rather, in the initial years o f the Empire, it could sometimes even intensify already- 
existing conflicts as citizens debated these against the backdrop of an obsession on the 
construction o f national identity. However, this does not mean that nationalism was 
an intrinsically divisive force. Ultimately, though they subscribed to different versions
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of what it meant, Badenese Catholics and Protestants agreed that they were all 
Germans. What we should take away here is the fact that nationalism was a force that 
both pushed and pulled and that it contained many inherent conflicts. Instead of being 
forced to accept a national identity characterized by Prussian and Protestant values, 
Badenese Catholics successfully infused German identity with their own 
understanding o f Germanness. Thus, throughout the Second Empire, the construction 
o f national identity constantly changed as the two confessions debated the meaning o f 
identity. However, at the end of the day, citizens in Konstanz, Heidelberg, and 
Freiburg agreed that they were German, though their versions o f that identity might 
have differed. Badenese Catholics’ resistance to the official commemorative 
discourse and their success in manifesting their own identities suggest that national 
identity should be considered a very fluid construct in which groups such as 
Protestants and Catholics offered their interpretation o f what it meant to be German in 
the Second Empire.
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